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Abstract 
While the integral role of paideia in Greek, Roman, and early Christian history has been widely 
recognized, the place of paideia in Jewish thought and the resultant influence on late antique 
Christianity, and thus on Western education as a whole, has been largely neglected. This study 
examines the theories of ideal Jewish education from three contemporaneous, but unique 
Diaspora Jews—Philo of Alexandria, the pseudonymous author of the Wisdom of Solomon, and 
Paul of Tarsus—particularly in light of the role of the Greek Septuagint translations. The purpose 
is not to locate a unified concept of Jewish Hellenistic paideia, but to allow the views of each 
author to stand on their own. The diverse educational theories all developed out of a complex 
amalgam of Jewish and Greco-Roman influences, brought together and reimagined thanks to the 
Septuagint and the consistent use of paideia as a translation for the Hebrew musar. The 
translators of the ancient Hebrew scriptures handed down to future generations a textbook and a 
teacher, a lens through which later Jewish thinkers could merge and morph ancestral traditions 
with contemporary Platonic and Stoic philosophy in the creation of new and innovative paideutic 
concepts. With their textbook in hand, these authors would deploy their ideal notions of paideia 
as a means of contemplating on and shaping the self and Jewish identity. Paideia, then, becomes 
the mechanism by which the most highly valued constituents of Jewish ethics and culture are 
formed and employed. The diverse developments in Jewish education explored reveal the varied 
dynamics both within the Jewish community and between the Jews and the wider cultural world. 
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Paideia became the perfect surrogate, a common, universal good which could touch on every 
facet determinative in the construction of the self. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Paideia has long been marked as a defining concept in the intellectual, cultural, and social 
histories of ancient Greece and Rome. The Greek term, notoriously difficult to translate, can 
refer at once to education, culture, and enculturation through education, and classicists have 
highlighted the centrality of paideia through to the Hellenistic and Roman periods, both as an 
idealized concept and in all the ways it would surface on the ground. Scholars of early 
Christianity too have pointed to the integral role of Greek paideia in the development and history 
of the early Church. In addition, Greek encyclical paideia, which would come to be known as the 
artes liberales, is commonly understood as the basis of modern, Western education, the influence 
of Greek paideia being mediated through late antique and medieval Christianity. However, the 
place of paideia in early Jewish thought and the influence it had on late antique Christianity, and 
thus on Western education as a whole, has been largely neglected. 
 The following study considers three unique views of idealized paideia from 
contemporaneous, Greek-speaking, Diaspora Jews: Philo of Alexandria, the pseudonymous 
author of the Wisdom of Solomon, and Paul of Tarsus. These conceptions of model education for 
the Jewish people all evince a creative amalgam of ancestral tradition and contemporary Greco-
Roman philosophical theory. This conceptual hybridity was facilitated by the revered scriptures 
of the Diaspora communities, the Greek Septuagint, and, in particular, the consistent rendering of 
the Hebrew musar with the Greek paideia throughout the translations. Therefore, this study of 
Jewish paideia appropriately begins with the Septuagint itself, examining in detail the effect the 
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musar to paideia transition had on how these texts came to be read and understood in the 
centuries following the initial translations. 
 The Septuagint was received and utilized as a textbook and a teacher, a singular 
educational resource for the Greek-speaking Jews of the Second Temple period. Perhaps even 
more importantly, the Septuagint would serve as a lens, through which later Jewish thinkers 
could reimagine, merge, and morph both their ancient received traditions and contemporary 
Platonic and Stoic philosophy in the creation of new and innovative paideutic concepts. With 
their textbook in hand, these authors could discuss and debate the proper means of Jewish 
education in major Hellenistic cities and its value and role within the life of the individual and 
the community at large. But, the discussions on paideia we find extend beyond issues of 
pedagogy or curricula, well beyond what one might reasonably expect to surface on the ground. 
The supremely elevated nature of and deference to paideia made it the perfect surrogate which 
could reach any and all facets determinative in the construction of the self. Paideia, then, 
becomes the mechanism by which the most highly valued constituents of Jewish ethics, culture, 
and identity are formed and employed. 
 
1. STATE OF THE QUESTION 
Scholarship on the Second Temple period has progressed considerably in the past century, both 
in terms of method and approach, and yet, despite the far greater historical understanding of the 
era as a result, knowledge of Jewish education during this time has been nominal, and there has 
been a lack of critical research conducted on the topic. Early studies on the subject often 
assumed an educational system based on either ancient Israelite or rabbinic models, a 
problematic basis from which to begin for several reasons, including the fact that many of these 
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studies took place at a time when, one, few scholars distinguished the diversity of the Second 
Temple period from later late antique forms of Judaism, and, two, critical research into early 
Israelite and Judahite education was still in its infancy.  
Compared to the extensive history of research on education in ancient Israel and Judah,1 
scholarship on Second Temple education appears quite meager. Swift highlights this 
embarrassing oversight in the preface to his 1919 monograph, bemoaning the lack of proper 
studies on “Hebrew education,” and the disregard of the Jewish contribution to larger histories of 
                                                 
1 For a review of the pertinent literature, see James L. Crenshaw, “Education in Ancient Israel,” JBL 104 (1985): 
601-15; Graham I. Davies, “Were there schools in ancient Israel,” Wisdom in Ancient Israel (ed. John Day, Robert 
P. Gordon, and H.G.M. Williamson; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 199-211; and James L. 
Crenshaw, Education in Ancient Israel: Across the Deadening Silence (New York: Doubleday, 1998), 4-5 note 6. 
Scholars have long been divided over how much can be said with certainty about ancient Israelite education given 
the paucity of unambiguous evidence. For a positive assessment, see August Klostermann, “Schulwesen im alten 
Israel,” Th. Zahn Festschrift (Leipzig: A. Deichert [Georg Bühme], 1908), 193-232; Lorenz Dürr, Das 
Erziehungswesen (Mitteilungen der Vorasiatesägyptischen Gesellschaft 36/2; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich, 1932); Hans-
Jürgen Hermisson, Studien zur israelitischen Spruchweisheit (WMANT 28; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 
1968); Bernhard Lang, “Schute und Unterricht im Alten Israel,” La Sagesse de l’Ancien Testament (ed. Maurice 
Gilbert; BETL 51; Gembloux: Duculot, 1979), 186-201; André Lemaire, Les écoles et la formation de la Bible dans 
l'ancien Israel (OBO 39; Fribourg: Editions Universitaires; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1981); Emile 
Puech, “Les Écoles dans l’Israel préexilique: données épigraphiques,” in Congress Volume: Jerusalem 1986 (ed. 
John A. Emerton; VTS 40; Leiden: Brill, 1988), 189-203; E. W Heaton, The School Tradition of the Old Testament 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). For a negative assessment, see Fletcher H. Swift, Education in Ancient Israel from 
the Earliest Times to 70 A.D. (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1919); Nathan Morris and Nathan Drazin, 
The Jewish School from the Earliest Times to the Year 500 of the Present Era (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 
1937), expanded in Hebrew to two volumes, History of Jewish Education from the Earliest Times to the Rise of the 
State of Israel (Tel Aviv: 1960), and A History of Jewish Education (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in 
Education, No. 29; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1940); R. Norman Whybray, The Intellectual Tradition in 
the Old Testament (BZAW 135; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974); Friedemann W. Golka, “Die israelitische 
Weisheitschule oder 'Des Kaisers neue Kleider,'” VTS 33 (1983): 257-70; Stuart Weeks, Early Israelite Wisdom 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); David W. Jamieson-Drake, Scribes and Schools in Monarchic-Judah: A Socio-
Archaeological Approach (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991); Nili Shupak, “Learning Methods in Ancient Israel,” VT 
53.3 (2003): 416-426. See also Emile Puech, “Les Écoles dans l’Israel préexilique: données épigraphiques,” 
Congress Volume: Jerusalem 1986 (VTS 40; 1988), 189-203; Nili Shupak, Where Can Wisdom Be Found? (OBO 
130; Freiburg-Göttingen, 1993); I. M. Young, “Israelite Literacy: Interpreting the Evidence, Part I,” VT 48 (1998): 
239-253; Young, “Israelite Literacy: Interpreting the Evidence, Part II,” VT 48 (1998): 402-422; William M. 
Schniedewind, How the Bible Became a Book: The Textualization of Ancient Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 40-45; David M. Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005); and Christopher A. Rollston, Writing and Literacy in the World of Ancient Israel: Epigraphic Evidence from 
the Iron Age (SBL.ABS 11; Atlanta: SBL, 2010). 
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education,2 a dissatisfaction echoed at the start of Drazin’s work from twenty years later.3 
However, these and other studies from this period4 suffer from major methodological problems, 
most seriously the uncritical use of rabbinic literature to describe the educational situation of the 
Jews centuries earlier. Rabbinic sources are cited far more than materials from the period, 
including the texts from the Hebrew Bible and New Testament. These early forays into the 
subject are little to be blamed, as the field at that time did not yet have the benefits that came 
from the Dead Sea Scrolls, greater critical study of the pseudepigrapha, and the generally more 
sophisticated methods developed in the past decades. Nevertheless, the inherent deficiencies in 
these studies make them of little use today. 
 For example, studies from this period routinely assume, based on later rabbinic literature, 
that the Jewish people of the Second Temple period developed a universally mandated education 
for all its people and that this education took place in established schools of different levels, from 
elementary to more advanced. We find claims such as, “The Jewish people almost alone, of all 
the ancient nations, provided for the universal schooling of its children. The earliest historical 
evidence to support this contention as of the first century B.C.E. can be found in the Palestinian 
Talmud (ca. 400 C.E.).”5 Note that this uncritical use of rabbinic materials is not confined to the 
first part of the twentieth century. Safrai’s study from 1976 is based nearly entirely on later 
rabbinic texts, and he takes depictions of pre-70 Jerusalem from the Talmuds almost without 
                                                 
2 Fletcher Harper Swift, Education in Ancient Israel from Earliest Times to 70 A.D. (Chicago: The Open Court 
Publishing Company, 1919). Swift argues that his will be the first broad treatment of the subject in English (v). 
3 Nathan Drazin, History of Jewish Education from 515 B.C.E. to 220 C.E. (During the Periods of the Second 
Commonwealth and the Tannaim) (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Education 29; Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1940), vii, 1-2. 
4 See also Eliezer Ebner, Elementary Education in Ancient Israel during the Tannaitic Period (10-220 CE) (New 
York: Bloch, 1956). 
5 Ernest Simon, “Hebrew Education in Palestine,” The Journal of Educational Sociology 22.3 (Nov. 1948): 190-205 
(190). Cf. Swift, Education in Ancient Israel, 86, who talks of the “universal compulsory education for the sake of 
preserving the nation.” 
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question, as when he uses the view from the Palestinian Talmud that pre-70 Jerusalem had 480 
synagogues, each with its own “house of reading” and “house of learning,” the former for study 
of the written law, the latter for the oral law, as evidence for the ubiquity of Jewish education 
during the period.6 
 As we move into more recent scholarship, we find very few extensive, detailed studies on 
the topic. Instead, we see a number of authors take up the issue very briefly and superficially in 
broader surveys7 as well as several more focused studies. There have been a number of critically 
sophisticated works on, for example, the role of the Greek preliminary studies in the thought of 
Philo of Alexandria in light of related discussions in Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman sources, and 
views on Jewish education as related to Ben Sira or the Dead Sea Scrolls have long been a 
standard aspect of the respective research fields.8 Studies on the texts of the New Testament in 
                                                 
6 Shmuel Safrai, “Education and the Study of the Torah,” in The Jewish People in the First Century (ed. S. Safrai 
and M. Stern; CRINT ½; Assen: Van Gorcum, 1976), 2:945-70 (2:947). See y. Meg. 73d; y. Ketub. 35c. Around the 
same time as Safrai’s study, Hengel, in his brief overview of Jewish education, notes the obvious exaggerated nature 
of the account. See Martin Hengel, Judentum und Hellenismus, Studien zu ihrer Begegnung unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung Palästinas bis zur Mitte des 2 Jh.s v.Chr. (2nd rev. ed.; WUNT 10; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1973), translated by John Bowden as Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in their Encounter in Palestine during the 
Early Hellenistic Period (2 vols.; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1974), 1:82. As to the universality of Jewish 
education and schools during the Second Temple period so prevalent in the earlier sources, Catherine Hezser’s 
monograph, Jewish Literacy in Roman Palestine (TSAJ 81; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), though focused 
primarily on the later period, has proven extremely influential and effective in providing the necessary corrective to 
this widespread view. 
7 Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, 1:65-83; John J. Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox, 1997), 35-39, 148-153; Erich S. Gruen, Diaspora: Jews amidst Greeks and Romans 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 123-124; and Tessa Rajak, Translation and Survival: The Greek 
Bible of the Ancient Jewish Diaspora (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
8 On Philo, see my brief history of research in Chap. 4. On Ben Sira, see in particular, Martin Löhr, Bildung aus dem 
Glauben. Beiträge zum Verständnis der Lehrreden des Buches Jesus Sirach (Dissertation; Bonn 1975); Helge 
Stadelmann, Ben Sira als Schriftgelehrter: Eine Untersuchung zum Berufsbild des vor-Makkabäischen Söfer unter 
Berücksichtigung seines Verhältnisses zu Priester-, Propheten- und Weisheitslehretum (WUNT 2/6; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1981); Oda Wischmeyer, Die Kultur des Buches Jesus Sirach (BZNW 77; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1995); 
Frank Ueberschaer, Weisheit aus der Begegnung: Bildung nach dem Buch Ben Sira (BZAW 379; Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2008); and Ueberschaer’s paper from the Fifth Nangeroni Meeting in Naples, Italy, “Jewish Education in 
Ben Sira.” And on the Dead Sea Scrolls, see, e.g., Carol Newsom, “The Sage in the Literature of Qumran: The 
Functions of the Maśkîl,” in The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East (ed. John G. Gammie and Leo G. Perdue; 
Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 373-382; Steven D. Fraade, “Interpretive Authority in the Studying 
Community at Qumran,” JJS 44 (1993): 46-69; Emanuel Tov, “The Scribes of the Texts Found in the Judean 
Desert,” in The Quest for Context and Meaning: Studies in Biblical Intertextuality in Honor of James A. Sanders 
(ed. C. A. Evans and S. Talmon; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 131-152; Tov, “The Text of the Hebrew/Aramaic and Greek 
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light of Greco-Roman education have also become popular in recent years.9 In addition, we find 
regular discussions of Jewish education in the Hellenistic Diaspora, at least in the narrow sense, 
where it relates to Jewish access to the gymnasium and to citizenship in cities like Alexandria.10 
 David Carr, in his 2005 monograph, has most closely attempted to approach some of the 
larger questions I will pursue here, though the focus of his work is decidedly different. As he 
states from the onset: “I ask: what can we plausibly suppose about how texts—particularly texts 
used over long periods of time—were produced, collected, revised, and used? How might we 
avoid imposing anachronistic models of textual production and reception on ancient texts? The 
alternative picture developed here not only illuminates the formation of the Bible but also 
provides insight into the nature of education in general and the use of writing as a major cultural-
religious medium.”11 Carr’s project is, first and foremost, a sort of book history of the Bible. The 
nature of Jewish education is of secondary concern, though it is often a major focal point 
                                                 
Bible Used in the Ancient Synagogues,” in The Ancient Synagogue from Its Origins until 200 C.E. Papers Presented 
at an International Conference at Lund University, October 14-17, 2001 (ed. Birger Olsson and Magnus Zetterholm; 
Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2003), 237-259; Armin Lange, “In Diskussion mit dem Temple: Zur 
Auseinandersetzung zwischen Kohelet und weisheitlichen Kreisen am Jerusalemer Tempel,” in Qohelet in the 
Context of Wisdom (ed. A. Schoors; Louvain: Peeters, 1998), 113-159; and Bilhah Nitzan, “Education and Wisdom 
in the Dead Sea Scrolls in Light of their Background in Antiquity,” in New Perspectives on Old Texts. Proceedings 
of the Tenth International Symposium of the Orion Center for the Study of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Associated 
Literature, 9-11 January, 2005 (ed. Esther G. Chazon and Betsy Halpern-Amaru; STDS 88; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 
97-116. 
9 See the recent studies of Samuel Byrskog, Jesus the Only Teacher: Didactic Authority and Transmission. in 
Ancient Israel, Ancient Judaism, and the Matthean Community (Coniectanea Biblica: New Testament Series; 
Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1994); Robert S. Dutch, The Education Elite in 1 Corinthians: Education and 
Community Conflict in Graeco-Roman Context (London: T&T Clark, 2005); Adam G. White, Where is the Wise 
Man? Graeco-Roman Education as a Background to the Divisions in 1 Corinthians 1-4 (London: T&T Clark, 
2010); and Matthew Ryan Hauge and Andrew W. Pitts, eds., Ancient Education and Early Christianity (London: 
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016). 
10 Victor Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of 
America, 1959); E. M. Smallwood, The Jews Under Roman Rule: From Pompey to Diocletian (SJLA 20; Leiden: 
Brill, 1976); R. Barraclough, “Philo’s Politics, Roman Rule and Hellenistic Judaism,” ANRW 2.21.1 (1984): 417-
553; A. Kasher, The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt (TSAJ 7, Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1985);  
J. M. Modrzejewski, The Jews of Egypt: From Ramses II to Emperor Hadrian (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication 
Society, 1995); and J. M. G. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE – 
117 CE) (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996). 
11 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 4. 
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throughout the book, yet always approached via his book history and his view of the “Bible” as 
an enculturating, subverting force.  
Carr’s study is impressive in its goals and breadth of material concisely covered—from 
the dawn of writing in ancient Mesopotamia to the end of the Second Temple period in under 
300 pages—and he does a fine job in highlighting the role of ancient Hebrew literature in the 
education of Jews during the Second Temple period, particularly in Palestine. There are, 
however, two serious problems with his approach. First, his focus on the textuality of the “Bible” 
alone leaves a distorted image of the overall education of the Jews, especially in the Diaspora.  In 
his discussion on Philo’s views on education, for instance, Carr draws a picture of Philo entirely 
fixated on “Hebrew” texts over and against Greek ones in the education of the Jews of 
Alexandria. Yet, he does this by completely ignoring Philo’s views on the necessity of 
encyclical—i.e. Greek—paideia and the actual way in which the Jewish law is utilized in 
education and to what ends. He portrays Philo as concerned solely with the Torah as the central 
educational element, but without mentioning that this education could come through Greek 
methods of exegesis—allegory—or that education via the Mosaic law inculcates (the Greek 
concept of) virtue and centers on (Greek) notions of the soul. His focus on biblical textuality 
might excuse these major oversights, but not when he extends this focus to include universal 
statements on Jewish education in general.12 
The other serious point of concern is Carr’s assumed, universally applied postcolonial 
model of the education of marginalized peoples, where native Jewish education—for Carr, the 
Bible—is initially intended and then serves as a subversive counter-curriculum designed to 
                                                 
12 To be fair, Carr does mention the objection that could be raised based on Philo’s views on the encyclia in such 
treatises as De congressu in a footnote, but dismisses it by simply stating that “such texts are not under discussion 
here” (Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 245 note 14). 
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contrast and undermine Hellenistic education. Why he begins and ends from this assumed model 
is unclear and actually unnecessary in his study. And, the vast majority of his own examples 
actually do not support this model and show, instead, much greater “cultural hybridity,” as he 
calls it.13 Only when we arrive at the end of his study and his discussion of the Hasmoneans and 
the Maccabean literature do we actually find direct evidence for his overarching claim. Yet, why 
we must take the view of (some of) the Hasmoneans as normative for the Jews of the Second 
Temple period, whether on notions of education or any other topic? The evidence he finds 
throughout the various sources to support his postcolonial model is, primarily, the centrality of 
the Torah, that a focus on one set of texts equates to a denigration of all other literature and even 
the cultures from which that literature sprang. This assumption is clearly not supported by the 
evidence we have. If Carr had not set out this specious presumption from the beginning and 
instead allowed the diversity of the materials and views to stand on their own, his study would 
have been much more effective.14 
Despite these critiques, Carr should be credited for his attempt to understand more fully 
Second Temple education in a broad, comprehensive manner. No other recent scholar has done 
so. However, though the field of Second Temple Judaism has been slow to fill this major gap in 
our historical understanding of the period, we are now beginning to see a shift and a recognition 
of the importance and necessity of thorough, critical study on the topic of Second Temple Jewish 
                                                 
13 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 238-239. 
14 In a recent study, Royce Victor picks up Carr’s intuitive postcolonial reading, and supplies it with actual models 
from postcolonial theorists and a comparison between Hellenistic Judea and colonial India. Victor should be 
credited with his open, theoretical approach, but, in the end, his study suffers from the same flaws as Carr’s, namely 
taking one example from the period as the exemplar for the entire period. Royce M. Victor, Colonial Education and 
Class Formation in Early Judaism: A Postcolonial Reading (LSTS 72; London: T&T Clark, 2010). I do not dismiss 
the postcolonial model outright, but it should not be used indiscriminately and without testing it in each case. 
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paideia, with a number of doctoral projects devoted to various aspects of the subject15 and two 
recent conferences centered on these very issues.16 
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OUTLINE 
This meager research history is deeply problematic, as the study of education can tell us far more 
about a group of people than issues pertaining solely to their schooling. Concepts or theories of 
education reveal comprehensive value systems which influence and illuminate a shared view of 
the self and the world. By studying education, we study those things most highly prized in a 
community and the way in which that community views itself with respect to the surrounding 
world. Educational theory, in particular, is uniquely illuminative, and though there is a clear 
dichotomy between idealized theory and way in which education actually surfaced on the 
ground, the former can be far more instructive in understanding these larger questions. 
 We find several examples of how views on education can be used as windows into more 
expansive issues of worldview and identity formation in the literature of the Second Temple 
period, particularly in that of the Greek-speaking Diaspora communities, in Hellenistic cities 
where paideia was a topic of continual and central importance. In what follows, I will explore 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., the recently published dissertation of Patrick Pouchelle, Dieu éducateur: Une nouvelle approche d’un 
concept de la théologie biblique entre Bible Hébraïque, Septante et littérature grecque classique (FAT II/77; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015). 
16 At the 2012 and 2013 Society of Biblical Literature annual meetings in Chicago and Baltimore, the Wisdom and 
Apocalypticism in Early Judaism and Early Christianity group offered several sessions on various aspects of early 
Jewish and Christian paideia, the results of which—including two papers of my own—will be published later this 
year as From Musar to Paideia: Education in Early Judaism and Christianity (ed. Matthew Goff, Karina Martin 
Hogan, and Emma Wasserman; Atlanta: SBL, forthcoming). This past summer, together with Gabriele Boccaccini 
and Luca Arcari, I organized and chaired a conference on “Second Temple Jewish Paideia within Its Ancient Near 
Eastern and Hellenistic Backgrounds” at the University of Naples, Federico II, with over thirty international, 
interdisciplinary scholars. We will be publishing the volume of proceedings in late 2016. Additionally, a recent 
research group has been formed within the Courant Research Centre “Education and Religion” at the University of 
Göttingen, led by Tobias Georges and titled “Piety and Paideia. Religious Traditions and Intellectual Culture in the 
World of the Roman Empire.” However, the focus is on the second and third centuries CE, not on the Second 
Temple period. 
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how idealized discussions of proper Jewish paideia reflect not only the actual educational 
systems from which these conversations sprang, but, more importantly, the process of 
contemplating on and shaping the self and Jewish identity within the wider Greco-Roman world. 
I have chosen three authors for this survey who share much in common but also possess 
distinctive views of Jewish ethics, culture, community, and identity, which result in unique 
depictions of ideal education, both in the forms it should take and the benefits it offers. Philo, the 
author of the Wisdom of Solomon, and Paul are all roughly contemporary to one another. The 
first two both lived in the major Jewish community of Alexandria and all three received an elite 
Hellenistic education. And, they all utilized and revered the Greek Septuagint as the sacred, 
received scriptures. Yet, despite these superficial commonalities, these Jewish thinkers develop 
their own unique notions of education, some irreconcilable with the others. Therefore, these three 
authors are an ideal group from which to begin to understand the diversity of educational 
concepts of the time and the ways in which paideia could be deployed as a means of 
contemplating Jewish identity. 
 As the three authors under discussion all utilized the Greek Septuagint translations as the 
basis from which to build their unique concepts of Jewish paideia, I will begin the study from 
Septuagint itself, in particular the decisive, fortuitous translation of the Hebrew musar with 
Greek paideia. Jewish thinkers in the Hellenistic Diaspora would come to conceive of ideal 
educational programs in ways absent from and even irreconcilable with ideas found in the 
ancient Hebrew texts themselves, developing them neither from their ancestral traditions alone 
nor solely from their Greco-Roman cultural milieux. Instead, these authors, writing with unique 
audiences and aims in mind, merged and morphed choice aspects of both in order to create 
theories or at least aspects of educational knowledge production, which could incorporate the 
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best of both Greek and Jewish notions of education, and which were ideally suited to their own 
particular purposes. This amalgamation of two, at times seemingly incompatible, circles of 
thought was made possible by our first known examples of Jewish Hellenistic literature, the 
Greek translations of the Hebrew scriptures. The Septuagint would serve as a textbook and a 
lens, through which later Jewish thinkers would view and reimagine both their ancestral customs 
and contemporary philosophical theories in the creation of innovative notions of Jewish paideia, 
which they would employ in their shaping of concepts of the self and of Jewish collective 
identity in the first-century Diaspora. 
In order to understand and read the Septuagint as Philo or Paul would have read it and the 
impact of the translation of paideia for musar, Part I begins from a detailed examination of the 
respective semantic ranges of the Hebrew and Greek terminology. In Chapter Two, I compare 
the usage of musar / y-s-r with paideia / paideuō, noting the many points of overlap but also the 
significant differences, such as the standard use of the Hebrew terminology to describe a 
pedagogical process based on verbal rebuke and physical punishment, a notion not inherent to 
the Greek terms. The Greek paideia, instead, is often idealized and connected to lofty notions 
such as virtue, citizenship, and the fate of the immortal soul. And paideia, particularly in the 
Hellenistic and Roman periods, came to take on a universalizing function, whereby proper 
education was determinative in one’s membership in a politeia rather than one’s family or even 
ethnos. 
Given the unique semantic ranges of the terms, the choice of paideia as a translation for 
musar had the potential to significantly impact the understanding of the texts as they came to be 
utilized in those very environments which held such lofty, idealized visions of paideia. This 
impact is explored in Chapter Three, where I compare the Septuagint translations with the 
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Hebrew vorlage. The ways in which scholars have read and understood the Septuagint has often 
been based, directly or indirectly, on the perceived origins of the Greek texts and the translators’ 
initial intended purpose for those texts.17 As opposed to basing my understanding of the Greek 
texts on the translators’ purposes, I will focus on the texts themselves and, in the analyses to 
follow, examine the Hebrew and Greek texts individually as if separate, autonomous documents 
in order to best understand how the Greek text would have been read in the Hellenistic settings 
where it came to be studied. The intention of the actual translators is of secondary importance, as 
conclusions related to the motivations of the individual translators are necessarily speculative, 
though researchers interested in this line of inquiry may often find light shed on this topic, so 
popular in Septuagint research, through my reading of the texts. Yet, the primary purpose here 
will be to attempt to read the Greek texts as a Jew in the Hellenistic Diaspora would have read 
them, as a Jew like Philo would have read them, not as “translation texts,” but simply as texts, 
sacred and worthy of study on their own.  
 In the Greek translations, I have identified two very different ways of handling the 
translation from musar to paideia. In the texts of Proverbs and Job, the Greek terminology 
maintains its traditional range of meaning, to the point of distancing the term from notions of 
violent punishment at times inherent in the Hebrew texts. The Greek Pentateuch and prophetic 
                                                 
17 Recent reviews of the material may be found in Gilles Dorival, “La traduction de la Torah en grec,” in La Bible 
des Septante: Le Pentateuque d’Alexandrie: Texte grec et traduction (ouvrage collectif sous la direction de Cécile 
Dogniez et Marguerite Harl; Paris: Cerf, 2001), 31-41; Dorival, “De nouvelles donées sur l’origine de la Septante?” 
Semitica et Classica 2 (2009): 73-79; Dorival, “New light about the origin of the Septuagint,” in Die Septuaginta – 
Texte, Theologien, Einflüsse. 2. Internationale Fachtagung veranstaltet von Septuaginta Deutsch (LXX.D), 
Wuppertal 23. – 27.7.2008 (ed. Wolfgang Kraus, Martin Karrer; WUNT 252; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 36-
47; Jan Joosten, “Reflections on the ‘Interlinear Paradigm’ in Septuagintal Studies,” in Scripture in Transition. 
Essays on Septuagint, Hebrew Bible, and Dead Sea Scrolls in Honour of Raija Sollamo (ed. A. Voitila and J. 
Jokiranta; JSJS 126; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 163-178; and Benjamin G. Wright III, “The Letter of Aristeas and the 
Question of Septuagint Origins Redux,” JAJ 2 (2011): 305-325. Joosten sees four major “paradigms” in the history 
of research: (1) the Letter of Aristeas; (2) official endorsement, but to provide the Jewish community of Egypt with a 
code of law, not to satisfy the curiosity of the Greeks; (3) liturgical, religious, and educational setting; and (4) the 
interlinear paradigm. Wright, instead, offers three major divisions prior to discussing his preference for the 
interlinear paradigm: (1) liturgical origin; (2) legal origin; and (3) Ptolemaic initiative connected to the library. 
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literature, however, follow the Hebrew urtext so closely that the Greek paideia / paideuō must 
take on the disciplinary, punishing aspects of the Hebrew musar / y-s-r, expanding the potential 
semantic range of the Greek terminology. This expanded range of meaning would have a 
definitive impact on the Wisdom of Solomon, which, with firm textual support, would develop a 
theory of paideia based on divine testing and punishing discipline. 
 Beyond this particular case, however, this initial and then consistent move to translate 
musar with paideia would have a profound impact in the centuries to follow, as the Greek-
speaking Jews would be handed a textbook of their own imbued with notions of paideia, just as 
the Greeks and Romans had in their own texts. Had the translators chosen a term with a closer 
range of meaning but less cultural significance—such as noutheteia or elegchos—Jews like Philo 
would not have had the tangible means necessary to reshape and merge their ancestral customs 
with contemporary paideutic theory in the creation of new conceptions of education. 
Once having established a chronologically situated and culturally concordant reading of 
the relevant Septuagint texts, Part II then explores the three unique concepts of paideia, 
highlighting the role of the Septuagint as both the textbook / teacher and the tool which 
facilitated the incorporation of Greek philosophy and educational ideals with Jewish traditions 
and law in the total education of the individual. Chapter Four explores the extensive views on 
paideia found in Philo of Alexandria’s corpus, including the various forms of education and the 
essential value of paideia in the life and development of the individual. In Philo’s overall 
educational theory, we find Greek encyclical paideia—what will come to be known as the artes 
liberals—, the study of native and foreign philosophy, and the use of the laws of Moses as 
trainers or teachers, educating the individual in the unwritten law of the nature and combating the 
irrational passions of the soul, as all crucially vital for each individual. Philo symbolizes paideia 
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in several ways to make explicit its necessity and value, including paideia as the “rod,” not the 
stick the pedagogue uses to beat misbehaving children, but the tool which quells the passions and 
desires of the soul. Philo also discusses the academic family, where orthos logos is the father and 
encyclical paideia is the mother, and the best children obey both parents, the divine education of 
the father and the worldly teachings of the mother, an idea which highlights Philo’s insistence on 
balance between the active and contemplative lives. Philo, throughout his work, is often 
consumed with issues of paideia, the component essential for keeping bodily desire at bay, the 
attainment of virtue and wisdom, and the realization of the immortal life of the soul. 
 In Chapter Five I move on to an Alexandrian text roughly contemporaneous to Philo: the 
Wisdom of Solomon. As with Philo’s writings, we find here a text permeated with the language 
and thought of paideia and a worldview which considered paideia the essential ingredient in 
attaining the true immortal life of the soul in nearness to the divine. However, the means of 
education, the pedagogy, envisioned in the Wisdom of Solomon is, at times, drastically different 
from Philo’s. While the pseudonymous author of the Wisdom of Solomon likely would have 
viewed the propaideumata and the Jewish law as beneficial educational resources, he also 
understood God’s violent testing as necessary paideia and determinative in the fate of the soul, 
divine, pedagogical discipline that could include even corporal death. The world, from the 
author’s perspective, is an agōn, a divine contest set up to determine those worthy of the true life 
of the soul, separated from the somatic prison, an idea made possible by the author’s Platonic 
influences and the extended range of meaning attached to paideia found in the Septuagint 
prophetic literature, particularly Isaiah. This rather harsh view of the world is, nevertheless, 
decidedly inclusive in scope, where this testing is applied to all of humankind universally and 
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where all are encouraged to be educated and gain immortality. Philo would agree with the 
inclusivity, but certainly not with the pedagogy. 
 The final view of Diaspora Jewish education explored is that of Paul in Chapter Six, in 
particular looking at his view of the Jewish law as propaedeutic in his Letter to the Galatians. 
Paul uses a number of metaphors to describe the law in the central argumentative portion of the 
letter, all of which point to the once necessary preliminary function of the law, but a role 
temporary and no longer needed now that Christ has brought the wisdom to which the law was 
preparatory. This preliminary, temporary view of the law culminates in Paul’s allegorical reading 
of the Hagar and Sarah narrative, much like Philo’s allegorical reading where Hagar represents 
the encyclical, preliminary paideia, both necessary for Abraham to attain Sarah—the symbol of 
virtue and wisdom— and dangerous once having moved on to the loftier goal. Paul’s reading, 
however, differs in two significant ways: one, Hagar represents not Greek encyclical paideia, but 
the Jewish law; and two, with the advent of Christ, wisdom is freely given to the community of 
believers. While Philo and other Hellenistic philosophers would argue that the encyclical studies 
must be abandoned after attaining wisdom, Paul argues the same for the Jewish law. 
 In all this, my aim is not to locate a unified theory or depiction of a normative, universal 
Jewish education during the Second Temple period. Instead, in order to comprehend and 
elucidate the complexity of views on Jewish education and identity formation within the 
multiform Jewish communities of the period, the diversity of Jewish paideia, in all its 
articulations, must be allowed to stand, without flattening it into a simplified, yet historically 
untenable concept. This type of teleological conceptualization has been one of the primary 
problems at the heart of scholarship on Jewish education during the period since its inception. 
Most specialists in Second Temple Judaism have long come to realize that the idea of a 
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normative Judaism at this time is a fallacy and that insisting on this notion is counter-productive 
and inimical to a genuine understanding of the period. My research on Jewish paideia begins and 
ends with this plurality firmly entrenched, and by avoiding preconceived, anachronistic models 
of education and by not transposing one theory over the others, we are able to see just how 
powerful the concept of paideia could be as a means of shaping ethics, culture, and identity. 
 
3. IMPLICATIONS 
A critical study of education is necessary in order to understand better not only the social and 
cultural lives of the Jewish people during the Second Temple period but also the complex 
relationships between Jews and non-Jews. Telling of the unique, developing, and at times 
divisive worldviews of the particular Second Temple writers or communities is the means 
proposed for the education of the Jewish people, the pedagogical tools and methods, whether the 
curricula of Greek preliminary education, philosophy, and/or the Jewish laws, customs, and 
traditions properly interpreted. But, the way in which a particular community or author imagined 
the ideal education of the Jews speaks to historical questions far larger than details of curricula or 
pedagogy. It can tell us how the author or community envisioned the Jewish people—or their 
own small part of it—within the world and their role in that world. Are the Jews to be part of the 
world or separate from it? Can they partake in the cultural and intellectual offerings of the time 
while still maintaining their own unique identity? These are the types of questions Christians 
would ask centuries later, and they are questions that still resonate today within many traditional 
religious communities. And they are questions that can be best understood through a 
programmatic study of education.  
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 From the examples here explored, we will find, through the critical analysis of each 
author’s views on paideia, an inclusive approach to education that would have been undermined 
had we begun from an assumed Judaism/Hellenism opposition. Philo of course has a special 
place for the law of Moses within the education of the people, but this neither undermines Greek 
education nor excludes non-Jews from achieving those goals to which the law, as paideia, led. 
Unlike Philo, the author of the Wisdom of Solomon is not overtly concerned with the Jewish law 
and, instead, focuses on the instruction of Wisdom, available to all of humankind, and the divine 
discipline that God uses to test humanity. And with Paul, though we do not know his broader 
views on education, we similarly find that wisdom, to which the Jewish law was preliminary, is 
now available to all who believe, whether Jew or Greek. In the views here examined, we have 
failed to locate Carr’s subversive Jewish curriculum. 
 Beyond the goal of a greater understanding of the Jews of this period, this research will 
also help to situate Jewish education within the overall history of Western education, a place that 
has long been denied it. The standard histories of Western education from the past century have 
either neglected completely the role of the Jewish people or have relegated Jewish education—
actually rabbinic forms of education—to a footnote in the history as a whole. According to most 
historians of education, our modern educational system begins, principally, in Greece. Greek 
education travels via Rome to Christendom, which incorporates it into traditional religious 
education and thereby fills the long gap between antiquity and the Renaissance.18 This secular-
religious synthesis may seem antithetical to modern Western education, but without it, the 
secular side, i.e. the liberal arts, would likely have been undermined and lost in the West. This 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Harry G. Good, A History of Western Education (2nd ed.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), 
58-59. This idea is also latent in the classic study of Henri I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity (trans. 
George Lamb; New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956), 314ff. 
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synthesis took the basis for modern education and carried it nearly 1500 years. And, it is this 
synthesis that historians of education have assigned to the early Church. The fact that we find 
this very fusion in Philo’s overall educational theory, where Greek and Jewish education are both 
essential in the development of the individual, and that it was Philo who influenced those early 
Christians who would incorporate Greek paideia with Christian education is in no way 
acknowledged. This research will help to correct this troubling oversight. 
 In seeking to clarify systematically the nature and diversity of ancient Jewish education, 
this project will help to fill a significant lacuna in the scholarly understanding of the Second 
Temple period. The dearth of critical inquiry on the subject has led to, at best, a professed 
ignorance, and, at worst, a gross misunderstanding of Jewish education based on unfounded, 
anachronistic preconceptions and assumptions. The result is an opaque slice of the cultural 
history of the period and a perpetuation of histories of Western education absent contributions of 
the Jewish people. This research has far-reaching implications in what it illumines not only 
concerning the adoption of Greek and Roman curricula into the wider education of the Jews but 
also how this adoption could co-exist alongside ancestral traditions, native customs, and the 
Mosaic law, all reworked and reinterpreted in light of a real or imagined pedagogic intention. 
And the study of these unique educational theories reveals how ancient Jewish authors could 
utilize paideia as an ideal means of contemplating on larger issues of Jewish communal and 
individual identity. 
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Part I. From Musar to Paideia 
The Septuagint translations of the Hebrew scriptures would prove the perfect lens through which 
later Jewish intellectuals living and working in major Hellenistic cities could interpret their 
ancient, ancestral customs in light of their current surroundings and the Platonic and Stoic 
philosophical milieux so prevalent, and thereby move beyond the largely utilitarian basis of elite 
scribal education found in ancient Israel and Judah to a point where idealized education, 
including now exegesis of the Mosaic law, could be an equalizing force and one determinative in 
the soul’s fate in this world and the next. Within the overall project of the Septuagint 
translations, two primary loci have proven decisive in this shift in idealized education: the 
translation of the Greek paideia for Hebrew musar and the Greek nomos for Hebrew torah. More 
than any other translation choices, whether in individual terminology or wider ideological 
motivations, these two consistent moves by the translators would prove highly influential in the 
direction Jewish education would take in the centuries to follow. While the torah to nomos 
translation has long been a topic of scholarly discussion, the musar to paideia shift has gone 
largely unnoticed. Therefore, the focus in the following two chapters will be on musar and 
paideia, first examining their traditional semantic ranges, then looking at the effect of the 
translation in the Septuagint. 
 For the purposes of this project the intentions of the Septuagint translators are of no 
consequence and have no bearing on our reading of the Greek. For our purposes, these are not 
translation texts. They are simply texts. If we are to understand how a Jew like Philo read the 
Septuagint, we simply cannot begin from any other premise. We know how the Septuagint texts 
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came to be utilized in the Diaspora, and we must, therefore, try to understand them as their 
ancient readers did, and not as we typically use them today, as text-critical tools for attempting to 
better grasp their source materials. Philo did not have both a Greek Pentateuch and a Hebrew 
Torah at his desk, and so we too cannot use the Hebrew to help explicate the Greek. The Greek 
should be allowed to stand on its own, and we must try to make sense of it on its own terms. 
 In looking at this transition and the differences between the Hebrew vorlage and the 
Greek, it is important that we keep in mind the work of James Barr.19 Barr’s sights were set 
squarely on the imprecise and haphazard use of linguistic arguments within biblical theology, 
especially as expressed is texts like Boman’s Die hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit dem 
Griechischen and Kittel’s Theologisches Wörterbuch zum neuen Testament. In particular, Barr 
had issue with the way many scholars used this sort of piecemeal linguistics in order to 
demonstrate a simple correlation between the structure of a language—or language group—and 
the worldview and value system of that language’s culture.20 So, from a sporadic and 
contextually- and historically-isolated treatment of the Hebrew and Greek languages, there 
developed the notion of an inherent, sharp contrast between the Hebrew and Greek mentalities. 
From here it is easy to see how one would naturally argue, then, that a translation from Hebrew 
into Greek reflects not only a shift in language but also a fundamental shift in outlook. Barr’s 
argument is that these types of assumptions are based entirely on an unsystematic, parochial use 
of linguistic evidence. When the languages are examined in their entirety and according to the 
methods of general linguistics, these supposed distinctions are proven fallacious.  
                                                 
19 James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961). See also his 
monograph from the next year, Biblical Words for Time (London: SCM, 1962). 
20 Barr, Semantics, 33 cites Pedersen, “The Semitic languages are as perfect expressions of Semitic thinking as the 
European languages of European thinking,” and Boman, “The unique character (Eigenart) of a people or of a family 
of peoples, a race, finds its expression in its own language.” 
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 Another point of contention, which surfaces primarily in his criticism of the TWNT, is the 
lack of distinction between a term and a concept and the resultant treatment of a term as if a 
concept, applying the full complex of meaning inherent in the concept to every use of the term, 
regardless of context, a move especially problematic when the “Bible” is taken as a unified 
whole. The issue becomes even more complex in the context of translations, as Boyd-Taylor has 
pointed out in his recent study on ἐλπίζω in the Greek Psalter in light of Barr’s approach.21 
According to Boyd-Taylor, when working with the Septuagint, “there is a temptation to assume 
that through the process of Hebrew-Greek translation concepts expressed in the source language 
somehow passed over into lexical meanings within the target language.”22  
 The dangers here are clear, particularly in the realm of biblical theology. However, the 
following is not a theological study, and the examination of musar and paideia avoids the types 
of issues with which Barr had a problem. The readings that follow are, one, fully situated within 
the broader contexts of the passages, two, not based on an assumed inherent difference between 
the Hebrew and Greek mentalities, and three, never applied universally. The diversity of the texts 
and the meanings of the terms are allowed to stand firmly on their own, without falling back on a 
supposed universal concept. Nowhere do I suggest that musar in the Hebrew texts or paideia in 
the Septuagint are technical, global concepts. Instead, I will argue that the translation led to a 
possibility of new meanings, an expanded range of meaning, not “a semantic revolution,” not a 
sort of universal conceptual shift. This expanded range of meaning will prove critical in the 
                                                 
21 Cameron Boyd-Taylor, “The Semantics of Biblical Language Redux,” in “Translation is Required” The 
Septuagint in Retrospect and Prospect (ed. Robert J. V. Hiebert; SBLSCS 56; Atlanta: SBL, 2010), 41-57. 
22 “The Semantics of Biblical Language Redux,” 42-43. Boyd-Taylor argues specifically againt Spicq, who argued 
in his lexical entry for ἐλπίζω: “a veritable semantic revolution is effected by the LXX,” whereby the Greek term 
was forever altered by its association with the Hebrew concept of חתב, in the creation of a “theology of hope,” as 
found, for example, in the Pauline corpus. See Ceslas Spicq, Theological Lexicon of the New Testament (trans. and 
ed. James D. Ernest; 3 vols.; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), 1:485, s.v. ἐλπίζω. 
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development, not of a unified concept of paideia in the Hellenistic Diaspora, but of a multiplicity 
of diverse educational theories. 
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Chapter 2. Musar and Paideia: Semantic Distinctions 
The translations of paideia for musar and nomos for torah were progressive, bold choices, not 
because the Greek and Hebrew terms are in no way related. There is a great deal of overlap in 
their respective ranges of meaning. The differences, however, are significant, and both paideia 
for musar and nomos for torah would not have been the most natural, instinctive translation 
moves. While both refer to some type of instruction or education, musar most often designates 
the pedagogy, the means of instilling said instruction, typically via some sort of reproof, 
reproach, or punishment; paideia, instead, more often denotes the content or the result of the 
educational process, not necessarily dependent on any sort of corrective punishment. In much of 
the ancient Hebrew literature, torah has more in common with the Greek paideia than musar, 
having the common notion of instruction, most often as the content, distinguishing it from—and 
helping us to understand the connection to—musar, as the pedagogy, as the means to instilling 
torah. Nomos, on the other hand, came to be more commonly understood as some sort of 
solidified law code, whether of the state or of the cosmos, that thing which holds a city, society, 
or the universe together and keeps it from falling into chaos. 
Perhaps more important than the actual discrepancies in meaning between the Greek and 
Hebrew terminology, both Greek terms held a vital place in the Hellenistic world of thought. The 
role of paideia in the development of the cultured citizen and, then, that citizen’s adherence to 
the nomoi of the state and of nature would have been topics regularly discussed in philosophical 
circles and even among the common citizenry of cities like Alexandria. Therefore, not only did 
these translation choices introduce new ideas into the texts, at times significantly diverging from 
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the Hebrew Urtext, but they also allowed those later Jewish intellectuals to enter fully into the 
meaningful discussions taking place in the Diaspora as to the role of law, philosophy, and 
education in the life of the citizenry. They would afford these Jewish thinkers a means of 
becoming part of the wider Greco-Roman dialogue and world. 
While scholars have long studied the respective distinctiveness of torah and nomos and 
the shift between the two in the Septuagint, the differences between musar and paideia have 
gone largely without comment. Scholars have failed to realize the importance of the shift from 
Hebrew musar to Greek paideia, not only in Second Temple Judaism, but to the history of 
Western education as a whole. A close examination of the semantic range of meanings of the 
terms in their native settings and then of the sources themselves will reveal a potential impact on 
later Jewish thought equal to or greater than that between torah and nomos. 
 
1. TORAH AND NOMOS 
Only a very brief comment on the semantic differences between torah and nomos is required 
prior to moving on to the analyses of musar and paideia, as the differences and the resultant shift 
in meaning to the Septuagint texts have been discussed extensively. Several early scholars 
argued that the Greek translators had either completely misunderstood the Hebrew or 
purposefully misrepresented the text when they translated torah with nomos.23 Others, instead, 
                                                 
23 See Solomon Schechter, Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909), esp. 
115ff.; C. H. Dodd, The Bible and the Greeks (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1935), 25-34; Samuel Belkin, Philo 
and the Oral Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940); and Samuel Sandmel, The Genius of Paul (New 
York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1958), 46-47. 
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have given a more thorough, nuanced reading of the translations and have pointed out both the 
differences and those places where the Hebrew concept fit well with the Greek.24 
There are, at times, clear points of contact between torah and nomos. In Deuteronomy 
and the Deuteronomistic History, the references to the הרותה ירבד or the הרותה רפס or the  רפס
השׁמ תרות seem often to look very much like a written code or collection of laws, much like a 
nomos. But, the more common understanding of torah in the Hebrew Bible, especially in 
prophetic or wisdom literature, relates to teaching or instruction generally, often coming from the 
deity via prophets or priests, but just as often coming from parents or received tradition.25 In this 
educational understanding, torah differs from the Greek nomos. Nomos has the more general 
sense of custom or tradition, which later could be solidified as law, whether of the state or the 
cosmos.26  
 It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the concept of nomos in the Hellenistic 
world. Two aspects in particular would suit well those Jewish writers influenced by Greek 
philosophy. First, the idea that law was of divine origin obviously fit well with the divinely given 
Mosaic law. For Aristotle, allowing nomos to rule was the equivalent of allowing God and nous 
to rule. Nomos, according to Aristotle, was nous without desire (διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ 
νόμος ἐστίν), and it was nomos which educated (παιδεύσας) the leaders (Pol. 3.1287a). Plato too 
                                                 
24 See James Sanders, The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible: Supplementary Volume (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1976), 909ff.; Alan F. Segal, “Torah and nomos in recent scholarly discussion,” Studies in Religion/Sciences 
Religieuses 1984 13/1 (1984): 19-27; and Stephen Westerholm, “Torah, nomos, and law: A question of 'meaning'” 
Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 15/3 (1986): 327-336. See also Gunnar Östborn, Tora in the Old Testament: 
A Semantic Study (Lund: Hakan Ohlssons,1945). 
25 E.g., “Hear, my child, your father's instruction, and do not reject your mother's teaching /־לאו ךיבא רסומ ינב עמשׁ
 ךמא תרות שׁטת” (Prov. 1:8); “Receive instruction from his mouth, and lay up his words in your heart / הרות ויפמ אנ־חק
 ךבבלב וירמא םישׂו” (Job 22:22); or “For they are a rebellious people, faithless children, children who will not hear the 
instruction of the Lord (הוהי תרות)” (Isa. 30:9). 
26 The literature on the concept in the Greek world is extensive. See H. Kleinknecht’s entry in the TDNT (4:1022-
1035) for much of the early bibliography. 
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believed in this connection to God and to the divine nous, and his ideal law code was an image of 
the divine form.27  
 These types of ideas coincided with concepts such as ideal, universal, or cosmic laws. 
Already in Heraclitus we find a kernel of the concept: “Those who speak with sense must rely on 
what is common to all, as a city must rely on its law, and with much great reliance: for all the 
laws of men are nourished by one law, the divine law; for it has as much power as it wishes and 
is sufficient for all and is still left over” (DK 114; trans. Kirk). While it is true that Philo is the 
first author we have in Greek to use the phrase nomos phuseos consistently,28 the idea of an 
intrinsic, unwritten order that supersedes all individual, written law codes finds probably its 
greatest expression in Stoic thought, from Zeno and Chryssipus on, whether they called it nomos 
phuseos, orthos logos, or something else.29 While the claim for the divine origin of Mosaic law 
would not have occasioned any serious objections from the Jews’ Greek and Roman neighbors, 
the insistence that this written law could in fact faithfully render the law of nature would have 
been a much tougher sell, but the connection would be possible through the use of nomos to 
translate torah consistently in the Septuagint. 
 
2. MUSAR / Y-S-R 
The most natural, common context for the Hebrew musar is within the sphere of instructional or 
pedagogical discipline. Its verbal root, y-s-r (רסי) means to “discipline,” “instruct,” “chasten,” or 
“admonish,” often with a view towards correcting the recipient’s wayward behavior, constructive 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Laws 701b-c; 890d; and 892aff. 
28 See discussion in Chapter 4. 
29 See Diog. Laert. VII, 87-88. 
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not destructive punishment.30 This corrective discipline is commonly given from a parent to 
child: 
 
Prov. 19:18 
 ךֶָשְׁפַנ אָש ִּת־לַא וֹתי ִּמֲה־לֶאְו הָוְק ִּת שֵּׁי־י ִּכ ךְָנ ִּב ר ֵּסַי 
 Discipline your son, for there is hope,  
and do not set your heart on killing him. 
 
Prov. 29:17 
 ךֶָשְׁפַנְל םי ִּנַדֲעַמ ן ֵּת ִּיְו ךֶָחי ִּני ִּו ךְָנ ִּב ר ֵּסַי 
 Discipline your son, and he will comfort you,  
and he will bring delight to your soul. 
 
As a father disciplines his son, so Yahweh disciplines his people and all humankind: 
 
Ps. 94:10,12 
׃תַעָד םָדָא ד ֵּמַלְמַה ַחי ִּכוֹי ֹאלֲה ם ִּיוֹגּ ר ֵּסֹיֲה 
׃וּנֶדְמַלְת ךְָתָרוֹת ִּמוּ הָּי וּנֶרְסַיְת־רֶשֲׁא רֶבֶגַּה י ֵּרְשַׁא 
He who disciplines the nations and teaches humanity knowledge, does he not rebuke? 
Happy is the man whom you discipline, O Lord, and whom you teach from your torah. 
                                                 
30 R. D. Branson, “yāsar, mûsār” TDOT (ed. G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren; Vol. VI; Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 127-134 (129). Branson points out that the association between y-s-r and y-k-ḥ (חכי), 
“rebuke,” can put y-s-r in the realm of destructive chastening, it is also often limited by mišpāt and, therefore, a 
controlled punishment, with an eye towards justice. See also R. B. Zuck, “Hebrew Words for ‘Teach,’” BS 121 
(1964): 228-335 (231). 
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For the children who do not learn from their parents’ corrective discipline, or the people who 
disregard Yahweh’s instructive chastening, worse punishments are in store, including public 
humiliation, exile, incestuous cannibalism, and death: 
 
Deut. 21:18-21 
  ֵּלֲא עַמְשׁ ִּי ֹאלְו וֹתֹא וּרְסיְו וֹמ ִּא לוֹקְבוּ וי ִּבָא לוֹקְב ַע ֵּמֹשׁ וּנֶני ֵּא הֶרוֹמוּ ר ֵּרוֹס ן ֵּב שׁי ִּאְל הֶיְה ִּי־י ִּכ׃םֶהי  
 לֶאְו וֹרי ִּע י ֵּנְק ִּז־לֶא וֹתֹא וּאי ִּצוֹהְו וֹמ ִּאְו וי ִּבָא וֹב וּשְׂפָתְו׃וֹמֹקְמ רַעַשׁ־  
 ׃א ֵּבֹסְו ל ֵּלוֹז וּנ ֵּלֹקְב ַע ֵּמֹשׁ וּנֶני ֵּא הֶרֹמוּ ר ֵּרוֹס הֶז וּנֵּנְב וֹרי ִּע י ֵּנְק ִּז־לֶא וּרְמָאְו 
 ׃וּאָר ִּיְו וּעְמְשׁ ִּי ל ֵּאָרְשׂ ִּי־לָכְו ךֶָבְר ִּק ִּמ עָרָה ָתְרַע ִּבוּ ת ֵּמָו םי ִּנָבֲאָב וֹרי ִּע י ֵּשְׁנַא־לָכ וּהֻמָגְרוּ 
If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son who will not obey the voice of his father or his 
mother, and, when they discipline him, he will not listen to them, then his father and his 
mother shall take hold of him and bring him out to the elders of his city and to the gate of 
his place. And, they shall say to the elders of his city, “This son of ours is stubborn and 
rebellious. He will not obey our voice. He is a glutton and a drunk.” Then all of the men 
of his city shall stone him to death. And so you shall purge the evil from your midst, and 
all Israel shall hear of it and be afraid. 
 
Lev. 26:18 
 םֶכי ֵּתֹאטַח־לַע עַבֶשׁ םֶכְתֶא הָרְסַיְל י ִּתְפַסָיְו י ִּל וּעְמְשׁ ִּת ֹאל הֶל ֵּא־דַע־ם ִּאְו 
 And if in spite of this you will not obey me, I will continue to punish you sevenfold for  
your sins. 
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Yahweh’s “education” of the people here in the Holiness Code involves terror, consumption, and 
fear (26:16), wild animals which will kill their children and livestock (26:22), and, finally, a 
hunger so great they must eat their own children (26:29). While the correction often goes 
unheeded and appears futile in these cases, there is often an intended, underlying lesson. Here, 
Yahweh is attempting to correct the people’s behavior, force them to learn from this instruction, 
and, therefore, stop them from breaking the covenant and, instead, return to obeying the 
commandments previously set forth. 
In some cases, the verb seems to have lost entirely the instructional or remedial context 
and refers only to the punishment, without the possibility or goal of correcting the recipient’s 
behavior: 
 
1 Kgs. 12:11 / 2 Chr. 10:11 
  ֶא ר ֵּסַיֲא י ִּנֲאַו םי ִּטוֹשַּׁב םֶכְתֶא רַס ִּי י ִּבָא םֶכְלֻע־לַע ףי ִּסוֹא י ִּנֲאַו ד ֵּבָכ לֹע םֶכי ֵּלֲע סי ִּמְעֶה י ִּבָא הָתַעְוםי ִּבַרְקַעָב םֶכְת  
 Now, whereas my father laid upon you a heavy yoke, I will add to your yoke. My father  
disciplined you with whips, but I will discipline you with scorpions.31 
  
The noun form largely falls in line with its verbal root’s range of meaning. Musar, most 
often, is connected to the process through which instruction is given, but it can refer to the 
educational content or to a body of knowledge which is to be received: 
 
                                                 
31 Cf. Deut. 22:18; 1 Kgs. 12:14 / 2 Chr. 10:14; Hos. 7:12; 10:10. Because of this complete lack of intended 
correction or remediation, I must disagree with Lane’s assertion that y-s-r always presupposes an educational 
purpose. See W. E. Lane, “Discipline,” in ISBE (1979): 1:948-950. According to Branson, “The use of yāsar in the 
sense of ‘punish,’ with no suggestion of remediation, could derive from the concept of corporal punishment of 
students (cf. mûsār below). In this case it refers more to the act of discipline than to its result, namely instruction. 
The next step was the loss of any pedagogical connotations” (TDOT 6:130). 
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Prov. 4:1-2 
 ׃הָני ִּב תַעַדָל וּבי ִּשְׁקַהְו בָא רַסוּמ םי ִּנָב וּעְמ ִּשׁ 
 י ִּתָרוֹת םֶכָל י ִּתַתָנ בוֹט חַקֶל י ִּכ ׃וּבֹזֲעַת־לַא  
Listen, children, to a father’s musar,  
and pay attention that you may gain understanding;  
for I give you good teaching;  
do not abandon my torah.32 
 
However, even when musar seemingly refers directly to the educational content,33 the process of 
acquiring that content is always lurking in the background, as this instruction is experiential, 
based either on the combined, empirical knowledge of one’s ancestors or on the lessons learned 
through corrective punishment.34 As Fox has it, “The core notion conveyed by musar is the 
teaching of the avoidance of faults. In line with its root-meaning, y-s-r ‘punish,’ ‘inflict,’ musar 
is originally, and usually, a lesson intended to correct a moral fault.”35 The close connection 
between musar and tochaḥath, verbal or physical reprimand, is telling in the understanding of 
musar as corrective discipline.36 In the book of Proverbs, musar and tochaḥath are closely 
related, often put in parallel to one another or placed in a genitive relationship (3:11, 5:12, 6:23, 
10:17, 12:1, 13:18, 15:5, 15:10, 15:32, 22:15), making the two terms inextricably linked, the 
former dependent on the latter. For example: 
                                                 
32 Cf. Prov. 1:8. 
33 Several scholars have pointed out this dual meaning of the term, as both process and content. See Richard J. 
Clifford, Proverbs (OTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999), 35 and Branson, “yāsar, mûsār” TDOT 
6:131-132. 
34 This latter sense led Waltke to define musar as a “chastening lesson.” See Bruce K. Waltke, The Book of 
Proverbs: Chapters 1-15 (NICOT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 175. 
35 Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 1-9 (AB 18a; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 34. 
36 See the excursus in the following chapter on the comparison between the Hebrew tochaḥath and the Greek 
elegchos. 
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Prov. 6:23 
 רָסוּמ תוֹחְכוֹת םי ִּיַח ךְֶרֶדְו רוֹא הָרוֹתְו הָוְצ ִּמ רֵּנ י ִּכ 
For the commandment is a lamp and the torah a light,  
and reproofs of musar are the way of life. 
 
Prov. 12:1 
 רַעָב תַחַכוֹת אֵּנֹשְׂו תַעָד ב ֵּהֹא רָסוּמ ב ֵּהֹא 
 Whoever loves musar loves knowledge,  
but the one who hates rebuke is stupid. 
 
The education of children apparently required more than verbal reprimands. Physical punishment 
was seen as necessary to a child’s upbringing, and, therefore, another tool often essential to 
musar was the rod.37 
 
Prov. 22:15 
  ֵּשׁ רַעָנ־בֶלְב הָרוּשְׁק תֶלֶוּ ִּאוּנֶמ ִּמ הָנֶקי ִּחְרַי רָסוּמ טֶב  
 Foolishness is bound up in the heart of a child, 
 but the rod of musar drives it far from him. 
 
Prov. 23:13-14 
                                                 
37 It is this connection to the rod that led Nili Shupak to argue that musar and y-s-r have the double meaning of 
“instruct-reprove” and “chastise-beat.” See N. Shupak, “Egyptian Terms and Features in Biblical Hebrew,” Tar 54/4 
(1985): 475-483. 
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 ׃תוּמָי ֹאל טֶב ֵּשַּׁב וּנֶכַת־י ִּכ רָסוּמ רַעַנ ִּמ עַנְמ ִּת־לַא 
 וֹשְׁפַנְו וּנֶכַת טֶב ֵּשַּׁב הָתַא ׃לי ִּצַת לוֹאְשּׁ ִּמ  
 Do not withhold musar from your child, 
 if you beat him with a rod, he will not die. 
 If you beat him with a rod, 
 you will deliver his soul from Sheol. 
 
Yahweh’s education of his people or of humankind in general also necessarily includes strict 
discipline, though Yahweh’s version of the rod is often a bit more severe, including corrective 
punishments such as illness, violent physical punishment, exile, and even death. 
 
Job 5:17 
  רַסוּמוּ ַהּוֹלֱא וּנֶח ִּכוֹי שׁוֹנֱא י ֵּרְשַׁא הֵּנ ִּהסָאְמ ִּת־לַא יַדַשׁ  
How happy is the one whom God reproves;  
therefore do not despise the musar of the Almighty. 
 
Jer. 30:14 
 וּשֹׁרְד ִּי ֹאל ךְָתוֹא ךְוּח ֵּכְשׁ ךְ ִּיַבֲהַאְמ־לָכ 
י ִּרָזְכַא רַסוּמ ךְי ִּתי ִּכ ִּה בֵּיוֹא תַכַמ י ִּכ 
 ֹ טַח וּמְצָע ךְֵּנוֲֹע בֹר לַעךְ ִּיָתא  
 All of your lovers have forgotten you; they do not seek you out; 
 for I have struck you with the blow of an enemy, the musar of a cruel foe, 
 because your iniquity is great, and your sins are numerous. 
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Isa. 26:16 
  ךָוּדָקְפ רַצַב הָוהְיוֹמָל ךְָרָסוּמ שַׁחַל ןוּקָצ  
O Lord, in distress they sought you, they poured out a prayer when your musar was on  
them. 
 
Isa. 53:5 
 וּני ֵּתֹנוֲֹע ֵּמ אָכֻדְמ וּנ ֵּעָשְׁפ ִּמ לָלֹחְמ אוּהְו 
 וּנָל־אָפְר ִּנ וֹתָרֻבֲחַבוּ ויָלָע וּנ ֵּמוֹלְשׁ רַסוּמ  
 But he was wounded for our transgressions, crushed for our iniquities; 
 upon him was the musar that made us whole, and by his bruises we are healed. 
 
In Job 5:17, Eliphaz is arguing with Job, that Job must welcome the afflictions and illness that 
God has brought upon him, as God does not allow suffering for no reason. In the end, so says 
Eliphaz, Job will be healed and he will have learned from this instructional punishment. 
Jeremiah 30:14 describes Yahweh’s discipline of his people as “an enemy’s wound,” and it is 
difficult to determine here whether this musar refers to corrective punishment or simply 
destructive punishment in response to the people’s sins. Though Branson argues that this is one 
of two examples in the texts of the Hebrew Bible where musar refers to Yahweh’s punishment of 
the people without any clear redemptive purpose (the other being Hos. 5:2),38 there is an eventual 
end to this punishment and a restoration of the people is assured. Therefore, there is likely some 
instructional notion lurking behind the usage of musar even here. 
                                                 
38 TDOT 6:133. 
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 The musar in both passages from Isaiah refers to a multiplicity of unpleasantness. While 
there has been extensive discussion over the actual time of composition and historical 
background of the so-called “Isaiah-Apocalypse” (Isa. 24-27), whether exilic, early Hellenistic, 
or Maccabean,39 in 26:16, Yahweh’s musar of the people includes the destruction of Jerusalem, 
the exile, and all of the horrors that go along with it. Despite the severity, this punishment is, 
again, meant to be instructive and redemptive: “Therefore, through this the guilt of Jacob will be 
expiated” (Isa. 27:9a).  
We find a different sort of redemptive musar in Deutero-Isaiah’s fourth servant song 
(Isa. 52:13-53:12). Here, the redemption of the people comes through another’s musar, 
Yahweh’s punishment of the innocent, righteous servant. The servant bears the full brunt of the 
suffering on account of the people’s collective guilt: born ill and disfigured (52:14; 53:2), 
despised and rejected (53:3), the servant dies an ignominious, painful death (53:9-10, 12). As 
with the previous passage from Isaiah, it is not readily clear how this, seemingly senseless, 
prolonged torture of an innocent can be termed musar and what is the pedagogical angle. It is 
certainly redemptive, if not for the servant, at least for the people around him. Sanders could be 
correct in his understanding of the usage of musar here as having a double purpose and intent: 
“(1) it expresses purposeful suffering as we have seen in earlier prophets and is clear here from 
the context; but (2) it is a suffering which is observed by kings, though experienced by the 
servant, that the kings ‘understand’ and learn therefore,”40 drawing on the idea in 52:15: “So he 
will startle many nations; kings will shut their mouths because of him; for that which had not 
been told to them, they will see, and that which they had not heard, they will understand.” 
                                                 
39 See the review of the pertinent literature in Benedikt Otzen, “Traditions and Structures of Isaiah XXIV-XXVII,” 
VT 24.2 (Apr. 1974): 196-206. 
40 Jim Alvin Sanders, Suffering as Divine Discipline in the Old Testament and Post-Biblical Judaism (Colgate 
Rochester Divinity School bulletin XXVIII; Rochester: Colgate Rochester Divinity School, 1955), 15. 
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One must welcome or “take” (l-q-ḥ) musar gladly, whether from one’s parent or from 
Yahweh, or more severe punishment is in order, moving beyond corrective to destructive 
discipline. God’s discipline of Israel is meant to correct its past sinful behavior and bring it back 
into the covenantal relationship. A continual theme through the book of Jeremiah is the people’s 
continual rejection of God’s musar, as punishment for past sins and discipline to curtail future 
sins. The end result of the continual dismissal of their instruction is the Babylonian exile. 
 
Jer. 2:30 
תי ִּחְשַׁמ הֵּיְרַאְכ םֶכי ֵּאי ִּבְנ םֶכְבְרַח הָלְכָא וּחָקָל ֹאל רָסוּמ םֶכיֵּנְב־תֶא י ִּתי ֵּכ ִּה אְוָשַּׁל 
In vain I have struck down your children; they accepted no musar. Your own sword  
devoured your prophets like a ravening lion. 
 
Jer. 5:3 
הָנוּמֱאֶל אוֹלֲה ךָיֶני ֵּע הָוֹהְי 
 רָסוּמ תַחַק וּנֲא ֵּמ םָתי ִּל ִּכ וּלָח־ֹאלְו םָתֹא הָתי ִּכ ִּה  
 בוּשָׁל וּנֲא ֵּמ עַלֶס ִּמ םֶהיֵּנְפ וּקְז ִּח  
O Lord, do your eyes not look for truth?  
You have struck them, but they felt no anguish; you have consumed them, but they  
refused to accept musar.  
They have made their faces harder than rock; they have refused to turn back.41 
 
Ultimately, rejection of instruction leads to death: 
                                                 
41 Cf. Jer. 7:28; 10:24; 30:14; 31:18; 32:33; and 35:13. 
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Prov. 5:23 
 הֶגְּשׁ ִּי וֹתְלַוּ ִּא בֹרְבוּ רָסוּמ ןי ֵּאְב תוּמָי אוּה 
 He will die for lack of musar, 
 and in the greatness of his folly, he will go astray.42 
 
While there are a few examples in the texts of the Hebrew Bible where musar and y-s-r 
do not have any clear pedagogical purpose, the most typical understanding of the terminology is 
discipline, instruction, or punishment designed to teach and to correct behavior. This pedagogy is 
largely experiential and is tied to some form of reproof, whether verbal chastisement or physical 
violence, which the recipient must eagerly accept from the parent or the deity. Education is 
achieved through the acknowledgment of past mistakes, repentance, and a commitment not to 
continue in one’s past sinful ways. 
 
3. PAIDEIA / PAIDEUŌ 
Scholars have long pointed out both the pivotal importance of paideia in ancient Greek, 
Hellenistic, and Roman societies and the notorious difficulty in defining the term and translating 
it into English (or German, French, etc.), and, though we have seen a flourishing of capable 
studies on the Greek and Roman educational processes and institutions in the past thirty years, no 
scholar has attempted to define the term in all its complexity holistically since Werner Jaeger and 
                                                 
42 Cf. Prov. 5:12 and 15:10. 
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Henri Irénée Marrou, whose seminal works are not, however, without their own problems.43 
Elsner sums up nicely the current state of the scholarly understanding of paideia: 
First, I am not at all sure that even now we really know what paideia meant in antiquity 
or, rather, at different times in a changing antiquity. There is a unitary, holistic and 
arguably monolithic idealism at constant play in both Jaeger and Marrou, which remains 
the case whenever paideia is invoked by modern scholarship as an explanation of cultural 
background, which is its most common function in its current use. That strategic and 
rhetorical employment of the concept as a deus ex machina to justify a broader set of 
generalizations and historical, sociological or institutional claims about antiquity, is 
worrying because it functions (as indeed the concept was meant to function in both Jaeger 
and Marrou) as an unquestioned good and as a canonical justification for whatever claim 
is being made. Effectively the concept of paideia has no defined propositional meaning in 
its usual usage save as the ideal goal of an educational process and the description of that 
process as a good in itself: this is precisely the continuing legacy of the approaches of 
both Jaeger and Marrou, and a result of the power of their accounts, despite the profound 
differences between them about what the ideal might be.44 
                                                 
43 Werner Jaeger, Paideia: Die Formung des griechischen Menschen (3 vols.; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1934-47), 
translated into English as Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture (3 vols.; Oxford: Blackwell, 1939-45); Henri Irénée 
Marrou, Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité (Paris: Le Seuil, 1948), translated into Enlgish as A History of 
Education in Antiquity (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956). For a recent competent, thorough critique of Jaeger and 
Marrou, see Jaś Elsner, “Paideia: Ancient Concept and Modern Reception,” International Journal of the Classical 
Tradition 20.4 (Dec. 2013): 136-152. Elsner does not dismiss the importance of these two great works, but rightly 
situates them within their own historical settings and, therefore, sees in them a reflection often more suitable to mid-
twentieth century Europe than to Ancient Greece or Rome, Jaeger portraying a top-down, universal bildung and 
Marrou, instead, focused on an anti-collectivist, anti-totalitarian paideia centered more on personal development 
than on state good. 
44 Elsner, “Paideia: Ancient Concept and Modern Reception,” 151. See also Jaeger’s opening to the second volume 
of Paideia, given prior to title page: 
Paideia, the title of this work, is not merely a symbolic name, but the only exact designation of the actual 
historical, subject presented in it. Indeed it is a difficult thing to define; like other broad comprehensive 
concepts (philosophy, for instance, or culture) it refuses to be confined within an abstract formula. Its full 
content and meaning become clear to us only when we read its history and follow its attempts to realize 
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It is not surprising that modern scholars idealize paideia, as the concept was already idealized by 
ancient Greek philosophers, orators, and sophists. In fact, though ancient and modern authors can 
talk at length on the specifics of paideia on the ground and how it actually functioned in the lives 
of students and the community as a whole, it is precisely the idealization of the concept that has 
given it such power for 2500 years, allowing the unalterably positive term to be exactly what one 
needed it to be at a given time and place, allowing it to take on whatever aspirations one viewed 
as possible or necessary during periods of growth, stagnation, or even horror. 
 Though Elsner expresses his cynicism about ever truly being able to grasp what paideia 
meant throughout antiquity, his final comment above, “Effectively the concept of paideia has no 
defined propositional meaning in its usual usage save as the ideal goal of an educational process 
and the description of that process as a good in itself,” provides a solid foundation on which we 
can begin to understand this elusive, complex idea. And, of immediate relevance, it gives us 
insight into the underlying difference between paideia and musar. 
 Attempting a holistic definition of such a complex, ancient concept that was utilized and 
constantly reinterpreted over centuries is, of course, fraught with problems, and though the 
attempt at this sort of endeavor may bear fruit, it is, in the end, likely to reveal more about the 
author’s own personal motivations, interests, and social, cultural, and political settings than 
anything firmly based in the past. Therefore, instead of attempting this futile exercise, I will 
                                                 
itself. By using a Greek word for a Greek thing, I intend to imply that it is seen with the eyes, not of 
modern men, but of the Greeks. It is impossible to avoid bringing in modern expressions like civilization, 
culture, tradition, literature, or education. But none of them really covers what the Greeks meant by 
paideia. Each of them is confined to one aspect of it: they cannot take in the same field as the Greek 
concept unless we employ them all together. Yet the very essence of scholarship and scholarly activity is 
based on the original unity of all these aspects—the unity which is expressed in the Greek word, not the 
diversity emphasized and completed by modern developments. The ancients were persuaded that education 
and culture are not a formal art or an abstract theory, distinct from the objective historical structure of a 
nation’s spiritual life. They held them to be embodied in literature, which is the real expression of all higher 
culture. That is how we must interpret the definition of the cultured man given by Phrynichus (s.v. 
φιλόλογος, p. 483 Rutherford): Φιλόλογος ὁ φιλῶν λόγους καὶ σπουδάζων περί παιδείαν. (2:ii) 
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simply look at some representative examples of the term’s use and attempt to read them without, 
as far as is possible, the baggage typically attached to such an important, weighty concept, all in 
service of the goal of contemplating the differences between the Greek and Hebrew terminology 
and how the shift in languages could have affected the later reading of the texts in the Hellenistic 
Diaspora. 
 Both the noun paideia and the verb paideuō derive from the substantive pais, “child,” 
with the -euō verb denoting a condition or activity related to the substantive, and the -eia, for 
e(u)-ia, showing the abstraction of that condition or activity.45 In this sense, there would seem to 
be little to distinguish the meanings of the terms from trophē / trephō, “nurturing,” “nourishing,” 
or “rearing” of children / to “bring up,” “rear,” or “raise,” children, and, in the earliest usage of 
our terminology, there is little difference between paideia and trophē: 
 
Aeschylus, Seven against Thebes 16-20 
 τέκνοις τε, Γῇ τε μητρί, φιλτάτῃ τροφῷ:  
ἡ γὰρ νέους ἕρποντας εὐμενεῖ πέδῳ,  
ἅπαντα πανδοκοῦσα παιδείας ὄτλον,  
ἐθρέψατ᾽ οἰκητῆρας ἀσπιδηφόρους  
πιστοὺς ὅπως γένοισθε πρὸς χρέος τόδε. 
 
You must aid both your children and Mother Earth, your beloved nurse. 
For when you were young, creeping upon her kind soil, 
                                                 
45 Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), §§840, 866. Cf. Ernst 
Fraenkel, Griechische Denominativa in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und Verbreitung (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1906), 176, 194. 
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welcoming all the distress of your paideia, 
she raised you as shield-bearing inhabitants 
and faithful in this time of need.46 
 
Yet, even at a very early stage, a focus on one particular aspect of child-rearing is emphasized, 
teaching: “οὔτοι με ξένον οὐδ᾽ ἀδαήμονα Μοισᾶν ἐπαίδευσαν κλυταὶ Θῆβαι” (Pindar, fr. 198a). 
Though the terminology, particularly the verb, could, at times, continue to be used nearly 
interchangeably for or in parallel with trophē / trephō,47 it is in this one aspect of the raising of 
children—education—which will come to dominate the extensive usage of the terms. 
 One of the earliest defining qualities of paideia was that, through it, anyone could acquire 
not only knowledge but virtue itself. Education, culture, and virtue, which in the past were tied 
directly to one’s noble, aristocratic lineage, became something attainable for everyone through a 
systematic and sustained training.48 This true education was not, however, to be confused with 
simple occupational training: 
 
Plato, Laws 1.643d-644b 
μὴ τοίνυν μηδ᾽ ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι παιδείαν ἀόριστον γένηται. νῦν γὰρ ὀνειδίζοντες 
ἐπαινοῦντές θ᾽ ἑκάστων τὰς τροφάς, λέγομεν ὡς τὸν μὲν πεπαιδευμένον ἡμῶν ὄντα τινά, 
[643ε] τὸν δὲ ἀπαίδευτον ἐνίοτε εἴς τε καπηλείας καὶ ναυκληρίας καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων 
                                                 
46 Cf. Euripides, Ion, 653 and Plato, Crito 54a. 
47 See, e.g., Plato, Crito 54a: “ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δέ; εἰς 
Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, 
αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται μὴ συνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς;” 
48 As Jaeger notes: “Its aim was to transcend the aristocratic principle of privileged education, which made it 
impossible for anyone to acquire areté unless he already possessed it by inheritance from his divine ancestors. It 
seemed east to transcend it by the application of logical reasoning, the new instrument whose power was constantly 
growing. There was only one method—to apply a deliberate system of education to the mind” (Paideia 2:287). 
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μάλα πεπαιδευμένων σφόδρα ἀνθρώπων: οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἡγουμένων, ὡς ἔοικ᾽, εἶναι 
παιδείαν ὁ νῦν λόγος ἂν εἴη, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν 
ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι 
ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης. Ταύτην [644α] τὴν τροφὴν ἀφορισάμενος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὡς 
ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν βούλοιτ᾽ ἂν μόνην παιδείαν προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα 
τείνουσαν ἤ τινα πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ σοφίαν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης, 
βάναυσόν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἀξίαν τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλεῖσθαι. ἡμεῖς 
δὴ μηδὲν ὀνόματι διαφερώμεθ᾽ αὑτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νυνδὴ λόγος ἡμῖν ὁμολογηθεὶς μενέτω, ὡς 
οἵ γε ὀρθῶς πεπαιδευμένοι σχεδὸν ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται, καὶ δεῖ δὴ τὴν παιδείαν [644β] 
μηδαμοῦ ἀτιμάζειν, ὡς πρῶτον τῶν καλλίστων τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀνδράσιν παραγιγνόμενον: 
καὶ εἴ ποτε ἐξέρχεται, δυνατὸν δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, τοῦτ᾽ ἀεὶ δραστέον διὰ βίου 
παντὶ κατὰ δύναμιν. 
 
But we must not allow our description of paideia to remain indefinite. For at present, 
when censuring or commending a man's upbringing (trophē), we describe one man 
[643e] as educated and another as uneducated, though the latter may often be 
uncommonly well educated in the trade of a pedlar or a skipper, or some other similar 
occupation. But we, naturally, in our present discourse are not taking the view that such 
things as these make up paideia: the paideia we speak of is training from childhood in 
goodness (aretē), which makes a man eagerly desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, 
understanding how both to rule and be ruled righteously. This is the special form of 
nurture (trophē) [644a] to which, as I suppose, our present argument would confine the 
term “paideia” whereas an upbringing which aims only at money-making or physical 
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strength, or even some mental accomplishment devoid of reason and justice, it would 
term vulgar and illiberal and utterly unworthy of the name “paideia.” Let us not, 
however, quarrel over a name, but let us abide by the statement we agreed upon just now, 
that those who are rightly educated become, as a rule, good, [644b] and that one should 
in no case disparage paideia, since it stands first among the finest gifts that are given to 
the best men; and if ever it errs from the right path, but can be put straight again, to this 
task every man, so long as he lives, must address himself with all his might. (LCL trans.) 
 
Plato here gives us his understanding of the ideal of paideia and its shift away from both trophē 
and vocational training. During one’s childhood development (trophē), an individual may be 
extremely well educated or trained in a trade, but could still be considered “ignorant,” 
“uneducated,” or “uncultured,” apaideutos. This is because, for Plato, paideia is not simply 
training in a skill, but rather “training from childhood in virtue (τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων 
παιδείαν),” a training for something loftier than one’s future profession, bodily perfection, or 
even art, though Plato makes clear elsewhere that physical education and music are integral in 
this lofty ideal of paideia.49 This exalted paideia, a special sort of trophē, has the goal of aretē, 
which is directly tied, in Plato’s ideal state, to becoming an ideal citizen, “knowing both how to 
rule and to be ruled with justice (ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης).”50  
These two connections, between paideia and aretē on the one hand and paideia and 
politeia on the other, become central to the Greek ideal of paideia. We find an elucidation of the 
                                                 
49 See, e.g., Rep. 2.376e-377a, where Plato explains that gymnastics is education for the body and music education 
for the soul, or Tim. 87c-88c, where we find that there must be a symmetry between the training of the soul and of 
the body. See also Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 2.39.1, where he explains that the Athenians’ military 
prowess is due to their superior paideia as youths, which makes them prepared at all times for any possible danger. 
50 Cf. Protagoras 327c-d. For more on paideia in Plato’s Laws, see R. G. Bury, “Theory of Education in Plato’s « 
Laws »,” Revue des Études Grecques, tome 50, fascicule 236-237 (1937): 304-320. 
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former in book eight of Aristotle’s Politics, showing that the goal of paideia is not simple utility, 
but rather a desire for further, superior forms of knowledge: 
 
Aristotle, Politics 8.1338a30-1338b9 
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι παιδεία τις ἣν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμην παιδευτέον τοὺς υἱεῖς οὐδ᾽ ὡς 
ἀναγκαίαν ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν, φανερόν ἐστιν: πότερον δὲ μία τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ 
πλείους, καὶ τίνες αὗται καὶ πῶς, ὕστερον λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν 
εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ γέγονεν, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἔχομέν τινα μαρτυρίαν ἐκ τῶν 
καταβεβλημένων παιδευμάτων: ἡ γὰρ μουσικὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖ δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν 
χρησίμων ὅτι δεῖ τινα παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, οἷον τὴν τῶν 
γραμμάτων μάθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πολλὰς ἐνδέχεσθαι γίγνεσθαι δι᾽ αὐτῶν μαθήσεις 
ἑτέρας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν οὐχ ἵνα ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ὠνίοις μὴ διαμαρτάνωσιν ἀλλ᾽ 
ὦσιν ἀνεξαπάτητοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν σκευῶν ὠνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν, [1338β] ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δ᾽ 
ὅτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν ανταχοῦ τὸ χρήσιμον 
ἥκιστα ἁρμόττει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθερίοις.  
 
It is clear therefore that there is a form of paideia in which boys should be trained not 
because it is useful or necessary but as being liberal and noble; though whether there is 
one such subject of education or several, and what these are and how they are to be 
pursued, must be discussed later, but as it is we have made this much progress on the 
way, that we have some testimony even from the ancients, derived from the courses of 
education which they founded—for the point is proved by music. And it is also clear that 
some of the useful subjects as well ought to be studied by the young not only because of 
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their utility, like the study of reading and writing, but also because they may lead on to 
many other branches of knowledge; and similarly they should study drawing not in order 
that they may not go wrong in their private purchases and may avoid being cheated in 
buying and selling furniture, [1338b] but rather because this study makes a man 
observant of bodily beauty; and to seek for utility everywhere is entirely unsuited to men 
that are great-souled and free. (LCL trans.) 
 
Aristotle echoes Plato’s belief that paideia should be concerned not only with the useful and 
necessary, but with the free (eleutherios) and the noble. Aristotle, however, makes clear that one 
is not to avoid those subjects which seem, on the surface, merely utilitarian—e.g. reading and 
writing—but to pursue them because of what these then lead to. The ends of basic skills such as 
reading, writing, music, and drawing are not trades or talents but the desire to seek and the ability 
to obtain more considerate, elevated forms of knowledge. This distinction between basic lessons 
or skills and higher education and virtue reminds one of a distinction which became ubiquitous 
in the later Hellenistic and Roman periods, between what was called encyclical (egkuklios) or 
mesē or preliminary paideia and wisdom, virtue, or philosophy. For example, the Stoic Ariston 
of Chios argued that “those who labor with the preliminary studies but neglect philosophy are 
like the suitors of Penelope, who, when they failed to win her over, took up with her maid 
servants instead.”51 Philo would make the same distinction between Hagar and Sarah. 
                                                 
51 Ἀρίστων ὁ Χῖος τοὺς περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα πονουμένους, ἀμελοῦντας δὲ φιλοσοφίας, ἔλεγεν ὁμοίους εἶναι 
τοῖς μνηστῆρσι τῆς Πηνελόπης, οἳ ἀποτυγχάνοντες ἐκείνης περὶ τὰς θεραπαίνας ἐγίνοντο (SVF 1:350). Stobaeus 
preserves the fragment. Elsewhere the comment is credited to Gorgias (Gnomol. Vatic. 166). See Albert Henrichs, 
“Philosophy, the Handmaiden of Theology,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 9:4 (1968): 437-450 (444); and 
K. Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 139. According 
to Pseudo-Plutarch, the statement is the philosopher Bion’s: “ἀστείως δὲ καὶ Βίων ἔλεγεν ὁ φιλόσοφος ὅτι ὥσπερ οἱ 
μνηστῆρες τῇ Πηνελόπῃ πλησιάζειν μὴ δυνάμενοι ταῖς ταύτης ἐμίγνυντο θεραπαίναις, οὕτω καὶ οἱ φιλοσοφίας μὴ 
δυνάμενοι κατατυχεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις παιδεύμασι τοῖς οὐδενὸς ἀξίοις ἑαυτοὺς κατασκελετεύουσι” (Lib. Ed. 7d). See 
also Yehoshua Amir, “The Transference of Greek Allegories to Biblical Motifs in Philo,” in Nourished with Peace: 
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 Like Plato, Aristotle also envisioned an ideal connection between paideia and politeia: 
 
Aristotle, Politics 1.1260b 
ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα δ᾽ οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ 
ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν ἀρετήν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν καὶ τοὺς 
παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν καὶ τὸ τοὺς 
παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ διαφέρειν: αἱ μὲν γὰρ 
γυναῖκες ἥμισυ μέρος τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παίδων οἱ κοινωνοὶ γίνονται τῆς 
πολιτείας. 
 
For since every household is part of a state, and these relationships are part of the 
household, and the excellence (aretē) of the part must have regard to that of the whole, it 
is necessary that the paideia both of the children and of the women should be carried on 
with a regard to the form of the constitution (politeian), if it makes any difference as 
regards the goodness of the state for the children and the women to be good. And it must 
necessarily make a difference; for the women are a half of the free population, and the 
children grow up to be the partners in the government of the state. (LCL trans.) 
 
Aristotle too is describing his ideal state, yet his understanding of the education of women and 
children and its connection to the state is more solidified here than in Plato’s description above. 
Aristotle takes for granted the unbreakable and necessary connection between the state and its 
                                                 
Studies in Hellenistic Judaism in Memory of Samuel Sandmel (ed. E. Hilgert and B. L. Mack; Chico, CA: Scholars 
Press, 1984), 15-25. For Quintilian’s understanding of the encyclia, see Institutio Oratoria 1.10.1ff. On the 
encyclical paideia, see the discussion in Chapter Four. 
46 
 
citizens, and therefore, he understands the state’s decisive role in their education. Education and 
citizenship are inseparable. 
 This ideal connection between the state and the education of its citizens was not only a 
topic of great import to philosophers. The sophist and rhetor Isocrates, whose views on education 
were often at diametric odds with Plato’s, nevertheless envisioned a necessary connection 
between paideia and politeia. 
 
Isocrates, Panathenaicus 12.138 
τοῦ μὲν οὖν διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων οἰκεῖσθαι τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον 
δικαίως ἂν ἐπενέγκοιμεν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῖς βασιλεύσασιν αὐτῆς, περὶ ὧν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον 
διελέχθην. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ παιδεύσαντες τὸ πλῆθος ἐν ἀρετῇ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ 
πολλῇ σωφροσύνῃ, καὶ διδάξαντες ἐξ ὧν διῴκουν, ἅπερ ἐγὼ φανείην ἂν ὕστερον 
εἰρηκὼς ἢ κεῖνοι πράξαντες, ὅτι πᾶσα πολιτεία ψυχὴ πόλεώς ἐστι, τοσαύτην ἔχουσα 
δύναμιν ὅσην περ ἐν σώματι φρόνησις: αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ βουλευομένη περὶ ἁπάντων, καὶ 
τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ διαφυλάττουσα, τὰς δὲ συμφορὰς διαφεύγουσα, καὶ πάντων αἰτία τῶν ταῖς 
πόλεσι συμβαινόντων. 
 
The fact, then, that our city was governed in those times better than the rest of the world I 
would justly credit to her kings, of whom I spoke a moment ago. For it was they who 
educated the multitude in the ways of virtue and justice and great sobriety and who 
taught through the manner of their rule the very truth which I shall be seen to have 
expressed in words after they had expressed it in their deeds, namely, that every polity is 
the soul of the state, having as much power over it as the mind over the body. For it is 
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this which deliberates on all questions, seeking to preserve what is good and to avoid 
what is disastrous, and is the cause of all the things which transpire in states. (LCL trans.) 
 
Despite the Platonic opposition to sophistic or rhetorical education, Isocrates’ Hellenic 
universalizing of paideia would form the basis for the Hellenistic model of determining one’s 
‘Greekness,’ not through birth and lineage, but through education and culture. 
 
Isocrates, Panegyricus, 50 
τοσοῦτον δ᾽ ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν τοὺς ἄλλους 
ἀνθρώπους, ὥσθ᾽ οἱ ταύτης μαθηταὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασι, καὶ τὸ τῶν 
Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεποίηκε μηκέτι τοῦ γένους ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ μᾶλλον 
Ἕλληνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως 
μετέχοντας. 
 
And so far has our city distanced the rest of humankind in thought and in speech that her 
pupils have become the teachers of the rest of the world; and she has brought it about that 
the name Hellenes suggests no longer a race but an intelligence, and that the title 
Hellenes is applied rather to those who share our culture than to those who share a 
common blood. 
 
On this, Jaeger noted, “Without the idea he here expresses for the first time, the idea that Greek 
paideia was something universally valuable, there would have been no Macedonian Greek 
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world-empire, and the universal culture which we call Hellenistic would never have existed.”52 
Though the Jewish authors to be discussed will follow, either directly or indirectly, Plato’s views 
on paideia and its instrumentality in the fate of the soul, they, like the entire history of education, 
are deeply indebted to Isocrates for this fundamental idea which rooted membership not in 
ethnicity, family, or heritage, but in education and culture.  
 Despite the great importance of Isocrates and the sophists in the development of Greek 
education outside the hands of the nobility, the connection between paideia and the fate of the 
soul we find in Plato will have a tremendous impact on the Hellenistic ideals of paideia, both 
within Jewish circles and without. 
 
Plato, Phaedo 107c-d 
νῦν δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὖσα, οὐδεμία ἂν [107δ] εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν 
οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο 
ἔχουσα εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα 
λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας. 
 
But now, since the soul is seen to be immortal, it cannot escape [107d] from evil or be 
saved in any other way than by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul takes 
with it to the other world nothing but its paideia and nurture, and these are said to benefit 
or injure the departed greatly from the very beginning of his journey thither. (LCL trans.) 
 
                                                 
52 Jaeger, Paideia 3:80-81. On the importance of Isocrates’ model of education, see chapters 2-6 in volume 3 of 
Jaeger’s Paideia. 
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We have already seen that Plato understood true paideia as education in virtue and the good. In 
Laws, this training was seen as the necessary requirement in making one a true citizen of the 
politeia. In the Phaedo, however, Plato goes further in positing a connection between paideia 
and the fate of the immortal soul, since the soul only leaves this world with the paideia and 
trophē it acquired during its short stay here within the mortal shell. One’s duty, then, is to spend 
a life devoted to nurturing and education of the soul. The consequences of ignorance now take on 
an entirely new dimension. 
 It is with this sense in mind that we can begin to understand the Hellenistic ideal of 
paideia, as expressed in a classic Roman-period treatise on education, Pseudo-Plutarch’s De 
liberis educandis. 
 
Pseudo-Plutarch, De liberis educandis 5c-e 
συνελὼν τοίνυν ἐγώ φημι καὶ χρησμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ παραινεῖν δόξαιμ᾽ ἂν εἰκότως ὅτι 
ἓν πρῶτον καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευταῖον ἐν τούτοις κεφάλαιον ἀγωγὴ σπουδαία καὶ παιδεία 
νόμιμός ἐστι, καὶ ταῦτα φορὰ καὶ συνεργὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν φημί. καὶ 
τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνθρώπινα καὶ μικρὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀξιοσπούδαστα καθέστηκεν. 
εὐγένεια καλὸν μέν, ἀλλὰ προγόνων ἀγαθόν. πλοῦτος δὲ τίμιον μέν, ἀλλὰ τύχης κτῆμα, 
ἐπειδὴ τῶν μὲν ἐχόντων πολλάκις ἀφείλετο, τοῖς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐλπίσασι φέρουσα προσήνεγκε. . 
. . παιδεία δὲ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐστὶν ἀθάνατον καὶ θεῖον. 
 
Briefly, then, I say (an oracle one might properly call it, rather than advice) that, to sum 
up, the beginning, the middle, and end in all these matters is good education and proper 
paideia; and it is this, I say, which leads on and helps towards virtue and towards 
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happiness. And, in comparison with this, all other advantages are human, and trivial, and 
not worth our serious concern. Good birth is a fine thing, but it is an advantage which 
must be credited to one's ancestors. Wealth is held in esteem, but it is a chattel of fortune, 
since oftentimes she takes it away from those who possess it, and brings and presents it to 
those who do not expect it. . . . But paideia, of all things in this world, is alone immortal 
and divine. 
 
In this text, roughly contemporaneous with Philo of Alexandria’s works, we see centuries of 
ruminating on an ideal paideia taken to a logical conclusion: there is nothing in this world more 
important than paideia, which alone is athanaton kai theion, and which eradicates (in this ideal 
view) the benefits of nobility, family, and wealth, all of which are insignificant (mikra) by 
comparison.53 
 In understanding the similarities and differences between the Hebrew and Greek 
terminology, it is also important to note that nowhere in De liberis educandis is paideia 
associated with the chastisement or punishment of free children for the purpose of their 
education. Better, we see a shift from education via the rod to education via the book: “For the 
corresponding tool of paideia is the use of books, and by their means it has come to pass that we 
are able to study knowledge at its source (τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν τρόπον ὄργανον τῆς παιδείας ἡ χρῆσις 
τῶν βιβλίων ἐστί, καὶ ἀπὸ πηγῆς τὴν ἐπιστήμην τηρεῖν συμβέβηκεν)” (8b); and further: “This 
also I assert, that children ought to be led to honourable practices by means of encouragement 
and reasoning, and most certainly not by blows or ill-treatment, for it surely is agreed that these 
                                                 
53 For Marrou, it is from the Hellenistic era, that we find the principle of paideia pushed to the limit, where paideia 
is no longer the means of equipping a pais for his future career, but comes to signify “culture,” “of something 
perfect: a mind fully developed, the mind of a man who has become truly man.” (A History of Education in 
Antiquity, 98-99). 
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are fitting rather for slaves than for the free-born; for so they grow numb and shudder at their 
tasks, partly from the pain of the blows, partly from the degradation. Praise and reproof are more 
helpful for the free-born than any sort of ill-usage, since the praise incites them toward what is 
honourable, and reproof keeps them from what is disgraceful” (8f-9a).  
 The fact that this author must forcibly argue against the use of corporal punishment in the 
education of children would suggest that physical chastisement had long been a popular 
pedagogical tool. We find confirmation of this as far back as Aristophanes and his particular 
brand of biting satire in Clouds: 
 
Aristophanes, Clouds 962-976 
 λέξω τοίνυν τὴν ἀρχαίαν παιδείαν ὡς διέκειτο,  
ὅτ᾽ ἐγὼ τὰ δίκαια λέγων ἤνθουν καὶ σωφροσύνη 'νενόμιστο.  
πρῶτον μὲν ἔδει παιδὸς φωνὴν γρύξαντος μηδὲν ἀκοῦσαι:  
εἶτα βαδίζειν ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς εὐτάκτως ἐς κιθαριστοῦ  
τοὺς κωμήτας γυμνοὺς ἁθρόους, κεἰ κριμνώδη κατανείφοι.  
εἶτ᾽ αὖ προμαθεῖν ᾆσμ᾽ ἐδίδασκεν τὼ μηρὼ μὴ ξυνέχοντας,  
ἢ ‘Παλλάδα περσέπολιν δεινὰν’ ἢ ‘τηλέπορόν τι βόαμα,’  
ἐντειναμένους τὴν ἁρμονίαν, ἣν οἱ πατέρες παρέδωκαν.  
εἰ δέ τις αὐτῶν βωμολοχεύσαιτ᾽ ἢ κάμψειέν τινα καμπήν,  
οἵας οἱ νῦν τὰς κατὰ Φρῦνιν ταύτας τὰς δυσκολοκάμπτους,  
ἐπετρίβετο τυπτόμενος πολλὰς ὡς τὰς Μούσας ἀφανίζων.  
ἐν παιδοτρίβου δὲ καθίζοντας τὸν μηρὸν ἔδει προβαλέσθαι  
τοὺς παῖδας, ὅπως τοῖς ἔξωθεν μηδὲν δείξειαν ἀπηνές:  
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975εἶτ᾽ αὖ πάλιν αὖθις ἀνιστάμενον συμψῆσαι, καὶ προνοεῖσθαι  
εἴδωλον τοῖσιν ἐρασταῖσιν τῆς ἥβης μὴ καταλείπειν. 
 
I will, therefore, describe the ancient system of paideia, how it was ordered,  
when I flourished in the advocacy of justice, and temperance was the fashion.  
In the first place it was incumbent that no one should hear the voice of a boy uttering a  
syllable;  
and next, that those from the same quarter of the town should march in good order  
through the streets to the school of the harp-master,  
naked, and in a body, even if it were to snow as thick as meal.  
Then again, their master would teach them, not sitting cross-legged, to learn by rote a  
song,  
either “Pallada persepolin deinan” or “teleporon ti boama”  
raising to a higher pitch the harmony which our fathers transmitted to us.  
But if any of them were to play the buffoon, or to turn any quavers,  
like these difficult turns the present artists make after the manner of Phrynis,  
he used to be thrashed, being beaten with many blows, as banishing the Muses.  
And it behooved the boys, while sitting in the school of the Gymnastic-master, to cover  
the thigh,  
so that they might exhibit nothing indecent to those outside;  
then again, after rising from the ground, to sweep the sand together, and to take care  
not to leave an impression of the person for their lovers. (LCL trans.) 
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Corporal punishment at the hands of parents or pedagogues was ubiquitous in Greek, Hellenistic, 
and Roman education.54 According to Plato, 
With the return of daylight the children should go to their teachers (διδασκάλους); for 
just as no sheep or other witless creature ought to exist without a herdsman, so children 
cannot live without a tutor (παιδαγωγῶν), nor slaves without a master. And, of all wild 
creatures, the child is the most intractable; for in so far as it, above all others, possesses a 
fount of reason that is as yet uncurbed, it is a treacherous, sly and most insolent creature. 
Wherefore the child must be strapped up, as it were, with many bridles—first, when he 
leaves the care of nurse and mother, with tutors, to guide his childish ignorance, and after 
that with teachers of all sorts of subjects and lessons, treating him as becomes a freeborn 
child. On the other hand, he must be treated as a slave; and any free man that meets him 
shall punish both the child himself and his tutor or teacher, if any of them does wrong 
(πᾶς ὁ προστυγχάνων τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν κολαζέτω τόν τε παῖδα αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν 
παιδαγωγὸν καὶ διδάσκαλον, ἐὰν ἐξαμαρτάνῃ τίς τι τούτων). (Laws 808c-e; LCL trans.)55 
 
We also find the idea of remedial suffering, even that at the hands of the gods, an idea expressed 
most memorably by Aeschylus: 
 
Aeschylus, Agamemnon 176-183 
  
τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς ὁδώ-  
                                                 
54 See Marrou, History of Education, 158-159; Beck, Greek Education, 104-109, 215-218; Bonner, Education in 
Ancient Rome, 115-145; Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind, 65-73; and my discussions on the rod in Chap. 4 and the 
pedagogue in Chap. 6. 
55 Cf. Plato, Protag. 325c-d. 
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σαντα, τὸν πάθει μάθος  
θέντα κυρίως ἔχειν.  
στάζει δ᾽ ἔν θ᾽ ὕπνῳ πρὸ καρδίας  
μνησιπήμων πόνος: καὶ παρ᾽ ἄ-  
κοντας ἦλθε σωφρονεῖν.  
δαιμόνων δέ που χάρις βίαιος  
σέλμα σεμνὸν ἡμένων. 
 
Zeus, who sets mortals on the path to understanding, Zeus, who has established as a fixed 
law that “wisdom comes by suffering.” But even as trouble, bringing memory of pain, 
drips over the mind in sleep, so wisdom comes to men, whether they want it or not. 
Harsh, it seems to me, is the grace of gods enthroned upon their awful seats. (Smyth 
trans.) 
 
The comical image from Aristophanes, the strong opposition to corporal punishment in schools 
from Ps.-Plutarch,56 and the idea of teaching through divine suffering in Aeschylus57 might 
suggest a similarity to the disciplinary, chastising nature inherent in the Hebrew musar, which, as 
we saw, most typically involved some form of verbal rebuke or physical violence. However, as 
opposed to the use of musar, never is this, often assumed violence, termed paideia or paideuō. 
Bertram has noted that never is paideuein used in non-biblical Greek to refer to corporal 
punishment until, perhaps, the second century CE, well after the translation of the Hebrew texts 
                                                 
56 Ps.-Plutarch was not alone. See Quintilian, 1.3.14-17; Plutarch, Marcus Cato 20.4; and the discussion in Marrou, 
History of Education, 272-273. 
57 Cf. Plato, Rep. 380b; Laws 854d, 862e, 934a, 944d. See James Adam, “Ancient Greek Views of Suffering and 
Evil,” in The Vitality of Platonism (ed. A. M. Adam; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), 190-212. 
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into Greek, and that this disciplinary notion of paideia was the result of the Greek terms taking 
on “a new and originally almost alien significance,” from the Hebrew musar / y-s-r.58 Though 
discipline and rebuke would have, at times, been a part of paideia—primarily for children only—
it was never the defining element, as it was with the Hebrew musar. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
From the earliest understanding of paideia, related generally to the upbringing of children, to the 
specification of the term to describe solely one aspect of child-rearing, education, to the further 
particularization of the terminology, now referring not to simple occupational training, but rather 
education in virtue and the good, which was connected to one’s role in the politeia and to the 
ultimate fate of one’s soul, there is much the Greek terms paideia and paideuō have in common 
with the Hebrew musar and y-s-r. We found that the primary locus for musar / y-s-r was in the 
realm of instruction and pedagogical discipline. Musar, like paideia, seemed to be geared toward 
a higher purpose than simple career training; it prepared an individual for life itself, and it was 
necessary to insure a productive, successful life. Yahweh’s musar was often collectively 
distributed to the people, who were meant to welcome it as a group in order to show their 
adherence to the covenant, and who, more often than not, collectively failed to properly absorb 
                                                 
58 TDNT 5:600, 608. Elsewhere Bertram has argued that rendering musar with paideia led to a psychologizing of the 
punishing aspect inherent in musar. See “Der Begriff der Erziehung in der griechischen Bibel,” in Imago Dei. 
Beiträge zur theologischen Anthropologie (Gustav Krüger festschrift; ed. H. Bornkamm; Giessen 1932), 33-51. 
Indicative of our Greek terminology not having this disciplinary notion in non-biblical Greek usage, LSJ lists the 
following definitions for paideia: “rearing of a child,” “training and teaching, education,” “its result, mental culture, 
learning, education,” “culture of trees,” “handiwork,” “anything taught or learned, art, science,” and “chastisement.” 
However, for this last definition, the only examples listed are LXX Proverbs 22:15 and Hebrews 12:5. Similarly, for 
paideuō, LSJ gives us: “bring up or rear a child,” “train and teach, educate,” “give instruction, teach,” “correct, 
discipline,” and “chastise, punish.” While for the definition of “correct, discipline,” LSJ gives Xenophon, 
Memorabilia 1.3.5 as an example, which talks about the self-discipline of the body and soul, for the final definition 
of “chastise, punish,” we find only the examples of LXX Hosea 7:12 and Luke 23:16. 
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and learn from this divine instruction, which then lead to collective punishment, including the 
Babylonian exile.  
 Despite the similarities, however, there are significant points of semantic discrepancy 
between how the terms were natively understood and used. The most prominent distinction 
between the Hebrew and the Greek is the standard sense of musar as the pedagogical process 
through which knowledge should be obtained and the form this pedagogy often took. We saw 
that it was very uncommon for the Hebrew terminology to be used to describe instructional 
content; instead, in nearly every case found, musar / y-s-r denotes the means of instilling 
instruction. This alone distinguishes it from paideia / paideuō, which more commonly refers to 
the content of instruction and to the result, a use never found with the Hebrew. More 
importantly, the form musar pedagogy typically takes—verbal rebuke and physical 
punishment—sharply distinguishes it from paideia. Though it was assumed that the education of 
children often involved beatings at the hand of the teacher or the pedagogue, this punishment 
was never actually referred to as paideia and it was never an inherent part of it, especially when 
it came to adult education.  
 The idealization and general importance of paideia in the Greek conscience also leads to 
important distinctions from the Hebrew notion, primarily in the connection between the 
individual’s paideia, virtue, and citizenship, together with the understood universalizing nature 
of paideia, through which anyone could gain in virtue and become part of Greek culture. While 
musar was often divinely distributed to the people collectively and it had collective 
consequences, the focus on the individual and the individual’s attainment of virtue to become 
part of the collective politeia is unique to the Greek term. Further, the idea first seen in Isocrates, 
but later taken up vigorously in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, that it was paideia not ethnos 
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that made one “Greek,” also finds no direct parallel in the Hebrew musar. This confluence of 
ideas surrounding the ideal of paideia will become one of the defining characteristics of 
Hellenism, and it will play a fundamental role in the Jewish intellectuals’ ability to enter into 
conversation with and utilize the wider Greek and Roman philosophical world of thought in the 
creation of their own unique notions of education, enculturation, and knowledge production. 
 Finally, the explicit Platonic connection between the paideia received during one’s 
corporeal existence and the fate of the immortal soul after somatic death will profoundly 
influence Jewish Hellenistic thinkers like Philo or the authors of the Wisdom of Solomon and 4 
Maccabees. Musar, of course, could play a determinative role in the outcome of one’s life, but 
the lack of a sustained afterlife or immortality concept in the texts discussed necessarily 
relegated the consequences of one’s musar to the mortal world and kept its influence earthborn. 
The immortality of the soul allowed paideia to have much loftier aspirations and a far longer 
reach. The Jewish authors in the Hellenistic Diaspora, with the immortal soul—at least in one 
direction—fully entrenched in their worldview, would pick up on this connection to paideia and 
develop new and unique conclusions based also on the expanded semantic range of the term 
drawn from the Hebrew musar, the notion of divine discipline. 
 Though the Hebrew and Greek terms are not diametrically opposed and, in fact, have 
very much in common, the differences between them are, at times, vast. And, while the 
motivations of the original translators for choosing paideia / paideuō as a nearly consistent 
translation for musar / y-s-r are close to impossible to comprehend with any certainty, the fact 
remains that they left for their later readers texts that, one, would have been read and understood 
in a way far differently from the Hebrew vorlage and, two, could actually mold the 
understanding of the Greek terminology itself, expanding the Greek term’s range of meaning 
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beyond its classical sense. Both of these scenarios will prove determinative in the understanding 
of Jewish paideia during the Second Temple period, and the way in which the diverse 
conceptions would be deployed in the complex process of shaping indidivual and collective 
identity.
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Chapter 3. Musar to Paideia in the Septuagint 
1. INTRODUCTION 
With the nuanced, diverse understanding of the terms in mind, we can now turn to reading the 
texts of the Septuagint alongside the Hebrew texts, not in order to utilize the Hebrew to explicate 
the Greek or to use the Greek to help better understand the Hebrew, but rather to see how each 
would likely have been read on their own terms. 
 In the following analyses, we shall see two primary and divergent ways of understanding 
paideia in the Greek translations. The Pentateuch, likely the earliest Septuagint translation, and 
the prophetic literature display a startling use of the Greek terminology, which comes to take on 
the violent disciplinary aspects inherent in the Hebrew texts but foreign to the Greek term’s 
range of meaning. The Hebrew essentially overwrites the Greek understanding of the terms. On 
the other hand, in the wisdom texts of Proverbs and Job, likely inheriting the translation choices 
from the Pentateuch translators, we find an understanding of paideia in no way at odds with the 
classical Greek semantic range. In fact, when a more literal translation of the Hebrew could 
result in an association between paideia and disciplinary violence, the translators subtly break 
this association in the resultant Greek text, making sure that paideia is not, as in the Pentateuch 
and the prophetic literature, understood in any way other than the classical sense. These two 
divergent notions of paideia found in the Septuagint translations will be partially but directly 
responsible for the various ways paideia would later be understood and used in the Hellenistic 
Diaspora, with Jewish thinkers incorporating Hebrew notions of musar or divine discipline and 
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Greek and Hellenistic ideas of paideia, especially the connection to virtue, the politeia, the 
immortality of the soul, and the universality that it brings, surpassing one’s birthright or even 
upbringing. 
 
2. MUSAR TO PAIDEIA IN THE SEPTUAGINT 
Musar to Paideia in the Pentateuch 
Septuagint specialists have long agreed that the Torah was the first of the Hebrew texts to be 
translated into Greek, likely in the early- to mid-third century BCE, with the later translators 
following several of the precedents set by this initial group over the next couple of centuries, 
including the literal quality of the translation, the style of the Greek, and the Greek vocabulary 
used.59 Though not overly prevalent in the Torah, the language of musar / y-s-r is here first 
translated with the Greek paideia / paideuō.  
 Extant examples of musar / y-s-r and paideia / paideuō in the Torah / Pentateuch are 
limited to the books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy. Y-s-r occurs three times in Leviticus, all in 
the concluding section of the Holiness Code, where the text discusses the penalties for Israel’s 
disobedience to the covenant. Each occurrence is translated with the Greek verb paideuō: 
 
Lev. 26:18  
םֶכי ֵּתֹאטַח־לַע עַבֶשׁ םֶכְתֶא הָרְסַיְל י ִּתְפַסָיְו י ִּל וּעְמְשׁ ִּת ֹאל הֶל ֵּא־דַע־ם ִּאְו 
                                                 
59 See See Emanuel Tov, “The Impact of the Septuagint Translation of the Torah on the Translation of the 
Other Books,” in The Greek and Hebrew Bible: Collected Essays on the Septuagint, ed. Emanuel Tov (New York: 
Brill, 1999), 183-194. 
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And if in spite of this you will not obey me, I will continue to punish you sevenfold for 
your sins. 
 
καὶ ἐὰν ἕως τούτου μὴ ὑπακούσητέ μου, καὶ προσθήσω τοῦ παιδεῦσαι ὑμᾶς ἑπτάκις ἐπὶ 
ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν· 
And if you still do not obey me, I will continue to punish you sevenfold for your sins. 
 
Lev. 26:23-24 
 ַגּ םֶכְתֶא י ִּתי ֵּכ ִּהְו י ִּרֶקְב םֶכָמ ִּע י ִּנֲא־ףַא י ִּתְכַלָהְו׃י ִּרֶק י ִּמ ִּע םֶתְכַלֲהַו י ִּל וּרְסָוּ ִּת ֹאל הֶל ֵּאְב־ם ִּאְו־לַע עַבֶשׁ י ִּנָא־ם
םֶכי ֵּתֹאטַח 
And if you are not corrected by me by these things, but continue hostile to me, then I too 
will continue hostile to you; and I myself will smite you sevenfold for your sins. 
 
καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐὰν μὴ παιδευθῆτε ἀλλὰ πορεύησθε πρός με πλάγιοι, πορεύσομαι κἀγὼ 
μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν θυμῷ πλαγίῳ, καὶ πατάξω ὑμᾶς κἀγὼ ἑπτάκις ἀντὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ὑμῶν.  
And if you are not yet corrected, but walk askew to me, then I too will walk with skewed 
wrath with you, and I myself will smite you sevenfold for your sins. 
 
Lev. 26:28 
י ִּרֶק־תַמֲחַב םֶכָמ ִּע י ִּתְכַלָהְו םֶכי ֵּתֹאטַח־לַע עַבֶשׁ י ִּנָא־ףַא םֶכְתֶא י ִּתְרַס ִּיְו  
I will continue hostile to you in fury, and I myself will punish you sevenfold for your 
sins. 
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καὶ αὐτὸς πορεύσομαι μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐν θυμῷ πλαγίῳ, καὶ παιδεύσω ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ ἑπτάκις κατὰ 
τὰς ἁμαρτίας ὑμῶν· 
And I myself will walk with you with skewed wrath, and I myself will punish you 
sevenfold according to your sins. 
 
Though not in the foreground, y-s-r does have an educational implication in these passages; 
Yahweh is attempting to correct the people’s behavior, force them to learn from this instruction, 
and, therefore, stop them from breaking the covenant and, instead, return to obeying the 
commandments previously set forth. So, it would not be completely inconceivable to describe 
this activity with the pedagogical verb paideuō. However, when we consider that Yahweh’s 
“education” of the people here involves terror, consumption, and fear (26:16), wild animals 
which will kill their children and livestock (26:22), and, finally, a hunger so great they must eat 
their own children (26:29), we are unlikely to find a Greek precedent for this type of pedagogy. 
Whether we understand this as “correction,” “education,” or “punishment,” paideia here takes on 
a connotation entirely foreign to its traditional range of meaning. 
There are six instances of musar / y-s-r in the book of Deuteronomy, one of the noun, five 
of the verb, all of which are translated with paideia / paideuō. The Greek verb occurs one other 
time in the text, translating the polel of the verb bîn in 32:10, which HALOT takes to mean “to 
take care of” and BDB “to attentively consider,” though the precise meaning is uncertain, as this 
is the sole example in the HB of bîn in this stem. In most cases, the use of the verb paideuō in 
LXX Deuteronomy does not necessarily stray too far from the classical Greek sense (4:36; 8:5 
[twice]; 21:8; 32:10), but, in two passages, the translator clearly stretches the meaning of the 
Greek terminology further than the classical sense would allow: 
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Deut. 11:2 
 ֶתְעַדי ִּו ַה וֹדָי־תֶא וֹלְדָגּ־תֶא םֶכי ֵּהלֱֹא הָוהְי רַסוּמ־תֶא וּאָר־ֹאל רֶשֲׁאַו וּעְדָי־ֹאל רֶשֲׁא םֶכיֵּנְב־תֶא ֹאל י ִּכ םוֹיַה ם הָקָזֲח
הָיוּטְנַה וֹעֹרְזוּ 
Remember today that it was not your children, who have neither known nor seen the 
musar of the Lord your God, but it is you who must acknowledge his greatness, his 
mighty hand and his outstretched arm, 
 
καὶ γνώσεσθε σήμερον ὅτι οὐχὶ τὰ παιδία ὑμῶν, ὅσοι οὐκ οἴδασιν οὐδὲ εἴδοσαν τὴν 
παιδείαν κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ σου καὶ τὰ μεγαλεῖα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν χεῖρα τὴν κραταιὰν καὶ τὸν 
βραχίονα τὸν ὑψηλὸν, 
And you will know today that it was not your children, who have neither known nor seen 
the paideia of the Lord, your God, and his great works, powerful hand, and lofty arm, 
 
Deut. 22:18 
 או ִּהַה־רי ִּעָה י ֵּנְק ִּז וּחְקָלְווֹתֹא וּרְס ִּיְו שׁי ִּאָה־תֶא  
The elders of that town shall take the man and punish him. 
 
καὶ λήμψεται ἡ γερουσία τῆς πόλεως ἐκείνης τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκεῖνον καὶ παιδεύσουσιν 
αὐτὸν, 
And the elders of that city shall take that man and punish him. 
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In 11:2, it is impossible to read paideia in the classical Greek sense, since, from the context of 
the passage (11:1-7), this paideia points to Yahweh’s punishments against Egypt and the sons of 
Eliab, which the people had witnessed, and their own hardships wandering in the wilderness. 
There is educational value for the people, but this is a form of education previously foreign to the 
Greek term, and it would be impossible to read into the Greek text the common understanding of 
paideia.60 In 22:18, which discusses the punishment of a man who falsely accuses his new bride 
of not being a virgin, there is no educational value tied to the verb at all. It simply refers to the 
financial restitution which he must pay to his wife’s father (22:19). Here paideuō is stripped of 
any pedagogical footing, unthinkable in a Greek setting. 
The evidence from the Pentateuch is limited, but from the usage in both Leviticus and 
Deuteronomy, paideia looks very different from what we see in classical Greek literature, with 
the term taking on notions of divine violence and punishment with the ultimate purpose of 
instructing the people through example and fear. The terminology is, in these texts, unable to 
maintain the traditional Greek sense and, instead, adopts completely the full range of meaning of 
the Hebrew terms. This “paideia as musar” is a concept that the Greek Pentateuch and, as we 
shall see, the Greek prophetic texts, will endow to later Jewish authors, who will then selectively 
draw upon these texts in order to incorporate notions of divine discipline into their overall 
conceptions of the ideal Jewish education and enculturation curriculum. 
 
Musar to Paideia in Prophetic Texts 
                                                 
60 Learning by positive example was certainly a proper and necessary means of paideia. See Lysias, Funeral Oration 
2.3: πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοὺς παλαιοὺς κινδύνους τῶν προγόνων δίειμι, μνήμην παρὰ τῆς φήμης λαβών: ἄξιον γὰρ 
πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις κἀκείνων μεμνῆσθαι, ὑμνοῦντας μὲν ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς, λέγοντας δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν γνώμαις, 
τιμῶντας δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς καιροῖς τοῖς τοιούτοις, παιδεύοντας δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς τῶν τεθνεώτων ἔργοις τοὺς ζῶντας. 
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We find the use of our terminology throughout the prophetic literature, though sparingly save for 
Isaiah and Jeremiah, both of which, like the Pentateuch translations, will prove influential in the 
later understanding of paideia as musar or God’s disciplinary violence. All instances of musar 
and y-s-r in Isaiah are translated with paideia and paideuō, except for 8:11, which has in the MT 
י ִּנ ֵּרְס ִּיְו. It seems that both the Greek and the Syriac understood the form as coming from the root s-
w-r, “to turn aside, leave, desert,” instead of y-s-r, translating the verb with ἀπειθοῦσι and 
ܝܢܝܛܣܢܘ respectively.61 In LXX 50:4-5, where paideia does not translate musar (v. 4 has παιδείας 
for םי ִּדוּמ ִּל, and ἡ παιδεία κυρίου is the subject that opens the ear instead of ה ִּוהְי יָנֹדֲא in v. 562), the 
traditional educational aspect of the noun is evident, but in all other cases, paideia takes on 
musar’s notion of divine chastening: 
 
Isa. 26:16 
וֹמָל ךְָרָסוּמ שַׁחַל ןוּקָצ ךָוּדָקְפ רַצַב הָוהְי 
O Lord, in distress they sought you, they poured out a prayer when your musar was on 
them. 
 
κύριε, ἐν θλίψει ἐμνήσθην σου, ἐν θλίψει μικρᾷ ἡ παιδεία σου ἡμῖν. 
O Lord, in affliction I remembered you; your paideia was on us with small affliction. 
 
Isa. 28:26 
  ויָהלֱֹא טָפְשׁ ִּמַל וֹרְס ִּיְווּנֶרוֹי  
                                                 
61 The Vulgate seems to have understood the form as the MT did, translating with erudivit me. 
62 On the phenomenon of paideia becoming the active subject of verbs in the Septuagint translations, see below in 
the section on the book of Proverbs. 
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 For his God instructs him for judgment and teaches him. 
 
 καὶ παιδευθήσῃ κρίματι θεοῦ σου καὶ εὐφρανθήσῃ. 
 And you will be instructed by the judgment of your God, and you will rejoice.  
  
Isa. 53:5 
 אָכֻדְמ וּנ ֵּעָשְׁפ ִּמ לָלֹחְמ אוּהְווּנָל־אָפְר ִּנ וֹתָרֻבֲחַבוּ ויָלָע וּנ ֵּמוֹלְשׁ רַסוּמ וּני ֵּתֹנוֲֹע ֵּמ  
But he was wounded for our transgressions, crushed for our iniquities; upon him was the 
musar that made us whole, and by his bruises we are healed. 
 
αὐτὸς δὲ ἐτραυματίσθη διὰ τὰς ἀνομίας ἡμῶν, καὶ μεμαλάκισται διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν· 
παιδεία εἰρήνης ἡμῶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτόν, τῷ μώλωπι αὐτοῦ ἡμεῖς ἰάθημεν. 
But he was wounded because of our lawless transgressions and harmed because of our 
sins; the paideia of our peace was upon him; by his bruises we were healed. 
 
In 26:16, God’s paideia is understood as but a small affliction (θλίψει μικρᾷ) compared to the 
great benefit conferred, similar to the birth pangs of a woman in labor (26:17). 27:7-9 reveals 
that this divine paideia includes even the exile, which at the same time expiates the guilt of the 
nation and forces them to remember the Lord and return to righteousness.63 The “instruction” in 
28:26 refers to the preparation of the people before they can be restored, God as the farmer who 
must plow the land and thresh the cumin with a rod (ῥάβδῳ 28:27). Finally, in 53:5 we have the 
servant who takes upon himself the paideia that makes the people whole, healthy, and at peace. 
                                                 
63 Cf. LXX Jer. 46:28 for a similar idea of the exile as part of God’s paideia. 
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This paideia which this innocent man must accept on behalf of an iniquitous people includes 
being beaten to death. This is the furthest we have seen the Greek terminology stretched thus far, 
and these passages will have a direct impact on the Wisdom of Solomon’s understanding of the 
divine paideia which the righteous man must accept, including even his brutal, bodily death. 
According to Sanders, “the clearest expose in the Bible of the doctrine of divine 
discipline is found in Jeremiah.”64 Although beyond the scope of Sanders’ monograph, we could 
say that the Septuagint version of Jeremiah, too, gives one of the clearest, most consistent 
pictures of the concept of paideia as musar. LXX Jeremiah consistently and extensively uses 
paideia / paideuō to translate the Hebrew musar / y-s-r and to refer to God’s divine punishment 
of the people. Of the thirteen instances of the Greek terms, there is only one example where the 
term has not taken on the transformed significance of the Hebrew, 17:23, which refers to 
Jeremiah’s failed attempt to instruct the people about Sabbath observance. In every other case, 
paideia has a clear and vivid chastening edge, which is the sole purview of God. A common 
theme developed throughout the text is the people’s continual rejection of God’s paideia, which, 
then, is their principal source of wickedness and sin and leads to the Babylonian exile.  
 
Jer. 2:30 
תי ִּחְשַׁמ הֵּיְרַאְכ םֶכי ֵּאי ִּבְנ םֶכְבְרַח הָלְכָא וּחָקָל ֹאל רָסוּמ םֶכיֵּנְב־תֶא י ִּתי ֵּכ ִּה אְוָשַּׁל 
In vain I have struck down your children; they accepted no musar. Your own sword 
devoured your prophets like a ravening lion. 
 
                                                 
64 Jim Alvin Sanders, Suffering as Divine Discipline in the Old Testament and Post-Biblical Judaism (Colgate 
Rochester Divinity School Bulletin XXVIII; Rochester, NY: Colgate Rochester Divinity School, 1955), 3. 
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μάτην ἐπάταξα τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν, παιδείαν οὐκ ἐδέξασθε· μάχαιρα κατέφαγεν τοὺς 
προφήτας ὑμῶν ὡς λέων ὀλεθρεύων, καὶ οὐκ ἐφοβήθητε. 
In vain I have smitten your children; you65 did not accept paideia; a sword has devoured 
your prophets like a destroying lion, and you did not fear. 
 
Jer. 5:3 
 ֲא ֵּמ עַלֶס ִּמ םֶהיֵּנְפ וּקְז ִּח רָסוּמ תַחַק וּנֲא ֵּמ םָתי ִּל ִּכ וּלָח־ֹאלְו םָתֹא הָתי ִּכ ִּה הָנוּמֱאֶל אוֹלֲה ךָיֶני ֵּע הָוֹהְיבוּשָׁל וּנ  
O Lord, do your eyes not look for truth? You have struck them, but they felt no anguish; 
you have consumed them, but they refused to take musar. They have made their faces 
harder than rock; they have refused to turn back. 
 
κύριε, οἱ ὀφθαλμοί σου <οὐχὶ> εἰς πίστιν; ἐμαστίγωσας αὐτούς, καὶ οὐκ ἐπόνεσαν· 
συνετέλεσας αὐτούς, καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησαν δέξασθαι παιδείαν· ἐστερέωσαν τὰ πρόσωπα 
αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ πέτραν καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησαν ἐπιστραφῆναι. 
O Lord, do your eyes not look for faith? You have scourged them, and they did not 
suffer; you consumed them, and they refused to receive paideia; they have made their 
faces harder than rock and they refuse to return. 
 
These examples make clear the notion of musar and paideia in the texts.66 The Hebrew text 
consistently refers to God’s punishment of the people for their wickedness as musar, and the 
Greek faithfully renders it with the standard translation of paideia, despite the fact that the Greek 
                                                 
65 The switch in subject in the Septuagint version seems to make the paideia here even more vivid and cruel, 
including the smiting of their children, than the musar in the MT version. 
66 Cf. Jer. 7:28; 10:24; 30:14; 31:18; 32:33; and 35:13. This is also what we find in Hosea’s conception of musar 
and paideia. See Hos. 5:2; 7:12, 15; and 10:10. 
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term simply could not encompass this range of meaning in its classical setting. While God’s 
violent paideia could afflict the innocent in Isaiah for a greater purpose, in Jeremiah, the paideia 
is always in response to wickedness and sin, as both punishment and instruction. In both texts, 
though, this punishment, no matter the severity, is seen as but a small affliction relative to the 
people’s sin and their future redemption. This is an idea that will be picked up by later authors in 
describing the chastening paideia, not of the wicked but of the righteous, yet miniscule torment 
in light of the future redemption in the form of the immortality of the soul in nearness to the 
divine.  
 
Musar to Paideia in Proverbs 
As we move to the use of paideia in the wisdom literature, we find a strikingly different take on 
how the Greek terminology is understood and utilized. While in the Pentateuch and the prophetic 
literature, the Greek terms come to adopt wholly the full range of meaning of the Hebrew musar, 
to the point where they cannot, at times, continue to maintain the Greek sense found in non-
Jewish Greek literature, the books of Proverbs and Job consistently affirm the traditional Greek 
understanding of paideia and distance the term from overt forms of physical discipline and 
violence inherent in the Hebrew text. While other, more suitable terms could have been chosen 
for the Hebrew musar / y-s-r, it is likely that the translators of the wisdom literature inherited the 
translation choices from the earlier translation of the Torah and were left with the task of trying 
to rework the text to suit better the Greek term’s semantic range. 
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The greatest number of instances of the Hebrew musar / y-s-r and the Greek paideia / 
paideuō in the HB and LXX occur in the book of Proverbs.67 Nearly every instance of musar is 
translated with the Greek paideia. Possible exceptions are 7:22, 8:33, 13:1, and 23:23. For 
unknown reasons, 8:33 and 23:23 are not extant in the Greek,68 and רסומ in 7:22 is probably best 
vocalized as môsēr, “bond,” from ʾsr, rather than mûsār. Therefore, we are left with only one 
instance where musar was not translated with paideia, 13:1: 
 
 הָרָעְגּ עַמָשׁ־ֹאל ץ ֵּלְו בָא רַסוּמ םָכָח ן ֵּב 
 A wise son, the musar of a father,  
but a scoffer does not listen to rebuke. 
 
 υἱὸς πανοῦργος ὑπήκοος πατρί, 
υἱὸς δὲ ἀνήκοος ἐν ἀπωλείᾳ. 
 A clever son is obedient to his father, 
 But a disobedient son goes to destruction. 
 
The Hebrew of 13:1a is a bit odd, with the second half the predicate of the first, literally “a wise 
son, musar of a father,” or “a wise son is the musar of a father,” which makes little sense. There 
have been several proposals made to clear up the meaning. For example, BHS, followed by 
NRSV, emends ʾb to ʾōhēb, “a wise son loves musar.” Others gap šamaʿ from 13:1b, take the 
                                                 
67 29 or 30 instances of musar (depending on whether you understand musar or moser in 7:22); 25 of paideia; 5 of 
ysr; and 12 of paideuō. 
68 Cook argues that the omission of 8:33 in the Greek was due to haplography. See Johannes Cook, The Septuagint 
of Proverbs-Jewish and/or Hellenistic Proverbs? Concerning the Hellenistic Colouring of LXX Proverbs (VTSup 
69; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 245. 
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notion of “obeys” from the Greek and the Syriac,69 or assume a qbl, “receives.” Fox, however, 
does not see a problem with the Hebrew, seeing the sentence as an example of “blunt 
juxtaposition, in which two nouns are set side-by-side without an obvious or usual semantic 
connection, leaving the reader to tease out the connection.”70 Both the Greek and the Syriac texts 
exhibit some confusion with the Hebrew and the intention to make the meaning more explicit.71 
We can read nothing more into the Greek text and the lack of paideia in this circumstance. 
 In LXX Proverbs, the Greek paideia is always translating the Hebrew musar, but for 
three exceptions. In 16:17, paideia occurs in a couplet not extant in the MT,72 and LXX 17:8 
appears to take an apparently distasteful proverb concerning the profitability of bribes and 
replace it with something more fully in line with Hellenistic sensibilities, the benefits of 
paideia.73 Finally, in 25:1 we find a unique translation move, emblematic of LXX Proverbs’ 
overall view of paideia and prescient of how Greek Proverbs will later come to be utilized: the 
mishley of Solomon become, not the paroimiai or the parabolai, but the paideiai of Solomon, the 
translator making explicit the educational value of the text and the sayings.74 
The Hebrew verbal root y-s-r is always translated with the verb paideuō, in 9:7, 19:18, 
29:17, 29:19, and 31:1. In just as many cases the Greek verb does not translate y-s-r. In 3:12 we 
                                                 
69 The Peshitto, similar to the Greek, has ܝܗܘܒܠܐ ܥܡܬܫܡ ܐܡܝܟܚ ܐܪܒ.  
70 Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 10-31 (AB 18b; New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 561. Fox argues 
against the retrograde gapping of šamaʿ, as this should only occur if the gapped verb is in final position (561 note 
271). 
71 The Vulgate too seems to try to help better explicate the Hebrew: filius sapiens doctrina patris qui autem inlusor 
est non audit cum arguitur. 
72 Compare: וֹכְרַד ר ֵּצֹנ וֹשְׁפַנ ר ֵּמֹשׁ עָר ֵּמ רוּס םי ִּרָשְׁי תַל ִּסְמ versus τρίβοι ζωῆς ἐκκλίνουσιν ἀπὸ κακῶν, μῆκος δὲ βίου ὁδοὶ 
δικαιοσύνης. ὁ δεχόμενος παιδείαν ἐν ἀγαθοῖς ἔσται, ὁ δὲ φυλάσσων ἐλέγχους σοφισθήσεται. ὃς φυλάσσει τὰς 
ἑαυτοῦ ὁδούς τηρεῖ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχήν, ἀγαπῶν δὲ ζωὴν αὐτοῦ φείσεται στόματος αὐτοῦ. 
73 Compare לי ִּכְשַׂי הֶנְפ ִּי רֶשֲׁא־לָכ־לֶא ויָלָעְב יֵּני ֵּעְב דַחֹשַּׁה ן ֵּח־ןֶבֶא to μισθὸς χαρίτων ἡ παιδεία τοῖς χρωμένοις, οὗ δ᾽ ἂν 
ἐπιστρέψῃ, εὐοδωθήσεται. Note the Syriac too removes the praise of bribery in the proverb. See Fox, Proverbs 10-
31, 1015. According to McKane, “LXX has apparently reacted against the opportunism of MT. What is achieved by 
bribery according to MT is, according to LXX, the product of παιδεία (mūsār), ‘discipline.’” See William McKane, 
Proverbs: A New Approach (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1970), 502. 
74 A and S do have παροιμίαι instead of παιδεῖαι, but paideiai seems like the clear lectio difficilior here, with 
paroimiai probably coming from a scribe(s) influenced by Prov. 1:1. 
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find the verb translating the Hebrew   ַחי ִּכוֹי, from y-k-ḥ, the root typically associated with y-s-r and 
almost always translated with the Greek elegchō. In fact, several good manuscripts have ἐλέγχει 
instead of παιδεύει, though it is difficult to say which is the best reading. On the one hand, 
paideuei would seem to be the lectio difficilior, as the verb y-k-ḥ is nearly universally translated 
with elegchō in LXX Proverbs.75 On the other hand, the idea in 3:12b, where the Lord “scourges 
(μαστιγοῖ) every son whom he receives,” would introduce an association between paideia / 
paideuō and physical violence which is unique in LXX Proverbs and in contrast to the 
understanding of paideia we find throughout the rest of the text. 
The participle paideuontos translates the Hebrew mōrāy, “teachers,” in 5:13, and 10:4, a 
stich not extant in the Hebrew, reads, “An educated (πεπαιδευμένος) son will be wise, and will 
use the fool as a servant.”76 LXX 28:17c-d, “educate (παίδευε) your son and he will love you and 
give honor to your soul,” seems to be a translation of MT 29:17. The reason for the placement in 
28:17 is unclear. Finally, the Greek translator of 22:3 took a rather mundane proverb found 
elsewhere in the text (27:12) and used it as an opportunity to introduce a unique educational 
concept, the idea of learning through witnessing the punishment of others: 
 
 וּרָעהָעָר הָאָר ם רָתְס ִּנְו וּשָׁנֱעֶנְו וּרְבָע םי ִּיָתְפוּ   
 A clever one sees evil and hides,  
but the simple go on and are punished. 
 
πανοῦργος ἰδὼν πονηρὸν τιμωρούμενον  
                                                 
75 9:7, 9:8, 15:12, 19:25, 24:25, 28:23, and 30:6. The lone exception is 25:12. 
76 According to Fox (Proverbs 10-31, 982): “The couplet is Gk in origin, since the Heb would have used ʿebed for 
‘servant’ in this context, but ʿebed is never rendered by Gk diakonos.” 
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κραταιῶς αὐτὸς παιδεύεται,  
οἱ δὲ ἄφρονες παρελθόντες ἐζημιώθησαν. 
When a clever man sees an evil man being punished  
severely, he is educated, 
but fools go on and are punished. 
 
This idea of intelligent people learning through the suffering of the wicked is similar to what we 
saw already in Deut. 11:2, though without the explicit violence, and it is a concept that will be 
picked up in later texts such as the Wisdom of Solomon. 
In several of the instances where paideia / paideuō translates musar / y-s-r, the Greek and 
Hebrew wholly overlap, and the Greek meaning fits well with the Hebrew range. Both musar 
and paideia come from Solomon’s proverbs themselves, parents, God, teachers or instructors, 
Lady Wisdom, and observation of the world.77 Both are closely connected with the “fear of 
Yahweh/God.”78 Both are received aurally and visually,79 are intimately connected to wisdom,80 
and lead to insight and understanding,81 which thereby makes them necessary for a good life82 
and for children.83 The rejection of musar and paideia is the trait of the foolish84 and leads to 
poverty, disgrace, and death.85 In all this, where paideia correlates well to musar in Proverbs, the 
understanding of the term in no way deviates from the classical Greek sense.  For example:  
                                                 
77 From the proverbs (1:2-3; 5:1-12; 25:1); one’s parents (1:8; 4:1-11; 15:5; 19:20, 27; 31:1); God (3:11); teachers or 
instructors (5:13); Lady Wisdom (8:10); observation of the world (24:32). 
78 15:33. 
79 Aurally (1:8; 4:1; 5:13; 19:20, 27; 23:12); visually (22:3; 24:32). 
80 1:7; 8:10; 15:33. 
81 4:1; 10:4; 12:1; 13:18; 15:33; 16:17; 19:20. 
82 4:13; 10:17; 16:17, 22. 
83 19:18; 22:15; 28:17; 29:17. 
84 1:7; 5:12-13, 23; 10:17; 12:1; 15:5; 19:27. 
85 5:23; 13:18; 15:10. 
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Prov. 19:20 
 ךֶָתי ִּרֲחַאְב םַכְחֶת ןַעַמְל רָסוּמ ל ֵּבַקְו הָצ ֵּע עַמְשׁ 
Hear counsel and accept musar, 
that you may be wise in your later years. 
 
ἄκουε, υἱέ, παιδείαν πατρός σου 
ἵνα σοφὸς γένῃ ἐπ᾽ ἐσχάτων σου. 
Hear, son, your father’s paideia, 
that you may be wise in your later years. 
 
Greek paideia here shows its affinity to the Sapiential worldview, and the Greek and Hebrew 
terms can both be read without compromise in their own native senses. When, however, the 
Hebrew text of Proverbs seems to head in a direction not compatible with the Greek 
terminology, the Greek text begins to diverge from its source and distance itself from apparently 
problematic ideas related to notions of education, resulting in a text that could later be read in 
ways wholly congruous to Hellenistic pedagogical notions. 
 In three cases, the Greek translator took a Hebrew text where musar was the object of a 
verb or a predicate nominative and made paideia the subject of the verb, transforming it into an 
active force.  
 
Prov. 10:17 
 בֵּזוֹעְו רָסוּמ ר ֵּמוֹשׁ םי ִּיַחְל חַרֹאהֶעְתַמ תַחַכוֹת  
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Whoever heeds musar is on the path to life,  
but one who rejects rebuke goes astray. 
 
ὁδοὺς δικαίας ζωῆς φυλάσσει παιδεία,  
παιδεία δὲ ἀνεξέλεγκτος πλανᾶται. 
Paideia protects the righteous paths of life, 
but paideia without refutation goes astray. 
 
Prov. 13:18 
דָבֻכְי תַחַכוֹת ר ֵּמוֹשְׁו רָסוּמ ַע ֵּרוֹפ ןוֹלָקְו שׁי ֵּר 
Poverty and disgrace are for the one who ignores musar,  
but one who heeds reproof is honored. 
 
πενίαν καὶ ἀτιμίαν ἀφαιρεῖται παιδεία,  
ὁ δὲ φυλάσσων ἐλέγχους δοξασθήσεται. 
Paideia removes poverty and disgrace, 
but the one who minds refutations will be honored. 
 
Prov. 15:10 
תוּמָי תַחַכוֹת אֵּנוֹשׂ חַרֹא בֵּזֹעְל עָר רָסוּמ 
There is severe musar for the one who forsakes the way, 
but one who hates reproof will die. 
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παιδεία ἀκάκου γνωρίζεται ὑπὸ τῶν παριόντων, 
οἱ δὲ μισοῦντες ἐλέγχους τελευτῶσιν αἰσχρῶς. 
The paideia of the simple86 is known by those passing by, 
but those who hate refutations will die shamefully. 
 
In all three verses, the move to make paideia the subject results in two separate but related 
outcomes. First, the notion of paideia is elevated, becoming an active force working in the 
universe, much like sophia, though not nearly as lofty.87 As an active subject, the Greek term 
takes on an almost abstract, independent, universal dimension not found in the Hebrew, where 
musar is typically the object of an action, something instilled by someone else, something to be 
heeded, accepted, or abandoned at the particular moment in time when it is offered. Though at 
times also a predicate nominative, nowhere in the texts of the Hebrew Bible is musar ever the 
subject of a verb, a force acting upon someone or something else. Making paideia an active 
subject exalts the concept to a level unknown with the Hebrew musar.88 
The second result of this change in subject is that it helps to distance the Greek term from 
the notion of punishment or correction found more clearly with the strict Hebrew parallelism. 
Throughout the book of Proverbs, musar and paideia are linked in some fashion to tochaḥath 
and elegchos.89 The Hebrew parallelism clearly shows that musar and tochaḥath are interwoven 
ideas, the former dependent on the latter. The Greek, however, subtly weakens this inseparable 
                                                 
86 Fox understands akakou as an error of for what should be kakou (Proverbs 10-31, 1007). This conjecture seems 
unnecessary. 
87 Cf. 4:13 in both the Hebrew and the Greek: “Take hold of musar / my paideia; do not let go; guard her, for she is 
your life.” 
88 While Cook and others have urged caution when interpreting the change in subjects or objects in the Septuagint 
translations, the important point here is how the Greek text would have later been read and interpreted, not the 
ideological or theological motivations of the translator. See Cook, The Septuagint of Proverbs, 226. 
89 3:11; 5:12; 6:23; 10:17; 12:1; 13:18; 15:5, 10, 32; 16:17; 22:15. 
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connection. In the three cases above, the translator has broken the strict parallelism of the 
Hebrew text, which is not uncommon in LXX Proverbs,90 but, nevertheless, results in a greater 
distance between paideia and elegchos, where elegchos may be an aspect of paideia but not the 
defining aspect. 
 
Excursus: תַחַכוֹת and ἔλεγχος 
As to the exact notions of tochaḥath and elegchos, the terms have much in common. The verbal 
forms y-k-ḥ and elegchō both have a similar range of meaning, to decide, judge, prove, rebuke, 
reprove, refute, correct, reprimand, censure, blame, etc., in essence, to set to right, with the nouns 
being the blame, censure, reprimand, etc., the thing which will set to right.91 The Hebrew 
terminology is common in a juridical setting, with the lemma found prominently in the context of 
the covenant lawsuit: “Come now, let us argue it out (הָחְכָוּ ִּנ), says the Lord: though your sins are 
like scarlet, they will be like snow; though they are red like crimson, they will be like wool” (Isa. 
1:18).92  
While tochaḥath is often under Yahweh’s purview, the book of Job turns this notion on 
its head, with Job wanting, instead, to bring God to trial for the unfair treatment he has received. 
In many ways, the entire text of Job revolves around the concept of tochaḥath, when and by 
                                                 
90 See Gillis Gerleman, Studies in the Septuagint. III. Proverbs (Acta Universitatis Lundensis Nova Series; Lunds 
Universistets Årsskrift Ny Följd Första Avedelningen 1 Band 52 Number 3; Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1956), 18. 
91 On the Septuagint usage, Büchsel notes that, in distinction from paideuein and y-s-r, “behind which there is 
always the idea of paternal chastisement, it [elegchō and y-k-ḥ] denotes the disciplining and educating of man by 
God as a result of His judicial activity. This embraces all aspects of education from the conviction of the sinner to 
chastisement and punishment, from the instruction of the righteous by severe tests to his direction by teaching and 
admonition” (“ἐλέγχω,” TDNT 473). We shall see that both of these comments are patently false. On the Greek 
terminology generally, see Friedrich Büchsel, “ἐλέγχω,” TDNT 2:473-476; LSJ 531; and T. Muraoka, A Greek-
English Lexicon of the Septuagint (Louvain: Peeters, 2009), 222. 
92 Cf. Isa. 2:4; 11:4; Ezek. 5:15; 25:17. See Herbert B. Huffmon, “The Covenant Lawsuit in the Prophets,” JBL 78.4 
(Dec., 1959): 285-295. On the Hebrew terminology generally, see “yākaḥ / tôkēḥâ / tôkaḥat,” TWOT §865. 
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whom it is appropriate and necessary. Job’s companions understand his great sufferings as part 
of God’s divine tochaḥath (5:17; 19:5; 22:4), designed to correct some unknown but certain fault 
on Job’s part. Job, instead, responds by wondering why they are putting him on trial, knowing 
that he is truly innocent and blameless (6:25-26). Yet, Job refuses to reprove his friends, instead 
making clear that he will only argue his case with God (ץָפְחֶא ל ֵּא־לֶא ַח ֵּכוֹהְו) (13:3, 5; 16:21), even 
though he knows that any trial between a mortal and an immortal is a priori unfair, as there is no 
one able to adjudicate between them (9:32-35). Nevertheless, in his despair, Job’s only desires 
the possibility: 
 
Job 23:3-7 
׃וֹתָנוּכְת־דַע אוֹבָא וּה ֵּאָצְמֶאְו י ִּתְעַדָי ן ֵּת ִּי־י ִּמ 
׃תוֹחָכוֹת א ֵּלַמֲא י ִּפוּ טָפְשׁ ִּמ ויָנָפְל הָכְרֶעֶא  
׃י ִּל רַמֹאי־הַמ הָני ִּבָאְו י ִּנ ֵּנֲעַי םי ִּל ִּמ הָעְד ֵּא 
ם ִּשָׂי אוּה־ךְַא ֹאל י ִּדָמ ִּע בי ִּרָי ַחֹכ־בָרְבַה ׃י ִּב  
׃י ִּטְפֹשּׁ ִּמ חַצֶנָל הָטְלַפֲאַו וֹמ ִּע חָכוֹנ רָשָׁי םָשׁ 
 
Oh, that I knew where I might find him,  
that I might come even to his dwelling! 
I would lay my case before him,  
and fill my mouth with tochaḥoth. 
I would learn the words with which he would answer me,  
and understand what he would say to me. 
Would he contend with me in the greatness of his power?  
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No, surely he would give heed to me. 
There an upright person could put him to trial,  
and I should be acquitted forever by my judge. 
 
In the end, Job, the “reprover of God ( ַהּוֹלֱא ַחי ִּכוֹמ)” (40:2), gets his chance, but as he expected, it 
is not a fair trial. Yahweh simply belittles Job, bragging about all of the great things of which he, 
and no one else, is capable, and Job, too awestruck to continue his plea, gives in (38:1-42:6). 
The Greek too is often used in the context of trials and lawsuits: “And all those who 
persuaded you by means of envy and slander—and some also persuaded others because they had 
been themselves persuaded—all these are most difficult to cope with; for it is not even possible 
to call any of them up here and cross-question (ἐλέγξαι) him, but I am compelled in making my 
defence to fight, as it were, absolutely with shadows and to cross-question (ἐλέγχειν) when 
nobody answers” (Plato, Apol. 18d; LCL trans.).93 
Unique to the Hebrew terms, God’s discipline, education, and reproof can take the form 
of severe punishment and violence: 
 
Ezekiel 5:15 
 הָמ ֵּחְבוּ ףַאְב םי ִּטָפְשׁ ךְָב י ִּתוֹשֲׂעַב ךְ ִּיָתוֹבי ִּבְס רֶשֲׁא ם ִּיוֹגַּל הָמַשְׁמוּ רָסוּמ הָפוּדְגוּ הָפְרֶח הָתְיָהְו  י ִּנֲא הָמ ֵּח תוֹחְכֹתְבוּ  
י ִּתְרַב ִּד הָוהְי 
And it will be a reproach, a taunt, a musar, and a horror to the nations around  
you, when I execute judgments upon you in anger, wrath, and furious tocheḥoth. I the 
Lord, have spoken. 
                                                 
93 There are many examples of the juridical usage of elegchos. See also Thucydides, History of Peloponnesian War 
3.53; Antiphon, Against the Stepmother for Poisoning 1.12; and Plato, Phaedrus 273b-c.  
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καὶ ἔσῃ στενακτὴ καὶ δηλαϊστὴ ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν τοῖς κύκλῳ σου ἐν τῷ ποιῆσαί με ἐν σοὶ 
κρίματα ἐν ἐκδικήσει θυμοῦ μου ἐγὼ κύριος λελάληκα 
And you will be mourned over and wretched among the nations around you, when I 
execute judgments upon you in the vengeance of my wrath. I, the Lord, have spoken. 
 
Note the difference in the LXX translation, where neither musar nor tochaḥath are translated 
with the typical paideia and elegchos. The translator here chose to simply ignore musar and 
tochaḥath, as opposed to instilling upon the typical Greek terminology aspects outside their 
semantic range. Greek elegchos / elegchō does not have the strong sense of punishment and 
physical threat or violence, which is often integral to the Hebrew concept of tochaḥath.94 
An important aspect of the Greek terminology which has no parallel in the Hebrew, is 
found in the philosophical sphere, where elegchō / elegchos represents the philosopher’s 
controverting of propositions as an integral aspect of paideia. We find an excellent discussion of 
this ideal educational tool in the dialogue between Theaetetus and the visiting philosopher in 
Plato’s Sophist. Coming to the conclusion that paideia is that part of teaching that gets rid of a 
lack of learning (ἀμαθίαν) in the soul (229c), the philosopher argues that paideia must be divided 
into two unique aspects, νουθετητικός and ἔλεγχος, “admonition” and “refutation.” The first, 
νουθετητικός or “admonition,” is the “rough road,” “our forefathers’ time-honored method of 
scolding or gently encouraging. They used to employ it especially on their sons, and many still 
                                                 
94 See also 2 Sam. 7:14: “I will be a father to him, and he shall be a son to me. When he commits iniquity, I will 
punish him with a rod such as mortals use, with blows inflicted by human beings (םָדָא יֵּנְב י ֵּעְג ִּנְבוּ םי ִּשָׁנֲא טֶב ֵּשְׁב וי ִּתְחַכֹהְו),” 
and the connection between y-k-ḥ and n-k-h, “smite” in Prov. 19:25 and Ps. 141:5. Note that LSJ offers several 
examples of elegchos / elegchō, meaning “(to) reproach, disgrace, dishonor,” and other unpleasantness, but always 
with the understanding that the rebuke is verbal and does not include any overt physical violence. 
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use it on them nowadays when they do something wrong” (229e-230a).95 The second, and clearly 
superior form of paideia, ἔλεγχος or “refutation,” the “smooth way,” is the means by which the 
belief in one’s own wisdom is called into question:  
They cross-examine someone when he thinks he’s saying something though he’s saying 
nothing. Then, since his opinions will vary inconsistently, these people will easily 
scrutinize them. They collect his opinions together during the discussion, put them side 
by side, and show that they conflict with each other at the same time on the same subjects 
in relation to the same things and in the same respects. The people who are being 
examined see this, get angry at themselves, and become calmer toward others. They lose 
their inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter to hear 
or has a more lasting effect on them. Doctors who work on the body think it can’t benefit 
from any food that’s offered to it until what’s interfering with it from inside is removed. 
The people who cleanse the soul, my young friend, likewise think the soul, too, won’t get 
any advantage from any learning that’s offered to it until someone shames it by refuting it 
(πρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας), removes the opinions 
that interfere with learning, and exhibits it cleansed, believing that it knows only those 
things that it does know, and nothing more. (230b-d)  
Elegchos, then, is a fundamental aspect of paideia which helps to cleanse the soul of ignorance 
and hubris by removing from it unfounded assumptions and presuppositions, leaving the 
individual in possession only of that which one truly does know and understand. In this sense, 
“refutation is the principal and most important kind of cleansing / τὸν ἔλεγχον λεκτέον ὡς ἄρα 
μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεών ἐστι,” (230d) and without it one is “uneducated and ugly 
                                                 
95 Translations from Plato’s Sophist are Cooper’s, from Plato: Complete Works (ed. John M. Cooper; assoc. ed. D. 
S. Hutchinson; Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 235-293. 
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(ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν96), in just the ways that anyone who is going to be really happy has 
to be completely clean and beautiful” (230e). 
 Socratic dialectic makes consistent use of, and is based on, this type of elegchos 
throughout Plato’s dialogues. A particularly nice example of not only the proper use of elegchos 
but also the difference between sophistical, rhetorical, or juridical elegchos and true 
philosophical elegchos is found in Socrates’ exchange with Polus in Plato’s Gorgias. Polus, 
encouraged by his rhetorical training and believing that he has caught Socrates in an obvious 
blunder, claims that even a child could refute him: “So hard to refute (ἐλέγξαι) you, Socrates! 
Nay, a mere child could refute you (ἐλέγξειεν), could he not, and prove your words are untrue?” 
(470c). Socrates draws Polus in and quickly turns the tables on him, pointing out the flaws of 
rhetorical refutation: “My gifted friend, that is because you attempt to refute me in rhetorical 
fashion (ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν), as they understand refuting (ἐλέγχειν) in the law 
courts. For there, one party is supposed to refute (ἐλέγχειν) the other when they bring forward a 
number of reputable witnesses to any statements they may make, whilst their opponent produces 
only one, or none. But this sort of refutation is quite worthless for getting at the truth (οὗτος δὲ ὁ 
ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν)” (470e-471a). While Polus may bring forward 
any number of false witnesses in an attempt sway favor, Socrates makes clear that the only 
witness that counts is the person sitting across the table, getting your opponent to bear witness 
for your side (472b-c). This speaks to the fundamental difference between rhetorical or juridical 
elegchos and philosophical, dialectic elegchos; the one seeks to win the favor of the crowd by 
any means necessary, the other seeks only the truth: “for the truth is never refuted (τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς 
οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται)” (473b). In the end, of course, the master takes Polus systematically through 
                                                 
96 Note the association between a lack of elegchos and dying aischrōs in Proverbs 15:10 above. 
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his elegchos and brings him over to his side of thinking, removing the error of hubris and 
ignorance from his soul, as is the purpose of elegchos.97 
Despite the similarity in the Hebrew and Greek terminology, read on their own, those 
texts which put musar and paideia into close association with tochaḥath and elegchos would 
have been understood very differently. The readers of the LXX in their Hellenistic setting would 
not have the insinuation of divine punishment typically associated with tochaḥath, but instead 
would read into the texts a natural and fundamental aspect of paideia, philosophical cross-
examining and dialogue versus violent rebuke. The choice of elegchos to translate the Hebrew 
tochaḥath introduced a different nuance of meaning. While tochaḥath was often connected to 
severe, perhaps physical, chastisement and punishment, the Greek term had a more natural 
setting in the educational sphere, as verbal refutation or cross-examination, either at court or in 
the philosophical circle. The relationship, therefore, between paideia and elegchos need not 
insinuate any form of disciplinary chastisement. The typical translation of tochaḥath / y-k-ḥ with 
elegchos / elegchō further affirmed the texts of the Septuagint and the Jews as part of the 
important discussions taking place on the nature of paideia within a wider philosophical 
perspective. 
 
Where musar is inseparably linked to the notion of chastisement or punishment, it is not 
uncommon for the Greek text to break subtly the strict identification. For example, in 6:23 and 
                                                 
97 We might see here a foreshadowing or a germ of the much more thorough and sophisticated system Aristotle will 
present in his De sophisticis elenchis, where he systematically goes through the various fallacies brought forth in 
sophistical or rhetorical arguments, how to spot them in others’ arguments and your own, and how to defend against 
them: “Let us now discuss sophistical refutations, that is, arguments which appear to be refutations but are really 
fallacies and not refutations (Περὶ δὲ τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων μὲν ἐλέγχων, ὄντων δὲ 
παραλογισμῶν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐλέγχων, λέγωμεν)” (164a). 
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22:15, musar is placed in a genitive/construct relationship with tochaḥath and sheveṭ, the rod, 
respectively. 
 
Prov. 6:23 
 
רָסוּמ תוֹחְכוֹת םי ִּיַח ךְֶרֶדְו רוֹא הָרוֹתְו הָוְצ ִּמ רֵּנ י ִּכ 
 For the commandment is a lamp and the torah a light,  
and reproofs of musar are the way of life. 
 
ὅτι λύχνος ἐντολὴ νόμου καὶ φῶς,98  
καὶ ὁδὸς ζωῆς ἔλεγχος καὶ παιδεία,  
For the commandment of the law is a lamp and a light, 
and refutation is the way of life and paideia.99 
 
Prov. 22:15 
 
וּנֶמ ִּמ הָנֶקי ִּחְרַי רָסוּמ טֶב ֵּשׁ רַעָנ־בֶלְב הָרוּשְׁק תֶלֶוּ ִּא 
 Foolishness is bound up in the heart of a child, 
 but the rod of musar drives it far from him. 
 
                                                 
98 Editors punctuate the verse differently. Rahlfs places the comma after φῶς, Swete after νόμου, though the 
ambiguity is noted in his apparatus. My translation makes clear where I suspect the comma should be placed. 
99 My translation of LXX 6:23 here differs from both the Brenton and NETS translations, which respectively have, 
“For the commandment of the law is a lamp and a light; a way of life; reproof also and correction,” and “for the 
law’s commandment is a lamp and a light and a way of life, reproof and discipline.” These translations, however, do 
not properly reflect the parallelism in the stich (6:23a: predicate, subject, predicate; 6:23b: predicate, subject, 
predicate). 
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 ἄνοια ἐξῆπται καρδίας νέου,  
ῥάβδος δὲ καὶ παιδεία μακρὰν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ. 
Foolishness is bound to the heart of a child, 
but the rod and paideia are from him. 
 
In both cases above, the Greek breaks the construct chain, which puts more distance between the 
pedagogy and the punishment, allowing the Septuagint text to be read in a way more consistent 
with the classical usage of paideia and, in 6:23, elegchos. Granted, there is still the association in 
22:15 between paideia and the rod. This is even clearer in 13:24 and 23:13-14, the only cases in 
LXX Proverbs where paideia is linked to some form of physical violence, but these, like 22:15, 
are very specific cases where the paideia is meant for a young child. The harsh treatment of 
children in their education and upbringing was not uncommon, but rather often seen as necessary 
in the ancient Greek context.100  
Only in the case of children was physical punishment seen as a necessary part of the 
educational process. Therefore, the connection between paideia and the rabdos in LXX Proverbs 
is neither surprising nor exceptional, and a text like 23:13-14 is perfectly understood in a Greek 
context: “Do not refrain from educating (παιδεύειν) a child; for if you beat him with a rod, he 
will not die. For if you beat him with a rod, you will deliver his soul from death.” Yet, it is 
important to note that never is this physical punishment of students referred to by the term 
paideia, and, by the time of Philo, we do find a number of Greek or Roman authors speaking out 
against the corporal punishment of children.101 
                                                 
100 See the discussion in Chap. 2. 
101 See the discussion in Chap. 2. 
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If we are attempting to read the Greek text on its own terms, as a Jew in the Hellenistic 
Diaspora would have read it, and not in light of the Hebrew, we come to the conclusion that 
nowhere in Greek Proverbs does paideia mean anything different from the classical Greek 
understanding of the term. The verb, paideuō, too, maintains the Greek sense over the Hebrew y-
s-r. There is clearly a great deal of overlap between the Hebrew musar and the Greek paideia, 
making them often quite compatible in Proverbs. But, the Hebrew term and the related tochaḥath 
/ y-k-ḥ have more naturally inherent the notion of physical discipline, rebuke, chastening, 
chastisement, punishment, etc., which is foreign to the Greek terminology, outside of the specific 
instance of disciplining children. Therefore, reading each text on its own terms would bring to 
mind a unique distinction of meaning based on the particular milieu. The notions of physical 
discipline, rebuke, and chastisement implicit in the Hebrew musar are largely absent from the 
Greek text and without the Hebrew text open beside the Greek, one would not be led to this 
understanding. What the translator has left us is a text which is able to be read in its entirety in 
easily understood Hellenistic terms and concepts.  
 
Musar to Paideia in Job 
Musar / y-s-r occurs five or six times in the book of Job.102 Paideia occurs only twice in the text, 
once as a translation of musar (20:3) and once as a translation of the Hebrew shevet, “rod” 
(37:13). The verb paideuō is not found in LXX Job. In 4:3 y-s-r is translated with the verb 
noutheteō, and in 5:17 musar is translated with noun nouthetēma. These Greek cognates are 
                                                 
102 As in Prov. 7:22, mwsr is probably best vocalized as môsēr in Job 12:18 instead of mûsār, “bond” as opposed to 
“discipline.” 
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terms probably better suited to musar / y-s-r and the notions of chastisement, rebuke, and 
admonition, often in the context of correcting behavior for instructional purposes, latent in them. 
 In every instance where our terminology is found in Job, the Greek translator distances 
the text from the idea that Job’s afflictions are somehow meant to be God’s divine education. 
This coheres well with the overall view of the text: the blameless Job is in no way in need of 
correction or instruction, and the afflictions are not meant as such; it is only Job’s friends who 
believe them to be, and they are consistently proven misguided. Even though coming from the 
mouth of Job’s ignorant companions, the following Greek texts suggest an uneasiness with 
utilizing the term paideia to Job’s great suffering. 
 
Job 5:17 
סָאְמ ִּת־לַא יַדַשׁ רַסוּמוּ ַהּוֹלֱא וּנֶח ִּכוֹי שׁוֹנֱא י ֵּרְשַׁא הֵּנ ִּה 
How happy is the one whom God reproves;  
therefore do not despise the musar of the Almighty. 
 
μακάριος δὲ ἄνθρωπος, ὃν ἤλεγξεν ὁ κύριος·  
νουθέτημα δὲ παντοκράτορος μὴ ἀπαναίνου 
Happy is the man whom the Lord has reproved; 
so, do not reject the chastisement of the Almighty. 
 
Job 33:16 
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104םֹתְחַי 103םָרָסֹמְבוּ םי ִּשָׁנ ֲא ןֶזֹא הֶלְג ִּי זָא 
Then he opens their ears, 
and he seals / frightens them with musar. 
 
τότε ἀνακαλύπτει νοῦν ἀνθρώπων,  
ἐν εἴδεσιν φόβου τοιούτοις αὐτοὺς ἐξεφόβησεν  
Then he opens the mind of men; 
he frightens them with such fearful visions. 
 
Job 36:10 
ןֶוָא ֵּמ ןוּבֻשְׁי־י ִּכ רֶמֹאיַו רָסוּמַל םָנְזָא לֶג ִּיַו 
He opens their ears to musar, 
and commands that they return from iniquity. 
 
ἀλλὰ τοῦ δικαίου εἰσακούσεται·  
※ καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι ἐπιστραφήσονται ἐξ ἀδικίας. 
But he will listen to the righteous; 
and he said that they will return from unrighteousness. 
 
Job 5:17 is part of Eliphaz’s first speech against Job (4:1-5:27), where he argues that Job must 
welcome the afflictions that God has brought against him, as the innocent will not suffer in the 
                                                 
103 Most scholars agree that this is best pointed as ûbemûsārām. 
104 Many scholars repoint the verb here, following the LXX, with yeḥittēm. See Norman C. Habel, The Book of Job: 
A Commentary (OTL; Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1985), 458. 
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end. Here, God’s musar may be the infliction of pain or wounds, but in the end God ultimately 
heals (5:18). The Greek translates musar with nouthetēma, a term that can carry the disciplinary 
aspects of musar but without the inherent pedagogical force found in paideia. Job 33:16 is from 
Elihu’s first speech (32:1-33:33), where he contends that God always answers mortals but in 
ways they may not understand, such as in dreams or visions. Here God is meant to frighten 
people in their dreams in order to correct their sinful behavior (33:17-18). The musar can include 
pain (v. 19), lack of appetite (v. 20), a wasting away of one’s flesh (v. 21), and a near-death 
experience (v. 22). The Greek translator clearly had a problem associating these awful 
punishments with God’s paideia and instead chose to label them more obviously as “fearful 
visions.” Job 36:10 is again Elihu speaking, maintaining God’s ultimate goodness and justice. 
While musar here is not directly associated with violent discipline, as in the previous two verses, 
Elihu’s point in his speech is that Job’s afflictions are part of God’s musar, and he must be 
willing to listen to and learn from God’s instruction or else die (36:11-15). As in the other 
examples, the Greek text shows no connection whatsoever between Job’s suffering and divine 
paideia. 
 Only twice in LXX Job do we find the term paideia, 20:3 and 37:13: 
 
Job 20:3 
 י ִּנ ֵּנֲעַי י ִּתָני ִּב ִּמ ַחוּרְו עָמְשֶׁא י ִּתָמ ִּלְכ רַסוּמ 
 I have heard musar which shames me, 
 and my discerning spirit compels me to answer. 
 
 παιδείαν ἐντροπῆς μου ἀκούσομαι,  
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καὶ πνεῦμα ἐκ τῆς συνέσεως ἀποκρίνεταί μοι  
I will hear paideia of my shame, 
and the spirit of understanding answers me. 
 
Job 37:13 
 וֹצְרַאְל־ם ִּא טֶב ֵּשְׁל־ם ִּאוּה ֵּא ִּצְמַי דֶסֶחְל־ם ִּא  
Whether for chastisement, or for his land,  
or for love, he causes it to happen. 
 
※ ἐὰν εἰς παιδείαν, ἐὰν εἰς τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ,  
※ ἐὰν εἰς ἔλεος εὑρήσει αὐτόν. 
Whether for paideia, or for his land, 
or for mercy, he will find him. 
 
The only time the translator used paideia for musar is in 20:3, where Zophar, angrily, refers not 
to God’s musar but to Job’s, to Job’s attempts to educate and correct his friends’ misguided 
ideas, that they themselves will be punished for persecuting Job without cause (19:28-29). Job 
37:13 is interesting, in that the translator chose to use paideia for the Hebrew shevet, “rod,” as 
opposed to the typical rabdos, where Elihu is discussing God’s workings in nature, which are 
inscrutable to humankind (36:24-37:12), replacing a disciplinary point with a pedagogical one: 
nature does not punish; it instructs. 
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The Greek text of Job consistently reveals an unwillingness to refer to Job’s afflictions as 
part of God’s discipline, which, in the Hebrew, is said to either punish Job for his sins or instruct 
him to be faithful to the divine. These assertions from Job’s companions are obviously erroneous 
and counter to the entire worldview espoused through the book of Job, where Job is wholly 
blameless and has done nothing wrong to deserve punishment or reproach. Unlike 
Deuteronomistic / covenantal theology or traditional Sapiential thinking, reward and punishment 
are not necessarily the result of piety and wickedness. In Job, God is mysterious and 
incomprehensible to humans and is above mortal concepts such as covenant or justice. The 
preceding Greek texts, then, can be read more closely in line with the overall thrust of the 
narrative, and one reading only the Greek version of the text would never associate physical 
violence with the lofty notion of paideia. There is no hint in Greek Job that paideia should refer 
to some kind of divine punishment or chastening rebuke.105 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
This study into the use of paideia in the Septuagint translations has yielded clearly defined 
results and a pattern of usage which would prove highly influential among the Greek speaking 
Jews in the Hellenistic Diaspora. The sense of paideia we often find in the Pentateuch and 
prophetic literature is largely foreign to the classical Greek range of meaning. Paideia in these 
texts could take on notions of divine disciplinary action, including physical and mental violence 
                                                 
105 This point would be strengthened if the translator or Job was the same as that of Proverbs, as several scholars 
have argued. See Gerleman, Studies in the Septuagint. III. Proverbs, 59-60; Gerleman, Studies in the Septuagint. I. 
Book of Job (Acta Universitatis Lundensis Nova Series; Lunds Universistets Årsskrift Ny Följd Första 
Avedelningen 1 Band 43 Number 2; Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1946); and Emanuel Tov, The Text-Critical Use of the 
Septuagint in Biblical Research (Revised and enlarged second edition; Jerusalem Biblical Studies 8; Jerusalem: 
Simor Ltd., 1997), 16. 
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designed to either punish the people for their sins, instruct the people to uphold their covenant 
promises, or both. In these texts, we might say that Hebrew notions of musar have been overlaid 
onto the Greek term, and this usage of paideia, connected to divine violence, will later be found 
only in those texts influenced by the Septuagint translation itself, Jewish Hellenistic literature 
and early Christian authors. The Greek translation of the Pentateuch and the prophetic literature 
expanded paideia’s possible range of meaning for the Jews and Christians who held these texts 
as sacred and foundational. 
In the wisdom literature, we find a very different approach to the translation of the 
Hebrew and the understanding of paideia within the Greek text: it does not encompass notions of 
punishment and physical rebuke but always has a clear educational emphasis. We never find in 
these texts a modification of the Greek term’s semantic range which, then, better reflects the 
Hebrew understanding of musar. Instead, the terminology in the texts maintain the classical 
Greek range of meaning. This differs fundamentally with the meaning overlaid onto the Greek 
paideia in the Pentateuch and prophetic literature. If the later Jewish translators of Proverbs and 
Job were in some measure bound to the use of paideia / paideuō, even in circumstances that 
directly conflicted with their innate meaning, they went to great lengths to distance the Greek 
notion from any hint of violence or physical rebuke. It is these two disparate and, at times, 
opposed views that will have such a tremendous impact on the understanding of paideia in later 
Jewish thinking, with authors able to utilize both concepts, the one more congruous to their 
ancestral customs, the other to their current Hellenistic Sitz im Leben, in order to develop ideas 
related to the education and enculturation of their fellow Jews encompassing, but unique from, 
both. 
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Part II. Thinking about Paideia in the Hellenistic Diaspora 
As we move from the production of the Septuagint to its reception in the first century CE, the 
impact of the translation choice of paideia for musar on the development of new and innovative 
educational theories is felt in a variety of ways. At the most discernible level, the two patterns of 
translation I have identified would have the more obvious repurcussions. With the translators of 
Proverbs and Job unwilling to compromise the classical semantic range of the paideia 
terminology, we are left with Greek texts which diverge from the Hebrew at those points which 
would have associated paideia with overt violence and disciplinary rebuke. Choosing to remain 
consistent with their translation of musar, the translators produced texts now distinct in their 
views on the role of corporal punishment and divine discipline within the realm of education. In 
the Greek Pentateuch and prophetic literature, however, later readers would find an impression 
of paideia distinctive from that found in any other Greek literature to that point. This paideia 
could refer directly to horrible violence and punishment. With God as the agent, this discipline 
was still viewed as educational, and, no matter the gravity of the suffering, it could be considered 
as but a slight and temporary discomfort compared to the rewards that came with the training. 
This view of paideia had a clear and direct result on at least two of the following authors. The 
author of the Wisdom of Solomon would take up this view with great fervency in developing his 
theory of education, but in a way altogether disparate from that found in the Septuagint texts 
themselves. The author would pick up the divine educational discipline from the prophets, but 
combine it with the Platonic view of paideia as determinative to the future life of the soul. God’s 
rebuke is still a minor affliction compared to its benefits, but the principle benefit is now 
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immortality free from the corporeal shell. This expanded view of paideia from the Septuagint 
would influence Philo as well, who would turn the notion on its head by symbolizing paideia as 
the disciplinary rod. Education does not require corporal punishment; instead, education is 
required to combat and beat back the desires of the flesh. Both of these authors would combine 
and reshape the traditions of Moses and the prophets together with that of Plato and the 
philosophers in the formulation of new, yet distinctive views on the role of punishment in 
education, and in this methodology we see another impact of the translation choice, less 
pronounced but far more consequential. 
 The very move of inserting paideia into the revered, received Jewish scriptures would 
provide the necessary link which allowed later thinkers like the author of the Wisdom of Solomon 
or Philo to freely merge Jewish traditions with Greek philosophical and rhetorical theories of 
education. Whether or not this was the outcome intended by the initial translators, later Jews 
were given their own texts devoted to paideia which could then be used in conjunction with the 
extensive reflections on paideia of Greek authors like Plato or Isocrates. The impact is felt 
throughout the discussions to follow, even if it is not immediately apparent. We can see the 
influence in Philo’s view of the necessity of encyclical paideia for most of humanity, in the 
Wisdom of Solomon’s call to follow the paideia of Sophia, and in Paul’s insistence on the 
propaedeutic function of the Jewish law. We see the influence everywhere, and the educational 
theories of our three authors would have developed far differently—if at all—had the initial 
translators chosen terms perhaps more semantically commensurate to the Hebrew musar. 
Instead, by imbedding terminology which had such a profound cultural significance in the 
Hellenistic world, the translators left to later generations the means of engaging the wider world 
on an equal, if not superior, level. In the following three chapters, we will see the result of this 
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initial translation move as found in three contemporary Jewish thinkers, each of whom developed 
their own distinctive views of the ideal paideia of the Jews and humankind generally. And we 
will see how the distinctive characteristics of each reflected not only their own unique views on 
education proper, but also the differing ways in which the authors would conceive of the self and 
of Jewish identity. 
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Chapter 4. Philo of Alexandria 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Philo of Alexandria is a crucial figure in our attempt to understand how Greek-speaking Jews 
could utilize the Septuagint in the creation of innovative notions and ideals of Jewish paideia in 
the Mediterranean Diaspora of the Second Temple period, and how these views of ideal paideia 
were employed as a means of contemplating on and shaping individual and collective identity. 
He is important, first, because we know who he is. We know when he lived and worked. We 
know about his family and his elite socio-economic status in the central Hellenistic city of the 
Roman world. We know of his elevated, respected role within the Jewish community of 
Alexandria, nearly one-third the total population of the city and the largest Jewish community in 
the world at the time. And, we know about his own education, at least from the viewpoint of 
personal reflections, interspersed sparingly throughout his writings. Philo’s corpus is another 
reason he is important in this understanding. His body of work is the largest we have from any 
Second Temple Jew and one of the largest from antiquity generally. And, much of this work is 
devoted precisely to the question of paideia.106 
                                                 
106 The statistics for the usage of paideia and cognates are impressive. The terminology set includes the terms 
paideia, paideuō, apaideusia, paideuma, propaideuma, paideusis, paidagōgos, apaidagōgētos, paideutikōs, 
apaideutos, eupaideutos, paidagōgeō, propaideuō, and paideutēs, and occurs in around 3.5% of all verses in Philo’s 
corpus, compared to 3% for sophia, 5.87% for nomos, and 10% for aretē. The most common of the set is paideia, 
152 instances in 146 verses, followed by the verb paideuō with 75 instances in 72 verses, apaideusia at 33 instances 
in 33 verses, and the rest of the terms following. The treatises with the highest percentage of usage per verse are De 
congressu eruditionis gratia (13.9% of verses), De ebrietate (12.5%), and De fuga et inventione (8.9%). 
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 These preceding points do not mean, however, that we can or should take Philo as 
representative of all Diaspora Jewish views on education, or that the various types of education 
he postulates, even those which he himself likely received, would have been desirable or even 
available to all Jews in Alexandria, not to mention those in smaller villages or in the countryside. 
What we have in Philo is a Jew from the very highest social and economic rung. He had the 
wealth and opportunities available to him to allow for the best possible education, and then the 
time necessary for research, study, and writing. As we discuss the various ideals Philo sets forth 
as the proper education for the Jewish people, and indeed for all humankind, we must keep this 
dichotomy in mind. 
 Despite this caveat, Philo remains deeply important to the project of understanding 
Jewish education, enculturation, and knowledge production during this period, not only because 
of his known biography or the size of his corpus, but also because of the way in which he makes 
use of his sources. In Philo, we find an ideal case of how a Second Temple Jewish thinker could 
utilize the Septuagint as a lens through which to view ancestral traditions, native customs, and 
the contemporary Greek philosophical milieu, and then to reimagine, reinterpret, combine, and 
morph foundational elements from each in the creation of a complex set of new and innovative 
paideutic concepts. And, in Philo, we see clearly that concern for the education of the Jewish 
people was not a question existing in isolation, but was part of a larger discussion taking place 
throughout the Hellenistic and Roman Mediterranean. Philo shares many of the same concerns as 
Quintilian, Plutarch, Cicero, and, perhaps closest of all, Plato himself, as to the ideal nature of 
education, the role of it in the life of the individual and the state, and its effect on the soul and the 
mind. Yet, while he addresses many of the same issues, his situation is unique among most 
writers on the subject at this time, in that he had one, additional concern that was of paramount 
98 
 
importance, namely how to welcome a foreign educational curriculum based on literature which 
would be construed as antithetical to Jewish monotheism and then include or even necessitate 
this instruction within the wider educational program of the Jewish people. How can the Jewish 
people embrace this education and receive all of the benefits which come with it without losing 
their own customs, traditions, and identity? If this “secular” curriculum is beneficial and even 
necessary, what role does the divinely received tradition play in the education of the people? 
 These are the types of concerns which Philo addresses in his development of distinctive 
conceptions of Jewish paideia. And, these are the very same questions on which Christians will 
later ponder in the hard-fought but eventual adoption of Greek paideia in the early Church. Thus, 
Philo, in his efforts to include both Jewish and Greek, religious and secular, native and foreign, 
within the ideal education of the individual, is important in situating ancient Jewish education 
within the history of Western education, a place which has long been denied it. 
 
State of Research on Philo and Paideia 
The best study to date on Philo’s views on paideia is a ten-page article in a little-known journal 
from 1971.107 This is because Walter Wagner, who worked primarily on late antique Christianity 
and notions of paideia therein, is the only person to at least hint at the complexity of Philo’s 
thought on paideia. Most scholarship on Philo and paideia has focused almost exclusively on 
Philo and encyclical paideia, the preliminary studies. Wagner, instead, outlines “four manners” 
of paideia in Philo, based on the differing relationships between the individual and God, the self, 
and the world: 1) divine discipline, whereby powers, such as the logos, correct improprieties; 2) 
                                                 
107 Walter H. Wagner, “Philo and Paideia,” Cithara 10 (1971): 53-64. 
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encyclical paideia; 3) paideia as the mother of the soul and wife of the logos; and 4) the coming 
together of the other forms as God’s actions towards and within the individual. Unfortunately, 
the nature and scope of the article does not allow Wagner to deeply or systematically elucidate 
these different views of paideia, and, while he intimated the necessity of a broader perspective 
on Philonic paideia, neither he nor any scholar since has adequately pursued such an approach. 
 Though most scholarship on the topic has simplified the concept and focused exclusively 
on Philo and Greek preliminary studies, there have been several helpful studies which have read 
Philo’s take on the encyclia in light of Greek and Roman views of the same, beginning, primarily 
from Colson’s 1917 JTS article.108 Colson identifies the Abraham, Hagar, and Sarah allegory as 
crucial to Philo’s view of the encyclia, reading it in light of the pervasive suitors of Penelope 
adage and, more generally, with an eye to wider discussions of encyclical curricula in, for 
example, Quintilian. Importantly, at the end of his article, Colson also acknowledges the 
influence of Philo’s views concerning the adoption of pagan learning on Clement and Origen 
and, thus, on early Christian views of education.109 
 This narrow take on Philo and paideia, where Philo’s paideia is taken solely as Greek 
preliminary education, has been followed by most scholars since, most thoroughly by Alan 
Mendelson in his short 1982 monograph, Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria, though it 
must be noted that Mendelson introduces the unique idea that Philo viewed the encyclia as 
                                                 
108 F. H. Colson, “Philo on Education,” JTS 18 (1917): 151-162. See also Paul Wendland, Die Hellenistisch-
Römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1907), 114-120, for 
another early look at Philo and Greek education. 
109 This last point has been explored most recently in Edgar Früchtel, “Philon und die Vorbereitung der christlichen 
Paideia und Seelenleitung,” in Frühchristentum und Kultur (ed. Ferdinand R. Prostmeier; Vienna: Herder Verlag 
GmbH, 2007), 19-33. 
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having inherent spiritual value, that they are beneficial beyond being preliminary to philosophy, 
and thus reflects a shift in the history of liberal education.110  
Thanks to scholars such as Raffaella Cribiore and Teresa Morgan, our understanding of 
Hellenistic and Roman education has increased significantly in the past twenty years.111 In fact, 
in her Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, Morgan makes prominent use of 
Philo’s depictions of the encyclia alongside those of Quintilian or Plutarch in her overall 
research, an inclusion rare for classicists, who tend to dismiss or ignore Philo more often than 
not. The most recent studies on Philo and the encyclia have incorporated the advances on the 
Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman sides.112 
The above studies have gone a long way in detailing Philo’s views on traditional Greek 
preliminary instruction, including details on the curriculum, the benefits of this “foreign” 
education to the Jewish people, and the relative importance of Greek paideia within the wider 
cultural values of the Jews. Yet, the fact that scholars have consistently focused solely on this 
                                                 
110 Alan Mendelson, Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria (Monographs of the Hebrew Union College 7; 
Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1982). See also Isaak Heinemann, Philons Griechische und Jüdische 
Bildung: Kulturvergleichende Untersuchungen zu Philons Darstellung der Jüdischen Gesetze (Hildesheim: Georg 
Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1962); M. Alexandre, De congressu eruditionis gratia (Les oeuvres de Philon 
d’Alexandrie vol. 16; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1967); and Thomas Conley, “‘General Education’ in Philo of 
Alexandria,” in Protocol of the Fifteenth Colloquy: 9 March 1975 (Berkeley: The Center for the Hermeneutical 
Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture, 1975), 1-11, for similar studies during this period focused on Philo and 
Greek paideia. 
111 Teresa Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998); Raffaella Cribiore, Writing, Teachers, and Students in Graeco-Roman Egypt (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 
1996); and Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001). 
112 Tae Won Kang, “Wisdom Mythology and Hellenistic Paideia in Philo: A Case Study of De Congressu 
Quaerendae Eruditionis Gratia,” (Dissertation; Claremont Graduate University; Chair Karen Jo Torjesen, 1999); 
and Karl Olav Sandnes, Challenge of Homer: School, Pagan Poets and Early Christianity (LNTS 400; London: 
T&T Clark, 2009), 68-78. To be fair, in Sandnes’ chapter on Philo, he does include the Jewish law within the wider 
program of Jewish education. He outlines a sequential, hierarchical system, with the encyclia first, followed by 
philosophy or wisdom, and ending with “Torah (supreme virtue or paideia)” (73). However, this third step, Jewish 
law as paideia, is never supported by the sources on which he is drawing, and he never sufficiently describes how 
this actually works. He even has a section entitled, “Real Paideia: The Law of Moses,” which sounds quite 
promising. Yet, this view of Jewish law as the pinnacle of paideia is based largely on preconceptions not confirmed 
by Philo’s own materials. I will discuss Sandnes’ work in more detail below. 
101 
 
one, narrow piece of the educational program, we are left with a distorted or, at least, hazy 
picture of Philo’s ideal conception of Jewish paideia, which included much more than the 
preliminary studies.113 
 
Aims, Organization, and Questions to be Addressed 
In light of the current state of research, my principal goal here is to understand and elucidate the 
concept of paideia in Philo’s works and thought, in all its various forms, within the realm of 
Jewish education, enculturation, and the production of knowledge. This clarification will begin 
from a detailed examination of the different types of paideia Philo discusses throughout his 
works, including encyclical, preliminary paideia, native and foreign philosophy, internal reason 
and paideia quelling the passions within the soul, the law of nature, and Jewish law, customs, 
and traditions. Throughout, we will look at Philo’s various ideal examples of paideia and the role 
they play as paideia themselves, as models to be emulated and imitated. These include the 
patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Moses, the Essenes, the Therapeutae, various Greeks and 
                                                 
113 Here it is necessary to mention the work that Greg Sterling has done on Philo and his own exegetical school since 
the late 1990s. While the reconstruction of Philo’s school is necessarily speculative, Sterling draws on his decades of 
research and experience as one of the foremost scholars of Philo in the world. See Gregory E. Sterling, “‘The School 
of Sacred Laws’: the Social Setting of Philo’s Treatises,” VC 53 (1999): 148-164; “Was there a Common Ethic in 
Second Temple Judaism?,” in J. J. Collins, G. E. Sterling and R. A. Clements (edd.), Sapiential Perspectives: 
Wisdom Literature in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium of the Orion 
Center, 20-22 May 2001 (Leiden 2004) 171-194; and, most recently, “The School of Moses in Alexandria: An 
Attempt to Reconstruct the School of Philo,” the paper he offered at a conference on “Second Temple Jewish 
Paideia in Its Ancient Near Eastern and Hellenistic Contexts,” the Fifth Nangeroni Meeting, which was held in 
Naples, Italy (June 30 – July 4, 2015). Any comments on this final piece are based on the conference draft. An 
edited version of the paper will be published with the proceedings in late 2016. Related to Sterling’s work, see also 
P. Borgen, “Greek Encyclical Education, Philosophy and the Synagogue. Observations from Philo of Alexandria’s 
Writings,” in O. Matsson (edd.), Libens Merito. Festskrift til Stig Strømholm på sjuttioårsdagen 16 sept. 2001, Acta 
Academiæ Regiæ Scientiarum Upsaliensis. Kungl. Vetenskapssamhällets Uppsala Handlingar 21 (Uppsala 2001) 
61-71; and the contribution of Sean Adams to the Fifth Nangeroni Meeting, “Philo’s Questions and the Adaptation 
of Greek Philosophical Curriculum.”  
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barbarians, and Philo himself. Though still within the realm of the ideal, these depictions should 
help us move closer to how Philo’s theories of paideia could have surfaced in reality. 
 Moving beyond the means of education, we will explore the value of paideia, both within 
the life of the individual and for the community at large. It would be difficult to overstate the 
importance of paideia in Philo’s thought. It is pervasive and built into Philo’s overarching 
concern for the life of the soul and the mind. This is because the gifts paideia offers are of the 
highest kind: virtue, world citizenship, immortality. The righteous life of the soul begins and 
ends with paideia. Without it, comes death. Not the hoped for, intended death of the body which 
allows the immortal soul to return home, but the death of the soul itself, an unthinkable evil. 
Paideia is everything for Philo. And, in this, it figures prominently in the major dualistic 
dichotomies Philo outlines throughout his work, that of the body/soul, sense perception/nous, 
and the active/contemplative life, where the ideal life involves not only attention and devotion to 
the noetic elements, but a cooperation of the heavenly with the worldly, a compromise between 
the two. This is Philo’s view of paideia as well. Balance is the goal, always. We see this 
prominently in the children of (earthly) paideia and (heavenly) logos, where the best kids are 
those who diligently attend to both parents, not the ones who follow the father alone. 
 From all the detail and diversity, we finally must see if we can extrapolate an overarching 
concept of Philonic paideia. Did Philo himself envision a grand view which encompassed all of 
the various aspects he discusses throughout his works, a system of paideia which could include 
encyclical preliminary studies, the Mosaic law and its allegorical reading, philosophy, mental 
discipline, and the imitation of nature (perhaps through the examples of special individuals from 
the past)? Can this all fit into an ideal view of individual education? How? And, grand view of 
paideia or not, what can all this tell us about Philo’s view of the Jewish people within the larger 
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world community? My stated purpose here is to see how Philo envisioned the education of the 
Jewish people, but is this Philo’s own intended concern? It’s rare that he draws a divide between 
foreign and native paideia. Was the education of the Jews to be different than that of the Greeks? 
Should it be? Are the Jews to act as exemplars for the world in their education? These are all 
questions which the followed detailed study of Philo and paideia should help to answer. 
 
2. ENCYCLICAL STUDIES 
Philo’s perspective on encyclical or preliminary paideia is the natural place to begin our 
comprehensive exploration of Philonic paideia. Not only has this been the one aspect of paideia 
on which the vast majority of scholarship has been focused and is the form of paideia which 
Philo himself most regularly discusses throughout his work, but the very nature of the encyclia as 
preliminary necessitates that we discuss this type of paideia before moving on to higher forms of 
education. Philo is horrified of those who would attempt to begin their educational ascent 
without first preparing themselves with the encyclia. Therefore, we must do the same. 
 Philo’s terminology for this form of education, consistent with contemporary Greek 
usage, centers on the substantives paideia, paideuma, propaideuma, mathēma, didaskaleion, and 
mousikē together with the adjectives egkuklios and/or mesos. So, we find examples such as τὴν 
ἐγκύκλιον παιδείαν (Cong. 73), ἡ ἐγκύκλιος μουσικὴ (Cong. 79), ἡ διὰ τῶν προπαιδευμάτων 
ἐγκύκλιος μουσική (Cong. 9), or simply τὰ ἐγκύκλια (Cong. 10). Why this type of paideia is 
egkuklios has been much discussed, but, by this period, the term likely had the force of either 
“circular” or “general.” So, we would have something like “the circuit of education,” or “all-
around education,” which is how Quintilian seems to have taken the Greek, referring to it as 
orbis doctrinae (Inst. 1.10.1) and would explain well Philo’s use of choreia and cognates in close 
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connection or as apparent synonyms for egkuklios, or “general, normal, ordinary education,” as 
opposed to specialized or more advanced education.114 Philo uses the adjective mesos 
interchangeably for egkuklios, as in τὴν μέσην παιδείαν (Cher. 3), ἡ μέση καὶ ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία 
(Cher. 6), τὴν μέσην καὶ ἐγκύκλιον χορείαν τε καὶ παιδείαν (Ebr. 33), or τὴν τῶν μέσων καὶ 
ἐγκυκλίων ἐπιστημῶν μέσην παιδείαν (Cong. 14), though it is not always clear if, with the term, 
Philo intended a different nuance in meaning, such as “intermediate education,” e.g. between 
elementary and philosophy, or “middling education,” i.e. between wholly good and wholly 
bad.115 Despite this uncertainty, it is clear that this type of education was intended as preliminary 
to something else, as Philo’s other favorite term to describe the encyclia makes abundantly clear, 
τὰ προπαιδεύματα (Leg. 3:167). 
 The disciplines of Philo’s encyclia are comparable to what we find in gentile sources, 
including the subjects of grammar, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music, dialectic, and 
rhetoric (Cong. 11, 15-18, 74-76; Mos. 1:23; Cher. 105; Agr. 18; Somn. 1:205; QG 3:21).116 
Philo differs from his Greek and Roman neighbors only in his inclusion of rhetoric as one of the 
encyclical disciplines, as rhetoric is often understood as the result of encyclical education or a 
                                                 
114 On the term, see L. M. de Rijk, “ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία: A Study of its Original Meaning,” Vivarium 3 (1965): 24-93, 
for an extensive discussion of the history of research. De Rijk understand the term egkuklios initially referring to 
general choric education, “training to make man ‘harmonious’” (86). Then, from the middle of the fifth century 
BCE, this choric paideia split into two “sister arts,” mousikē for the soul and gumnastikē for the body, with the 
encyclia coming to refer only to the mousikē (87-88). Finally, from the first century BCE on, the term encyclical 
paideia was used to denote a new ideal of all-round education, preparatory to specialist training (91-92). 
115 Morgan understands Philo’s use of mesos as intending those subjects more advanced than elementary reading and 
writing but preliminary to philosophy. See Literate Education, 34 note 113. For Júnior, it is because they are “a 
reality halfway to perfection.” Manuel Alexandre Júnior, “Philo of Alexandria and Hellenic Paideia,” Euphrosyne 
37 (2009): 121-130 (125). The use of mesos for the encyclia is common among the Stoics. See Colson, “Philo on 
Education,” 153. 
116 For details on the various discipline in Philo, see Mendelson, Secular Education, 4-24. For the Greek, Hellenistic, 
and Roman curricula, see Marrou, A History of Education, 150-216, 274-291; Frederick A. G. Beck, Greek 
Education 450-350 B.C. (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1964), 111-144, 201-227; Stanley F. Bonner, Education in 
Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 163-276; 
Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind, 160-244; Morgan, Literate Education, 81-89; and W. Martin Bloomer, The 
School of Rome: Latin Studies and the Origins of Liberal Education (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2011), 111-138. 
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more advanced stage. While many understood encyclical paideia as preliminary to 
philosophy,117 some took it as preparation for advanced rhetorical training.118 For Philo, 
instruction in the encyclia was meant to provide more than technical proficiency or knowledge of 
the various subjects. Grammar, for example, through the study of history and literature, leads to a 
healthy skepticism of polytheistic myths and fables (Cong. 15). Geometry, by instilling a sense 
of equality and proportion, sows a zeal for justice (Cong. 16). Rhetoric and dialectic teach the 
means and power of persuasion, but, more importantly, provide the student with a rational mind 
and the ability to refute sophistical argumentation and deceit (Cong. 17-18). In this way, 
encyclical paideia is understood as preparatory, not only to more advanced disciplines, but also 
to the attainment of wisdom and virtue. 
 Philo repeatedly places the encyclical studies at a level inferior to other forms of paideia, 
philosophy, virtue, or wisdom. In language crucial to his allegorical understanding of the 
Abraham, Hagar, and Sarah narratives, Philo could delineate a three-step progression:  
καὶ μὴν ὥσπερ τὰ ἐγκύκλια συμβάλλεται πρὸς φιλοσοφίας ἀνάληψιν, οὕτω καὶ 
φιλοσοφία πρὸς σοφίας κτῆσιν. ἔστι γὰρ φιλοσοφία ἐπιτήδευσις σοφίας, σοφία δὲ 
ἐπιστήμη θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν τούτων αἰτίων. γένοιτ᾽ ἂν οὖν ὥσπερ ἡ 
ἐγκύκλιος μουσικὴ φιλοσοφίας, οὕτω καὶ φιλοσοφία δούλη σοφίας. 
And just as the encyclia contribute to one’s ascension to philosophy, so too does 
philosophy contribute to the acquisition of wisdom. For philosophy is the devoted 
attention to wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human and their 
                                                 
117 Seneca Ep. 88; Ps.-Plutarch Lib Ed. 7c-d. 
118 Quintilian Inst. 1.10.1; Cicero De or. 1.73-77. See Morgan, Literate Education 35, 190-198; Sandnes, Challenge 
of Homer, 24.  
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causes. Therefore, just as encyclical scholarship is the handmaiden of philosophy, so 
philosophy is the handmaiden of wisdom. (Cong. 79) 
He tells us that those who attend solely to the encyclia, dwell near but not with wisdom (Sacr. 
44). At his most pejorative, Philo can claim that devotion to the preliminary studies alone, with 
no thought to move beyond them, is nothing but sophistry (Cher. 9-10; Mut. 260). More typical 
is the association he makes between encyclical paideia and imperfect souls, moving towards 
perfection but not yet reaching it (Det. 64-66). We find this idea in his depictions of Abraham 
(Leg. 3:244-245), Joseph (Det. 6-10), and Aaron, who is compared to his brother Moses, the 
already perfected individual (Leg. 3:128, 140, 159). 
 Philo offers several metaphors to help explain the relationship between the preliminary 
studies and loftier philosophy, wisdom, or virtue. He likens the encyclia to the gates of a house: 
“For just as gates are the beginning of a house, so the encyclical preliminary studies are the 
beginning of virtue / ὥσπερ γὰρ οἰκίας ἀρχαὶ πυλῶνες, καὶ ἀρετῆς τὰ ἐγκύκλια προπαιδεύματα” 
(Fug. 183). These are the “fountains of intermediate paideia / αἱ παιδείας τῆς μέσης πηγαι,” as 
they irrigate and prepare those souls thirsty for learning (Fug. 187-188). The encyclical studies 
decorate the entrance to the house of the soul, built of virtue on a foundation of a well-mannered 
disposition and didaskalia (Cher. 101-105). The encyclia are the necessary path which leads to 
virtue: “For just as vestibules are placed before the gates of a house, and just as in cities there are 
suburbs, through which one must pass in order to enter the cities, so too do the encyclia lay 
before virtue. For the encyclia are the road which conducts to virtue. / ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν μὲν οἰκίαις 
αὔλειοι πρόκεινται κλισιάδων, ἐν δὲ πόλεσι τὰ προάστεια, δι᾽ ὧν εἴσω βαδίζειν ἔνεστιν, οὕτως 
καὶ ἀρετῆς πρόκειται τὰ ἐγκύκλια· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁδός ἐστιν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνην φέρουσα” (Cong. 10). 
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 Food is another common metaphor Philo uses to explain the role of encyclical paideia. 
While the virtues are the proper food for fully-grown adults, the encyclia nourish the soul like 
milk does infants:  
ἐπεὶ δὲ νηπίοις μέν ἐστι γάλα τροφή, τελείοις δὲ τὰ ἐκ πυρῶν πέμματα, καὶ ψυχῆς 
γαλακτώδεις μὲν ἂν εἶεν τροφαὶ κατὰ τὴν παιδικὴν ἡλικίαν τὰ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου μουσικῆς 
προπαιδεύματα, τέλειαι δὲ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἐμπρεπεῖς αἱ διὰ φρονήσεως καὶ σωφροσύνης 
καὶ ἁπάσης ἀρετῆς ὑφηγήσεις· ταῦτα γὰρ σπαρέντα καὶ φυτευθέντα ἐν διανοίᾳ καρποὺς 
ὠφελιμωτάτους οἴσει, καλὰς καὶ ἐπαινετὰς πράξεις 
 
Since milk is the food of infants, but wheat cakes are the food for mature adults, so must 
the soul in childhood have milk-like food, which are the preliminary studies of encyclical 
scholarship. But the adult food, fit for men, are the guidelines set forth via prudence, 
temperance, and every virtue. For these things, sown and implanted in the mind will bear 
the most advantageous fruit, noble and praiseworthy actions. (Agr. 9; cf. Cong. 19; Prob. 
160)  
 
In this same vein, Philo likens the encyclia to seedlings, implanted in immature souls, on whose 
fruit the souls will feed. Once the souls have reached adulthood, the mature trees of the virtues 
will take root instead (Agr. 18). 
 These metaphors, most not unique to Philo,119 all clearly indicate the preliminary and 
preparatory nature of encyclical paideia, which is not meant to be an end in itself, but instead is 
designed to help the individual progress to things far loftier, namely philosophy, virtue, and 
                                                 
119 For the milk to solid food metaphor, see Epictetus, Diss. 2.16.39; 3.24.9. The agricultural metaphor can be found 
in Ps.-Plutarch, Lib. Educ. 2b-c; 5c-e; Lucian, Anach. 20-21. 
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wisdom. Philo explores this relationship most explicitly and forcefully in his allegorical reading 
of the Hagar, Sarah, and Abraham narratives, where we find Philo’s detailed understanding of 
the necessity of the encyclia within one’s wider educational, and in fact spiritual, development, 
but also the dangers of this type of education and thus their essential impermanence. 
 
The Allegory of Abraham, Hagar, and Sarah 
Philo discusses his allegorical understanding of the Abraham, Hagar, and Sarah accounts in a 
surprisingly consistent, coherent manner throughout his body of work, a fact which speaks to the 
place this reading held for him throughout his career.120 Whether Philo was following the lead of 
other Jewish exegetes before him in this novel reading of the Genesis story or was the creator of 
the interpretation can only be guessed, though his is the earliest known example we have.121 
What is certain, is that allegorical interpretation of the narrative as intending to describe the 
proper path from preliminary instruction to loftier philosophy, virtue, or wisdom, is akin to the 
common philosophical adage concerning Penelope, her maid servants, and her suitors.122 The 
Stoic Ariston of Chios argued that “those who labor with the preliminary studies but neglect 
philosophy are like the suitors of Penelope, who, when they failed to win her over, took up with 
                                                 
120 See Cher. 3-10; Leg. 3:244-245; Sacr. 43; Post. 130-132, 137; Agr. 9-19; Her. 274; Mut. 255; Somn. 1:240; QG 
3:18ff.; and most of Cong. 
121 See the discussion of the allegory of Sarah in, Maren R. Niehoff, “Mother and Maiden, Sister and Spouse: Sarah 
in Philonic Midrash,” HTR 97.4 (2004): 413-44 (430-433), who attempts to show through internal evidence that 
Philo is familiar with and following an existing Jewish exegetical tradition, but that he also contributes to that 
tradition. Cf. Kang, “Wisdom Mythology and Hellenistic Paideia in Philo,” 60. 
122 Nearly all scholars see a correspondence between Philo’s allegorical reading of the Hagar/Sarah narrative and the 
Penelope allegory. The only author I know of who argues adamantly against a connection, due to the discrepancies 
between the two allegories, is Thomas Conley, “‘General Education’ in Philo,” 6-8. In their responses to his paper, 
both John Dillon and Alan Mendelson take Conley to task on this point. 
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her maid servants instead.”123 Philo, having no desire to allegorically read Homer, applies a 
similar principle to his reading of the Genesis narrative. 
 A succinct account of Philo’s reading is found in the third book of the Allegorical Laws: 
But it’s necessary to consider another woman, of what sort Sarah happened to be, the 
governing virtue (τὴν ἄρχουσαν ἀρετήν); and the wise Abraham was guided by her, when 
she recommended him such actions as were good. For before this time, when he was not 
yet perfect, but even before his name was changed, he gave his attention to subjects of 
lofty philosophical speculation; and she, knowing that he could not produce anything out 
of perfect virtue (ἐπισταμένη ὅτι οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο γεννᾶν ἐξ ἀρετῆς τελείας), counseled 
him to raise children out of her handmaid, that is to say out of encyclical education (ἐκ 
τῆς παιδίσκης τουτέστι παιδείας τῆς ἐγκυκλίου), out of Agar, which name being 
interpreted means a dwelling near; for he who meditates dwelling in perfect virtue, before 
his name is enrolled among the citizens of that state, dwells among the encyclical studies 
(τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις μαθήμασι), in order that through their instrumentality he may make his 
approaches at liberty towards perfect virtue. After that, when he saw that he had become 
perfect, and was now able to become a father, although he himself was full of gratitude 
towards those studies (τὰ παιδεύματα), by means of which he had been recommended to 
virtue, and thought it hard to renounce them; he was well inclined to be appeased by an 
                                                 
123 Ἀρίστων ὁ Χῖος τοὺς περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα πονουμένους, ἀμελοῦντας δὲ φιλοσοφίας, ἔλεγεν ὁμοίους εἶναι 
τοῖς μνηστῆρσι τῆς Πηνελόπης, οἳ ἀποτυγχάνοντες ἐκείνης περὶ τὰς θεραπαίνας ἐγίνοντο (SVF 1:350). Stobaeus 
preserves the fragment. Elsewhere the comment is credited to Gorgias (Gnomol. Vatic. 166). See Albert Henrichs, 
“Philosophy, the Handmaiden of Theology,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 9:4 (1968): 437-450 (444); and 
K. Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 139. According 
to Pseudo-Plutarch, the statement is the philosopher Bion’s: “ἀστείως δὲ καὶ Βίων ἔλεγεν ὁ φιλόσοφος ὅτι ὥσπερ οἱ 
μνηστῆρες τῇ Πηνελόπῃ πλησιάζειν μὴ δυνάμενοι ταῖς ταύτης ἐμίγνυντο θεραπαίναις, οὕτω καὶ οἱ φιλοσοφίας μὴ 
δυνάμενοι κατατυχεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις παιδεύμασι τοῖς οὐδενὸς ἀξίοις ἑαυτοὺς κατασκελετεύουσι” (Lib. Ed. 7d). See 
also Yehoshua Amir, “The Transference of Greek Allegories to Biblical Motifs in Philo,” in Nourished with Peace: 
Studies in Hellenistic Judaism in Memory of Samuel Sandmel (ed. E. Hilgert and B. L. Mack; Chico, CA: Scholars 
Press, 1984), 15-25. 
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oracle from God which laid this command on him. “In everything which Sarah says, obey 
her voice.” (Leg. 3.244-245) 
We find here all of the primary elements of the allegory. Sarah is the representative of virtue; 
Hagar that of the preliminary studies. Encyclical paideia / Hagar was absolutely necessary in 
Abraham’s desire to attain to virtue / Sarah, who encouraged his intimate relationship with Hagar 
/ the encyclia, as he was not yet prepared for virtue / Sarah. Abraham was very fond of his 
studies / Hagar and was reluctant to give them up, but he submitted to God’s will, and 
understood that once having reached his goal of virtue / Sarah, his precious studies / Hagar 
would have to be abandoned. 
 Philo devotes an entire treatise to his understanding of encyclical paideia and the 
allegory, On Mating with the Preliminary Studies (Cong.),124 which allows him ample room to 
explore this aspect of education in detail. Philo saw this paideia as necessary for most people 
who desire true wisdom: “For we are not as yet capable of becoming the fathers of the offspring 
of virtue, unless we first of all have a connection with her handmaiden; and the handmaiden of 
wisdom is the encyclical scholarship of the preliminary studies. . . . So the encyclia are placed in 
front of virtue, for they are the road which conducts to her” (Cong. 9-10). While Philo 
continually points out the importance of this encyclical paideia for most people, the exemplar 
being Abraham who is the type of one who acquires wisdom through instruction,125 there are 
                                                 
124 The Latin title is De congressu eruditionis gratia, the Greek ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΟΠΑΙΔΕΥΜΑΤΑ 
ΣΥΝΟΔΟΥ. 
125 See Migr. 88; Praem. 24-51; Jos. 1. Abraham is the exemplar of one who acquires virtue through instruction 
(διδακτικὴ), Jacob through practice (ἀσκητικὴ), while Isaac is a rare member of the self-taught race (αὐτομαθὲς 
γένος). This threefold typology of learners—through instruction, nature, or practice—is common and goes back at 
least to Aristotle, thought Billings has shown that Philo’s depictions of the triad are also deeply influenced by Plato. 
See Thomas H. Billings, The Platonism of Philo Judaeus (Dissertation, University of Chicago; Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1919), 82ff.. Ps.-Plutarch, Lib. Educ. 2a-c, understands the triad as nature, reason/learning, and 
custom/training (φύσιν, λόγον/μάθησιν, ἔθος/ἄσκησιν), perfection coming from a combination of all three. His 
models are Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato. See also Aristotle, Eth. Nic. I.9.1099b; X.9.1179b. 
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some who do not need this paideia in their attainment of virtue, such as Isaac: “But the self-
taught race (αὐτομαθὲς γένος), of which Isaac was a partaker, the greatest joy of good things, has 
received as its share a nature simple, unmixed, and pure, standing in need of neither training nor 
instruction (ἀσκήσεως μήτε διδασκαλίας), in which there is need of the concubine sciences 
(παλλακίδων ἐπιστημῶν)” (Cong. 36). 
 The benefits of the preliminary studies are, then, for the majority of people, clear and 
profound. But, this is not the end of the narrative. Philo must explain why Sarah banishes Hagar 
and forces Abraham to abandon this paideia, of which he was so fond. Could they not co-exist? 
In beginning to understand Philo’s reading of this important piece of the Genesis narrative, we 
must remember that Philo, often forcefully, makes clear that the handmaiden is in no way to be 
confused with the true mistress, wisdom. First of all, as opposed to one’s connection with 
wisdom which is noetic (i.e. via the mind or νοῦς), the connection to encyclical paideia is 
somatic and aesthetic (i.e. via the body or σῶμα and the senses or αἰσθήσεις):  
For it follows of necessity that the man who delights in the encyclical contemplations, 
and who joins himself as a companion to varied learning, is as such enrolled under the 
banners of the earthly and Egyptian body (ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἐγχορεύοντα ταῖς ἐγκυκλίοις 
θεωρίαις καὶ πολυμαθείας ἑταῖρον ὄντα τῷ γεώδει καὶ Αἰγυπτίῳ προσκεκληρῶσθαι 
σώματι); and that he stands in need of eyes in order to see and to read, and of ears in 
order to attend and to hear, and of his other external senses, in such a manner as to be 
able to unfold each of the objects of the external sense (τῶν αἰσθητῶν). (Cong. 20). 
Because of this bodily connection, the sarkic desires tend to want to weigh down and oppress the 
soul. Herein lies the potential danger of Greek paideia, becoming too infatuated with the 
handmaiden to the detriment of the mistress: “For some men, being attracted by the charms of 
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handmaidens, have neglected their true mistress, philosophy, and have grown old, some in 
poetry, and others in the study of painting, and others in the mixture of colors, and others in ten 
thousand other pursuits, without ever being able to return to the proper mistress” (Cong. 77). The 
neglected mistress will not just sit idly by, but convict the guilty party to his face: “I am treated 
unjustly, and in utter violation of our agreement, as far as depends on you who transgress the 
covenants entered into between us; for from the time that you first took to your bosom the 
preliminary studies, you have honored above measure the offspring of my handmaiden, and have 
respected her as your wife, and you have so completely repudiated me that you never by any 
chance came to the same place with me” (Cong. 151-152; cf. 158-159). Because of this danger, 
this pull to infatuation with the preliminary studies, they must be given up entirely if one is to 
fully embrace the true wife of virtue or wisdom. 
 Another area where we see the marked difference between encyclical paideia and 
wisdom is in Philo’s depictions of Ishmael and Isaac. While Isaac, the child of Sarah, represents 
a sophos, a wise man, Ishmael, Hagar’s son, represents a sophist: “For Isaac received wisdom for 
his inheritance, and Ishmael sophistry (σοφίαν μὲν γὰρ Ἰσαάκ, σοφιστείαν δὲ Ἰσμαὴλ 
κεκλήρωται). . . . For the same relation which a completely infant child bears to a full-grown 
man, the same does a sophist bear to a wise man, and the encyclical branches of learning (τὰ 
ἐγκύκλια τῶν μαθημάτων) to real knowledge in virtue” (Sobr. 9). With this strong dichotomy 
between encyclical paideia and wisdom explicitly made, we now can understand why Sarah had 
to banish Hagar and why Abraham had to give up his precious studies: 
But when Abram, instead of an inquirer into natural philosophy, became a wise man and 
a lover of God . . . then too those preliminary studies which bear the name of Agar, will 
be cast out, and their sophistical child will also be cast out, who is named Ishmael. And 
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they shall undergo eternal banishment, God himself confirming their expulsion, when he 
bids the wise man obey the word spoken by Sarah, and she urges him expressly to cast 
out the serving woman and her son; and it is good to be guided by virtue, and especially 
so when it teaches such lessons as this, that the most perfect natures are very greatly 
different from the mediocre habits, and that wisdom is a wholly different thing from 
sophistry (σοφία σοφιστείας ἀλλότριον); for the one labors to devise what is persuasive 
for the establishment of a false opinion, which is pernicious to the soul, but wisdom, with 
long meditation on the truth by the knowledge of right reason (ὀρθοῦ λόγου), brings real 
advantage to the intellect. (Cher. 7-9) 
Sarah’s banishing of Hagar and Ishmael is meant to demonstrate to the reader the vast difference 
between encyclical paideia and wisdom and the need to dispose of preliminary education, once 
having attained virtue, lest one is tempted by her (bodily) charms and begins to mistake the 
handmaiden for the mistress. 
 Philo’s allegorical interpretation of the Hagar/Sarah narrative is extremely well 
developed and consistently applied throughout several treatises of his corpus. The topic was 
obviously an extremely important one for Philo, living in the most Hellenistic of cities, and his 
allegorical understanding of the Genesis story is an attempt to reconcile the obvious benefits he 
perceived in a traditional Greek education and the possibly disastrous influences it could play in 
the Jewish community if not undertaken with proper care. For Philo, this paideia was a means to 
an end, but once the end is achieved—the attainment of wisdom or virtue—this paideia must be 
thrown out. The temptations of the handmaiden are just too great to allow her to live in the same 
house as the mistress. 
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An Indispensable Yet Treacherous Paideia: Concluding Remarks on the Preliminary 
Studies 
Mendelson has argued that past scholarship had too readily seen a disparaging view of the 
encyclia in Philo’s thought, having a strictly subordinate, preliminary value, a means to an end 
only.126 Against this, Mendelson maintains that encyclical paideia could be an end in themselves, 
in their role in the ascent of the sage, where the encyclia produce the skepticism necessary to 
begin the ascent from the world.127 As it was not uncommon to find stern critiques of encyclical 
paideia, Mendelson presents Philo’s view as a shift in perspective.128 
 On the role of encyclical paideia in the ascent or return of the nous to heaven, Mendelson 
is certainly correct. In describing the descent of the nous and its necessary entanglement in the 
body, Philo contends that only the nous which is able resist and discard sense perception and the 
evils of the body is able to return upwards, by first “being trained in all forms of encyclical 
scholarship, from which it derives a desire for contemplation and acquires temperance and 
patience, formidable virtues, leaving its former home, and finding a means of return back to its 
native country, and it brings with it those things of paideia, which are called ‘substance’ [cf. 
Gen. 15:14] / τοῖς τῆς ἐγκυκλίου μουσικῆς ἐντραφεὶς ἅπασιν, ἐξ ὧν θεωρίας λαβὼν ἵμερον 
ἐγκράτειαν καὶ καρτερίαν, ἐρρωμένας ἀρετάς, ἐκτήσατο, μετανιστάμενος καὶ κάθοδον τὴν εἰς 
τὴν πατρίδα εὑρισκόμενος πάντ᾽ ἐπάγεται τὰ παιδείας, ἅπερ ἀποσκευὴ καλεῖται” (Her. 274; cf. 
Spec. 3:187ff.).  
                                                 
126 Mendelson, Secular Education, 64, 68. He points to scholars such as James Drummond, Philo Judaeus; or, The 
Jewish-Alexandrian Philosophy in its Development and Completion (2 vols.; London: Williams and Norgate, 1888), 
1:262; Hans Leisegang, Der heilige Geist (Leipzig: Teubner, 1919), 62; Erwin R. Goodenough, By Light, Light: The 
Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1935), 241; and Ralph Marcus, “An 
Outline of Philo’s System of Education,” in Sepher Touroff (ed. I. Silberschlag and J. Twersky; Boston: Hebrew 
College, 1938), 223-231 (229); among others. 
127 Secular Education, 70. 
128 See, e.g., Seneca Ep. 6.56; 108.23-26; Diog. Laert. 7:32, 129; Ps.-Plutarch Lib. Ed. 7c-e. 
115 
 
 Additionally, the encyclia play a role in the mind’s rejection of pleasure and the taming 
of the irrational faculties of the soul in its attachment to virtue (Sacr. 44-45, et al.), a laudable 
function, suggesting something beyond simply preliminary. However, the connection between 
encyclical paideia and such mundane notions as sense perception (Post. 137; Her. 315), 
practicality (Agr. 12-13; Leg. 3:167), local customs and laws (Ebr. 34, 63, 68), and the body 
(Cong. 20), make the propaideumata desirous, dangerous, and thus necessarily temporary. Philo 
himself testifies to his own problems with attending to the illegitimate children of the encyclia to 
the neglect of the legitimate children (Cong. 6). Given their transitory nature, we must view the 
encyclia as the lowest rung on Philo’s educational ladder, even while they are necessary for the 
vast majority of humanity. 
 
3. PHILOSOPHY AS PAIDEIA 
Philo’s metaphorical imagery most commonly depicts encyclical paideia as preliminary to and 
necessary for virtue and wisdom, but, like many of his contemporaries, he understood the 
encyclia as subordinate also to philosophy on this upward path.129 Mesē paideia is the 
handmaiden to philosophy (Cong. 145), and the lovers of kalokagathia know that it is impossible 
to approach philosophy without first becoming acquainted with the entire range of encyclical 
learning (Ebr. 49). Once one has progressed to the study of philosophy, a reversion to the lesser 
branches of paideia is not advisable (Ebr. 51). 
 Philo’s adamancy on the necessity of approaching true philosophy only after being 
prepared with the encyclical studies derives from philosophy’s relationship to and origin from 
                                                 
129 See Seneca Ep. 88; Ps.-Plutarch Lib. Educ. 7c-d. 
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the lower branches of education. Closely following Plato, Philo argues that contemplation of the 
universe is ultimately responsible for the development of philosophy. In Opif. 53-54, Philo, 
drawing on Tim. 47a-c, describes the ascent to philosophy, beginning from observation of the 
stars and planets, making use of the sense of sight, whose instrument is light. The mind ponders 
the harmony of the heavenly bodies, which move in accordance with the laws of music. This 
leads to the soul contemplating the substance of the stars, their existence, their origin, and the 
causes of their movements. Finally, “it is from inquiry into these things that the genus of 
philosophy has arisen; no more perfect good has ever entered into human life. / ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων 
ζητήσεως τὸ φιλοσοφίας συνέστη γένος, οὗ τελειότερον ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἦλθεν εἰς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον 
βίον” (Opif. 54; cf. 77).130 Though not explicit in this passage, this type of speculation and 
contemplation is due to one’s training in the preliminary studies (Her. 274; Spec. 3:187ff.), an 
idea hinted at in Opif. 53 and the focus on the instrumentality of the light of the soul, which Philo 
elsewhere claims is nothing else than paideia (Leg. 3:167). 
 In De congressu Philo delves deeper into this connection between philosophy and 
preliminary paideia. Here, it seems that philosophy did not so much originate as was inherent 
and waiting to be discovered. It is philosophy that provided the first principles and seeds to the 
particular branches of instruction, from which, then, speculation arises (Cong. 146).131 While the 
particular branches occupy themselves with the invention of a multiplicity of complications, 
philosophy is concerned with the fundamental nature of things. Geometry may focus on triangles 
                                                 
130 Compare to Tim. 47a7-b2: περί τε τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως ζήτησιν ἔδοσαν: ἐξ ὧν ἐπορισάμεθα φιλοσοφίας γένος, 
οὗ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτ᾽ ἦλθεν οὔτε ἥξει ποτὲ τῷ θνητῷ γένει δωρηθὲν ἐκ θεῶν. Runia describes Philo’s use as a 
“loose paraphrase,” arguing that he likely cited the passage from memory. See David Runia, On the Creation of the 
Cosmos according to Moses. Introduction, Translation and Commentary (Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series 
1; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 203. See also V. Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire de l’Écriture chez Philon d’Alexandrie: 
son caractère et sa portée; observations philologiques (ALGHJ 11: Leiden: Brill, 1977), 98-99. 
131 Philo is not unaware of the circularity of his argument; instead, it appears to be a fundamental part of his larger 
argument on the cyclic origin and destiny of the nous. 
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and circles and all sorts of other figures, but the exact nature of a point or a line is the 
provenance of philosophy (Cong. 146-147). Reading and writing are fundamental to the study of 
grammar, but it is philosophy which contemplates the nature and elements of language (Cong. 
148-150). This is why Philo can, disparagingly, refer to the encyclia as technai, but philosophy 
as epistēmē (Cong. 142). 
 This distinction between encyclical paideia and philosophy is based on Philo’s 
understanding of the core of philosophy. The branches of paideia, though they may hint at 
nature, are above all concerned with particulars. Philosophy, instead, is entirely focused on the 
nature and essence of existing things; “the world is its subject matter / ὕλη γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῆς ὅδε ὁ 
κόσμος” (Cong. 144). Encyclical education is akin to following good and noble law codes of 
particular cities (Ebr. 34, 63, 68), but philosophy is paideia in the universal and in nature, and 
devotion to philosophy is to live according to natural law (Prob. 160). 
 Philo, at times, draws a distinction, seemingly Stoic in origin, between the natural, 
logical, and moral principles of philosophy.132 Philo, openly following ancient tradition, 
compares the three with the image of the field or garden of philosophy, where physical or natural 
philosophy is represented by the trees and plants which produce the fruit of moral philosophy, all 
of which is protected and hemmed in by the fence of logical philosophy (Agr. 14ff.; Mut. 75).133 
All three are necessary and mutually beneficial: “through the logical comes infallible 
interpretation, through the moral comes the correction of manners, and through the physical 
                                                 
132 On the Stoic division, see Catherine Atherton, The Stoics on Ambiguity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 40ff. 
133 The garden imagery also appears Stoic in origin. See John M. Dillon, “The Pleasures and Perils of Soul-
Gardening,” in Wisdom and Logos: Studies in Jewish Thought in Honor of David Winston (ed. D. T. Runia and G. 
E. Sterling; SPhA 9; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 190-197. 
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comes knowledge of heaven and the world” (Spec. 1:336), though the moral portion is typically 
understood as the pinnacle, which utilizes the other two in its search for virtue (Mut. 75). 
 We saw that, in Philo’s allegorical interpretation, Abraham’s transition from Hagar to 
Sarah represents the ascent from encyclical paideia to virtue or wisdom. Elsewhere, Philo 
describes another transition for Abraham, that from natural to moral philosophy. Prior to 
becoming Abraham, Abram “delighted in the lofty philosophy which investigates those things 
which take place in the air, and the sublime nature of those things which exist in heaven, which 
mathematics has appropriated as the most excellent part of natural philosophy. . . . But, when 
Abram, instead of an inquirer into natural philosophy, became a wise man a lover of God, had 
his name changed to Abraham” (Cher. 4, 7). The Genesis narrative literally describes the 
changing of his name, but the true allegorical understanding describes how “he migrated from 
natural to moral philosophy, from contemplation of the world to knowledge of the creator, from 
which he acquired piety, the most excellent of possessions” (Mut. 76). From the larger 
allegorical reading, Philo suggests that Abram’s interest in natural philosophy alone was unable 
to bear the fruit of moral philosophy. It was only after his acquisition of the encyclical studies 
that Abraham was then able to advance to moral philosophy and virtue. (Leg. 3:244). 
 
Jewish Philosophy 
In all this discussion on philosophy and paideia to this point, there has been nothing to suggest 
the provenance of this philosophy which is subsequent to preliminary education and necessary 
for the attainment of virtue. We are not told whether this is Greek or barbarian or Jewish 
philosophy. Philosophy, so far, appears universal, transnational. And, this should not be 
surprising, as Philo never highlights the fact that encyclical paideia was, in fact, Greek; instead, 
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he seems to go out of his way to omit it. However, at several points Philo does refer to the Jews’ 
patria philosophia, their ancestral philosophy. According to Philo, the emperor Tiberius was 
well aware that Jewish people practiced their ancestral philosophy in the synagogues on the 
Sabbath (Legat. 156), and that the legate Petronius himself, because of his zeal for paideia, had 
learned something of “Jewish philosophy (Ἰουδαϊκῆς φιλοσοφίας)” (Legat. 245). But, what 
exactly is this ancestral or Jewish philosophy? 
 In book two of the Life of Moses, Philo claims that the lawgiver, whose own education 
included the full curriculum of encyclical paideia and philosophy (Mos. 1:23), intended the 
seventh day to be devoted to meeting together and public training in philosophy, through which 
the populace would advance in kalokagathia and improve their moral characters and lives (Mos. 
2:215), a custom which continues to Philo’s own day:  
ἀφ᾽ οὗ καὶ εἰσέτι νῦν φιλοσοφοῦσι ταῖς ἑβδόμαις Ἰουδαῖοι τὴν πάτριον φιλοσοφίαν τὸν 
χρόνον ἐκεῖνον ἀναθέντες ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ θεωρίᾳ τῶν περὶ φύσιν· τὰ γὰρ κατὰ πόλεις 
προσευκτήρια τί ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ διδασκαλεῖα φρονήσεως καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης 
καὶ δικαιοσύνης εὐσεβείας τε καὶ ὁσιότητος καὶ συμπάσης ἀρετῆς, ᾗ κατανοεῖται καὶ 
κατορθοῦται τά τε ἀνθρώπεια καὶ θεῖα; 
According to this custom, even to this day the Jews pursue philosophy on the seventh 
day, dedicating this time to their ancestral philosophy and to the knowledge and 
contemplation of nature. For what are the prayer houses in each city but schools of 
prudence, courage, temperance, and justice, and of piety, holiness, and every virtue, by 
which things human and divine are understood and set right? (Mos. 2:216) 
Though the description here of the proseuchai as Greek philosophical schools may have been 
influenced by Philo’s audience and purpose of this particular text, it is clear thus far that Jewish 
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philosophy, as it is devoted to nature and the attainment of virtue, cannot be distinguished from 
any other sort. However, when Philo describes the philosophical education of the Essenes and 
the Therapeutae and its connection to Jewish law, we can begin to see the distinctive character of 
the Jews’ ancestral philosophy. 
 Essene education is devoted entirely to the moral aspect of philosophy, as the logical part 
is unnecessary for the acquisition of virtue and the natural part is only beneficial for the 
contemplation of the existence of God and the creation of the universe. In their education in 
moral philosophy, “they utilize their ancestral laws as trainers, laws which would have been 
impossible for the human soul to devise without divine inspiration. / ἀλείπταις χρώμενοι τοῖς 
πατρίοις νόμοις, οὓς ἀμήχανον ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπινοῆσαι ψυχὴν ἄνευ κατοκωχῆς ἐνθέου” (Prob. 
80). They are instructed with these laws throughout the week, but especially on the Sabbath, 
when they gather together in the synagogues. There, one member reads the books and another, 
one of the most experienced elders, teaches, explaining the philosophical, symbolic meaning of 
the text (Prob. 81-82). In this way, the members of the community “are educated in piety, 
holiness, justice, economy, politics, and the knowledge of those things which are truly good, bad, 
or indifferent, and to choose what is beneficial and to avoid the opposite, making use of three 
established criteria, the love of God, the love of virtue, and the love of man” (Prob. 83). 
 Philo’s description of the education of the Therapeutae is similar. During the week, they 
study their ancestral philosophy in complete solitude, utilizing their holy texts, reading them 
allegorically in order to uncover the secret meaning lying beneath the literal expressions (Cont. 
28). They also study ancient allegorical treatises and attempt to imitate their systems and 
explanations in the creation of new written works (Cont. 29). Then, like the Essenes, they meet 
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together on the Sabbath, and one of the elder members instructs the others, allegorically 
exegeting the precise meaning of the laws (Cont. 30-31).134  
 As with the Essenes, the Jewish law is instrumental in the education and philosophy of 
the Therapeutae. In fact, Philo knows of a tradition that claims that they are called “Therapeutae” 
or “Therapeutrides” because “they are educated by nature and the sacred laws to serve God / ἐκ 
φύσεως καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν νόμων ἐπαιδεύθησαν θεραπεύειν τὸ ὄν” (Cont. 2). While I will focus on 
the role of Jewish law in education more broadly in the following section, it is important here to 
see how and why the Jewish law is involved in this educational philosophy.  
Nikiprowetzky has argued that, for Philo, this ancestral philosophy was, above all, the 
study and practice of the Jewish law.135 Philo describes the Jewish laws themselves as 
“philosophical” (Mos. 2:36), and argues that “whatever benefits are derived from the most 
esteemed philosophy for its students are derived for the Jews through their laws and customs / 
ὅπερ γὰρ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας τῆς δοκιμωτάτης περιγίνεται τοῖς ὁμιληταῖς αὐτῆς, τοῦτο διὰ νόμων καὶ 
ἐθῶν Ἰουδαίοις” (Virt. 65). We have seen that the philosophical study of the laws requires proper 
interpretation through allegorical exegesis that the literal text might reveal its true teaching and 
lead, ultimately, to the acquisition of virtue. This goal of the study of Jewish philosophy is no 
different than that of Greek philosophy. Yet, the Jewish laws serve as the best possible teachers, 
as they were set down by the greatest student, teacher, and philosopher in history, Moses (Mos. 
2:2), who understood that the study of philosophy must begin with the contemplation of nature 
and be in line with order of the universe (Mos. 2:211). The exact relationship between the law of 
Moses and the universal law of nature and the connection to Jewish paideia will be discussed 
                                                 
134 For more on the study of philosophy on the Sabbath, cf. Mos. 2:211-212; Dec. 98-101; Spec. 2:62-64; Hyp.7:10-
14; and Opif. 128. 
135 Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire de l’Écriture chez Philon d’Alexandrie, 97-116. 
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below, but it is important to point out now that both philosophy—whether foreign or native—and 
the laws of Moses could serve as paideia in the law of nature. 
 
Philosophy as Another Step on the Upward Ascent 
Philo makes it clear time and again that the study of philosophy is necessarily subsequent to 
encyclical paideia and that to approach philosophy prior to completing the preliminary studies is 
dangerous and ill-advised. But, philosophy is not the end; it is another means to an end, another 
step towards the attainment of loftier goals. It would be wrong, therefore, to see in Philo’s 
thought a too elevated veneration of philosophy, even Jewish philosophy. Philosophy, in the end, 
is another tool, an excellent tool, but a tool nonetheless, which is utilized towards greater 
objectives. Philo makes this perfectly clear: “Just as the encyclia contribute to one’s ascension to 
philosophy, so philosophy contributes to the acquisition of wisdom. . . . Therefore, just as 
encyclical scholarship is the handmaid of philosophy, so philosophy is the handmaid of wisdom 
(γένοιτ᾽ ἂν οὖν ὥσπερ ἡ ἐγκύκλιος μουσικὴ φιλοσοφίας, οὕτω καὶ φιλοσοφία δούλη σοφίας)” 
(Cong. 79).136  
 Philo described the encyclia as a road which leads to virtue, but he also describes 
philosophy as the road to virtue, though a better road, a “royal road” (Post. 101-102). 
Philosophy, also like the preliminary studies, is crucial for the ascent of the nous, out of the body 
and back to heaven (Spec. 2:230). And the study of philosophy is “that which man, though 
                                                 
136 It is not uncommon to find scholars who argue that Philo is here subordinating Greek philosophy to Jewish law, 
an idea based on the deeply problematic notion that the identification between Jewish law and wisdom was 
ubiquitous at this time. See, e.g., Wolfson, Philo, 1:149-150; or M. Pohlenz, Kleine Schriften (2 vols.; Hildesheim: 
G. Olms, 1965), 1:324-330. Dillon, though unfortunately maintaining the assumed identity between wisdom and 
law, nuances the argument and arrives at a concept perhaps more in line with Philo’s thought. Seeing that Philo’s 
subordination of philosophy to wisdom is completely in accord with Stoic thought, Winston argues, “Far from 
subordinating philosophy to Scripture, Philo is rather identifying the summit of philosophical achievement with the 
Mosaic Law” (“Response” to Thomas Conley’s “‘General Education’ in Philo,” 19). 
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mortal, is made immortal” (Opif. 77). Philosophy is preliminary and preparatory like the 
encyclical studies, but, unlike the encyclia, it is a lifelong pursuit, not a source of simple lessons, 
which, upon grasping, can be discarded. The knowledge gained through the study of philosophy 
connects to the soul rather than the body, the noetic rather than the sense-perceptible. Philosophy 
thus poses no danger to those infatuated with it. 
 
4. THE JEWISH LAW AS PAIDEIA 
Like any good Greek or Roman philosopher of his time, Philo envisioned the study of 
philosophy as a, if not the, essential step on the upward path to the attainment of wisdom and 
virtue. But, according to Philo, Jewish ancestral philosophy was distinct from any other in that 
the Jewish people had in their laws incomparable teachers, which would guide the student of 
philosophy more surely on the path towards virtue. The Jews have a great advantage over all 
other peoples, not in the ends they are able to attain, but in the means which allow them to more 
easily reach those ends. Philo discusses the educational value of the Jewish law throughout his 
work, in great detail and in ways which are not tied explicitly to the study of Jewish ancestral 
philosophy. 
 
Moses, Student and Teacher 
Philo regularly portrays Moses as a teacher of the Jewish people, his laws serving as the people’s 
textbook, as they were intended. However, in order to contemplate Moses the teacher, we must 
first understand Moses the student. In his biography of the lawgiver, Philo describes in some 
detail the education of the young Moses, growing up in the royal palace with all the attendant 
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advantages. Naturally, Philo’s description of Moses’ education is based on the practices of 
Roman Egypt rather than pharaonic, Moses having the educational opportunities of the most elite 
members of society, even those of the royal family. 
 Even within the realm of the elite, Moses was special. Philo foreshadows his future 
intellectual prowess in describing his being weaned off milk at an unusually early age (Mos. 
1:18), a subtle reference to the typical depiction of the encyclia as milk suitable for infants prior 
to the solid food of philosophy. Indeed, even at the start of his education, Moses appears to 
require more than “milk.” Moses was a serious student, diligent in all those lessons which would 
benefit the soul (Mos. 1:20). He had a truly international education, with private teachers from all 
over Egypt and Greece, and, because of his innate intellectual gifts, he quickly surpassed their 
lessons and was able to comprehend difficult subjects on his own, without his teachers. His 
genius was due to the fact that, instead of learning anew, he was able to access memories of 
innate knowledge (ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι δοκεῖν, οὐ μάθησιν) (Mos. 1:21).137 Therefore, Moses was 
able to speed through his studies in all the encyclical subjects and in Egyptian philosophy (Mos. 
1:23), and become an expert in philosophical—as opposed to sophistical—rhetoric and dialectic 
(Mos. 1:24).  
 As he grew older, Moses continued his education, now focused on the taming of the 
passions, impulses, and violent affections of the soul (Mos. 1:25-26). His asceticism was 
renowned, and, through his actions every day, he exhibited the doctrines of philosophy, living for 
the soul alone and not for the body (Mos. 1:27-29).138 This particular aspect of paideia will be 
                                                 
137 Cf. Mos. 1:22: “The well-disposed soul anticipating its lessons, is improved by itself rather than by its teachers, 
taking hold of some sort of primordial knowledge.” On innate knowledge, implanted within the soul, see below. 
138 Cf. Leg. 3:128, where Philo distinguishes Aaron, as the model of one moving towards perfection, who restrains, 
guides, and subdues the passions, from Moses, the model of the already perfected soul, who prefers, instead, to 
completely and permanently eradicate the passions. 
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discussed further below, but it is important here to show how Philo sets up Moses as the 
ultimate, perfect model of the learning soul, displaying a mastery of all three models of attaining 
virtue, through teaching, the self, and training. Yet, despite the amazing opportunities he had as 
Pharaoh’s grandson and his vast intellectual talents, Moses longed for the paideia of his kin and 
ancestors (τὴν συγγενικὴν καὶ προγονικὴν ἐζήλωσε παιδείαν), considering the paideia of his 
adopted home as ultimately illegitimate (νόθα), though quite brilliant for a time (Mos. 1:32).  
 In his longing to seek a better education, Moses found a new paideia and a new teacher, 
with God himself educating his pupil Moses (Mos. 1:80), first through signs (Mos. 1:77-80),139 
and later through the laws, on the mountain when Moses was initiated in the divine will (Mos. 
2:71). Moses’ initiation, Philo tells us elsewhere, involved not only his own education, but it also 
led to his, then, becoming a hierophant and a teacher of divine things (Gig. 54), who would 
initiate others into these divine mysteries (Virt. 178). In the generations to come, Moses would 
continue this “initiation,” through the education he passed on in the Jewish law, particularly in its 
proper interpretation. 
 Philo often refers to the text of the Pentateuch as Moses’ education of the people, with 
such phrases as “as Moses often teaches, saying… / ὡς καὶ Μωυσῆς πολλαχοῦ διδάσκει 
λέγων…” (Migr. 8; cf. Mut. 220, 236) or “Moses speaks here very instructively (παιδευτικῶς)” 
(Virt. 165) or “Moses is here philosophizing and teaching us / φιλοσοφῶν καὶ διδάσκων ἡμᾶς” 
(Her. 291). Moses “trains (συνασκήσας)” and “educates” those “living under his constitution 
(πολιτευομένους)” with his “laws as trainers (τοὺς ἀλείπτας νόμους)” (Praem. 4-5). The soul is 
“taught by the hierophant and prophet Moses” (Leg. 3:173). This type of language is common in 
                                                 
139 Cf. Mos. 1:95, where God attempts to instruct the Egyptians through signs and wonders, though to no avail, 
leading to further afflictions and admonitions. This is an idea that will be fully taken up by the author of the Wisdom 
of Solomon, though it is important to note that Philo is careful to not refer to the plagues as paideia. 
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Philo’s work, however, when he describes Moses as an educator via the law or the law as having 
a specifically educational function, it is nearly always in reference to the non-literal meaning of 
the text. 
 
Paideia through Allegorical Interpretation of Jewish Law 
It is often pointed out that Philo considered both the literal and allegorical meanings of the 
Pentateuch necessary for the Jewish people,140 and this idea is, at least partially, correct, the 
clearest support of which is found in Philo’s De migratione Abrahami, where he derides those 
Jews who disregard the literal meaning of the text upon discovering the allegorical: 
εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἳ τοὺς ῥητοὺς νόμους σύμβολα νοητῶν πραγμάτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὰ 
μὲν ἄγαν ἠκρίβωσαν, τῶν δὲ ῥᾳθύμως ὠλιγώρησαν· οὓς μεμψαίμην ἂν ἔγωγε τῆς 
εὐχερείας· ἔδει γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ζητήσεώς τε τῶν ἀφανῶν ἀκριβεστέρας 
καὶ ταμιείας τῶν φανερῶν ἀνεπιλήπτου. 90  νυνὶ δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐν ἐρημίᾳ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς μόνοι 
ζῶντες ἢ ἀσώματοι ψυχαὶ γεγονότες καὶ μήτε πόλιν μήτε κώμην μήτ᾽ οἰκίαν μήτε 
συνόλως θίασον ἀνθρώπων εἰδότες, τὰ δοκοῦντα τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπερκύψαντες τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν γυμνὴν αὐτὴν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς ἐρευνῶσιν· οὓς ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος διδάσκει χρηστῆς 
ὑπολήψεως πεφροντικέναι καὶ μηδὲν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔθεσι λύειν, ἃ θεσπέσιοι καὶ μείζους 
ἄνδρες ἢ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ὥρισαν. 91  μὴ γὰρ ὅτι ἡ ἑβδόμη δυνάμεως μὲν τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγένητον, 
ἀπραξίας δὲ τῆς περὶ τὸ γενητὸν δίδαγμά ἐστι, τὰ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ νομοθετηθέντα λύωμεν. . . . 92  
μηδ᾽ ὅτι ἡ ἑορτὴ σύμβολον ψυχικῆς εὐφροσύνης ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς πρὸς θεὸν εὐχαριστίας, 
                                                 
140 See Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough, By Light, Light. The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism (New Haven, CT: 
Philo Press, 1935), 82-83; Harry A. Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religions Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam (2 vols.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), 1:115ff.; Samuel Sandmel, “Philo’s Environment 
and Philo’s Exegesis,” Journal of Bible and Religion 22.4 (Oct. 1954): 248-253; and David Dawson, Allegorical 
Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 72-74. 
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ἀποταξώμεθα ταῖς κατὰ τὰς ἐτησίους ὥρας πανηγύρεσι· μηδ᾽ ὅτι τὸ περιτέμνεσθαι 
ἡδονῆς καὶ παθῶν πάντων ἐκτομὴν καὶ δόξης ἀναίρεσιν ἀσεβοῦς ἐμφαίνει, καθ᾽ ἣν 
ὑπέλαβεν ὁ νοῦς ἱκανὸς εἶναι γεννᾶν δι᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀνέλωμεν τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ περιτομῇ τεθέντα 
νόμον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ἁγιστείας καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων ἀμελήσομεν, εἰ μόνοις 
προσέξομεν τοῖς δι᾽ ὑπονοιῶν δηλουμένοις. 93  ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα μὲν σώματι ἐοικέναι 
νομίζειν, ψυχῇ δὲ ἐκεῖνα· ὥσπερ οὖν σώματος, ἐπειδὴ ψυχῆς ἐστιν οἶκος, προνοητέον, 
οὕτω καὶ τῶν ῥητῶν νόμων ἐπιμελητέον· φυλαττομένων γὰρ τούτων ἀριδηλότερον 
κἀκεῖνα γνωρισθήσεται, ὧν εἰσιν οὗτοι σύμβολα, πρὸς τῷ καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν 
μέμψεις καὶ κατηγορίας ἀποδιδράσκειν. 
For there are some who, looking upon the literal laws as symbols of noetic things, have 
studied some things with great accuracy, and have disregarded with indifference other 
things. These men I should blame for their recklessness, for they should attend to both 
classes of things, a precise inquiry into hidden things and a blameless stewardship of the 
obvious things. 90 But now, living alone by themselves, as in a desert, or as if being souls 
without bodies and without knowing any city or village or house or, in short, the 
company of other people, they overlook what is apparent to many people and instead 
seek for the plain truth by itself. The sacred scripture teaches them to reflect carefully on 
noble conceptions and to abandon none of the customs which men greater and more 
divine than any in our time had enacted. 91 For, though the seventh day is a lesson which 
teaches us both about the power of the uncreated God and the rest of the created, we 
cannot abrogate the laws made concerning it. . . . 92 Nor does it follow that, because the 
feast is a symbol of the joy of the soul and of its gratitude towards God, we are to 
repudiate the seasonal festivals. Nor, because circumcision is an emblem of the excision 
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of pleasures and all passions and of the destruction of impious opinion, according to 
which the mind has imagined itself to beget on its own, does it follow that we are to 
annul the established law concerning circumcision. Since we shall neglect the laws 
concerning temple worship and many other things, if we attend only to those things 
which are made clear via their deeper intention. 93 But, it is necessary to think that one 
class of things resembles the body, and the other the soul; therefore, just as one must care 
for the body because it houses the soul, so too must one care for the written, literal laws. 
For, when these laws are kept, the other things will be more clearly understood, of which 
these laws are symbols, and, in so doing, one will escape blame and censure from the 
majority. (Migr. 89-93) 
Philo here argues that one must continue to follow the literal observances of the law even after 
coming to understand the true allegorical meanings behand the individual enactments, as the 
praxis is meant to remind and further instill the deeper teaching of the text. However, this is not 
to say that Philo put the literal and allegorical interpretations of the Pentateuch on an equal level, 
especially in understanding the intended lessons of the text, and Philo often condemns those 
ignore the true allegorical meaning in favor of the plain, surface reading (Somn. 1:102).141 While 
the individual ordinances must continue to be observed, Philo clearly argues that the educational 
value of the Mosaic law comes via a deeper, non-literal exegesis. 
 The value of an allegorical, symbolic, or figurative reading over the literal is particularly 
highlighted when the plain meaning of the written text is problematic and seemingly contrary to 
Philo’s particular understanding of an ultimately transcendent, uncreated, incorporeal deity.142 
                                                 
141 Philo calls these men “micro-citizens” in comparison with the citizens of the cosmos who interpret allegorically 
(Somn. 1:39). On Philo’s denigration of these “pure literalists,” see Montgomery J. Shroyer, “Alexandrian Jewish 
Literalists,” JBL 55.4 (Dec. 1936): 261-284. 
142 See Wolfson, Philo, 1:116; and Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 91. 
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The ancient Hebrew scriptures and their Greek translations are rife with anthropomorphic and 
angelomorphic language describing the God of Israel communicating and interacting directly 
with humans in human or angelic form, an image preposterous and even blasphemous for Philo. 
However, knowing that Moses would never have added anything unnecessary or blatantly false 
in his text,143 Philo must explain these problematic passages. 
 On the passage “the Lord went down to see the city and the tower,” from the Tower of 
Babel narrative in the book of Genesis (Gen. 11:5), Philo comments that the statement “must be 
heard in a wholly figurative sense. For to imagine that the divinity can go towards, or go from, or 
go down, or go to meet, or, in short, that it has the same qualities and movements as particular 
animals, or to move at all, is, as they say, a monstrous and other-worldly impiety. / τὸ δέ, 
"κατέβη κύριος ἰδεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸν πύργον" τροπικώτερον πάντως ἀκουστέον· προσιέναι 
γὰρ ἢ ἀπιέναι ἢ κατιέναι ἢ τοὐναντίον ἀνέρχεσθαι ἢ συνόλως τὰς αὐτὰς τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ζῴοις 
σχέσεις καὶ κινήσεις ἴσχεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ θεῖον ὑπολαμβάνειν ὑπερωκεάνιος καὶ 
μετακόσμιος, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἐστὶν ἀσέβεια” (Ling. 135). Moses, of course, could never be 
charged with such an impiety, therefore, “these things are spoken of anthropomorphically by the 
lawgiver of God, who is not in the form of a man, for the benefit of our education, as I have often 
said before in reference to other passages. / ταῦτα δὲ ἀνθρωπολογεῖται παρὰ τῷ νομοθέτῃ περὶ 
τοῦ μὴ ἀνθρωπομόρφου θεοῦ διὰ τὰς τῶν παιδευομένων ἡμῶν, ὡς πολλάκις ἐν ἑτέροις εἶπον, 
ὠφελείας” (Ling. 135).  
 This type of base anthropomorphic language Philo argues was intended to be beneficial 
for the education of the foolish, who are incapable of conceiving of a deity without form or 
speech or emotion. God is described in the holy literature as a man  
                                                 
143 See, e.g., Fug. 54. 
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in order to educate the life of the foolish (τὸν τῶν ἀφρόνων βίον παιδεῦσαι) . . . 
attributing to God a face, hands, feet, a mouth, voice, anger, passions . . . he offers these 
expressions not with an eye towards truth, but for the benefit of those who might learn 
from them, for some are very dull in their natures, so as to be completely unable to 
imagine God without a body. . . . For we must be content if such people are able to be 
corrected through the fear hanging over them through such descriptions. And these are 
the only two paths in the entirely of the law, the one leading towards the truth, by which 
we have assertions such as “God is not like a man” [Num. 23:19], the other, that which 
has an eye towards the opinions of the stupid, to whom it is said, “The Lord God shall 
educate you as a man educates his son” [Deut. 1:31]. (Somn. 1:234-237)144  
Elsewhere, Philo argues that Moses used this type of language “as a sort of introduction, for the 
sake of correcting those people who could not be corrected otherwise” (Deus 52). These are 
people who are more attached to the body and sense perception than those attached to the soul 
and incorporeal things, those who are able to have a proper comprehension of an incorporeal 
deity in need of nothing (Deus 55-56). Anthropomorphism as literary device, then, serves a very 
elementary educational purpose, necessary for children or the child-like who have not advanced 
to a higher intellectual or philosophical level. The educational value of the law, however, goes 
far beyond this introductory level, especially when we move into Philo’s allegorical reading of 
the text.  
Allegory is both the primary literary device Moses used in crafting his law code, and the 
exegetical tool necessary to delve below the surface meaning of the text and understand the true 
                                                 
144 In Deus 51-54 Philo makes the very same argument and comparison between Num. 23:19 and Deut. 1:31 when 
exegeting Gen. 6:7. Cf. QG 1:55; 2:54. Philo also understands Moses using such anthropomorphisms as “I am your 
God” (Gen. 17:1) as a form of catachresis (Mut. 27). 
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meaning, the lesson Moses intended. Philo can refer to this underlying view of the text explicitly 
as paideia for the people, but even when he does not, this is always the assumption: the allegory 
of the Mosaic law uncovers the lawgiver’s originally intended paideia, lessons concerning the 
nature of and relationship between the body and the soul or mind and their attendant sense 
perceptible and noetic properties. For example, it was his desire to educate (παιδευτικὸς) that led 
Moses to include in his law an entire “holy book” allegorically describing the exodus of the soul 
out of the body (Migr. 14). The historical narratives of particular individuals and peoples 
contained in the law are, in reality, paideumata about more universal truths about the nature of 
the cosmos and the soul’s path to virtue (Her. 267-268; Agr. 68, 122). This dichotomy between 
the literal text and the underlying allegorical paideia led the philosophically-minded Therapeutae 
to envision the Jewish law itself in terms of the Mosaic allegory, viewing the plain words to be 
the body and the invisible meaning beneath these words the soul (Cont. 78). Philo, it seems, 
would agree. However, this view of the law does not mean that the literal commandments—i.e. 
the body—can be or must be thrown off in favor of the allegorical reading—the soul—alone. 
First, there is the wider issue of balance in Philo’s overall worldview, balance between the active 
and contemplative and between the body and soul, an absolute necessity for Philo and an issue 
which will be discussed further below. Second, there is the educational benefit of the plain 
commandments, a paideia which, unlike the encyclia, cannot be abandoned. 
Philo’s entire exegetical project to reveal the underlying, intended lessons hidden beneath 
the surface of the literal text clearly highlights the educational quality of those aspects of the 
Mosaic law which are not legislative at all, that is the creation narrative and histories. 
Understanding the history of Abraham as a symbol of the soul migrating away from the passions 
and moving up through the ranks of necessary paideia to loftier virtue and wisdom, turns a 
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particular, individual drama into a universally applicable lesson. And yet, while some thought it 
eminently reasonable to assume that observance of the literal legislative aspects of the law were 
irrelevant after determining and following the universal lessons gained through allegorical 
interpretation—such as those Philo derides in Migr. 89-93 and later Christians beginning from 
the Epistle of Barnabas—Philo insists that the literal, particular commandments remain in effect 
for all, regardless of their own intellectual advancement. This is due, in part, to the educational 
force Moses intended, not only with the narrative, but also with the praxis itself, where practice 
of the literal laws could forcefully instill elements of the broader allegorical program and its 
lessons.  
Philo’s allegorical interpretation of Jewish law as justification for its observance is part of 
a long line of tradition in Greek-speaking Jewish communities of the Second Temple period, 
going back to the pseudonymous author of the Letter of Aristeas and the roughly 
contemporaneous Aristobulus. While much has been discussed on the motivations for 
allegorizing the Jewish laws, whether tending towards particularism or universalism,145 those 
laws which most clearly served to differentiate the Jews from their Gentile neighbors and those 
which would have been most distasteful or unusual to Gentile ears, those laws which then 
become synonymous with Gentile views of Jewish practice,146 would have provided fertile 
ground for allegorical interpretation. Thus, we find allegorical explanations of Jewish dietary 
laws (Aris.144-171) and the Sabbath (Aristobulus frag. 5), both of which take what was 
                                                 
145 Dawson, Allegorical Readers, argues that Philo’s overall allegorical program was designed to usurp Greek and 
Roman values. Others, instead, see Philo more engaged with the wider culture and aiming more towards a 
universalism. See Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994), 13ff.; and J. Dyck, “Philo, Alexandria and Empire: The Politics of Allegorical 
Interpretation,” in Jews in the Hellenistic and Roman Cities (ed. J. R. Bartlett; London: Routledge, 2002), 149-174. 
146 See H. A. Musurillo, ed., The Acts of the Pagan Martyrs: Acta Alexandrinorum (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1954); Menachem Stern, Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism (3 vols.; Jerusalem: The Israel 
Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1974, 1980, 1984); and Erich Gruen, Diaspora: Jews amidst Greeks and 
Romans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 15-53. 
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particular and, to outsiders, peculiar, and endow them with philosophical and universal meaning. 
Philo is no different in this regard, but the overall, ever-present aim of his allegorical exegesis, 
focused continually on all things psychic, results in unique explanations. 
The Jewish dietary restrictions become, for Philo, literal, daily expressions of their 
deeper, symbolic significance, that is the soul’s need to excise the passions and devote itself, 
instead, to education. Certain types of animals are forbidden, not because they are inherently 
unclean, but because of what they represent and what they teach those following the food laws. 
In fact, Philo openly admits that there is no logic to the literal meaning of some of the food laws, 
and only through allegorical interpretation (δι᾽ ὑπονοιῶν) does the logic become evident (Agr. 
131). We learn that clean animals must, first, chew the cud, which is meant to remind one of the 
necessity of the soul to ruminate over and again on its paideia, contemplating the lessons 
received until they are firmly implanted within the soul (Spec. 4:107; Agr. 132). Next, the animal 
must have cloven hooves, the hoof parted as life itself is parted, one road leading to wickedness, 
the other to virtue. The cloven hoof represents the necessity of distinguishing between the two, 
choosing and remembering what is right, and avoiding and forgetting the opposite (Spec. 4:108; 
Agr. 133-134). Animals with solid hooves imply that the nature of good and evil is one and the 
same, while those with many toes show that there are many roads which lead to deceit (Spec. 
4:109). As far as water-dwelling creatures are concerned, only those which have both fins and 
scales are permissible, as they represent a patient and temperate soul, while those without 
symbolize a soul devoted entirely to pleasure (Spec. 4:110-112). Likewise, reptiles which crawl 
upon their bellies are symbolic of souls devoted to pleasure and insatiable appetite and those 
which are four-legged and many-footed (τετρασκελῆ καὶ πολύποδα) are akin to souls enslaved to 
all the passions (Spec. 4:113). But, reptiles which jump and leap off of the ground are clean, as 
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they represent the rational soul which, through its devotion to orthē paideia, is able to resist the 
weight of the body and the passions and spring up from the earth to the heavens (Spec. 4:113-
115). In all these dietary restrictions and the distinctions made between clean and unclean 
animals, Moses “causes the extinction of appetite” (Spec. 4:118). 
Circumcision was another defining marker of Jewish particularism and separateness, 
though the Jews, of course, were not the only ones to practice it. Nevertheless, circumcision 
became a source of continual fodder in Greek and Roman anti-Jewish polemics,147 as Philo 
himself makes clear at the opening of his multi-volume De specialibus legibus: “We will begin 
from that law which is an object of ridicule by the majority of people” (Spec. 1:1). Philo then 
goes on to give multiple reasons for the continuation of a painful and mutilating (Spec. 1:3) 
ancestral custom, beginning from those of exegetes before him, explanations both medical—
preventative, cleanliness, prolificness—and anatomical, the resemblance of the circumcised 
portion to the heart, making what is invisible visible (Spec. 1:4-7). Philo proceeds to give his 
own interpretation of the practice, seeing it as symbolic of two larger, more universal lessons: the 
excision of the pleasures which delude the mind and the soul, and self-knowledge and the 
destruction of vain opinion from the soul (Spec. 1:8-10; Migr. 92). 
Sabbath practice, too, had an allegorical meaning underlying Moses’ literal proscriptions, 
which was bound up together with the creation account itself. The idea that God required a 
certain number of days to create the world and then needed a period of rest is, to Philo, nonsense 
(Dec. 99). This division, then, must have an intended educational purpose, a lesson for those who 
keep the Sabbath day holy, a commandment through which Moses tells the people to “always 
imitate God” (Dec. 100). With God as the paradigm, the six days of creation represent to 
                                                 
147 See, e.g., Josephus, C. Ap. 2:137. 
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humanity mortal needs, the “unavoidable necessities of life,” while the seventh day is devoted to 
the contemplation of nature, the period serving as both model for all human actions and for the 
perfect way of life, the balance between the active and contemplative lives (Dec. 99-101). God’s 
immortal, uncreated, wholly perfect nature did not require such a division of time, but humanity, 
composed of both body and soul, requires those things beneficial to both, the active life in 
service to the body and the contemplative life devoted to the perfection of the intellect (Spec. 
2:64).  
It must be made clear that Philo does not apply this method only to those laws which 
most obviously distinguished Jews from Gentiles. For example, Philo can take a rather obscure 
law concerning the purification of the homes of lepers and allegorically make it applicable even 
to those who are not priests charged with such cleansing:  
Therefore, in the law concerning leprosy, “when in a house hollows appear of a greenish 
or fiery red color, then the inhabitants shall take out the stones in which such hollows 
appear, and put in other stones in their places” [Lev. 14:36-42], that is to say, whenever 
diverging qualities, which the pleasures and the appetites, and the passions akin to them, 
have created, weighing down and oppressing the whole soul, have made it more hollow 
and more lowly than its natural condition would be, it is necessary to remove the reasons 
which are the causes of this weakness, and to introduce instead reasons made healthy by a 
lawful training and correct education (ἀγωγῆς νομίμου ἢ καὶ παιδεύσεως ὀρθῆς). (Det. 
16) 
All commandments proscribed by Moses are to Philo customs which must be followed and, 
through their practice, lessons designed to educate the Jews about the life and educational 
journey of the soul. 
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The Jewish people have in the law of Moses a powerful educational tool, which teaches 
on different levels, depending on the intellectual prowess of the individual, in both its narratives 
and its legislation. But, the question remains as to why is the law is so pedagogically valuable. 
The simplest answers would point to the divine origin of the law or the intellectually and 
philosophically perfect lawgiver. However, the validity of the law as an educational tool is due 
not only to its origins, but also to its nature, specifically its relationship to the unwritten order of 
the universe. 
 
The Law of Moses and the Law of Nature 
Philonic scholarship has long and extensively explored the concept of natural law in Philo’s 
works and thought and the connection he makes between the written law of Moses and the 
unwritten law of nature, discussing Philo’s originality—or lack thereof—in the development of 
the concept of natural law, the connections between his concept and similar ideas in Stoic 
philosophy, the bold and problematic move of equating a written law code with the unwritten 
order of the universe, and the reasons behind Philo’s insistence on such a connection. However, 
in all this discussion, the correlation between the Mosaic/natural law link and Philo’s insistence 
on the educative role of the Jewish law has gone largely unnoticed. 
 The fact that Philo is the first Greek writer we have who extensively and technically 
utilized the term “law of nature” or νόμος φύσεως, led Helmut Koester to claim that Philo 
himself was the originator of the concept, an idea which could only have sprung from the unique 
amalgamation of Jewish and Greek thought and within a philosophical framework where Stoic 
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elements are regularly subsumed beneath a broader Platonic framework.148 This is not to say that 
Philo developed the theory in a vacuum. Koester makes clear the background Heraclitean, 
Platonic, and Stoic elements, but he also allows for originality on Philo’s part, against the then 
common trend of viewing Philo’s thought, particularly his philosophy, as utterly derivative.149 
 Scholars immediately recognized the value of Koester’s work, though they pointed out 
one major problem with his study and his claim for Philo’s contribution: his only passing 
reference to and ultimate dismissal of similar concepts and terminology in Stoic-influenced Latin 
literature, particularly that of Cicero. Richard Horsley argued extensively and, for most, 
conclusively that Philo and Cicero were both deeply influenced by earlier Stoic thought on the 
concept,150 and this indebtedness to Stoic philosophy has been assumed in all studies on natural 
law in Philo since.151  
                                                 
148 Helmut Koester, “Nomos Phuseos: The Concept of Natural Law in Greek Thought,” in Religions in Antiquity. 
Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough (ed. Jacob Neusner; Studies in the History of Religions XIV; 
Leiden: Brill, 1968), 521-541. See Koester’s conclusion: “It seems that there can be little doubt that Philo has to be 
considered as the crucial and most important contributor to the development of the theory of natural law. Most 
probably, Philo was its creator, at least insofar as the evidence from the Greek literature is in question. Only a 
philosophical and theological setting in which the Greek concept of nature was fused with the belief in a divine 
legislator and with a doctrine of the most perfect (written!) law could produce such a theory, and only here could the 
Greek dichotomy of the two realms of law and nature be overcome. All these conditions are fulfilled in Philo, and 
the evidence for the development of this theory of the law of nature in Philo is impressive” (540). 
149 See, e.g., Wilfred L. Knox, Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity (London: Oxford University 
Press 1944), 34. 
150 Richard Horsley, “The Law of Nature in Philo and Cicero,” HTR 71 (1978): 35-59. 
151 Markus Bockmuehl, “Natural Law in Second Temple Judaism,” VT 45.1 (Jan., 1995) 17-44, agrees in part with 
Horsley’s critique of Koester, but adds that Philo’s development of the theory was also indebted to a long line of 
tradition within Second Temple Judaism itself. John W. Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the 
Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity 2; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 
acknowledges the Stoic influence, but allows for some philonic originality and creativity: “Philo follows the Stoics 
in his formulations, especially in adopting the description of the order of nature as the ὀρθὸς λόγος. Reason guides 
nature. Philo gives us more: he is the first writer in Greek, whose work is extant, to speak so clearly and often of the 
νόμος φύσεως. While Philo has clearly adopted Stoic terminology, he provides the missing link: the term itself. To 
follow the λόγος of nature is to follow the νόμος φύσεως. It is Philo who first gives us the formulation on a 
consistent basis” (75-76). 
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 While Philo’s level of originality in developing the Stoic concept of natural law continues 
to be debated,152 Philo’s connection between the unwritten, perfect law of nature with a written 
law code does not have an immediate locus in Greek philosophical thought, and, as many have 
pointed out, would have been viewed by non-Jewish philosophers as deeply problematic.153 And 
though we find earlier Alexandrian Jews who implicitly drew a connection between the Jewish 
law and the order of nature,154 Philo is the first known author who consistently and 
systematically binds the two together and makes the relationship a foundational aspect of his 
broader worldview. 
 Philo opens his treatise on the Genesis creation narrative by explaining the curiosity of 
Moses beginning his law code with an account of the creation of the world. Moses surpassed all 
other lawgivers before and after him, including those who simply and straightforwardly set forth 
their regulations and those who shroud their laws with deceptive fables and myths (Opif. 1-2). 
Moses, instead, begins with creation, because, unlike all other written law codes, Moses’ law 
was in consort with the order of the universe: 
 ἡ δ᾽ ἀρχή, καθάπερ ἔφην, ἐστὶ θαυμασιωτάτη κοσμοποιίαν περιέχουσα, ὡς καὶ τοῦ 
 κόσμου τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῦ νόμου τῷ κόσμῳ συνᾴδοντος καὶ τοῦ νομίμου ἀνδρὸς εὐθὺς 
                                                 
152 On Greek and Roman concepts of higher, unwritten, and/or natural law, see Rudolf Hirzel, Agraphos Nomos 
(Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaft 20; Leipzip: Teubner, 1900), 65ff.; J. L. Adams, “The 
Law of Nature in Greco-Roman Thought,” Journal of Religion 25 (1945): 97-118; R. M. Grant, Miracle and Natural 
Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought (1952): 19-28; Paul A. Vander Waerdt, “Zeno’s Republic and 
the Origins of Natural Law,” in The Socratic Movement (ed. P. A. Vander Waerdt; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1994), 272-308; Matt A. Jackson-McCabe, Logos & Law in the Letter of James: The Law of Nature, the Law of 
Moses, & the Law of Freedom (NTSupp 100; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 29-86; and Tony Burns, Aristotle and Natural 
Law (London: Continuum, 2011), especially for his discussion on Aristotle’s influence on the Stoic conception of 
natural law and for his extensive bibliography on the subject.  
153 See, e.g., Hindy Najman, “A Written Copy of the Law of Nature: An Unthinkable Paradox?” SPhA 15 (2003): 
54-63. 
154 See Let. Aris. 161: “For our laws have not been drawn up at random or in accordance with the first casual thought 
that occurred to the mind, but with a view to truth and the indication of orthos logos.” In the small number of 
fragments we have of Aristobulus, there are hints that he too connected the Mosaic law with the orthos logos of 
nature. See Frags. 2.2-3; 5.9-10, 12. 
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 ὄντος κοσμοπολίτου πρὸς τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως τὰς πράξεις ἀπευθύνοντος, καθ᾽ ἣν 
 καὶ ὁ σύμπας κόσμος διοικεῖται. 
 His opening is, as I have said, most amazing, in that it contains an account of the creation 
 of the cosmos, and the reason for this is that the cosmos is in harmony with the law and 
 the law with the cosmos, and the man who observes the law is at once a citizen of the 
 cosmos, governing his actions according to the intention of nature, according to which 
 the entire cosmos is regulated. (Opif. 3) 
 This connection is quite remarkable, as Philo understood the sense-perceptible cosmos 
being governed by a perfect, universal law, a “politeia by which the cosmos is administered” 
(Abr. 61), which he contrasts specifically with the plurality of law codes of the individual cities: 
“For this cosmos is a great city (μεγαλόπολις), and it has one politeia and one law; and this logos 
of nature enjoins what one ought to do and forbids what one ought not to do. But, the individual 
cities are unlimited in number and make use of differing politeiai and laws; for there are different 
customs and regulations found and established in different places” (Jos. 29). There is discord 
among the various peoples because of this plurality, because “they were not satisfied with the 
laws of nature (τοῖς τῆς φύσεως θεσμοῖς)” (Jos. 30). The particular law codes were, thus, added 
to the perfect politeia of nature, “for the laws of individual cities are additions to the orthos logos 
of nature / προσθῆκαι μὲν γὰρ οἱ κατὰ πόλεις νόμοι τοῦ τῆς φύσεως ὀρθοῦ λόγου” (Jos. 31).155 
                                                 
155 While the Greek term “law of nature” may be lacking in earlier philosophical literature, the idea is clearly present 
in early Stoicism, often connected to or equated with orthos logos. For example, according to Chrysippus, “And this 
is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own 
human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the common 
law, that is to say, the orthos logos (ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος) which pervades all things, and is 
identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is” (Diog. Laert. VII. i. 88). On the Stoics and orthos logos, see A. 
A. Long, “The harmonics of Stoic virtue,” in Stoic Studies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 202-
223; and Brian E. Johnson, The Role Ethics of Epictetus: Stoicism in Ordinary Life (Plymouth, UK: Lexington 
Books, 2014), 72-76. 
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 The goal of humanity should be to live in harmony with the order of the universe, to be 
citizens of the great city by living according to the law of nature.  A life in accord with law is a 
life of freedom (Prob. 45), but “but the unerring law is orthos logos, not some perishable, mortal 
law, not some soulless law written on soulless papyrus or stelae, but the imperishable law 
stamped by an immortal nature on an immortal mind (ἀλλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀθανάτου φύσεως ἄφθαρτος ἐν 
ἀθανάτῳ διανοίᾳ τυπωθείς)” (Prob. 46). Total obedience to particular law codes, even those of 
great men like Solon or Lycurgus, is not sufficient to ensure the life of freedom, because they are 
simply additions to the universal law, “orthos logos, which is the fountain from which all other 
laws spring” (Prob. 47). Particular law codes may spring from the unwritten law of nature, the 
great importance of following natural law is that orthos logos is the “never-ending fountain of 
virtues” (Plant. 121).156 
 This is not to suggest that the law codes of individual cities were inherently bad. They are 
simply insufficient. Philo actually has kind things to say about other laws and encourages 
obedience to the laws of the state.157 In Abr. 16, Philo argues that lawgivers strive to fill the souls 
with good hope, but the virtuous man, instead, has within him an “unwritten, self-taught law, 
which nature has implanted.” There are certain individual, therefore, who have been able to live, 
inherently, according the law of nature, without the help of any written law code, including that 
of Moses. 
 Adam was the first human citizen of the cosmos, and the first human to adopt the politeia 
of the world, “the orthos logos of nature, which more properly is designated ‘ordinance,’ being a 
                                                 
156 On the connect between orthos logos and virtue, see also Leg. 3:150; Gig. 17, 48; Migr. 128; Spec. 2:29; Virt. 
127; and Prob. 62. 
157 Pace Martens, One God, One Law, 99-100, who argues that Philo only accepts other law codes where they were 
drew on the law of Moses. See below on the extended discussion of mother paideia and father orthos logos in Ebr., 
where observance of the laws of the state is part of one’s obedience to mother paideia and part of the perfect, 
balanced life. 
141 
 
divine law in accordance with which things suitable and appropriate are assigned to each person / 
αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ὁ τῆς φύσεως ὀρθὸς λόγος, ὃς κυριωτέρᾳ κλήσει προσονομάζεται θεσμός, νόμος 
θεῖος ὤν, καθ᾽ ὃν τὰ προσήκοντα καὶ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἑκάστοις ἀπενεμήθη” (Opif. 143). Adam 
shared this constitution with those citizens who came before him, the “rational and divine 
natures, both those incorporeal and noetic and those not without bodies, such as the stars” (Opif. 
144). This natural law existed prior to the creation of the first human, who would follow it, living 
in as close to a divine state as was possible for a mortal creature, at least until the arrival of 
woman, allegorically interpreted as sense perception, which would give rise to desire, bodily 
pleasures, a breaking of the law of nature, and forfeiture of immortality (Opif. 151-152).  
 The arrival of sense perception into the universe did not prevent all of humankind after 
Adam from living according to this same natural law, but it did become much more difficult. 
Certain extraordinary individuals throughout history have been able to follow the original, 
unchanged law of nature, imprinted upon their minds, without the help of written instructions or 
guidance and, in so doing, have become models for others to follow, living laws to emulate. It is 
for precisely this reason that Moses decided to follow his account of creation with the lives of 
such extraordinary individuals, “the more general laws, which are archetypes, as it were, of the 
particular laws, which are copies” (Abr. 3). Moses permanently enshrined the lives of these 
individuals in his writings not only to praise their actions, but also to encourage others to emulate 
their conduct (Abr. 4), to show that particular laws which would follow were in accord with the 
universal law of nature, and, finally, to demonstrate that it is not difficult to adhere to the 
particular laws, as these men were able to obey the law of nature without any outside, written 
help:  
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These men have become living and rational laws (ἔμψυχοι καὶ λογικοὶ νόμοι), whom 
Moses extolled for two reasons: first, because he wanted to show that the injunctions laid 
down are not out of sync with nature; and second, to demonstrate that it is not overly 
difficult for those who wish to live according to these established laws, when these first 
men readily and easily obeyed the unwritten legislation (ἀγράφῳ τῇ νομοθεσίᾳ) before 
any of the particular laws were written down. So that one may properly say that the 
written laws are nothing more than memorials of the life of the ancients, discussions of 
the ancient deeds and words which they had adopted. (Abr. 5) 
These individuals, without the benefit of instructors or teachers, were able to conduct their lives 
according to the unchanging ancient law of nature (Abr. 6). Abraham did not have the benefit of 
the law of Moses, but was nevertheless able to fulfill completely “the divine law and all the 
divine commandments, not having been taught to do so by written texts, but by unwritten nature, 
he was eager to follow all healthy and salutary impulses” (Abr. 275). In the hands of Moses, 
Abraham is thus not only law-abiding (νόμιμος), but he himself becomes “an unwritten law and 
ordinance (νόμος αὐτὸς ὢν καὶ θεσμὸς ἄγραφος)” (Abr. 276). Abraham’s life is set up as a 
paradigm to follow, a model for those who wish to live in accordance with the divine law. We 
have discussed in detail one of the ways Abraham served as a model, as an allegorical 
representation of the soul on the path from preliminary paideia to wisdom, ironically as the 
model of the soul which requires teaching to acquire virtue. 
 Philo understands the role of those wise individuals who could live in perfect harmony 
with the law of nature as paradigmatic, whether the lives of ancient patriarchs like Abraham or 
Moses himself (Dec. 1), set down as permanent models in the law of Moses, or the actions of 
contemporary individuals, both Jewish and Gentile, who serve as imminent sparks of virtue and 
143 
 
wisdom wherever they go: “In the past, there were some people who surpassed their 
contemporaries in virtue, taking God alone as their guide and living according to the law, that is 
the orthos logos of nature, who were not only free themselves, but also filled all who came near 
them with the spirit of freedom. And now too, in our own time, there are some who are, as it 
were, images of the kalokagathia of wise men, modeled from the archetypal representation” 
(Prob. 62). Elsewhere, Philo makes clear that these contemporary models can be found among 
all nations. In a present-day world filled with covetousness and mutual hostility (Spec. 2:43), 
there exist certain special individuals, “whether Greek or barbarians, who are practicers of 
wisdom, living a life blameless and beyond reproach,” who avoid associations with injustice and 
corrupt public institutions (Spec. 2:44) and, instead, live peaceful lives devoted to the 
contemplation of nature and the ascent of the mind (Spec. 2:45). These people, through their 
devotion to the order of nature and paideia, are full of kalokagathia and able to rise above all the 
bodily pleasures and appetites which weigh down the soul (Spec. 2:46). Though few in number, 
they serve as “a smoldering coal of wisdom in their various cities, on account of which virtue 
may not become entirely extinguished and thus destroyed from our race” (Spec. 2:47). Philo 
laments the fact that this number is so small and argues that if all men lived in accordance with 
nature’s designs, the world would be free of pain and fear and, instead, be filled with eternal joy 
and happiness (Spec. 2:48). It is in this, the difficulty of innately following the law of nature and 
the very few able to do so, where we begin to see the purpose and role of the law of Moses and 
the special place it holds for the Jewish people. 
 In the discussion of the role of the Jewish law in the study of ancestral philosophy, we 
saw that Moses intended his citizens to live according to the laws of nature (Mos. 2:211), and we 
have seen that the seemingly odd inclusion of both a creation narrative and historical accounts at 
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the start of his law code were meant to demonstrate this possibility of achieving this goal through 
adherence to the particular laws he would then set forth. The particular injunctions of the law 
would allow the normal person who followed them closely to achieve what only a small handful 
of extraordinary individuals had been able to accomplish on their own. The laws had this power 
because, one, they were modeled on the living laws as archetypes, those who innately followed 
the law of nature, and, two, they were set down by the most perfect intellect the world has seen. 
Moses was such an exceptional student, who was able to quickly master and then surpass the 
lessons of his teachers, because he had complete access to and total recall of the knowledge 
latent within him. This knowledge was nothing but the orthos logos of nature, imprinted upon 
the mind or soul, and the attendant virtues (Mos. 1:48). And it is this which Moses would set 
down as written copies, as only he could:  
Therefore, it is a great thing if it has fallen to the lot of one person to arrive at any one of 
the qualities before mentioned, and it is an amazing thing, as it seems, for one to have 
been able to grasp them all, which Moses alone appears to have done, having given a 
very clear description of the aforesaid virtues in the commandments which he 
established. 11 And those who are well versed in the sacred books know this, for if he had 
not had these principles innate within him, he would never have compiled those 
scriptures at the promptings of God. And he gave to those who were worthy to use them 
the most admirable of all possessions, likenesses and copies of the paradigms which were 
impressed upon his soul (τῶν ἀγαλματοφορουμένων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παραδειγμάτων 
ἀπεικονίσματα καὶ μιμήματα), which became the laws which most clearly and plainly 
revealed the aforementioned virtues. (Mos. 2:10-11) 
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 With fewer and fewer people in the world able to live by the innate law of nature, God, 
through Moses, gave the Jewish people some assistance, a written guide which would allow 
those who followed its ordinances and studied its deeper meanings to live as humanity was 
initially intended, to overcome the passions and appetites within the soul and elevate the noetic 
over the sense-perceptible. The law of Moses was given so that “the one who followed the laws 
and welcomed the concomitant conformity to nature would live in accordance with the 
arrangement of the universe with perfect harmony and concord between his deeds and his 
actions” (Mos. 2:48). Because the written laws of Moses were “the most closely resembling 
image of the politeia of the cosmos” (Mos. 2:51), and each of the particular, individual laws “aim 
at the harmony of the universe and are in agreement with the logos of eternal nature (τῷ λόγῳ 
τῆς ἀιδίου φύσεως)” (Mos. 2:52).158 
 
Mosaic Paideia, Concluding Comments 
In Philo’s understanding, the connection between the written law code of the Jews and the 
unwritten, universal law of nature is determinative in the educational value of the Mosaic law, 
the entirety of which becomes, in Philo’s hands, paideia, a textbook whose purpose is to instruct 
the student to live according to orthos logos and, thereby, attain the sought-after goals of all 
                                                 
158 Scholars have long argued that Philo, in drawing this connection, equates the law of Moses with the law of 
nature. See Koester, “Nomos Phuseos,” 533; John W. Martens, “Philo and the ‘Higher’ Law,” Society of Biblical 
Literature 1991 Seminar Papers (ed. E. H. Lovering; SBLSPS 30; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 309-322 (317); 
and Hindy Najman, “The Law of Nature and the Authority of Mosaic Law,” SPhA 11 (1999): 55-73 (60, 64). 
However, Philo’s argument that the laws of Moses are the best possible representations of the laws of nature is not 
an argument for identical similitude, the limiter, “best possible,” being crucial here. This is further confirmed by 
Philo’s standard view of copies as necessarily imperfect and degenerative (Opif. 140-141). There is a definite 
hierarchy, the law of nature being superior to the law of Moses, but one that makes little difference, as the law of 
Moses remains the best possible representation on earth. A hierarchy, however, does not equate to a disparagement 
or subversion of the Jewish law or Judaism itself, an assumption often lurking behind the motivation of some 
scholars to prove an equality between the law of nature and the law of Moses in Philo’s thought. 
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forms of paideia, wisdom, virtue, and, ultimately, the immortal life of the soul.159 The written 
law of Moses is a unique educational resource, not only due to its connection to the unwritten 
order of nature, but also because it is capable of different levels of instruction, from the most 
elementary to highly advanced, depending on the level and capacity of the individual student, 
and we can distinguish an internal hierarchy of Mosaic paideia. Moses could use figurative, 
anthropomorphic language to instruct the most elementary students to come to proper conception 
about God. Practice of the literal Jewish ordinances would educate at different levels, from the 
beginning student who is not yet able to conceive of the deeper allegorical meaning of the laws 
to those more fully cognizant of the intended lessons underlying Jewish praxis, and literal 
observance as a whole, with its intended target of the earthly mind (γηίνῳ νῷ), is at an 
intermediate level of instruction (Leg. 1:93-95). Finally, deep allegorical study of the Jewish law, 
in service to ancestral philosophy, appears to be the loftiest form of paideia for the most 
advanced students, highly educated thinkers like Philo himself. In fact, Philo’s entire allegorical 
project is the product of this loftiest level of education. 
 While an internal hierarchy is clear, caution is required in attempting to discern the 
relationship between this Mosaic paideia and other forms of education Philo insists are 
necessary, such as the encyclical studies and philosophy. It is not uncommon for scholars to 
assume an overall hierarchy of educational forms that places the Jewish law on top, but they do 
so without firm Philonic support.160 Philo can repeatedly and consistently argue for the 
preliminary nature of the encyclia prior to philosophy or philosophy prior to virtue and wisdom, 
                                                 
159 It should be noted that several scholars have argued that Philo equates the laws of Moses with the Greek virtues. 
See, e.g., Wolfson, Philo, 2:200; and Naomi G. Cohen, “The Greek Virtues and the Mosaic Laws in Philo: An 
Elucidation of De Specialibus Legibus IV 133-135,” SPhA 5 (1993): 9-23. Yet, the relationship Philo consistently 
draws between the two—that the laws are training towards virtue—is so closely paralleled to that between the 
encyclia or philosophy and the virtues that one must conclude that, for Philo, the Mosaic laws were not themselves 
the virtues, but paideia which leads to the attainment of the virtues. 
160 See, e.g., Sandnes, The Challenge of Homer, 73. 
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but he never openly draws these comparisons between Mosaic paideia and other forms. His 
silence on this is likely intentional, as is his near absence of ethnic markers for the various forms 
of education. The curriculum of encyclical studies Philo discusses is undoubtedly Greek, but one 
would never know this from Philo himself. Only in his discussion of Moses’ education, do we 
see a distinction along ethnic lines. Philo goes out of his way to not distinguish between Greek 
and Jewish paideia.  
 One of the clearest examples of this is Philo’s discussion of mother paideia and father 
orthos logos as the parents of learning souls in De ebrietate 33ff., which I will examine in detail 
below. The best students—the perfect learning souls—are those who attend to both parents, not 
just one or the other. Philo could have easily made a distinction here between the necessity of 
both Greek encyclical paideia and Jewish Mosaic paideia, but he does not. The father is orthos 
logos, not orthos logos obtained through a study of the law of Moses. Philo’s scenario is 
decidedly inclusive. 
 It would be easy to claim superiority for the paideia of Moses, and it may seem self-
evident, but, with Philo himself not doing so, it is best to view Mosaic paideia as existing 
alongside other forms. Encyclical paideia or the study of Greek philosophy were not preliminary 
to education via the Jewish law. Mosaic paideia took place continually throughout one’s life and 
existed, at different levels, at every stage of the individual’s educational development. This 
conclusion not only makes the best sense of Philo’s thought, but also likely best reflects the 
education of elite Alexandrian Jews of Philo’s own time.  
 
5. THE ROD OF PAIDEIA 
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One of primary results of the examination on the transition from musar to paideia in the 
Septuagint translations was the observation that, while certain of the translations held strictly to 
the understanding of paideia found within the ancient and contemporary Greek contexts, to the 
point of altering the underlying Hebrew so as to distance paideia from notions of violence and 
disciplinary punishment more inherent in the Hebrew musar, others followed the Hebrew text so 
closely that there was no choice but to imbue the Greek paideia with those violent connotations. 
This decision, to consistently utilize paideia as a translation for musar even in those cases which 
would stretch the meaning of the Greek term beyond its traditional usage, would have far-
reaching implications in the development of paideutic notions in later Jewish and Christian 
settings. In the following chapter we will see just how far the idea of paideia as musar or divine, 
violent discipline could be taken, in a text roughly contemporary to the writings of Philo, the 
Wisdom of Solomon, where a fundamental and necessary form of paideia is the testing of 
humanity by God or Wisdom, educative tests which could include great violence, torture, and 
even death.  
 Disciplinary, chastising forms of paideia, whether the agent was human or divine, were 
linked to the rhabdos, the rod or cane used to beat misbehaving children. Note that this 
connection was fundamental in both Jewish and Greco-Roman traditions, where the rod of the 
pedagogue was ubiquitous in literature and vase paintings. The term paideia may have not 
traditionally meant violent discipline, but there is little doubt that beatings were a regular part of 
the instruction of children in ancient Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman education.161 
 Philo too makes the connection between paideia and the rod, though in a manner quite 
unexpected, allegorically reading the rod of Jacob and the rod of Moses as paideia, the weapon 
                                                 
161 See Marrou, History of Education, 158-159; Beck, Greek Education, 104-109, 215-218; Bonner, Education in 
Ancient Rome, 115-145; Cribiore, Gymnastics of the Mind, 65-73. 
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necessary for combating the passions, desires, and appetites within the soul. Instead of beating 
children, the rod of paideia would beat the passions into submission. The rod, then, for Philo, 
was purely symbolic and metaphorical. With the connect to the rod, Philo is neither suggesting 
the necessity of divine disciplinary violence, as the author of the Wisdom of Solomon does, nor 
even condoning the corporal punishment of children. The training of the soul via the rod does not 
require physical abuse, but rather the application of paideia and orthos logos to combat those 
things detrimental to the life of the soul and the individual. In linking paideia with the rod of 
Jacob and Moses, Philo internalizes the understanding of paideia as musar and reevaluates and 
restructures it in the development of, what was to him, a more acceptable image of paideia. At 
the same time, Philo also subtly undermines the connection between corporal punishment and the 
instruction of children inherent in Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman education, and, in so doing, he 
participates in a philosophical debate current among several of Philo’s near contemporaries, such 
as Quintilian and Ps.-Plutarch.162 
 
The Allegory of the Rods of Moses and Jacob 
The fullest allegorical exegesis which will serve as foundational for Philo’s understanding of 
paideia as the rod which helps to supplant the irrational passions of the soul is found in book two 
of Legum allegoriae. Philo begins from an allegorical reading of Exod. 4:1-5, which he then 
links, through a sort of pre-rabbinic gezerah shevah, to Gen. 32:10, from Moses to Jacob and 
back, connected together via each man’s respective rhabdos. Having just established the serpent 
                                                 
162 See Marrou, History of Education, 272-273; Morgan, Literate Education, 132. 
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as the symbol of pleasure (Leg. 2:84), Philo sets out his base proof text for establishing the role 
of paideia in combating the passions: 
And serpentine pleasure (ἡ ὀφιώδης ἡδονη) does not even abstain from attacking that 
most God-loving Moses, for we read as follows: “‘If, therefore, they will not obey me, 
nor listen to my voice—for they will say, “God has not been seen by you”—what shall I 
say to them?’ And the Lord said to Moses, ‘What is that which is in your hand?’ And he 
said, ‘A rod (ῥάβδος).’ And God said, ‘Cast it onto the ground.’ And he cast it onto the 
ground, and it became a serpent (ὄφις), and Moses fled from it. And the Lord said to 
Moses, ‘Stretch out your hand, and take hold of it by the tail.’ And having stretched out 
his hand, he took hold of it by the tail, and it became a rod (ῥάβδος) in his hand, ‘That 
they may believe you.’” (Leg. 2:88) 
We next learn that the story is not actually about God inquiring about Moses’ stick. The question 
“What is that which is in your hand?” is to be understood as “What is in the practical life of the 
soul (τῷ πρακτικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ βίῳ)? For the hand is a symbol of action (πράξεως)” (Leg. 
2:89). Moses’ reply of “a rod,” should actually be read as paideia: “And he answers, ‘paideia,’ 
which he calls a rod” (Leg. 2:89). Paideia is fundamental to the practical—or active—life. 
 Before completing his allegorical exegesis of the Exodus passage, Philo then takes the 
mention of the rhabdos as an opportunity to connect this account to the Genesis passage and to 
Jacob, the symbol of the soul which ascends to virtue through training (ἄσκησις): “On which 
account, Jacob, the supplanter of the passions, says, ‘For with my rod (ῥάβδῳ), I passed over this 
Jordan.’ But, Jordan is to be interpreted as ‘descent.’ And those things of a lower and earthly and 
perishable nature exist in wickedness and passion; but the athlete163 mind (ὁ ἀσκητὴς νοῦς) 
                                                 
163 My translation of the Greek askētēs as “athlete,” I feel best represents Philo’s imagery of Jacob as the model of 
the one who achieves virtue through training (ἄσκησις). “Trainer” is acceptable, though ambiguous, having both an 
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passes over these things with paideia” (Leg. 2:89).164 Using his allegorical interpretation of the 
encounter between God and Moses, Philo takes the “lowly” notion of a man crossing over a river 
with a cane (βακτηρίαν) and observes a lofty, universal truth, that the rod of paideia is necessary 
to overcome the corruptible passions. 
 With the link to Jacob, the athlete mind, established and at the fore, Philo then returns to 
complete his exegesis of the Exodus passage: 
Well, therefore, does the God-loving Moses answer. For truly the actions of the virtuous 
man are supported by paideia as by a rod, quelling the agitation and restlessness of the 
soul. This rod, when cast away, becomes a serpent. And very appropriately. For if the 
soul casts away paideia, it becomes fond of pleasure instead of being fond of virtue. On 
which account Moses fled from it, for one who is fond of virtue does flee from passion 
and from pleasure. (Leg. 2:90)  
A soul without paideia becomes susceptible to the influence of the irrational passions. And the 
first instinct of Moses, being the God-loving, virtue-loving man he is, is to flee from such 
passions, to avoid them and keep them at bay. However, Moses’ instinct here is wrong. Escape 
from the passions is the action fit for a mind not yet made perfect, but Moses, who represents the 
mind already perfected, must instead endure in his war with the passions and fight against them 
in order to keep them from wholly taking over and despoiling the soul (Leg. 2:91).165 The rod of 
paideia is both necessary to supplant the passions and the result of successfully conquering them:  
                                                 
objective and subjective meaning. “Ascetic,” though obviously matching the Greek closely, should be avoided as the 
term conjures too easily notions of Christian monasticism and hermetism, which are not suitable here. 
164 Cf. Leg. 3:18, where Jacob subdues forcefully low-hanging, less powerful passions, but flees from the loftier 
passions on his way to perfect virtue. 
165 We saw earlier that Aaron is the paradigm of one on the path towards perfection and, thus, one who flees the 
passions instead of fighting them directly. See Leg. 3:128, 140, 159.  
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On which account God commanded Moses “to take hold of it by the tail,” that is to say, 
let not the hostile and untamable spirit of pleasure terrify you, but with all your power 
take hold of it, and seize it firmly, and master it. For it will again become a rod instead of 
a serpent, that is to say, instead of pleasure it will become paideia in your hand. (Leg. 
2:92) 
 
Several other occurrences of a rhabdos in the books of Moses Philo likewise interprets as 
referring to paideia: Mut. 135 on Gen. 38:25 and Judah’s rod; Cong. 94 on Lev. 27:32 and the 
tenth portion of cattle “under the rod” holy to the Lord;166 and Sacr. 63 on Exod. 12:11 and the 
Passover meal understood as the passing over from the created to the uncreated through the help 
of paideia. While the imagery of being “under the rod” could easily, in the literal sense, suggest 
physical chastisement and discipline, and indeed this is how scholars have often viewed these 
passages in Philo,167 Philo makes perfectly clear that the rod is but a symbol of the working of 
paideia within the soul or mind, mental discipline not actual corporal punishment. We see this 
explicitly in part of Philo’s allegorical reading of the Hagar/Sarah narrative, in his explanation of 
Gen. 16:6 and the idea that Sarah “afflicted (ἐκάκωσεν)” Hagar. 
Philo’s understanding of passage centers on the notion of affliction, and he begins from 
the comment in Deut. 8:2 that God “afflicted (κακώσῃ)” and “tested (ἐκπειράσῃ),” the people in 
the wilderness through, among other things, starvation (Cong. 170). While such passages would 
provide the author of the Wisdom of Solomon the basis for his understanding of paideia as 
necessary, divine discipline and testing, the idea that God was doing something so vulgar (Cong. 
                                                 
166 Philo often associates the number ten with paideia. See Post. 97; Sacr. 122; Cong. 88, 111; Mut. 228. 
167 See Claude G. Montefiore, “Florilegium Philonis,” JQR 7.3 (Apr. 1895), 481-545 (489-490); Billings, The 
Platonism of Philo, 86-87; Ronald Williamson, Philo and the Epistle to the Hebrews (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 302-304; 
and Conley, “‘General Education’ in Philo,” 4-6. 
153 
 
171) gives Philo the ammunition he needs in order to argue that Moses had intended a different, 
true meaning. The words “he afflicted,” in reality, “are equivalent to ‘he educated and 
admonished and corrected (ἐπαίδευσε καὶ ἐνουθέτησε καὶ ἐσωφρόνισε),” and this starvation is 
not about a deficiency of food, but rather of “pleasures, desires, fears, pain, injustices, and all 
things which are the works of wickedness or of the passions” (Cong. 172). Applying this idea to 
his reading of the Hagar/Sarah passage, Philo finally argues: “When, then, you hear that Hagar 
was afflicted by Sarah, you must not imagine any of those things which customarily arise out of 
feminine jealously; for the passage is not about women but about minds (οὐ γὰρ περὶ γυναικῶν 
ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διανοιῶν), the one being trained in the preliminary studies, the other 
struggling through the contests of virtue” (Cong. 180). This type of allegorical reworking is 
indicative of Philo’s overall view of paideia as the rod and any seemingly disciplinary aspects 
associated with it. 
 
Aids in the Fight against the Passions: Model Athletes, Mosaic Law, Orthos Logos, 
Conscience 
The connection between the rod of paideia and Jacob is not a coincidence. For Jacob, the symbol 
of the mind which improves to virtue through training, the rod of paideia was the natural ally 
against the irrational and earthly impulses. Jacob is the “athlete of knowledge (ὁ ἀσκητὴς 
ἐπιστήμης) warring against the opposite disposition, ignorance, in a way shepherding the 
irrational powers in the soul by admonishing and correcting (νουθετῶν καὶ σωφρονίζων) them” 
(Det. 3). In fact, this is the reason Jacob is portrayed by Moses as a shepherd in Gen. 30:36 (Agr. 
42). Moses gives the title of “shepherd” only to the wise, the true kings, as they rule over 
irrational impulses like a flock (Agr. 41). Moses himself is portrayed as such (Exod. 3:1), as he is 
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“the shepherd of that mind which embraces delusion over truth and welcomes appearance over 
reality” (Agr. 43). The athlete is able to corral that which has gone astray. 
 The shepherd of the unruly passions and those guided by them, the athlete of virtue 
should serve as a model for others: “For we look upon the athlete of insight (φρονήσεως 
ἀσκητὴν) as the sun, since the one gives light to our bodies, and the other to the things of the 
soul, and the paideia which such a person makes use of, we look upon as the moon at night, for 
the use of each is the purest and most useful” (Somn. 2:134). We have seen that Moses was such 
a model student and the very paradigm of the already perfected individual because he had 
mastered all three paths to wisdom and virtue, including the training of the passions (Mos. 1:25-
26, 28-29), and, as a help for those not so gifted, he left behind “trainer laws (τοὺς ἀλείπτας 
νόμους)” to help chasten those passions (Praem. 5).168 We saw earlier how the dietary laws 
could allegorically symbolize the extinction of appetite, the destruction of the passions, and the 
literal practice of the ordinances helped to forcefully instill this paideia. 
The laws of Moses, as paideia, then, could provide help and guidance in chastening the 
irrationality of the soul, and models like Jacob or Moses served as paradigms for the use of the 
rod of paideia. But humankind also has internal helpers, most notably orthos logos and 
conscience, which work in concert with the various forms of paideia to control the passions 
within the soul. We saw earlier how special individuals throughout history were able to 
completely adhere to the unwritten law of the universe, the orthos logos of nature, without any 
external help, solely by following the copy of the universal law which was imprinted in their 
minds. While this perfect correspondence is rare, the way in which God created the sense-
perceptible world and the composite nature of humanity mean that every individual has a stamp 
                                                 
168 The Essenes, who utilized such “trainer laws” (Prob. 80), were also known as “athletes of virtue (ἀθλητὰς 
ἀρετῆς)” (Prob. 88). 
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of the divine law within their soul or mind,169 and this image aids in the fight against the 
irrational. 
Philo often describes this internal orthos logos as that which, together with paideia, helps 
to subdue the passions and properly guide the mind. In this way, orthos logos can be portrayed, 
like Jacob or Moses above, as the shepherd of our internal flock, which, without orthos logos to 
“correct and educate it (νουθετήσοντός τε καὶ παιδεύσοντος), strays a great distance from the 
rational and immortal life” (Post. 68). Philo also envisions this function of orthos logos as the 
charioteer, holding the reins of the passions (Leg. 3:118, 222), or the pilot, steering rightly the 
mind or soul (Sacr. 51). Yet, orthos logos is not able to guide on its own; it must work together 
with the mind.170 While a tyrannical nous can cause suffering in both the body and soul and an 
indulging in passions and pleasure, the kingly nous insures that the composite individual “will, 
like a ship, enjoy a fair voyage through life, being guided on its course by the good and skillful 
pilot, that is orthos logos (κυβερνώμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τεχνίτου κυβερνήτου, οὗτος δέ 
ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος)” (Leg. 3:80). Philo sets Aaron apart as one who attended to orthos logos 
and bridled the soul with orthos logos as its charioteer instead of allowing the passions to 
become too wild and trample the whole soul (Leg. 3:128). Instead, Adam is the example of a 
mind moved contrary to orthos logos, swayed by Eve, that is sense perception, letting the horses 
                                                 
169 God thought about the plans for his great cosmic city, from which was ordered the intelligible world (Opif. 19). 
The intelligible cosmos “is nothing else than the Logos of God as he is actually engaged in creating the cosmos” 
(Opif. 24). The human nous was then modeled on the divine logos or nous (Opif. 69, 146; Spec. 3:207; QG 2:62). 
Because of this, the human nous contains, in essence, the outlines of the noetic cosmos, the entire world of ideas. It 
is this nous which God breathes into man’s face via pneuma (Opif. 135). God “inspired (ἐνέπνει) that crafted thing 
from above with something of his own divinity. And this invisible divine nature stamped upon (ἐνεσφραγίζετο) the 
invisible soul its own impressions, in order that even the ground of the earth might have a share in the image of 
God” (Det. 86). Commenting on Gen 2:8, Philo says, “It was proper, after the creation of the world, to establish a 
contemplative system of life, in order that man, by the sight of the world and of the things which are contained in it, 
might be able to attain to a correct notion of the praise due to the Father. And since it was not possible for him to 
behold nature herself, nor properly to praise the Creator of the universe without wisdom, therefore the Creator 
planted the outline of it in the rational soul of the principal guide of man, namely the mind” (QG 1:6). 
170 Note that nous too is also described as the charioteer or pilot of the soul. See Sacr. 45; Leg. 3:224. Philo seems to 
shift these roles back and forth with no hesitation or contradiction. 
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get the better of the charioteer, the ship get tossed upon the waves despite the pilot’s efforts (Leg. 
3:222-223).  
Conscience (συνειδός) is another internal aid in the individual’s fight against the 
passions, using elegchos to correct and subdue those unruly psychic components.171 Like the rod 
of paideia and orthos logos, conscience rebukes and chastens from within, though the particular 
purview of conscience often appears aimed at sins committed intentionally. Thus, conscience is 
not imagined as a shepherd or charioteer or pilot, but as the judge within the soul: “unintentional 
misdeeds, even if they are extremely extensive, are not worthy of blame and are pure, in that they 
do not have conscience, that burdensome accuser; but intentional offenses, even if they don’t 
extend a great deal, being convicted before the judge within the soul, are considered unholy, 
polluted, and impure” (Imm. 128). Conscience effectively restrains the voluntary impulse of the 
offender until the soul is set right (Imm. 100). This means putting it back under the reigns of 
orthos logos (Imm. 126).   
Much like he did in his conceptualization of the rod of paideia, Philo, in his 
understanding of conscience, takes an idea most commonly associated with corporal punishment 
and internalizes the violence. Earlier we discussed the transition of tôḵaḥath to elegchos in the 
                                                 
171 Philo is the first author writing in Greek to use the term “conscience,” whether συνειδός or συνείδησις, 
extensively, though the Latin equivalent, conscientia, is regularly found from the first century BCE, in Cicero for 
example. Several scholars have understood that Philo essentially identified suneidos with elegchos, that both were 
effectively “conscience.” See V. Nikiprowetzky, “La doctrine de l’élenchos chez Philon, ses résonances 
philosophiques et sa portée religieuse,” in Philon d’Alexandrie. Lyon 11-15 Septembre 1966: colloques nationaux 
du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (Paris: Éd. du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1967), 
255-273; and R. T. Wallis, The Idea of Conscience in Philo of Alexandria (CHSHMC 13; Berkeley, 1975). Bosman, 
however, tried to distinguish between the two, suggesting that suneidos typically had a negative role, while elegchos 
was more positive. See Philip Bosman, Conscience in Philo and Paul: A Conceptual History of the Synoida Word 
Group (WUNT 2.166; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003); and Bosman, “Conscience and Free Speech in Philo,” SPhA 
18 (2006): 33-47. Klauck acknowledges that Philo, at times, had a more negative view of conscience, but he adds 
that Philo would distinguish between a bad conscience and a good or pure conscience. See H.-J. Klauck, “Accuser, 
Judge and Paraclete: on Conscience in Philo of Alexandria,” Skrif en Kerk 20 (1999): 107-118 (112-113), translated 
and abridged from H.-J. Klauck, “Ein Richter im eigenen Innern: das Geswissen bei Philo von Alexandrien,” in 
Alter Welt und neuer Glaube: Beiträge zur Religionsgeschichte, Forschungsgeschichte und Theologie des Neuen 
Testaments (ed. H.-J. Klauck; NTOA 29; Göttingen 1994), 33-58. 
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Septuagint translations, where, along the same lines as the transition from musar to paideia, 
several texts appear to maintain the classical usage of the Greek elegchos, while others transfer 
the idea of tôḵaḥath as violent correction onto the Greek term. The result of this is that the notion 
of elegchos, which is so closely connected to paideia in the Septuagint texts, would come to be 
understood as a natural component of pedagogical discipline, whether human or divine. The rod 
and elegchos would pair well. We will see this explicitly in the Wisdom of Solomon, where 
elegchos is a fundamental aspect of the text’s insistence on the necessity of divine, violent testing 
for all of humankind in the overall goal of earning the immortal life of the soul after corporeal 
death. However, just as with the rod, Philo does not accept this easy connection, and, instead, 
transfers the chastening aspect of elegchos to the soul. The author of the Wisdom of Solomon will 
view the sense perceptible world and corporeal life as an agōn, a contest to be overcome and 
won in pursuit of the true life of the soul. Philo thrusts the agōn into the soul, an internal struggle 
for the life of the soul, contested by the individual with the help of paideia, nous, orthos logos, 
the laws of Moses, and conscience.172 
 
The Rod of Paideia Concluding Thoughts 
All of the various concepts examined here—rhabdos, askētēs, orthos logos, suneidos, 
elegchos—find commonality in the internalized struggle of the soul, in the fight against the 
irrational impulses which can lead it astray. Philo’s concept of the rod of paideia, then, is not so 
much a unique type of paideia or a pedagogical method as it is a symbol of how paideia works 
to bring about necessary change and correction. It symbolizes one of the many essential benefits 
                                                 
172 See Det. 23-24; Praem. 52 for the internal agōn of the soul. 
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of paideia in the life of the individual. But, this symbol can possibly tell us more. The conception 
of the rod of paideia is an ideal place to attempt to see how Philo’s writings might speak to a 
broader social reality.  
What was Philo’s view on corporal punishment in the educational process? This is a 
question most would expect addressed in a section on the rod and paideia. Like most questions 
which attempt to move from Philo’s theory or philosophy to an actual social setting, the answer 
is not readily found in his corpus. Most have assumed that Philo, like the majority of his Jewish 
and Gentile contemporaries, would have found corporal punishment as a necessary tool in early 
childhood education. In fact, Philo discusses the rights of parents with respect to their children, 
that the parents are permitted to beat, imprison, and even kill their children over the course of 
their upbringing (Spec. 2:232-239). However, he never describes this punishment as paideia and 
he does not connect it to the children’s education. I think this omission is telling. Add to this the 
fact that Philo goes to great lengths to take the tool of corporal punishment, the rod, and 
reinterpret it as a means of supplanting desire and passion instead of one’s children or students, 
and it would not be too bold of a claim to argue that Philo was among those began to call into 
question the necessity of physical punishment in the educational process.173 It would appear that 
Philo understood one’s lessons, philosophical training, and the laws of Moses, working in 
consort with divinely-received innate powers and conscience, as a far more effective tool in the 
fight against irrationality and bodily desire than a simple stick and a beating. 
 
6. THE ACADEMIC FAMILY AND A LIFE OF BALANCE 
                                                 
173 See Quintilian, 1.3.14-17; Ps.-Plutarch, Lib. Educ. 9a. 
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We find one of Philo’s most fascinating discussions on paideia in his treatise De ebrietate or On 
Drunkenness, where encyclical paideia is said to be the mother of learning souls. As with his 
concept of the rod of paideia, the imagery of mother paideia suggests not so much a distinct 
form of education or pedagogy, but rather a symbol of how education benefits the individual, 
specifically the necessity of paideia in maintaining a perfectly balanced life, a life both active 
and contemplative. 
 At the end of his preceding treatise (Plant. 140ff.), Philo explored what other 
philosophers have said concerning drunkenness (μέθης), and now, in De ebrietate, he will go on 
to consider the views of Moses on the subject (Ebr. 1). According to Philo, drunkenness, as 
depicted throughout the law of Moses, is not the condition of the body upon drinking too much 
wine, but rather the state of the soul which lacks education. Drunken foolishness, insensibility, 
and insatiability are the result of apaideusia, a lack of education due “not to simple ignorance, 
but to a purposeful aversion to paideia / οὐ τὴν παιδείας ἀνεπιστημοσύνην ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὴν 
ἀλλοτρίωσιν” (Ebr. 6). As unmixed wine is to the drunkard, so apaideusia is to the soul (Ebr. 
11). Apaideusia is the greatest of all the errors of the soul (Ebr. 12, 15, 27). 
 The drunken soul is in need of parents to save it through admonitions and chastisement 
(Ebr. 29). It would be reasonable to take the parents of the soul as God and Wisdom, the parents 
of the entire universe (Ebr. 30-31), but no one would be able to suffer even the mildest of threats 
or censure from these parents (Ebr. 32). Therefore, these parents are to be removed from the 
discussion and others must be considered, that is their pupils, those who are assigned to care for 
those souls not wholly untrained or uneducated, orthos logos and paideia: “Therefore we say that 
the father is masculine and perfect orthos logos, and the mother is the middle, encyclical course 
of paideia, and it is good and advantageous to obey them, as a child obeys his parents” (Ebr. 33). 
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 The parents each have their own unique skillset which they are able to pass on to their 
children. The father, orthos logos, teaches the children to follow and obey nature, to pursue 
naked, bare truth, while the mother, paideia, teaches the children to attend to the just customs 
established in cities, nations, and countries (Ebr. 34). The purview of the mother includes the 
particular customs, traditions, and laws of the state, while the father is concerned, instead, with 
the laws of nature (Ebr. 64, 68). Mom’s lessons apply to the created world, while dad’s concern 
the divine (Ebr. 77).  
 Paideia and orthos logos have four classes of children (Ebr. 35). The worst are those 
children who ignore both parents, who contribute nothing to society or to piety and are a burden 
on their cities and all those around them (Ebr. 77-79). These are children so thoroughly drunk on 
the unmixed wine of apaideusia that their destruction is all but assured. The next two classes are 
each half-perfected (ἡμιτελὴς), the one attending only to the mother (Ebr. 36-64), the other 
attached solely to the father (Ebr. 65-76), the latter being the clear superior class. Those children 
who only pay attention to the mother can become “conquered by the unmanly and womanly 
association with sense perception, the passions, and the senses,” so that they are dragged about 
by anything that passes by (Ebr. 63). However, they still have their mother as their ally and are 
thus far better off than those who have ignored both parents (Ebr. 64). The second best class are 
the children who neglect their mother’s lessons and adhere fully to their father. They are 
represented by the priesthood (Ebr. 65). One could imagine that this group would be considered 
the top class, focused solely on things divine, the true order of nature, and neglecting those 
things which are but a shadow. But, for Philo, this was not the ultimate goal. The priesthood is 
necessary and to be greatly admired, but the greatest of all the learning souls is that which 
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attends to both parents; these children “will carry off the prize of victory as superior to all the 
others” (Ebr. 35; cf. 80-92).  
 That Philo considered the best student that soul which adhered to the lessons of both 
parents speaks to his overall concern for a properly balanced life. A cursory reading of Philo 
might lead one to assume that an ideal life would be devoted solely to the mind over the body, or 
to the noetic over the sense-perceptible, or to the contemplative over the active. After all, things 
corporeal and sarkic and political are the constant source of problems through Philo’s works. 
These are the things which lead to an unhealthy devotion to pleasures and desire, and they 
disrupt the natural function of the soul and prevent the mind from ascending back upwards. But, 
Philo’s overall viewpoint is that the solution to these problems is not wholesale rejection, but a 
proper balance between the mind and the body, but with the mind firmly in control of the reins. 
A look again at Migr. 93 is instructive here: “But, it is necessary to think that one class of things 
resembles the body, and the other the soul; therefore, just as one must care for the body because 
it houses the soul, so too must one care for the written, literal laws. For, when these laws are 
kept, the other things will be more clearly understood, of which these laws are symbols, and, in 
so doing, one will escape blame and censure from the majority.” The intended active and 
contemplative balance is built into Moses’ creation narrative, the six days of the active life and 
the seventh day devoted to contemplation (Dec. 99-101). His metaphorical family makes 
perfectly clear the necessity of all forms of paideia in achieving this properly balanced life. 
Encyclical paideia on the mother’s side and philosophy and the study of the laws of Moses, both 
of which are an education in orthos logos, on the father’s side. 
 
7. THE DEATH OF THE SOUL DRUNK ON APAIDEUSIA 
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After Philo discusses the family of mother paideia, father orthos logos, and their four orders of 
children, he picks up again the larger theme of the treatise, drunkenness and the dangers of 
apaideusia. We have seen again and again that paideia, in all its forms, leads to the acquisition 
of virtue and wisdom and, ultimately, the immortality of the soul. Here, Philo affirms that the 
opposite is also true, that a lack or rejection of paideia leads to death, not the natural death of the 
body, but the unimaginable death of the soul: “ignorance brings death, but paideia brings 
immortality. For just as in our own bodies, disease is the cause of dissolution and health the 
cause of preservation, so in like manner in our souls, that which saves is prudence—for this is 
the health of the mind—and that which destroys is foolishness, which inflicts an incurable 
disease” (Ebr. 140). Given Philo’s Platonic affinities, the idea of the soul’s death, during, as we 
shall see, corporeal existence, would appear a bizarre and seemingly impossible phenomenon.174 
However, he discusses it often and extensively, finding evidence of it throughout the law of 
Moses. We must conclude, then, that psychic death as punishment, particularly for apaideusia, 
was a vital and thoroughly established part of Philo’s worldview.175 
                                                 
174 Plato often and blatantly argues for the soul’s inherent immortality. In his Phaedo Socrates refutes those who 
claim that the soul is, in fact, mortal and simply dissolves upon the death of the body: “Consider then, Cebes, 
whether it follows from all that has been said that the soul is most like the divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, 
indissoluble, always the same as itself, whereas the body is most like that which is human, mortal, multiform, 
unintelligible, soluble, and never consistently the same” (Phaed.80a-b), and 
Will the soul, the invisible part which makes its way to a region of the same kind, noble and pure and 
invisible, to Hades in fact, to the good and wise god whither, god willing, my soul must soon be going—
will the soul, being of this kind and nature, be scattered and destroyed on leaving the body, as the majority 
of men say? Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias, but what happens is much more like this: if it is pure 
when it leaves the body and drags nothing bodily with it, as it had no willing association with the body in 
life, but avoided it and gathered itself together by itself and always practiced this, which is no other than 
practicing philosophy in the right way, in fact, training to die easily. Or is this not training for death? 
(Phaed. 80d-81a; cf. 105d-106b) 
Philo could find in this passage, especially in the idea of “training for death,” a perfect argument for the righteous, 
whose souls are, indeed, immortal. But, this also directly refutes the idea of the soul’s death, even for the wicked. 
Plato makes no distinction in this case. For Plato, a polluted soul will have to undergo purification and a series of 
transmigrations into other, non-human bodies, but the soul is nevertheless immortal (cf. Phaed. 81c-e; 83d-e). 
175 For a full discussion of the phenomenon in both Philo and the Wisdom of Solomon, see Jason M. Zurawski, “Hell 
on Earth: Corporeal Existence as the Ultimate Punishment of the Wicked in Philo of Alexandria and the Wisdom of 
Solomon,” in Heaven, Hell, and the Afterlife: Eternity in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (ed. J. Harold Ellens; 3 
vols.; Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2013), 1:193-226. 
163 
 
 
Psychic Death in De fuga et inventione 53-64 
In his treatise On Flight and Finding, Philo has the perfect occasion to delve into the concept of 
psychic death when explaining Moses’ true allegorical meaning behind the punishments decreed 
for homicides, specifically when Moses claims that, “If anyone should strike another and he dies, 
let the striker die by death (ἐὰν πατάξῃ τίς τινα καὶ ἀποθάνῃ, θανάτῳ θανατούσθω)” (Fug. 53; cf. 
Exod. 21:12). The fastidiousness of the translator—translating the common Hebrew technique of 
strengthening the meaning of a verb (infinitive absolute plus finite verb;176 here תָמוּי תוֹמ, “let him 
surely die”), with the awkward Greek θανάτῳ θανατούσθω (literally, “let him die by death”)—
sets Philo up with an ideal opportunity for a bit of creative exegesis. For Philo, the Greek 
translation of the Torah was as divine and infallible as the Hebrew, so he must explain the odd 
phrase: “Knowing clearly that Moses adds no superfluous word . . . I was at a loss as to why he 
did not simply say that the one who kills intentionally shall die, but instead that he shall die by 
death. For how else does anyone who dies die but by death?” (Fug. 54-55). In his confusion, 
Philo consults with “a wise woman, by the name of Skepsis (σκέψις).” This “woman,” likely 
representing his own philosophical inquiry,177 teaches Philo that 
some people who are living are dead and some who are dead are alive (ζῶντες ἔνιοι 
τεθνήκασι καὶ τεθνηκότες ζῶσι). She said that the wicked, even though they should 
continue to a long, old age, are dead, deprived of a life of virtue, but that the good, even if 
                                                 
176 For the Hebrew idiom, see, e.g., Wilhelm Gesenius, Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar (ed. E. Kautzsch; trans. A. E. 
Cowley; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), 342ff. 
177 According to Jaap Mansfeld, “Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Others in a Middle Platonist Cento in Philo of 
Alexandria,” VC 39.2 (June 1985): 131-156 (142), when Philo turns to “Skepsis,” he is saying that in times of 
perplexity, you may turn to the philosophers. 
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they are separated from communion with the body, live forever, having received an 
immortal portion. (Fug. 55)178 
 
 Later, Philo uses the example of Cain and the fact that Moses makes no mention of his 
death to explain that “impiety is an unending evil, once kindled never able to be extinguished. . . 
. [Impiety] is immortal as to the life among us [on earth], since as to the existence with God it is 
without soul and dead, and, as someone has said, ‘more worthless than dung’ ” (Fug. 61; quoting 
Heraclitus 76 M). While heaven is the region for good things, evil is assigned to earth, “living at 
the greatest distance from the divine choir, wandering about mortal life, unable to die from the 
human race” (Fug. 62). Therefore, “Cain, the symbol of wickedness, will not die, for it is 
necessary that wickedness always live in the mortal race among humankind” (Fug. 64).179 Cain, 
appropriately, becomes Philo’s epitome of the psychic suicide. 
                                                 
178 The most notorious use of the phrase, “to die by death” comes not, however, from the injunctions against 
homicide, but in God’s command to the first parents not to eat of the tree of knowledge (Gen 2:17). In Philo’s 
exegesis of this passage in Leg. 1:105-107 he describes the death of the soul, in contrast to the natural, intended 
death, in detail: 
Accordingly, therefore, he says, “On the day in which you shall eat of it, you shall die by death (θανάτῳ 
ἀποθανεῖσθε).” And yet, though they do eat of the tree, not only do they not die, but they even beget 
children and become the causes of life for others. What, then, should we say? Namely, that death is of two 
kinds; the one being the death of the man, the other the particular death of the soul. Now, the death of the 
man is the separation of the soul from the body, while the death of the soul is the destruction of virtue and 
the entrance of wickedness. For which reason, God says that they will not merely “die (ἀποθανεῖν)” but that 
they will “die by death (θανάτῳ ἀποθανεῖν),” clearly indicating that he is discussing not the common 
variety of death but the peculiar and extraordinary death, that is of the soul, entombed in passions and all 
sorts of wickedness (ἐντυμβευομένη πάθεσι καὶ κακίαις ἁπάσαις). That one sort of death almost does battle 
with the other variety; for the one is the separation of those things which were previously combined, body 
and soul, but the other, on the contrary, is the union of both, the inferior portion, the body, having control, 
while the superior portion, the soul, is put in subjugation. Therefore, wherever he says, “to die by death,” 
observe closely that he is discussing that death which is inflicted for punishment, not that which exists 
according to nature. The natural death is the one according to which the soul is separated from the body, 
while the death which is for punishment is when the soul dies according to the life of virtue and lives solely 
to the life of wickedness. 
179 On Fug. 53-64, Mansfeld notes that, “what we have here is a little Middle Platonist treatise (or a treatise in the 
Middle Platonist manner) concerned with the vicissitudes of the soul as illustrated by a plurality of related ideas 
ultimately deriving from ('Pythagoras', the 'Orphics',) Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Homer, which have been 
reinterpreted in order to serve a common purpose. Philo has merely applied this cento to the exegesis of Scripture, 
bringing out his proof-expression and listing scriptural passages that can be integrated in the cento” (“Heraclitus, 
Empedocles, and Others in a Middle Platonist Cento in Philo of Alexandria,” 145). 
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Philo regularly assigns the sins of blasphemy, devotion to pleasure, and especially lack or 
neglect of education as the causes of the soul’s death. Lack of paideia is particularly problematic 
as it is the cause and source of so many other sins (Fug. 198-201). Ultimately, the death knell of 
the soul comes from allowing the body to imprison, engulf, and effectively smother the soul. 
During its corporeal existence, the soul is essentially carrying around a corpse (νεκροφορεῖν; 
Leg. 3:69; cf. 3:74; Somn. 2:237; Migr. 21). At the end of one’s “life” the soul simply leaves this 
corpse, i.e. the body, behind (Leg. 3:70). This is the way it is supposed to work, when the mind 
occupies itself with heavenly contemplations. But, “whenever it abandons its inquiry into divine 
things, it then regards the body as a friend, a kinsman, and brother, and therefore it takes refuge 
with those things dear to the body” (Leg. 3:72). By allowing the body to dominate what should 
be dominant, the wicked individual commits suicide by killing one’s own soul.180 
 
What is Psychic Death? 
Psychic death entails the destruction of virtue, making the soul entirely subject to the body and 
living only for vice. The complete loss of virtue can actually prevent the natural death of the 
body181 which leads to the immortal life of the soul.182 
 The most powerful result of the soul’s death during corporeal existence is the knowing 
eternal separation from God (Post. 69; Fug. 80-81), where God deserts and despises the 
                                                 
180 Philo clearly states that Cain committed psychic suicide: “Therefore we read in the subsequent passage, ‘Cain 
rose up against Abel his brother and murdered him.’ Now, according to the obvious interpretation, he suggests that 
Abel has been killed. But, according to the more accurate examination, it becomes clear that Cain himself was killed 
by himself so that we should read the passage as, ‘Cain rose up and killed himself,’ and not the other” (Det. 47). 
181 See again Leg. 1:105-107. 
182 The distinction between the two deaths is a favorite of Philo’s. See also, for example, QG 1:16, 76 and Post. 39. 
Often the distinction is drawn between Abel and Cain, Abel being the one who, though dead, is truly alive, and Cain, 
though living, is actually dead. See Det. 49, 70. 
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psychically dead (QG 1:70, 73). This deserted individual, Philo at times can even describe as 
being transformed from a rational creature into a brute, irrational beast (QG 1:50, 76; Abr. 33).183 
 The destiny of the psychically dead is telling. While the immortal soul’s destiny is in 
heaven or the noetic world in nearness to the divine, those who have destroyed their own souls 
can only look forward to the ground:  
What is the meaning of the phrase, “Until you return to the earth from which you were 
taken” [Gen 3:18]? For humankind was not formed from earth alone, but also from the 
divine spirit. First, it is evident that the earth-born creature was compounded out of earth 
and heaven. And because he did not remain uncorrupted but made light of the commands 
of God, turning away from the best and most excellent part, namely heaven, he gave 
himself wholly over to the earth, the denser and heavier element. Second, if he had been 
desirous of virtue, which makes the soul immortal, he would certainly have obtained 
heaven as his lot. Since he was zealous for pleasure, through which psychic death 
(ψυχικὸς θάνατος) is brought about, he again gives himself back to the earth; accordingly 
Scripture says, “Dust thou are, wherefore to dust shalt though return.” Thus earth is the 
beginning and end of the evil and vile man, but heaven of the virtuous man. (QG 1:51) 
 
                                                 
183 John Conroy has argued extensively that Philo’s concept of the death of the soul goes beyond mere metaphor and 
that it actually involves an ontological change in the person, reducing the wicked individual to the level of a beast. 
He notes, “. . . for Philo, the hierarchy is metaphysical, and individual human beings have the opportunity of motion 
up or down the scale of being. For instance, a righteous person, when she or he dies, moves up the scale from being 
“mortal, rational, animate” to the state of an ‘immortal.’ Further, when an unrighteous person refuses to live by the 
dictates of reason, s/he moves down the scale of being to that of an ἂλογα.” John T. Conroy, Jr., “‘The Wages of Sin 
is Death:’ The Death of the Soul in Greek, Second Temple Jewish, and Early Christian Authors,” (Ph.D. 
dissertation; University of Notre Dame; Gregory E. Sterling, Director; April 2008), 83. See also Conroy, “Philo’s 
‘Death of the Soul’: Is This Only a Metaphor?” SPhA 23 (2011): 23-40. 
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Instead of positing a theory of transmigrations—which Philo seems to reject184—the best 
explanation for the idea that the wicked man “gives himself to the earth,” is that Philo is here 
talking simply about burial. The soul is trapped on earth in the corporeal vessel during one’s 
lifetime, and at death, while the righteous leave their bodies behind to enjoy a blessed 
immortality, the wicked are simply buried in the ground. The earth, then, becomes the permanent 
home for the wicked who have destroyed their own souls. 
This earthly existence, devoid of God’s presence, is Philo’s idea of hell: “And banishing 
the unjust and atheistic soul, he disperses it far from himself to the region of the pleasures and 
desires and injustice. And this region is called most suitably the region of the impious, not that 
which is fabled to exist in Hades. For the real Hades (ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν Ἅιδης) is the life of the 
wretch, who is vengeful and a miscreant, and guilty of all sorts of curses” (Cong. 57). There is no 
“afterlife” punishment, because this “life” is not really life. This (corporeal) life is, rather, death. 
So, it would be more appropriate to actually speak of an “afterdeath” reward, the immortal life of 
the soul. Punishment simply consists in continuing in death. This horrifying, unimaginable fate, 
                                                 
184 Pace Winston, who suggests that, “Since Philo further indicates that the earth is the beginning and end of the evil 
and vile man (QG 1:51), we may conclude that in his view the destruction of the wicked very likely consists in an 
endless series of reincarnations. This would fit precisely his definition of folly as ‘a deathless evil, never 
experiencing the end that consists in having died, but subject to all eternity to that which consists in ever dying’ 
(Det. 178). It is apparent, however, that such is the fate only of those who have become incurably wicked and thus 
resemble the class of the incurables which appears in the Platonic myths of the Phaedo (113E), Gorgias (525-26) 
and Republic (615E), who are doomed never to emerge from Tartarus” (David Winston, Logos and Mystical 
Theology in Philo of Alexandria [Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1985], 39). Winston admits that Philo 
rarely, if ever, refers to the reincarnation of the soul, but nevertheless maintains the idea: “What, then, will be the 
final destiny of those progressing toward but never fully attaining perfect wisdom? It is quite likely that Philo 
thought they needed to undergo further transmigrations to purge them before they could escape the wheel of rebirth 
and enter the disembodied state of eternal bliss. Philo’s sparse references to reincarnation reveal a reluctance on his 
part to give undue prominence to a Platonic conception which was essentially alien to Jewish tradition” (42). 
Burnett, instead, seems correct in saying, “Although both Philo and Plato emphasize the connection between the 
soul's conduct and its fate, Philo posits no successive incarnations of the soul according to fate in which the wicked 
soul will ultimately be purified and freed from the body” (Fred W. Burnett, “Philo on Immortality: A Thematic 
Study of Philo’s Concept of Palingenesia,” CBQ 46 [1984]: 447-470 [466 n. 83]). For a similar view, see also Erwin 
R. Goodenough, “Philo on Immortality,” HTR 39.2 (April, 1946): 85-108 (106). A new monograph on the subject 
has just been published, which appears to argue alongside Winston, that Philo did accept the tenet of reincarnation, 
though not openly. Sami Yli-Karjanmaa, Reincarnation in Philo of Alexandria (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2015). I have 
not yet been able to consult this volume. 
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beyond reprieve or correction, is the result, ultimately, of a rejection of paideia. Instead, a 
diligent adherence to one’s paideia leads to virtue and wisdom, guaranteeing the soul’s immortal 
existence. It would be hard to make a more important argument as to the necessity of education 
in the life of the individual. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence set forth above provides a strong foundation from which to determine Philo’s 
overarching view of paideia. Education begins with the preliminary studies. Encyclical paideia 
is preparatory to philosophy, virtue, and wisdom, and it is absolutely essential for nearly every 
individual. Study of the encyclia leads to speculation, necessary for the ascent of the mind, it 
helps to fight off the passions of the soul, and provides the necessary balance between the active 
and contemplative lives. But, because the encyclia are so enticing, they can trap students and 
keep them from moving on to more advanced education and the acquisition of virtue. Therefore, 
encyclical paideia is necessarily temporary and must be abandoned once moving on to 
philosophy. The knowledge and experience gained through these studies, however, remains valid 
and essential as the student moves upward to more advanced studies. 
 Encyclical paideia is prerequisite to the study of philosophy, as the encyclia prepare the 
student to properly speculate on nature, and philosophy is, in essence, paideia in the workings of 
the universe and the true orthos logos of nature. Unlike the preliminary studies, philosophy is a 
lifelong education. Yet is it still preparatory. Education in philosophy leads to the acquisition of 
virtue and wisdom, the ascent of the mind, and the immortality of the soul. Jewish ancestral 
philosophy too is devoted to the contemplation of nature, yet it is unique from all other forms of 
philosophy in that the Jews utilize the laws of Moses in support of their philosophical education, 
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as the Mosaic laws are also paideia in the law of nature, and the study and performance of the 
laws allows one to live according to nature’s intention. The goal of all philosophy is the same. 
Jewish philosophy is exceptional only in that they have the best possible teachers in the laws of 
Moses. 
 Mosaic law is a unique and exceptional form of paideia in many respects. Study of the 
laws of Moses is preparatory, like the encyclia or philosophy, to virtue, wisdom, and 
immortality. But, unlike the encyclia, it is eternally valid; no aspect of the law is to be abandoned 
no matter the intellectual progress of the individual. The continued validity of the law is due to 
the nature of the law as paideia. While there is an internal hierarchy in the educational value of 
the law, from the very basic to the most advanced and sophisticated, all aspects of the law as 
paideia point to truth and the order of nature. Slavish devotion to the encyclia could lead to 
sophistry and vain opinion, but adherence even to the literal practice of the individual ordinances 
of Moses lead to a life aligned with orthos logos, a life balanced between the active and 
contemplative. The law of Moses, as the best possible copy of the law of nature, is the ideal 
paideia to allow the average individual to live as God and nature intended. Yet, Mosaic paideia 
does not supersede the other forms of education; it exists alongside it. All paideia is valuable in 
the individual’s path upwards and everyone has a responsibility to take advantage of all available 
educational opportunities. 
 After discussing the varieties of paideia, we looked at three vivid symbols Philo utilized 
in order to illustrate the great benefits paideia could provide. With the rod of paideia, Philo takes 
the symbol of corporal punishment, the cane of the pedagogue, and reimagines it as the symbol 
of paideia combating desire and irrational impulse within the soul. All paideia, whether the 
preliminary studies, native or foreign philosophy, or the laws of Moses, had the power to the 
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help the individual combat those things which lead to ruin and destruction. Philo’s academic 
family, with encyclical paideia as the mother and orthos logos as the father of learning souls, 
points to the necessity of all aspects of paideia in a properly balanced life. Perfection requires the 
education of both parents, the mother’s lessons focused on the worldly and particular and the 
father’s focused on the order of the universe and the divine. For this, both the preliminary studies 
and philosophy are required. Finally, Philo’s depiction of the soul drunk on the unmixed wine of 
ignorance or apaideusia reveals the great value of paideia by illustrating the opposite’s results. 
Rejection of paideia leads to a multitude of sins and the destruction of virtue from the soul, the 
result of which is the suffocation of the soul and its death, trapped forever in the tomb of the 
body and the earth, never able to escape and return home. The most horrific fate imaginable 
awaits those who do not heed their paideia. 
 In attempting to determine an overall, grand view of paideia within Philo’s thought, we 
must recognize that all forms of paideia are preparatory, as they are meant to lead to greater 
things such as virtue and immortality. Paideia is always a means, not an end in itself. This 
recognition, however, does not insinuate any disparagement on Philo’s part, for paideia 
generally or any form of paideia in particular. Following the above study, we would have a 
difficult time finding an author, ancient or modern, more enamored with education than Philo of 
Alexandria. But, by recognizing the preparatory nature of paideia, we are made immediately 
aware of an essential hierarchy, not that of the forms of paideia itself, but the hierarchy between 
the means and the end. The goal of all paideia is virtue and wisdom and the immortal life of the 
soul that follows.  
 In order to attain virtue, one must strive to live according to the law of nature, to abide by 
orthos logos, and to control the irrational aspects of the soul which will ultimately destroy it. 
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Education is what is necessary to achieve this, not Greek education or Jewish education, but 
education. The starting point is encyclical paideia, as it is a prerequisite to the study of 
philosophy. The Mosaic law was a great advantage to the Jews in their education towards virtue, 
but it did not replace other forms of education and it was not a required form of study for non-
Jews. Because of this ideal educational resource, the Jews were like the priests of the world 
(Spec. 2:163), but this did not mean that Gentiles who did not study the laws of Moses could not 
acquire virtue, wisdom, and immortality, and we have observed that some Gentiles could serve 
as living laws, models of a life in accord with nature. 
We do not find a progression from the encyclia to foreign philosophy to Mosaic paideia. 
In Philo’s writings, education in the laws of Moses existed, for the Jews, alongside the other 
paideia. The way in which Philo conceived of this synthesis between Greek and Jewish 
education, between the secular and the religious, would have a significant impact on those 
earliest Christians who also had to decide how best to incorporate Greek paideia into overall 
Christian education. This influence extends to the history of modern Western education as a 
whole, as it was late antique and medieval Christians who were responsible for bringing Greek 
paideia into the Renaissance and modernity.  
This synthesis also likely reflected the social reality for Philo and his contemporaries. 
Elite Alexandrian Jews would have had access to Greek education either in small school circles 
or through private tutors, from the most elementary literate education to advanced rhetorical and 
philosophical studies, if we are allowed to judge from Philo’s own command of these subjects. 
Education in and via the laws of Moses would have occurred elsewhere, likely at the synagogue 
or at home, if we are to extrapolate from Philo’s depictions of Essene and Therapeutae 
education. This Mosaic education of the synagogue would have ranged from elementary to 
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intermediate, as the most advanced level of education in the laws through the study and use of 
allegory, would not have been accessible to most members of the community. For this level, we 
should look for a school of Jewish philosophy, perhaps the school of Philo himself, as Sterling 
has reconstructed it, where varying levels of exegesis would have been taught alongside Greek 
philosophy.185   
While it would have been commonplace to find the texts of Homer in elementary schools 
or the treatises of Plato in philosophical circles, the textbook of the synagogue and of Philo’s 
school would have been the Septuagint, the Greek law of Moses as well as texts like Proverbs. 
Segal argued that Philo’s equation of the law of Moses with the law of nature was his way of 
correcting what he saw as a mistranslation of nomos for torah,186 but I would argue the exact 
opposite. Philo was not trying to correct a perceived misunderstanding on the part of the 
translators. It was precisely the fact that torah became nomos that allowed for the opportunity of 
connecting the written nomos of Moses with the unwritten nomos of the universe. And this 
connection, in the hands of Philo, centered on his view of the laws of Moses as the paideia which 
would help guide the Jewish people to live according to nature, an idea made possible by the 
other essential translation choice, paideia for musar. In the following chapters, we will see the 
effects of this translation choice on other authors, with the Wisdom of Solomon fully committing 
to the view of paideia as musar or divine discipline and Paul taking the notion of the Mosaic law 
as paideia to a conclusion Philo would not, that it, like the encyclia, was preliminary and 
necessarily temporary. 
                                                 
185 See note 9 above. 
186 Alan F. Segal, “Torah and nomos in recent scholarly discussion,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 1984 
13/1 (1984): 19-27 (23-24). 
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Chapter 5. The Wisdom of Solomon 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Wisdom of Solomon is an ideal model of a Jewish text from the Hellenistic Diaspora that 
seamlessly incorporates the idea of paideia as musar or divine discipline found in the Pentateuch 
and the LXX prophetic literature with the ideals of classical Greek and Hellenistic paideia. This 
text, roughly contemporaneous to the writings of Philo of Alexandria,187 with its complex 
structure, seemingly ambiguous intended audience, and amalgam of influences and referents, has 
often eluded readers as to its precise aims and message, apart from the clear goal for the reader to 
attain wisdom.188 However, through systematically focusing on the concept(s) of paideia, we 
                                                 
187 In the past, the proposed date of composition of the Wisdom of Solomon ranged from the third century B.C.E. to 
the second century C.E. Today most scholars generally date it to the earlier period of Roman dominion of Egypt, 
usually between 30 B.C.E and the middle of the first century C.E., the most persuasive arguments placing it during the 
reign of the emperor Gaius. For good general introductions on the dating of the text, see Giuseppe Scarpat, Libro 
della Sapienza: Testo, traduzione, introduzione e commento (3 vols.; Biblica Testi e studi 1, 3, 6; Brescia: Paideia, 
1989-1999), 1:14-24; and David Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon (AB 43; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979), 
20-25. 
188 The purpose is often discussed with respect to both the genre(s) of the text and the intended audience. The genre 
has been variously characterized as protreptic discourse, epideictic discourse, and/or encomium. For Wisdom as a 
logos protreptikos, see Friedrich Focke, Die Entstehung der Weisheit Salomos (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1913), 86; James M. Reese, Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and Its Consequences (AnBib 
14; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1971), 90-91, 117-121; and Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 18, who all 
focus on the didactic, hortatory nature of the text. Scholars who have found, instead, that the text as a whole is more 
epideictic than didactic, and is better understood as an encomium to Wisdom, are Paul Beauchamp, De Libro 
Sapientiae Salomonis (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1963), Maurice Gilbert, “Sagesse,” DBSup 11 (1986): 58-
119 (77-87); Paolo Bizzeti, Il Libro della Sapienza: Struttura e genere letterario (Brescia: Paideia, 1984); and José 
Vílchez Lindez, Sabiduría (Sapiencialies V; Nueva Biblia Espanola; Estella: Editorial Verbo Divino, 1990), 38-39. 
Recently Moyna McGlynn has argued, instead, that the text is better described as an aition. See Divine Judgement 
and Divine Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom (WUNT2 139; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 4-9. Many now 
argue that the text appears composed of a variety of genres—the protreptic or didactic exhortation to attain wisdom, 
the encomium to lady Wisdom, and perhaps the epideictic oratory of the final section of the text, all of which are, 
nonetheless, essentially didactic. See, e.g., Michael Kolarcik, The Book of Wisdom: introduction, commentary, and 
reflections (NIB 5; Project Director, Jack A. Keller; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997), 433-600 (443); John J. 
Collins Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age (OTL; Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 181-182; 
and Randall D. Chesnutt, “Solomon, Wisdom of,” in The Eerdman’s Dictionary of Early Judaism (ed. John J. 
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find a text which revolves around the goal of gaining wisdom as well as the means to do so, a 
text at once thoroughly permeated by a Hellenistic, sapiential perspective, and yet creatively 
developed out of its unique combination of sources, all in service to the goal of developing a new 
theory of paideia. 
 In the earliest critical study of the Wisdom of Solomon, it was standard opinion that the 
text was a composite of three or more individual authors, writing at different times for different 
purposes.189 However, since Carl Grimm’s monumental commentary from 1860, the text’s unity 
has no longer been seriously called into question.190 The work of scholars such as Wright, Reese, 
Bizzeti, and Gilbert, begun primarily in the 1960s, on the structure and genre of the text, have 
sufficiently confirmed the unity of the composition and the tripartite structure.191 Yet, the 
purpose of the structure has remained an elusive question. The continued division of the text into 
three “books,”—usually along the lines of “Book of Eschatology,” “Book of Wisdom,” and 
“Book of History”—which began with Weber in 1904, has not always aided the understanding of 
the text but has, at times, hindered a more thorough, nuanced appreciation of the author’s 
motivations and overall message.192 
 One consistent theme that appears throughout the text and its unique parts is the detailed 
understanding of God’s and Wisdom’s education, discipline, and pedagogical testing of 
                                                 
Collins and Daniel C. Harlow; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 1242-1244, who rightly notes, however, that the 
precise purpose of the text is tied directly to the question of the intended audience, which is an issue that has also 
eluded scholarly consensus. 
189 See, e.g., J. G. Eichhorn, Einleitung in die apokryphen Schriften des Alten Testaments (Leipzig: Weidmann, 
1795), 142-149; C. G. Bretschneider, “De Libri Sapientiae parte priore Cab. I-XI, e duobus libellis diversis conflata” 
(Dissertation; Wittenburg, 1804); or J. C. C. Nachtigal, Die Versammlungen der Weisen. 2 Teil. Das Buch der 
Weisheit (Halle: J.J. Gebauer, 1799). 
190 C. L. W. Grimm, Das Buch der Weisheit (Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zu den Apocryphen des Alten 
Testamentes VI; Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1860). 
191 See James M. Reese, “Plan and Structure of the Book of Wisdom,” CBQ 27 (1965): 391-399; A. G. Wright, “The 
Structure of the Book of Wisdom,” Bib 48 (1967): 165-184; Maurice Gilbert, “La structure de la prière de Salomon 
(Sg 9),” Bib 51 (1970): 301-331; U. Offerhaus, Komposition und Intention der Sapientia Salomonis (Bonn: 
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1981), 71-73; and P. Bizzeti, Il libro della Sapienza, 65ff. 
192 Weber first introduced his theory in “Die Komposition der Weisheit Salomos,” ZWT 48 (1904): 145-169. 
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humanity. This is a text that is, throughout, colored with the language and ideals of a new 
paideia, and it is the text’s focus on paideia, as both content and pedagogy, which unites the 
seemingly divergent sections into a coherent whole. However, the way in which the author 
makes use of radically different conceptions of paideia in service to his overall project is wholly 
unique and would have been unthinkable without the intermediary help he received from the 
Septuagint translations, which handed down to him the acceptable tools necessary to create a 
bold theory of paideia. 
 Interpreting the Greek texts of the Pentateuch and the prophetic literature in light of a 
worldview imbued throughout with Greek philosophical thought, most predominantly the idea of 
the immortality of the soul—or at least the soul’s potential immortality—yields fascinating 
results, likely never considered by either the authors of the original Hebrew texts or their Greek 
translators. The notion of paideia as musar is taken to the extreme in the text, where God’s 
disciplinary violence takes on new dimensions, where one’s entire corporeal existence becomes 
nothing but an agon of divine discipline which can include even bodily death. Yet, drawing on 
LXX Isaiah, this death becomes but a trifle and a test in comparison to its reward, the true 
immortal life of the soul in nearness to the divine.  
 However, our author was not reading the Pentateuch and prophetic literature alone. From 
LXX Proverbs, which focuses not on disciplinary violence but on the dire necessity of paideia, 
its universality, and the strong connection between paideia and sophia, the author of the Wisdom 
of Solomon could envision his project on a grander and more inclusive scale. Proverbs provided 
the paradigm necessary to develop Wisdom as the educator of humankind, to include Wisdom’s 
teachings and the text itself as part of a new paideia, and to make this paideia truly global and 
free from partiality and exclusivity. Therefore, through devotion to Wisdom and her instruction, 
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the gift of immortality and nearness to the divine is available to all humankind. This paideia is 
truly universalizing, though the process by which it equalizes would seem entirely foreign and 
odd to Plato or Isocrates.  
What seem like incompatible notions related to paideia, however, come together and 
work in concert in the text, and this melding perfectly exemplifies how Jewish authors writing in 
Greek would come to use the Septuagint as a lens through which to read and interpret both their 
received ancestral traditions and the intellectual culture of their Hellenistic milieu in the creation 
of new and innovative paideutic concepts. While, in the details, the author of the Wisdom of 
Solomon gives us several different aspects of his understanding of paideia, viewed holistically, 
paideia comes to represent complete and universal education, both the content and the processes 
by which it is attained. This paideia has no ethnic or restrictive significance or determination, but 
instead is the definitive factor of righteousness and the means by which the individual gains the 
true immortal life of the soul.  
 
2. CONCEPTIONS OF PAIDEIA IN THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON 
Throughout this complex text, we find a number of distinct views of paideia, not all of them 
obviously related. The first hint we have of the concept comes in the author’s opening address, 
pointing to the central importance of the idea and its connection to the predominant player in his 
drama, the figure of Wisdom or Sophia. In 1:4-5, we see that Wisdom will not be involved in 
deceit, transgression, or wickedness of any kind, because she is the hagion pneuma paideias, the 
“Holy Spirit of paideia.”193 The very first description of Wisdom in the text is as the source of 
                                                 
193 For the originality of paideias over the minority readings of paideiou or sophias see C. Larcher, Le Livre de la 
Sagesse ou la Sagesse de Salomon (3 vols.; EBNS 1,3,5; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1983-1985), 1:174-175; J. Ziegler, 
Sapientia Salomonis (Septuaginta: Vetus Testamentum Graecum. Auctoritate Societatis Litterarum Gottingensis 
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paideia, humanity’s educator, the one who will allow them to understand all things on earth and 
in heaven.194 
 
Paideia as the Educational Content 
While this opening highlights the importance of the concept in the author’s program, it tells us 
little about to what exactly paideia refers in the text. The term, together with the cognate verbal 
form, paideuō, is used by the author variously to denote both the pedagogy and the educational 
content. We shall see later that as the means by which individuals are educated and thereby made 
righteous, the author’s portrayal of paideia often aligns more closely with the Hebrew concept of 
musar, which it inherited from the Greek translations of the Pentateuch and prophetic literature, 
than with the Hellenistic ideals of paideia proper. But, when paideia in the Wisdom of Solomon 
refers to the content of education, the concept is fully compatible with Hellenistic sensibilities.  
In the author’s second direct address to the kings and judges of the earth (6:1-21), the 
expressed purpose of the text is made clear, to correct the behavior of the rulers before it is too 
late, before they are beyond repentance. In this second address, we learn that the author viewed 
his own teachings as paideia, as education meant to guide one on the path to wisdom and 
immortality. The addressees have already gone astray: they are unjust rulers, who have neither 
                                                 
editum; vol. XII,1; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962, 1980), 96; and Ernest G. Clarke, The Wisdom of 
Solomon (Cambridge Bible Commentary; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 16. 
194 Most modern commentators agree that the phrase in Wisd. 1:5, hagion pneuma paideias, should refer to Wisdom 
herself, not to a human spirit. As David Winston has it, Wisdom here is “the holy spirit, that divine tutor.” See The 
Wisdom of Solomon, 99. According to Larcher, “L’expression hagion pneuma paideias, « le saint Esprit qui éduque 
», glose le mot « Sagesse » du v. précédent en introduisant la notion d’ « Esprit » et hagion marque la transition : La 
Sagesse ne peut cohabiter avec la malice et la souillure, parce qu’elle est une réalité « sainte » (La Livre de la 
Sagesse, 1:175). For Scarpat, “Il santo spirit della disciplina” should refer directly to Wisdom and, from that, to 
God. See Scarpat, Libro della Sapienza, 1:77 (cf. 1:116). 
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kept the law nor lived according to God’s purposes (6:4). Therefore, before God’s full 
disciplinary wrath comes upon them the author attempts to help: 
 
Wisd. 6:9-11 
 9  πρὸς ὑμᾶς οὖν, ὦ τύραννοι, οἱ λόγοι μου,  
ἵνα μάθητε σοφίαν καὶ μὴ παραπέσητε· 
 10  οἱ γὰρ φυλάξαντες ὁσίως τὰ ὅσια ὁσιωθήσονται,  
καὶ οἱ διδαχθέντες αὐτὰ εὑρήσουσιν ἀπολογίαν. 
11  ἐπιθυμήσατε οὖν τῶν λόγων μου,  
ποθήσατε καὶ παιδευθήσεσθε. 
 
9  To you, then, O rulers, my words are directed,  
in order that you may learn wisdom and not transgress.  
10  For whoever piously observes holy things will be made holy,  
and those who have been taught them will find a defense.  
11  Therefore, desire my words,  
long for them, and you will be educated.195  
 
The author’s own words, and thus the entire text, then become a pedagogical tool, a textbook for 
righteous living. This reminds us of the claim that Jesus ben Sira’s grandson and posthumous 
translator claimed about his grandfather’s work: 
 
                                                 
195 Cf. 6:1: ἀκούσατε οὖν, βασιλεῖς, καὶ σύνετε· μάθετε, δικασταὶ περάτων γῆς, and 6:25: ὥστε παιδεύεσθε τοῖς 
ῥήμασίν μου, καὶ ὠφεληθήσεσθε. 
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Ben Sira prologue 7-14 
 ὁ πάππος μου Ἰησοῦς ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἑαυτὸν δοὺς 
εἴς τε τὴν τοῦ νόμου 
καὶ τῶν προφητῶν 
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πατρίων βιβλίων ἀνάγνωσιν 
καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἱκανὴν ἕξιν περιποιησάμενος 
προήχθη καὶ αὐτὸς συγγράψαι τι τῶν εἰς παιδείαν καὶ σοφίαν ἀνηκόντων, 
ὅπως οἱ φιλομαθεῖς καὶ τούτων ἔνοχοι γενόμενοι 
πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπιπροσθῶσιν διὰ τῆς ἐννόμου βιώσεως· 
 
My grandfather, Jesus, who had devoted himself extensively to the study of the law, the 
prophets, and the other books of our ancestors, and had acquired considerable proficiency 
in them, was himself led to write something on paideia and wisdom, so that those who 
love learning might, by also becoming acquainted with what he had written, make even 
greater progress in living according to the law. 
 
The author of the Wisdom of Solomon’s assertion is even greater. His intention is not to teach his 
readers simply to live according to the Jewish law. He intends, through the teachings he claims to 
have received from Wisdom herself, to educate humankind on the proper, and only, way to 
achieve the true immortal life of the soul. This is an extraordinary claim for this textbook, this 
new paideia. 
 While the author, in the guise of the righteous king, plays the role of teacher, the constant 
figure of Wisdom—and thus God, Wisdom’s own guide—is the ultimate source of educational 
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content, and a devotion to her paideia is the ultimate prerequisite to acquiring Wisdom. Much 
like the figure of Sophia in LXX Proverbs, Wisdom, the holy spirit of paideia, in our text is 
available to all who desire her; there is no hint of esotericism or ethnic partiality here (6:12-16). 
For those committed to her paideia, the educational and spiritual value is without end: “For she 
is an unfailing treasure for mortals; those who acquire it attain friendship with God, commended 
for the gifts that come from paideia (διὰ τὰς ἐκ παιδείας δωρεὰς συσταθέντες)” (7:14). The 
content of Wisdom’s teachings is complete, universal knowledge: 
 
Wisd. 7:15-22 
 15  ἐμοὶ δὲ δῴη ὁ θεὸς εἰπεῖν κατὰ γνώμην  
καὶ ἐνθυμηθῆναι ἀξίως τῶν δεδομένων,  
ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ τῆς σοφίας ὁδηγός ἐστιν  
καὶ τῶν σοφῶν διορθωτής. 
16  ἐν γὰρ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ οἱ λόγοι ἡμῶν  
πᾶσά τε φρόνησις καὶ ἐργατειῶν ἐπιστήμη. 
17  αὐτὸς γάρ μοι ἔδωκεν τῶν ὄντων γνῶσιν ἀψευδῆ  
εἰδέναι σύστασιν κόσμου καὶ ἐνέργειαν στοιχείων, 
18  ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος καὶ μεσότητα χρόνων,  
τροπῶν ἀλλαγὰς καὶ μεταβολὰς καιρῶν, 
19  ἐνιαυτοῦ κύκλους καὶ ἄστρων θέσεις, 
20  φύσεις ζῴων καὶ θυμοὺς θηρίων,  
πνευμάτων βίας καὶ διαλογισμοὺς ἀνθρώπων,  
διαφορὰς φυτῶν καὶ δυνάμεις ῥιζῶν, 
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21  ὅσα τέ ἐστιν κρυπτὰ καὶ ἐμφανῆ ἔγνων·  
22  ἡ γὰρ πάντων τεχνῖτις ἐδίδαξέν με σοφία 
 
 15 May God grant that I speak with judgment, 
 and to have thoughts worthy of his gifts, 
 because he himself is both the guide of Wisdom 
 and the corrector of the wise. 
 16 For both we and our words are in his hand, 
 as are all understanding and skill in crafts. 
 17 For it was he who gave me unerring knowledge of existence, 
 to know the structure of the universe and the operative power of the elements; 
 18 the beginning and end and middle of times, 
 the alternations of the solstices and the changes of the seasons; 
 19 the cycles of the year and the positions of the stars; 
 20 the natures of animals and the tempers of beasts, 
 the force of spirits and the reasonings of mortals, 
 the varieties of plants and the powers of roots. 
 21 I learned both what is hidden and what is manifest; 
 22 for Wisdom, the fashioner of all things, taught me. 
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This totality of knowledge reminds us of the famous Stoic definition of wisdom as “knowledge 
of matters human and divine,” which is also found in 4 Maccabees and throughout Philo’s 
corpus.196 
 
The Wisdom of Solomon and Gentiles: Global or Nationalist Paideia? 
If this paideia can include the educational curriculum as laid out in the text itself and the “full 
range of human science and philosophy,”197 as taught by Wisdom, should we associate it with 
known curricula of the Jewish Hellenistic world? Should we equate paideia in this text either 
with the encyclical educational system so well developed by this time in Alexandria, as it often 
does in his contemporary Philo’s writings, or with the Mosaic nomos, as it does in the Greek 
translation of Ben Sira or in 4 Maccabees?  
 While it has long been observed that the author of the Wisdom of Solomon shows little 
overt interest in the Jewish law, especially in the particularistic aspects of it, many scholars have 
assumed its importance in the mind of the author.198 Wisd. 2:12, where the impious are accused 
of sins against the law and against paideia, has been one of the decisive verses in the discussion 
of the author’s view of the Mosaic law, the intended audience of the text, and the entire tone set 
forth in the book.  
 
Wisd. 2:12 
                                                 
196 See Pseudo-Plutarch, Placita 874e: οὖν Στωικοὶ ἔφασαν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν εἶναι θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων 
ἐπιστήμην. The attribution and transmission of the definition is quite complex. See René Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: 
The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 8-40. 
197 Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 172, remarking on 7:15-22. 
198 See, e.g., Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 42-43; John J. Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 192; 
Leo G. Perdue, Wisdom Literature: A Theological History (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 308; or 
Lester Grabbe, Wisdom of Solomon (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 92. 
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 ἐνεδρεύσωμεν τὸν δίκαιον, ὅτι δύσχρηστος ἡμῖν ἐστιν  
καὶ ἐναντιοῦται τοῖς ἔργοις ἡμῶν  
καὶ ὀνειδίζει ἡμῖν ἁμαρτήματα νόμου  
καὶ ἐπιφημίζει ἡμῖν ἁμαρτήματα παιδείας199 ἡμῶν· 
 
Let us lie in wait for the righteous man, because he is inconvenient to us, 
and he opposes our actions;  
he reproaches us for sins against the law  
and charges us with sins against our paideia.  
 
What exactly did the author intend by the terms nomos and paideia here? 
 The genitive pronoun hēmōn in 2:12d has been singled out by scholars in their 
understanding of these terms. As Larcher, following Fichtner and others, pointed out, the 
pronoun could modify either hamartēmata or paideias. “Sins against our paideia” would refer to 
transgressions against the education that the impious had personally received. “Our sins against 
paideia” would instead refer to transgressions “against an objective reality, a body of doctrine or 
standard practice.”200 Scarpat has argued extensively that nomos and paideia here should refer 
exclusively to the Mosaic Law, in part because the pronoun, hēmōn, according to Scarpat, is 
inclusive of the righteous man and the author.201 Against those who want to see instead a 
reference to natural law and Greek education, Scarpat argues that the inclusive aspect of the 
                                                 
199 See Ziegler, Sapientia Salomonis, 100, for the variant readings for paideias (paidīas, paidiās, and apaideias). 
200 Larcher, Le Livre de la Sagesse, 1:243. 
201 Scarpat, Libro della Sapienza, 1:187. 
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pronoun means that the righteous man and the impious who torment him must have had the same 
nomos and paideia, which could only have been the Mosaic Torah.202 
 The pronoun, however, should not cause any problems. First, this is a direct quote from 
the group of wicked men, who are speaking to one another. This is their paideia (or their sins 
against paideia). There is no reason to posit that the pronoun should include the righteous man or 
the author and his audience. The referent of the pronoun hēmōn, then, makes little difference in 
our understanding of the verse. Only if paideia is ever associated specifically with the Mosaic 
Torah, with a specific set of laws and/or customs, would it be significant. But, this is never the 
case in our text. Paideia is never equated with the written law or specific ancestral customs, and 
we cannot assume this was the case based on other Jewish sources like Ben Sira. This author 
makes no distinction between “Jewish paideia” and “Greek paideia.” There is one paideia for all 
of humankind, and the impious in 2:12 are accused of sins against it.  
There is also no reason to assume the righteous man must be Jewish, as the author goes to 
great lengths to avoid just such an identification. The righteous man’s ethnicity is never made 
explicit, because not only would this idea fall outside of the author’s purpose, but making the 
righteous man specifically Jewish would actually defeat one of his primary goals, to show that 
ethnicity has no part to play in the acquisition of wisdom and immortality.  
A continuous point of debate among scholars has been the author of the Wisdom of 
Solomon’s views towards gentiles and Hellenistic culture in general. While the influence of that 
                                                 
202 Scarpat argues that nomos and paideia elsewhere in the text should also refer specifically to the Jewish law. For 
example, on 6:17-19, he argues, “La stretta connessione e interdipendenza di questi termini o meglio di questa realtà 
religiosa è descritta nel passo di Sap. 6,17-19 costruito forse in base alle forme della logica corrente, con un 
sillogismo detto sorite o forse con un procedimento più semplice detto della «catena» (vedi avanti, p. 368): la 
paideia è l'unico modo per essere fedeli al patto nell'osservanza delle leggi, la quale porta all'incorruttibilità, cioè 
alla vicinanza con Dio e fa raggiungere all'uomo l'unico regno degno di questo nome: la Sapienza” (Libro della 
Sapienza, 1:77). Bertram, instead, argued that the author of Wisdom accepted the pedagogical ideal of the 
Hellenistic world but inserted the foreign concept of divine punishment (Bertram, “παιδεύω,” TDNT, 5:610). 
185 
 
culture on the author is no longer contended,203 scholars remain divided over whether the text 
displays a more inclusive view and rapprochement with Hellenism, as in the Letter of Aristeas, 
or whether it uses the language of Hellenism in order to undermine it, as in 4 Maccabees.204 
Three main issues in the text are typically brought forward in this discussion: the audience of the 
text, the general nature of the first two parts versus the apparent nationalism of the third, and the 
lack of proper names in the so-called “Book of History.” The language used throughout the text 
is actually not ambiguous. The question is whether we are to take the author seriously or not. 
Was he being genuine with his words or deceptive? 
 The text is addressed, from the first, to the “rulers of the earth (οἱ κρίνοντες τὴν γῆν)” 
(Wisd. 1:1), and later the second address is directed specifically at the “kings (βασιλεῖς)” and 
“judges of the ends of the earth (δικασταὶ περάτων γῆς)” (6:1). These rulers, kings, and judges 
are the ones who are to “love righteousness” (1:1), not “invite death” (1:12), “learn wisdom and 
not transgress” (6:9), and be “educated (παιδευθήσεσθε)” (6:11), in order to gain an immortal 
kingdom: “Therefore if you delight in thrones and scepters, O monarchs of the peoples (τύραννοι 
                                                 
203 Reese’s 1970 monograph, Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and its Consequences, showed 
definitively that the Hellenistic influence was not superficial but thorough. See also S. Lange, “The Wisdom of 
Solomon and Plato,” JBL 55.4 (Dec., 1936): 293-302; John S. Kloppenborg, “Isis and Sophia in the Book of 
Wisdom,” HTR 75.1 (Jan., 1982): 57-84; and, more recently, Luca Mazzinghi, Notte di paura e di luce. Esegesi di 
Sap 17,1‐18,4 (AnBib 134, Roma: Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1995); and Mazzinghi, “Law of Nature and Light of 
the Law in the Book of Wisdom (Wis 18:4c),” in Studies in the Book of Wisdom (ed. Géza G. Xeravits and József 
Zsengellér; JSJSup 142; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 37-59. 
204 See Winston, The Wisdom of Solmon, 3: “In contrast to Pseudo-Aristeas’ mild criticisms of heathen cults, the 
author of Wisd’s wrathful exhibition of the innumerable crimes and corruptions connected with pagan idolatry and 
his unrestrained attack on Egyptian theriolatry (worship of animals), is an unmistakable sign of the complete rupture 
which had in his time sundered the Jewish community from the native Egyptians and Greeks.” See Scarpat, Libro 
della Sapienza, 1:28: “Anche se troviamo l'eco di queste correnti culturali e religiose, il nostro autore va messo fra 
coloro che non condividevano, come altri e come Filone, il fìloellenismo fra i Giudei d'Alessandria; egli appartiene 
alla schiera di coloro che sostenevano che l'idolatria, sotto le sue varie sembianze, era assolutamente inconciliabile 
con la fedeltà al patto, inconciliabile con l'osservanza stretta di quella Legge che, unica, assicurava la vita eterna. 
Del resto, secondo qualche commentatore della Sapienza, l'autore ebbe solo un contatto superficial con l’ellenismo; 
secondo noi la sua cultura pagana va poco oltre le letture che la scuola esigeva o praticava. Le sue conoscenze 
filosofiche sono quelle correnti, con i termini correnti, nelle interpretazioni della divulgazione scolastica. Le 
influenze registrate, su cui qualche studioso insiste, secondo noi non rivelano assolutamente una particolare e 
approfondita cultura greca. La sua cultura è giudaica, i suoi libri sono la legge e i profeti, i salmi e i libri 
sapienziali.” 
186 
 
λαῶν), honor wisdom, so that you may reign forever (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα βασιλεύσητε)” (6:21). 
Clearly, the fictive addressees could not be thought of as Jews. They must be gentile rulers. 
Gentile rulers who are told to learn, gain wisdom, and gain immortality! This is astonishing 
language used to address gentile rulers, especially those who have not, as of yet, ruled rightly 
(6:4). But, are we to take the language at face value? Are we to take the audience seriously? 
 Nearly all modern scholars agree that the author could not possibly have envisioned 
gentile leaders in Egypt reading his text, or even a widespread pagan audience.205 However, 
many have gone further in positing that, because the actual audience could not have been 
primarily gentiles, these addressees must naturally be disguised Jews, and that the impious 
described in chapter two are not simply exemplars of impiety, but are specifically wayward Jews 
who have found themselves astray from proper Jewish worship, enticed by the charms of 
Hellenistic culture.206 The idea that the author could have intended an actual (or real) primarily 
                                                 
205 E.g., Enns, on Wisd. 1:1, explains, “Although the book is addressed to the pagan rulers, I do not think that these 
rulers were the actual, intended audience, but merely provided the literary context in which Ps-Solomon could 
address his beleaguered countrymen. Could we really expect the rulers of Ps-Solomon’s day to have been moved by 
his warnings to follows [sic] the way of wisdom? It seems more likely that even these opening chapters are 
addressed to Jews. Ps-Solomon is telling his audience, ‘See, these pagan rulers are doomed to certain judgment and 
destruction. They mean you no good and their end is certain. Do not be like them or the people they rule. They do 
not follow wisdom’s path, but you should.’” See Peter Enns, Exodus Retold: Ancient Exegesis of the Departure from 
Egypt in Wis 10:15-21 and 19:1-9 (Harvard Semitic Museum Monographs 57; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 140.  
While I, like nearly all Wisdom of Solomon scholars, agree that actual gentile rulers were not the intended audience 
here, I could not disagree more with Enns’ understanding of the author’s purpose. Reese likens these figurative 
addressees to those of the Hellenistic kingship tracts. See Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and Its 
Consequences, 146-151, followed by Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 63-63, 101. See also Larcher, Le Livre de 
la Sagesse, 1.164-165. 
206 J. P. Weisengoff, “The Impious of Wisdom 2,” CBQ 11.1 (Jan., 1949): 40-65, argued that “The author wrote the 
book primarily for faithful Jews, to encourage them in their trials and to warn them against the materialism to which 
many of their compatriots had fallen victims” (64), and that “The "impious" are thus to be regarded as Jewish 
contemporaries of the author of Wisdom, who, under the stress of the constant threat of pogroms, or because of the 
mockery of pagans, or because of their pagan environment and their love of sense pleasure, surrendered their faith in 
Yahweh and in the Torah, banded with pagan sensualists to enjoy the present life to the full, and were, therefore, a 
source of sorrow and scandal to the faithful” (65). For Winston, the text “was probably designed as a broadside 
against assimilated Alexandrian Jews who had turned their backs on their spiritual heritage (cf. Philo Mos. 1.31), 
some ultimately resorting to apostasy, and those pagans (either Alexandrian or Romans or both) who were hostile to 
Judaism” (The Wisdom of Solomon, 14). Larcher argued that the impious in chap. 2 were meant to be apostate Jews, 
but part III was aimed at the gentile persecutors of the Jews (Le Livre de la Sagesse, 1:114-115). Scarpat’s is a 
dissenting voice: “Il libro della Sapientia non ha intenti missionari o apologetici ma, certamente, l'autore si sarà 
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Hellenistic  Jewish readership, but a fictive royal gentile audience, with the actual Jewish 
audience meant to read the text as if it were written for pagan rulers, the audience the readers 
would imply from the text itself, has never been seriously considered.207 The use of a fictive 
audience—together with a fictive author—is not an unfamiliar rhetorical device in either Jewish 
Hellenistic literature—see the Letter of Aristeas—or in ancient protreptic discourse.208 
 This assumed dichotomy between proper Jewish service and apostate Hellenism is, then, 
carried over into an ethnocentric reading of the third section of the text. The author’s description 
of Israelite history, from Adam to the Exodus, is, no doubt, unique, in that, as with the rest of the 
text, there is a complete lack of proper names. The stories are, in broad strokes, the same as we 
find them in the Septuagint, and we see the same invective against Israel’s historical enemies, 
especially the Canaanites and the Egyptians. Idolatry, particularly that of the Egyptian sort, is 
attacked without mercy. The question then becomes, why. Why go to such lengths to remove the 
identities in the narrative? 
 Most scholars who presume a restrictive message have assumed that there was no need 
for the proper names because the stories would have been so well known to the text’s Jewish 
                                                 
augurato di essere letto dai potenti del suo popolo e anche dai potenti della terra, ai quali talvolta esplicitamente si 
rivolge” (Libro della Sapienza, 8). 
207 Scholars of modern rhetorical studies and audience theory have long discussed the differences between real, 
ideal, and implied, invoked, or fictional audiences and their relationship. The “real” audience or readers are the 
actual humans who end up reading (or hearing) the text. An “ideal” audience is a creation of the author at the time of 
writing, who imagines a future actual readership, though there is much discussion as to whether or not this ever truly 
exists. The “fictive” audience is a creation of the author, often designed as a rhetorical device in service to the 
narrative or purpose. An “implied” audience, is the understanding of the audience the actual reader would come to 
understand through the reading of the text. If properly executed, the fictive audience and the implied audience 
should be identical, and this is what, I believe, we find in the Wisdom of Solomon, a fictional audience of pagan 
rulers crafted by the author in service to the overall purpose of the text and an audience of pagan rulers implied by 
the real readers of the text. See Edwin Black, “The Second Persona,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 56.2 (1970): 109-
119; Walter Ong, “The Writer’s Audience is Always a Fiction,” PMLA 90.1 (Jan.,1975): 9-21; Helen Rothschild 
Ewald, “The Implied Reader in Persuasive Discourse,” Journal of Advanced Composition 8.1 (1988): 167-178; and 
James E. Porter, Audience and Rhetoric: An Archaeological Composition of the Discourse Community (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992). 
208 See Mark D. Jordan, “Ancient Philosophic Protreptic and the Problem of Persuasive Genres,” Rhetorica: A 
Journal of the History of Rhetoric 4.4 (Autumn 1986): 309-333. 
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audience.209 A few, however, have taken the typology of the third section of the text seriously. 
For example, in attempting to determine whether the righteous of the text are only meant to 
represent Jews and the unrighteous, non-Jews, Goering has come to the conclusion that the lack 
of proper names is purposefully designed to highlight the contrast between, not Jews and non-
Jews, but between the righteous and the impious: 
 
A more perfect wisdom is available to all who seek it, regardless of ethnic identity or 
religious affiliation. While the experiences of Solomon and the ancient Israelites are 
paradigmatic, the author’s vision, like that of Philo, is nonetheless potentially universal, 
in that any human may seek the specialized wisdom that will permit her or him to know 
more sufficiently the deity and his cosmos.210 
                                                 
209 Reese argues that “only a group of Hellenistic Jewish students, trained not only in their own religious traditions 
but also in Greek literature and philosophy, in rhetoric and science could have been capable of appreciating the 
Sage’s artistry and allusions.  And only members of a group actually occupied in scholarly pursuits would have been 
disposed to follow such an artificial presentation” (Hellenistic Influence, 146). Mazzingi argues for a Jewish 
readership because a pagan reader could not have understood these stories (“Wis 19:13-17,” 79). Cheon, who 
situates the text during the time of the pogrom in Alexandria and sees its purpose as meant to comfort an oppressed 
people, makes the claim that the author “identifies himself and his community as Israelites, the righteous people 
(18.6, 8). . . . He does this through his interpretation of Scripture with which both he and his audience were familiar. 
By interpreting their shared traditions in light of persecution, he intends to persuade them to strengthen their 
adherence to that tradition.” See Samuel Cheon, The Exodus Story in the Wisdom of Solomon: A Study in Biblical 
Interpretation (JSPS 23; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), here 24-25. Cheon postulates three reasons for 
the lack of proper names in the pseudo-historical section: (1) the author’s intention was not to write an historical 
account of the Exodus; (2) the author may have been trying to typologically describe the differences between the 
good and bad in order to make his text more coherent and meaningful to his generation; and (3) the author assumed 
an audience familiar with the scriptural content. According to Cheon, “If they were not familiar with Scripture, they 
could not understand Pseudo-Solomon’s discourse, which subtly avoids the proper names” (110-111). This 
assumption by many scholars is simply false. The narrative would have been (and is) perfectly understandable 
without knowing the referents; it would have just been understood in a different way.  
210 Gregory Schmidt Goering, “Election and Knowledge in the Wisdom of Solomon,” in Studies in the Book of 
Wisdom (ed. Géza G. Xeravits and József Zsengellér; JSJSup 142; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 163-182 (182). See also W. 
Vogels, “The God Who Creates Is the God Who Saves,” Église et Théologie 22 (1991): 315-335 and Michael 
Kolarcik, “Universalism and Justice in the Wisdom of Solomon,” In Treasures of Wisdom: Studies in Ben Sira and 
the Book of Wisdom (Festschrift M. Gilbert; ed. N. Calduch-Benages, J. Vermeylen; Leuven: Leuven University 
Press, 1999), 289-301. Kolarcik notes that the problem is to reconcile the universalistic outlook found in the first 
two parts of the text with the particularistic outlook in the third. He claims that the author was carried away in the 
third section by his rhetoric, but that justice remains the guiding principle of his argumentation. “It is equally clear 
that the author could have recoiled from universalistic language and embraced unbridled nationalism. But this is not 
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If we understand the so-called “Book of History” as a typology between the impious and the 
righteous and not as a dichotomy between Jew and Gentile, the apparent nationalism of the third 
section vanishes. Even the strong polemic against idolatry does not prove an anti-Gentile bias, as 
we find similar arguments from Greek and Roman philosophers, including the euhemeristic 
explanation for the origins of idolatry (14:12-21) and the disdain for Egyptian animal worship 
(11:15; 15:18-19).211 We shall see that, in this distinction between the righteous and the impious, 
the author continually makes clear that the righteous are the ones who learn from God’s divine 
paideia, and the impious are those who do not. In this way, the third section of the text fits 
perfectly with the first two. The early classification of the last section as the “Book of History” 
cemented an incorrect or at least incomplete idea in the minds of later scholars who inherited the 
                                                 
the case. The author maintains a universalistic spirit sympathetic to what is eminently reasonable in Hellenism” 
(301). Reese also saw the author as attempting universalizing through typology (Hellenistic Influence, 71, 160). 
211 As Collins has noted, “This critique of idolatry has been described as ‘one of the most sustained attacks on 
Gentile religiosity that we have from the pen of a Diaspora Jew’ and has been taken as evidence that the 
predominant theme in the Wisdom of Solomon is ‘the social conflict and cultural antagonism between Jews and 
non-Jews.’ But this conclusion overlooks the fact that much of this polemic can be paralleled in the writings of Stoic 
and Cynic philosophers. Many Greeks could be expected to share the contempt for Egyptian animal worship and 
other crass forms of superstition.” John J. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic 
Diaspora (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 200-201, quoting J. M. G. Barclay, Jews in the 
Mediterranean Diaspora from Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE – 117 CE) (Edinburgh: Clark, 1996), 186, 184. For 
recent discussions of euhemerism and Greek philosophy, see Albert I. Baumgarten, “Euhemerus’ Eternal Gods: or, 
How Not To Be Embarrassed by Greek Mythology,” in Classical Studies in Honor of David Sohlberg (ed. Ranon 
Katzoff with Yaakov Petroff and David Schaps; Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1996), 91-103; Jacob Stern, 
“Heraclitus the Paradoxographer: Περί Ἀρίστων, ‘On Unbelievable Tales,’ Transactions of the American 
Philological Association (1974-) 133.1 (Spring 2003): 51-97; and Sylvie Honigman, “Euhemerus of Messene and 
Plato’s Atlantis,” Historia: Zeitschrisft für Alte Geschichte 58.1 (2009): 1-35. On euhemerism and the Wisdom of 
Solomon, see Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 270-271. On Euhemerus himself, see now Franco De Angelis and 
Benjamin Garstad, “Euhemerus in Context,” Classical Antiquity 25.2 (October 2006): 211-242. Greek and Roman 
abhorrence of Egyptian religiosity, especially animal worship, is well known. See Juvenal, Satire 15, which begins, 
Quis nescit, Volusi Bithynice, qualia demens Aegyptos portenta colat? or Cicero, Tusc. 5.78: “Who does not know 
of the custom of the Egyptians? Their minds are infected with degraded superstitions and they would sooner submit 
to any torment than injure an ibis or asp or dog or crocodile, and even if they have unwittingly done anything of the 
kind there is no penalty from which they would recoil.” Cf. De natura deorum 1.16.43; 1.29.81; and 1.36.101. See 
Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 232, who mentions the story found in Cassius Dio 51.16.5, that Octavian, when 
asked if he would like to visit Apis, declared that he was “accustomed to worship gods, not cattle.” On a comparison 
between the critiques of idol worship in the Letter of Aristeas and the Wisdom of Solomon, see Benjamin G. Wright 
III, The Letter of Aristeas: ‘Aristeas to Philocrates,’ or ‘On the Translation of the Law of the Jews’ (CEJL; Berlin: 
de Gruyter, 2015). 
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terminology and the preconceptions that came with it. If a label is required, “Typological 
History” would be more accurate terminology for the section and a better representation of the 
text’s motivations. 
 Nationalist, ethnic, or exclusive language of any sort has absolutely no place in the 
Wisdom of Solomon, in any of the traditionally structured “Books,” and it would be a mistake to 
read an ethnocentrism into the text without adequate cause. Instead, every indication in the text 
points to inclusivity, paideia and sophia available to all, and, through them, the ultimate reward 
of immortality. Therefore, it would be misguided to equate the content of paideia in the text with 
the Mosaic law. Likewise, we cannot identify it with any other exclusive curriculum. The 
educational content of Wisdom’s teachings was universal knowledge, and the language used to 
describe it could fit well with the various subjects taught in the gymnasium as the 
propaideumata. But, paideia clearly goes beyond these preliminary studies, including, among 
other things, the very lessons taught in the text itself. Therefore, paideia in the text should not be 
identified with a particular Greek curriculum, whether preliminary, secondary, or tertiary, or with 
Mosaic law. It could likely include both—just as it could include the author’s own book and his 
typological reading of Israelite history—, but it could never be one or the other exclusively. 
 
Paideia as Musar: Divine Discipline and the Testing of Humanity 
As the pedagogy or the means by which humanity is educated in the text, paideia / paideuō takes 
on a meaning radically different from anything found in classical Greek or contemporary 
Hellenistic sources, including notions of divine, disciplinary violence and physical punishment. 
In this, the term has taken on elements from the Hebrew musar / y-s-r foreign to the traditional 
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semantic range and facilitated by the Septuagint translations of the Pentateuch and the prophetic 
texts, which the author of the Wisdom of Solomon was reading and exegeting. 
 While in the Greek translations of the wisdom books of Proverbs and Job, the use of 
paideia / paideuō is fully compatible with the traditional Greek understanding of the concept and 
the translations are often seen distancing the concept of paideia from overt forms of physical 
discipline and violence inherent in the Hebrew text, the use of paideia / paideuō in the 
Pentateuch and prophetic literature is strikingly different, with the Greek terms wholly adopting 
the full range of meaning of the Hebrew concept of musar. In the Greek Pentateuch and 
prophetic literature, it is often impossible to read the Greek paideia / paideuō in a manner 
consistent with its classic semantic range. 
 Especially important is the Greek translation of Isaiah, a text with which our author was 
well aware,212 where God’s violent, chastening paideia is understood as but a small affliction 
(θλίψει μικρᾷ) compared to the great benefit conferred (26:16). This divine paideia can include 
exile, which at the same time expiates the guilt of the nation and forces it to remember the Lord 
and return to righteousness (27:7-9), and even the torture and death of the righteous (53:5). As 
we shall see, the connection between the servant’s paideia in LXX Isaiah and the righteous 
man’s paideia in Wisdom of Solomon 2-3 is striking.213 
 This notion of paideia as musar or divine discipline is an idea elaborated upon 
throughout the text, often portrayed as God’s testing of humanity, and the author uses an 
amazing variety of clear juridical terminology to describe God’s (or Wisdom’s) pedagogical 
testing of the righteous, the impious, or humanity universally: πειράζω, ἐτάζω, ἐξετάζω, 
                                                 
212 See Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 20-21. 
213 See George W. E. Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 58-92, on the connection between Wisdom of Solomon 2-5 and 
the fourth servant song in Second Isaiah. 
192 
 
καταδικάζω, νουθετέω, δοκιμάζω, κρίνω, ἐλέγχω, ἐξελέγχω, κολάζω, βασανίζω, τιμωρέω, 
μαστιγόω.214 In the final third section of the text, the typological history, the author transforms 
the unique history of the Israelites and the Exodus into a universal didactic tale, designed to 
highlight the differences, not among particular ethnic or cultural groups, but between the 
righteous and the impious or ungodly. We see here a clear dichotomy between the righteous who 
learn from God’s pedagogy and the impious who do not through a continuous series of divine 
tests which God (or Sophia) uses to instruct humankind, give them a chance to repent for past 
transgressions, and learn to not repeat past mistakes. Winston has described these comparisons as 
the seven “antitheses,” which illustrate what he argues is the author’s theme, “that Egypt was 
punished measure for measure, whereas Israel was benefited by those very things whereby Egypt 
was punished.”215 But, by focusing on this ethnic dichotomy, Winston and others have missed 
the larger issue. These “antitheses” are not meant to draw attention to some unspoken divine 
protection of the Israelites. Instead, they are designed to portray divine instruction through 
testing and the results of passing and failing the tests.  
 In chapter eleven, the author makes clear reference to the story of Moses striking the rock 
at Horeb, providing miraculous water for the people to drink (Ex. 17:6; Deut. 8:15). Here it is 
God or Sophia who provides the righteous with water from the flinty rock (11:4).216 The 
impious, however, receive a river defiled with blood (11:6). There are two intended lessons in 
                                                 
214 Testing of the righteous: πειράζω (2:17; 3:5; 11:9); ἐτάζω (2:19); καταδικάζω (2:20); κολάζω (3:4); παιδεύω 
(3:5; 11:9; 12:22); νουθετέω (11:10; 16:6); δοκιμάζω (2:19; 3:6; 11:10); κρίνω (12:21); διαφθείρω (16:5); 
ἀνάμνησις (ἐντολῆς νόμου σου) (16:6). Testing of the impious: ἐλέγχω / ἔλεγχος (1:3, 5, 8, 9; 2:11, 14; 4:20; 11:7; 
17:7; 18:5); κολάζω (11:5, 8, 16; 16:1, 9); κρίνω (11:9; 12:10); βασανίζω (11:9; 12:23; 16:1, 4); καταδικάζω (11:10; 
17:11); ἐτάζω (6:6); ἐξετάζω (11:10); τιμωρέω (12:20; 18:8); μαστιγόω (12:22). Universal testing: πειράζω (2:24); 
κολάζω (12:14, 15); ἐλέγχω (12:2); ὑπομιμνῄσκω (12:2); νουθετέω (12:2); κρίνω (12:13, 18); καταδικάζω (12:15); 
ἐξελέγχω (12:17); διοικέω (12:18). 
215 Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 227. Winston cites Focke, Die Entstehung der Weisheit Salomos, 12-15. See 
also Cheon, The Exodus Story in the Wisdom of Solomon. 
216 Interestingly, Philo, in his allegorical understanding of the passage, says that the rock was divine Wisdom herself 
(Leg. 2.86). Paul, perhaps knowing the tradition, instead argues that Jesus was the rock (1 Cor. 10:4). 
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these divine actions. First, the righteous learn the consequences of impiety and the rewards for 
enduring God’s trials:  
 
Wisd. 11:8-10 
8 δείξας διὰ τοῦ τότε δίψους  
πῶς τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἐκόλασας.  
9 ὅτε γὰρ ἐπειράσθησαν, καίπερ ἐν ἐλέει παιδευόμενοι, 
ἔγνωσαν πῶς μετ᾽ ὀργῆς κρινόμενοι ἀσεβεῖς ἐβασανίζοντο· 
10 τούτους μὲν γὰρ ὡς πατὴρ νουθετῶν ἐδοκίμασας, 
ἐκείνους δὲ ὡς ἀπότομος βασιλεὺς καταδικάζων ἐξήτασας. 
 
8 You revealed, by the thirst [of the righteous],  
how you punished their antagonists.  
9 For when the righteous were tested, though disciplined in mercy,  
they came to know how the impious were tormented when judged with anger.217  
10 For you tested them like a reproving father,  
but the others you examined like a condemning king. 
 
The righteous are those who endured God’s test in the wilderness and were rewarded with 
miraculous water from a rock. They learned how, one, God’s pedagogical discipline leads to 
reward, and, two, a failure to learn leads to even greater testing. 
                                                 
217 The author is likely taking the idea of paideia via the discipline of others from texts like Deut. 11:2; Isa. 53:5; 
Jer. 2:30; and Prov. 22:3. 
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 If this were the end of the lesson, I could perhaps agree with the argument for the ethnic 
disparity,218 but we see that these two miracles were also meant to further instruct the already 
impious: 
 
Wisd. 11:12-14 
12 διπλῆ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔλαβεν λύπη  
καὶ στεναγμὸς μνημῶν τῶν παρελθόντων·  
13 ὅτε γὰρ ἤκουσαν διὰ τῶν ἰδίων κολάσεων  
εὐεργετημένους αὐτούς, ᾔσθοντο τοῦ κυρίου.  
14 τὸν γὰρ ἐν ἐκθέσει πάλαι ῥιφέντα ἀπεῖπον χλευάζοντες,  
ἐπὶ τέλει τῶν ἐκβάσεων ἐθαύμασαν  
οὐχ ὅμοια δικαίοις διψήσαντες. 
 
12 For a twofold grief overtook [the impious]  
and a groaning over the memories of what had happened.  
13 For when they heard that through their own punishments,  
the righteous had benefited, they took note of the Lord.  
14 For though they had mockingly rejected the one who had formerly been cast out and  
exposed,  
at the end of the events, they came to admire,  
having thirsted in a manner unlike the righteous. 
                                                 
218 Cheon, who largely follows the idea of Winston’s “antitheses,” notes that in Wisd. 11:1-14, “Pseudo-Solomon 
interprets this temporary thirst as God’s testing of Israel and further as God’s educational opportunity for the 
righteous people to understand how the Lord punished their enemies,” without, however, making mention of the 
second didactic test of the impious. See Cheon, The Exodus Story in the Wisdom of Solomon, 33. 
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The impious also come to learn the rewards for endurance and the punishments for a rejection of 
the divine instruction. Of course, the impious will just as soon forget their lessons and continue 
in their iniquity and ignorance, while the righteous will heed their teachings.219 Note that 
nowhere in this historical review does the author of the Wisdom of Solomon make mention of the 
Lord hardening the heart of the Egyptian pharaoh, as we find in both MT and LXX Exodus.220 
An externally hardened heart suggests a predestination or preordained punishment, an inability to 
learn from one’s mistakes and then correct them, an idea that directly conflicts with one of the 
messages of the text: even the wicked and those who have gone astray have the ability to be 
educated, disciplined, and turned onto the path of immortal righteousness. The impious are not 
tormented and destroyed solely because of their past sins, but because they continue in sin and 
ignorance, refusing to learn from God’s divine discipline. 
 This language of divine discipline and testing pervades the entirety of the Wisdom of 
Solomon, and, even when the Greek terms paideia or paideuō are not immediately present, it is 
always attached to the author’s idealized concept of divine, disciplinary paideia. Time and again 
we see that these tests, no matter how harsh, are meant to instruct and to correct behavior. In 
11:15, God (or Sophia) sends a multitude of irrational creatures against the impious in response 
to their ignorant worship of like creatures, “in order that they might come to know that one will 
be punished through those very things by which he sins” (11:16). This is a learning opportunity 
designed to allow the impious to repent from their past transgressions: “Therefore, you correct 
little by little those who trespass, and you remind them of the things through which they sin, in 
order that they may be delivered from their wickedness and come to believe in you, Lord” (12:2).  
                                                 
219 Cf. 12:18-27 and 16:4-9 for similar depictions of a twofold didactic test of the righteous and the impious. 
220 Exod. 4:21; 7:3, 13, 14, 22; 8:15, 19, 32; 9:7, 12, 34, 35; 10:1, 20, 27; 11:10; 14:4, 8. 
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As in LXX Isa. 26:16, this disciplinary action is a small affliction compared to the rewards 
gained from the education. 
 
Paideia as Somatic Death (Extreme Musar) Resulting in Psychic Immortality 
The concept of paideia as musar or divine discipline and testing, together with the juridical 
terminology set, is found not only in the final section of the text, the typological history, but also 
in the opening chapters, where it takes on a greater, cosmic dimension and where the education 
and disciplinary test can include even bodily death.  
The scenario outlined in the first five chapters of the Wisdom of Solomon, depicting the 
struggle between the anonymous righteous man and the wicked ungodly parallels that between 
the righteous and the impious just examined. Here, we learn about a group of individuals who 
bring on their own destruction through their ignorance and their rejection of paideia, which leads 
them to torment, torture, and eventually murder a righteous individual, because “he reproaches 
us for sins against the law and charges us with sins against our paideia” (2:12), thinking that they 
will test the righteous man’s claims about God and true life and death (2:16-20). Yet, precisely 
because of their continual ignorance, they do not realize that they were not actually the ones 
putting the righteous man to the test. God was the one doing the testing, both of the righteous 
man and the impious. 
 At the start of chapter three, we see that this torment, torture, and murder of the righteous 
man was part of God’s divine, educative test. While, to the ignorant, the righteous appear to die, 
we find out that this was not actually the case:  
 
Wisd. 3:1-6 
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 1  Δικαίων δὲ ψυχαὶ ἐν χειρὶ θεοῦ,  
καὶ οὐ μὴ ἅψηται αὐτῶν βάσανος. 
2  ἔδοξαν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀφρόνων τεθνάναι, 
καὶ ἐλογίσθη κάκωσις ἡ ἔξοδος αὐτῶν 
3  καὶ ἡ ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν πορεία σύντριμμα,  
οἱ δέ εἰσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ. 
4  καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὄψει ἀνθρώπων ἐὰν κολασθῶσιν,  
ἡ ἐλπὶς αὐτῶν ἀθανασίας πλήρης· 
5  καὶ ὀλίγα παιδευθέντες μεγάλα εὐεργετηθήσονται,  
ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἐπείρασεν αὐτοὺς  
καὶ εὗρεν αὐτοὺς ἀξίους ἑαυτοῦ· 
6  ὡς χρυσὸν ἐν χωνευτηρίῳ ἐδοκίμασεν αὐτοὺς  
καὶ ὡς ὁλοκάρπωμα θυσίας προσεδέξατο αὐτούς. 
 
1 The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, 
and no torment will ever touch them.  
2 In the eyes of the foolish they seem to have died,  
and their departure was considered a misfortune,  
3 and their going away from us their destruction,  
but they are at peace.  
4 For though in the sight of mortals they were punished,  
their hope is full of immortality.  
5 And, having been disciplined a little, they will receive great good,  
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because God has tested them  
and found them worthy of himself.  
6 Like gold in a furnace, he tried them,  
and like a sacrificial burnt offering, he accepted them. 
 
Just like the righteous of the typological history, who had to endure the desert and thirst before 
receiving their reward, the righteous here must endure mockery, persecution, suffering, and, 
finally, death itself before receiving the ultimate reward. The stakes are clearly higher here than 
in the typological history; the righteous must have total faith in God and total faith that the life of 
the body is not the true life and that the death of the body will release the soul and allow it to live 
the immortal life in nearness to the divine. But, refocusing the salvific suffering and death of the 
pais of LXX Isa. 53:5, if one is able to brave this ignominious and violent test, the reward will 
far outweigh the brutal ordeal. 
 The Wisdom of Solomon is perfectly clear on what exactly is required in order to survive 
such a test and achieve the true immortal life of the soul. Those who take advantage of and fully 
embrace the paideia of Sophia and as outlined in the text will earn the reward of immortality in 
nearness to the divine and, especially relevant to the author’s fictive addressees, an eternal 
kingdom: 
 
Wisd. 6:17-21 
 17  ἀρχὴ γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡ ἀληθεστάτη παιδείας ἐπιθυμία,  
18  φροντὶς δὲ παιδείας ἀγάπη, 
ἀγάπη δὲ τήρησις νόμων αὐτῆς,  
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προσοχὴ δὲ νόμων βεβαίωσις ἀφθαρσίας, 
19  ἀφθαρσία δὲ ἐγγὺς εἶναι ποιεῖ θεοῦ· 
20  ἐπιθυμία ἄρα σοφίας ἀνάγει ἐπὶ βασιλείαν. 
21  εἰ οὖν ἥδεσθε ἐπὶ θρόνοις καὶ σκήπτροις, τύραννοι λαῶν,  
τιμήσατε σοφίαν, ἵνα εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα βασιλεύσητε. 
 
 17 The beginning of Wisdom is the truest desire for paideia, 
 18  and concern for paideia is love for her; 
 and love for her is the keeping of her laws, 
 and attention to her laws is a guarantee of immortality; 
 19 and immortality makes one near to God; 
 20 so, the desire for Wisdom leads to a kingdom. 
 21 If, then, you delight in thrones and scepters, you rulers of the nations,  
 honor Wisdom that you may rule forever. 
 
While the text shows clear influence of Platonic ideas concerning the role of paideia in the future 
life of the soul, it does not maintain the notion of the unconditional immortality of the soul. 
Immortality and the true life of the soul is one’s reward for enduring God’s disciplinary paideia 
during the mortal life, while the soul is confined to the corporeal shell. No higher reward could 
be imagined. Yet, the rejection of one’s paideia and a continued life in ignorance leads to the 
worst possible fate imaginable, the death of the soul even during corporeal existence and an 
eternal separation from the divine. 
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Apaideusia and the Death of the Soul 
The concept of death in the Wisdom of Solomon has been extensively studied. Most scholarship 
has focused on what sort of death the author references in the first part of the text, that death 
which “God does not create” (Wisd. 1:13), whether it is supposed to be bodily, spiritual, 
“ultimate,” “second,” or some combination thereof.221 Yet, the idea that the souls of the wicked 
could die prior to their somatic death has gone largely unnoticed.222 A focus on the text’s 
supposed eschatology has not helped.223 Given some of the apocalyptically-tinged language used 
by the author, scholars have assumed apocalyptic and eschatological motifs when, instead, much 
                                                 
221 See Yehoshua Amir, “The Figure of Death in the ‘Book of Wisdom’,” JJS 30 (1979): 154-178; John J. Collins, 
“The Root of Immortality: Death in the Context of Jewish Wisdom,” HTR 71.3/4 (Jul.-Oct., 1978) 177-192; Beverly 
R. Gaventa, “The Rhetoric of Death in the Wisdom of Solomon and the Letters of Paul” in The Listening Heart (ed. 
K. G. Hoglund, E. F. Huwiler, J. T. Glass, and R. W. Lee; JSOTSup 58; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987), 127-145; 
Michael Kolarcik, The Ambiguity of Death in the Book of Wisdom 1-6: A Study of Literary Structure and 
Interpretation (AnBib 127; Rome: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1991); R. J. Taylor, “The Eschatological 
Meaning of Life and Death in the Book of Wisdom I-V,” ETL 42 (1966): 72-137; Frederick R. Tennant, “The 
Teaching of Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom on the Introduction of Sin and Death,” JTS 2 (1901): 207-223; and J. P. 
Weisengoff, “Death and Immortality in the Book of Wisdom,” CBQ 3 (1941): 104-133. 
222 For example, John R. Levison, Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism: From Sirach to 2 Baruch (JSPS 1; Sheffield: 
JSOT Press, 1988), 52, nicely describes the contrast between the “eternal peace” of the righteous and the “eternal 
death” of the impious, but he suggests that his eternal death begins only with their physical death. Beverly Gaventa 
(“The Rhetoric of Death,” 135) notes, “the author does not treat death as a crisis that impends in the present. Death, 
instead, is a future point at which God will accomplish justice for the faithful.”  See also William J. Deane, The 
Book of Wisdom: The Greek Text, the Latin Vulgate and the Authorised English Version with an Introduction, 
Critical Apparatus and a Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon, 1881), 117; and Weisengoff, “Death and Immortality,” 
127, for similar views. One of the rare exceptions is Samuel Holmes, who states correctly that “Physical death, 
however, is practically disregarded by our author: he fixes his attention upon spiritual death, and this can take place 
even on earth. The wicked are made to say, ‘as soon as we were born we ceased to be’ (v. 13). According to this 
statement spiritual death does not mean annihilation; the wicked are spiritually dead even on earth” (APOT 1:530). 
223 See, for example, John J. Collins, “Apocalyptic Eschatology as the Transcendence of Death,” CBQ 36.1 (1974): 
21-43 (esp. 39); and Shannon Burkes, “Wisdom and Apocalypticism in the Wisdom of Solomon,” HTR 95.1 (Jan., 
2002): 21-44, who argues that the book is sapiential in form, “but bridges the sapiential and apocalyptic 
worldviews” (40). I tend to agree, instead, with Kolarcik’s recent comment, “The tenor of work’s sapiential values 
carries the argument of the author from beginning to the end. Though it is likely that the author made reference to 
and employed motifs from current apocalyptic literature, such motifs as the mysteries of God, wisdom sitting by the 
throne of God, and apocalyptic judgments unfolding in the cosmos, these motifs are employed within the context of 
a convincing and entertaining argument which are characteristic features of the sapiential worldview” (Michael 
Kolarcik, “Sapiential Values and Apocalyptic Imagery in the Wisdom of Solomon,” in Studies in the Book of 
Wisdom [ed. G. G. Xeravits and J. Zsengeller; Leiden: Brill, 2010], 23-36 [36]). 
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of the punishment of the wicked better fits their fate on earth in the corporeal shell and their 
learning of the ultimate fate of the righteous.224 
 In the opening chapter, the author exhorts the Gentile rulers of the earth to pursue 
righteousness and abstain from impiety. He tells them, “Do not be zealous for death by the error 
of your life, and do not bring on destruction by the works of your hands; because God does not 
make death nor does he delight in the destruction of the living” (Wisd. 1:12-13). Instead of death, 
God intends humanity for immortality: “For he creates all things to exist and the creations of the 
cosmos are salvific and there is no destructive poison in them, nor is a kingdom of Hades on 
earth. For righteousness is immortal” (1:14-15).225 The immortality intended for humankind is 
the immortality of the soul, and the uninvited death that God does not create is clearly the death 
of the soul: “Be on guard against useless grumbling, and keep your tongue from slander; for 
clandestine speech will not travel without effect, and a lying mouth kills [or takes away] the soul 
(ἀναιρεῖ ψυχήν)” (1:11).226  
                                                 
224 For a fuller discussion of the phenomenon in the Wisdom of Solomon and in Philo, see Jason M. Zurawski, “Hell 
on Earth: Corporeal Existence as the Ultimate Punishment of the Wicked in Philo of Alexandria and the Wisdom of 
Solomon,” in Heaven, Hell, and the Afterlife: Eternity in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (3 vols.; ed. J. Harold 
Ellens; Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2013), 1:193-226. 
225 The careful reader will note that I am taking the aorist tense verbs in 1:13-14, 16, and 23-24 as gnomic aorists 
and therefore translating them with a proverbial present tense. I do so according to the argument that the aorists are 
found in close parallel with present tense verbs and that the author is here not referencing one particular moment in 
the past, but a continual state. He is claiming that God never creates death, but always creates things to exist. For a 
full discussion see Jason M. Zurawski, “Separating the Devil from the Diabolos: A Fresh Reading of Wisdom of 
Solomon 2:24,” JSP 21.4 (2012): 366-399 (387-388). Several commentators have argued for a gnomic 
understanding of the aorists in 1:16. See Scarpat, Libro della Sapienza, 1:132; and Winston, The Wisdom of 
Solomon, 113. 
226 Later, the text makes clear that humanity was born mortal with respect to the body: “I too am mortal like all of 
humanity, descended from the earthborn protoplast, and in a mother’s womb I was sculpted into flesh” (7:1). Here 
the author draws on the language of Genesis’ second human creation narrative in order to reference humanity’s 
bodily mortality, just as he seems to recall the first human creation narrative in 2:23 in order to affirm humanity’s 
psychic immortality. This idea along with the clearly platonic (or orphic) comment in 9:15, “For a perishable body 
weighs down the soul, and this earthly tent burdens a thoughtful mind (νοῦν),” suggests that the author of the 
Wisdom of Solomon envisioned a dualistic body-soul dichotomy, and he distinguishes between the natural death of 
the individual—the separation of the soul from the body, allowing the soul to return home to enjoy its immortal 
life—and the punishment death—the death of the soul even during corporeal life. Collins sees in 9:15 a tendency by 
the author of Wisdom to possibly devalue “the particular instances and experiences which make up the immediate 
substance of life. . . . This tendency is not only contrary to the wisdom tradition expressed in Proverbs and Sirach 
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 Setting out immediately the intended destiny of humanity—immortal with respect to the 
soul—the author goes on to depict the impious as those who do not understand this. Their 
ignorance, which will result in the deaths of their own souls, centers on precisely their mistaken 
ideas about life and death, assuming that there is but one life and one death, that of the body: 
 
Wisd. 2:1-5 
 1  εἶπον γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς λογισάμενοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς  
ὀλίγος ἐστὶν καὶ λυπηρὸς ὁ βίος ἡμῶν,  
καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἴασις ἐν τελευτῇ ἀνθρώπου,  
καὶ οὐκ ἐγνώσθη ὁ ἀναλύσας ἐξ ᾅδου. 
2  ὅτι αὐτοσχεδίως ἐγενήθημεν  
καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐσόμεθα ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρξαντες·  
ὅτι καπνὸς ἡ πνοὴ ἐν ῥισὶν ἡμῶν,  
καὶ ὁ λόγος σπινθὴρ ἐν κινήσει καρδίας ἡμῶν, 
3  οὗ σβεσθέντος τέφρα ἀποβήσεται τὸ σῶμα  
καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα διαχυθήσεται ὡς χαῦνος ἀήρ. 
4  καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἡμῶν ἐπιλησθήσεται ἐν χρόνῳ,  
καὶ οὐθεὶς μνημονεύσει τῶν ἔργων ἡμῶν·  
καὶ παρελεύσεται ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ὡς ἴχνη νεφέλης  
καὶ ὡς ὁμίχλη διασκεδασθήσεται  
διωχθεῖσα ὑπὸ ἀκτίνων ἡλίου  
                                                 
but is also in tension with the basic thrust of the Wisdom of Solomon itself.  We are assured at the beginning of the 
book that God created all things that they might exist, and ‘the generative forces of the world are conducive to 
salvation’” (“The Root of Immortality,” 191). But when we see that the existence which God intended is the 
immortal existence of the soul, there is no longer any contradiction. 
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καὶ ὑπὸ θερμότητος αὐτοῦ βαρυνθεῖσα. 
5  σκιᾶς γὰρ πάροδος ὁ καιρὸς ἡμῶν,  
καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναποδισμὸς τῆς τελευτῆς ἡμῶν,  
ὅτι κατεσφραγίσθη καὶ οὐδεὶς ἀναστρέφει. 
 
1  For they reasoned unsoundly, saying to themselves,  
“short and sorrowful is our life  
and there is no remedy at the end of man  
and no one has been known to return from Hades.  
2  Because we were born by mere chance,  
and after this we shall be as though we had never existed,  
for the breath in our nostrils is but smoke  
and the logos is but a spark in the beating of our hearts;  
3  when it is extinguished, the body will turn to ashes  
and the spirit will dissolve like empty air.  
4  Our name will be forgotten in time,  
and no one will remember our works,  
and our life will pass away like the traces of a cloud  
and be scattered like mist chased by the rays of the sun  
and overcome by its heat.  
5  For our allotted time is but a passing shadow,  
and there is no return from our death,  
because it’s been sealed up and no one returns.” 
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This ignorant attitude leads the impious eventually to torture and murder the righteous man, 
thinking that if they inflict their idea of death, they will forever destroy him (2:17-20). But, in so 
doing, they simply reveal the difference between the two deaths and their own lack of 
comprehension, because, as previously discussed, their actions actually lead to the righteous 
man’s immortality. 
 In Wisd. 2:21-24 the author directly refutes the unsound reasoning of the impious 
concerning life and death:  
 
Wisd. 2:21-24 
 21  Ταῦτα ἐλογίσαντο, καὶ ἐπλανήθησαν·  
ἀπετύφλωσεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἡ κακία αὐτῶν, 
22  καὶ οὐκ ἔγνωσαν μυστήρια θεοῦ  
οὐδὲ μισθὸν ἤλπισαν ὁσιότητος  
οὐδὲ ἔκριναν γέρας ψυχῶν ἀμώμων. 
23  ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπ᾽ ἀφθαρσίᾳ  
καὶ εἰκόνα τῆς ἰδίας ἀϊδιότητος ἐποίησεν αὐτόν· 
24  φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον,  
πειράζουσιν δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ τῆς ἐκείνου μερίδος ὄντες. 
 
21  Thus they reasoned, but they were led astray,  
for their wickedness blinded them,  
22  and they did not know the mysteries of God,  
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nor hoped for the reward for holiness,  
nor discerned the prize for blameless souls.  
23  For God creates humanity for incorruption  
and makes it in the image of his own eternity;  
24  but through an adversary’s envy death enters into the world,  
and those who belong to death’s party put humanity to the test.227 
 
The impious did not realize that God intends the human soul for immortality and that through 
their own wicked actions they have at the same time destroyed their own souls and made 
possible the psychic immortality of the righteous: 
 
Rejection of paideia  Actions of the impious 
 Death of the body for the righteous / Death of the soul for the impious 
 Immortal life of the soul for the righteous / Only the life of the body for the impious 
 
 Psychic immortality is conditional, and the text is clear on the causes for the loss of that 
immortality and the soul’s eternal death: blasphemy (1:2), slander (1:11; 2:24228), and especially 
lack or disregard of education. In 1:3, σκολιοὶ λογισμοὶ, crooked or perverse or unsound 
reasoning, is targeted as the cause of psychic death. Wisd. 2:1-5 shows that the unsound 
reasoning of the ungodly was specifically related to their fundamental misunderstanding when it 
                                                 
227 My translation of 2:24 is obviously quite different from the typical reading of the verse, “But through the devil’s 
envy death entered the world, and those who belong to his company experience it” (NRSV). In a recent article I 
discuss the problems of the traditional interpretations at length and focus on reconstructing a translation and 
interpretation more in line with both the Greek text and the context of the passage in the author’s argument. See 
Zurawski, “Separating the Devil from the Diabolos.” 
228 The choice of the term diabolos in 2:24 is telling. The term points to an adversary, inimical precisely due one’s 
slanderous nature. See Zurawski, “Separating the Devil from the Diabolos,” 390-391. 
206 
 
came to the meanings of true life and death. This blindness, ignorance, or lack of discernment 
(cf. 2:21-22) is the root cause of further transgression, such as leading an anarchic life of 
debauchery (2:6-9), violence against the weak (2:10-16), and, ultimately, the torture and murder 
of the righteous innocent (2:17-20). These impious individuals had previously received a proper 
education, but they disregarded it: “[the righteous man] reproaches us for sins against the law 
and accuses us of sins against our paideia (ἁμαρτήματα παιδείας ἡμῶν)” (2:12; cf. 17:1 where it 
is the “ἀπαίδευτοι ψυχαὶ” which go astray). 
 No matter the particular transgression, throughout the text the author of the Wisdom of 
Solomon, perhaps against those who want this text to be more apocalyptically-oriented than it is, 
reinforces the idea that the individual is entirely responsible for his or her own soul. There is 
nothing in this world (or out) that can kill the soul except one’s own actions: “Do not be zealous 
for death by the error of your life and do not bring on destruction by the works of your hands” 
(1:12), and “But the impious by their hands and their words summon death, considering it a 
friend, they pine for it and make a covenant with it. For they are worthy to be of death’s party” 
(1:16). Unlike so many apocalyptic texts, there is no hint of superhuman evil in the Wisdom of 
Solomon. There are no demonic forces in the world that tempt humanity or try to prevent its 
righteousness. All the creatures or causes in the world are salutary (1:14). One of the overarching 
purposes of the text is to make known that everyone is capable of obtaining wisdom and living 
by the order of the universe (cf. 6:12-16). If the soul dies it is because its owner killed it. There is 
no psychic murder, only psychic suicide.229 
 The author of the Wisdom of Solomon enjoys taking traditional values and beliefs—as in 
the understanding of life and death—and turning them completely on their heads, all in service to 
                                                 
229 On spiritual suicide in Wisdom and Philo, see Karina M. Hogan, “The Exegetical Background of the ‘Ambiguity 
of Death’ in the Wisdom of Solomon,” JSJ 30 (1999): 1-24. 
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his belief in the fundamental role of paideia in the life of the individual. Chapters three and four 
describe the differences between the life of the soul and the life of the body, and here we find a 
dichotomy between the educated righteous and the ignorant impious, exemplified through human 
traits which have, in the past, had clear deuteronomistic or traditional sapiential implications. 
Problems such as childlessness (3:13-14) or dying young (4:7-15), which historically marked 
disgrace or just punishment for sins committed,230 now become aspects of divine paideia. The 
barren woman, the eunuch, and the man who dies early are not being punished through their 
afflictions but instead will be rewarded in the future for enduring them, because they know, like 
the righteous man, that the bodily life is not the true life. The wicked, instead, may have a brood 
of children and live to a long, old age, but all of this will account for nothing (3:16-17), because 
“those who reject wisdom and paideia are miserable (σοφίαν γὰρ καὶ παιδείαν ὁ ἐξουθενῶν 
ταλαίπωρος), and their hope is vain, their labors without profit, and their works useless” (3:11). 
The wicked may live long without their souls, but their lives will turn out horrible, and, at death, 
instead of enjoying that nearness to the divinity, they will simply become “corpses without honor 
and an outrage among the dead forever” (4:19). Like Philo, the author of the Wisdom of Solomon 
seems to suggest that earth is the ultimate destiny of the wicked, in the body during life and in 
the ground at death.231 But, the Wisdom of Solomon diverges from Philo on one key point, an 
afterlife existence, however brief, for the wicked. 
 After the bodies of the impious die, buried in their eternal home of earth, we see the final 
conviction of the wicked, with the righteous and their blessed immortality serving as the ultimate 
nail in their coffin: “They will come with dread at the calculation of their sins, and their lawless 
                                                 
230 See, e.g., Gen. 30:23; Lev. 20:20-21; Deut. 23:1-2. 
231 See, e.g., Philo, Fug. 55-64; Ebr. 140-141; Leg. 1.105-107; QG 1.51; Cong. 56-57. For more, see Zurawski, 
“Hell on Earth,” 194-207. 
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deeds will convict them to their face. Then the righteous man will stand with great confidence in 
the presence of those who afflicted him and those who rejected his labors. When they see him 
they will be shaken with dreadful fear and be amazed at the righteous man’s unexpected 
salvation” (4:20-5:2). It is only at this point that the impious fully realize what a grave error they 
had made. They see the man whom they tortured and killed and realize that his God did protect 
him, that he actually passed the test. And they realize that they failed their test, that their 
miserable earthly existence is all they will ever have:  
 
Wisd. 5:1-6a 
 1  Τότε στήσεται ἐν παρρησίᾳ πολλῇ ὁ δίκαιος  
κατὰ πρόσωπον τῶν θλιψάντων αὐτὸν  
καὶ τῶν ἀθετούντων τοὺς πόνους αὐτοῦ. 
2  ἰδόντες ταραχθήσονται φόβῳ δεινῷ  
καὶ ἐκστήσονται ἐπὶ τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς σωτηρίας· 
3  ἐροῦσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μετανοοῦντες  
καὶ διὰ στενοχωρίαν πνεύματος στενάξονται καὶ ἐροῦσιν 
4  Οὗτος ἦν, ὃν ἔσχομέν ποτε εἰς γέλωτα  
καὶ εἰς παραβολὴν ὀνειδισμοῦ οἱ ἄφρονες·  
τὸν βίον αὐτοῦ ἐλογισάμεθα μανίαν  
καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν αὐτοῦ ἄτιμον. 
5  πῶς κατελογίσθη ἐν υἱοῖς θεοῦ  
καὶ ἐν ἁγίοις ὁ κλῆρος αὐτοῦ ἐστιν; 
6  ἄρα ἐπλανήθημεν ἀπὸ ὁδοῦ ἀληθείας, 
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1 Then the righteous man will stand with great confidence  
in the presence of his tormentors  
and those who had disdain for his labors.  
2 And when they see him, they will tremble with dreadful fear  
and marvel at the miracle of his salvation.  
3 They will speak to one another in repentance,  
and, in anguish of spirit, they will groan:  
4 “This is the man whom we once held in derision,  
and as a by-word of reproach, fools that we are!  
We considered his life as madness  
and his end as being without honor. 
5 How was he reckoned among the sons of God, 
and how is his lot among the holy ones?  
6 But it was we who strayed from the path of truth.” 
 
In the typological history, the wicked in the desert were educated not only through their own 
punishments but also through the miraculous rewards of the righteous, when they would come to 
see and understand God as the author of all; so here too do the impious learn through their 
observance of the righteous man’s reward of immortal life, when they understand how horribly 
ignorant they were about the nature of life and death. 
Just as the impious in the desert received a river of gore in return for their decree to kill 
the innocent and a plague of irrational animals in exchange for their worship of the creatures, the 
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impious here are punished according to their ignorant reasoning (3:10). They believed that this 
life was the only life and that death meant extinction. They assumed that their names and their 
works would be forgotten, that their lives, like their deeds, would simply “pass away like the 
traces of a cloud, be scattered like mist chased by the rays of the sun” (2:4). In 5:9-12, after the 
ungodly realize their grave error, they find that they ironically foretold their own punishment. All 
their accumulated wealth and prestige vanish like a shadow. Just as a bird’s or an arrow’s flight 
path immediately disappears without a trace, so too do their lives. Yet their punishment is even 
more severe. They assumed this would happen and that all these things would dissolve upon 
death. This is what led them to their libertine enjoyment of life. But, as we’ve seen, their 
punishment, their death, actually begins already during their corporeal existence, when they are 
not even able to enjoy the pleasures of the flesh. They expected nothingness upon death, but now 
they realize that their actions led to nothingness during life: “As soon as we were born, we 
ceased to be, and we had no sign of virtue to show, but were entirely consumed in our 
wickedness” (5:13). They realize that their psychic death means an eternal separation from the 
divine (cf. 1:2-3). Though they have come to recognize that their views on life and death were 
mistaken and their actions wicked, it is too late. They have had their opportunities for learning 
and repentance. They have been educated. But they rejected their education and the wisdom that 
comes with it. The immortality and all the gifts that come with the paideia of Wisdom are 
forever lost to those who denounce their education. The wicked had failed the great cosmic test, 
the agōn,232 which is the mortal life of the body, the proving ground designed to determine who 
is worthy of the immortal psychic life. 
                                                 
232 Cf. Wisd. 4:2 and 10:12. On the Hellenistic agōn motif in the Wisdom of Solomon, see Victor C. Pfitzner, Paul 
and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature (NTS 16; Leiden: Brill, 1967), 54-57. 
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 Like his Alexandrian compatriot Philo, the author of the Wisdom of Solomon rejected the 
notion of a fiery hell where the souls of the wicked would be eternally tormented in the afterlife. 
It would not be incorrect to say that he also rejected the notion of an afterlife reward for the 
righteous. Instead, the Wisdom of Solomon completely redefines the concepts of “life” and 
“death.” “Life,” according to any true and meaningful definition, is the life of the soul, which it 
can only fully and permanently experience once it is released from within the confines of the 
body. Its time on earth is merely prologue, a time of education and testing, preparation for its 
true destiny. Death, the one according to nature, actually leads to life. That death is really not 
even the death of the body, since the body is already dead, a corpse which the soul must carry 
around. The soul leaves the corpse behind in the ground. The new concept of “Death” is much 
worse, the imprisonment of the soul within this corpse, so entwined with the body and sense-
perception that upon that natural death, it cannot be released. The soul becomes so attracted to its 
dead shell that it too dies and is simply buried in the ground along with the flesh. In the Wisdom 
of Solomon, Wisdom and her paideia allow the soul’s immortality and release from the corporeal 
prison. Wisdom “will neither enter a deceitful soul nor dwell in a body involved in sin” (1:4). 
Without Wisdom, therefore, the soul will be imprisoned in the body. Immortality is impossible 
without Wisdom and paideia. 
 
3. CONCLUSION: PAIDEIA AS GLOBAL EDUCATION AND THE UNIFYING FACTOR OF THE 
WISDOM OF SOLOMON 
In a text devoted to the divine figure of Wisdom, whom the author depicts in the loftiest possible 
terms, her first and principle function is as the educator of all humankind, the holy spirit of 
paideia, and it is the steadfast focus on the nature and necessity of paideia that unites the 
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seemingly disparate sections of the Wisdom of Solomon into a unified whole with a clear, 
consistent message and purpose. The opening third of the text is designed to startle and perhaps 
frighten the audience, with revolutionary propositions as to the true nature of life and death and 
the cosmic import of paideia and sophia, the means necessary to enjoy the intended psychic 
immortality. The properly educated know that this corporeal life of the body is fleeting and 
nothing more than a test to determine the worthiness of the true, immortal life of the soul. Those 
who have rejected their paideia believe, instead, that the life of the body is all there is. This 
apaideusia leads to nothing less than the death of the soul and knowledge that the righteous, who 
took heed of their paideia, will live an immortal life in the presence of the divine while they will 
be forever separated, their future consisting of nothing more than a corpse and the cold earth. 
After this opening barrage, the middle portion of the text goes on to describe the gifts that come 
from paideia and sophia in a loving, sensual manner. Instead of the unimaginable fate that awaits 
those who refuse to learn, here Wisdom’s education leads to total knowledge of the universe and 
immortality. From the initial shock of the opening, the middle section, beginning from the 
second direct address to the world rulers, reinforces the idea that it is not too late to learn, repent 
of past misdeeds, and choose a new path, one devoted to Wisdom and her paideia. Lastly, the 
final section of the text brings in proof of this dichotomy in a global drama, which highlights the 
historical results of the acceptance and disregard of God’s and Wisdom’s divine, disciplinary 
paideia. The unique history of Israel becomes here a universal typology between the righteous 
who learn from their education and the impious who do not and eventually suffer the ultimate 
fate. This section is the mundane reflection of the first. The structure is bold and effective, and it 
makes little sense until we understand the primacy of paideia in the author’s purpose as the total 
education of all of humankind. 
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 The different perspectives on paideia seem, on the surface, to be incompatible and 
perhaps even contrary. And, within the text’s Greco-Roman milieu, the different views espoused 
in the text likely would have been considered divergent and nonsensical. Certain of the text’s 
paideutic concepts would have fit naturally within a Hellenistic philosophical context, such as 
the strong ties to wisdom, the educational content as complete knowledge of all things human 
and divine, the direct correlation between the paideia received during one’s corporeal existence 
and the fate of the soul after it is released from the body, and the equalizing nature of paideia 
which eradicates differences based on ethnicity and socio-economic status. However, the way in 
which the Wisdom of Solomon understands paideia as pedagogy would likely have been foreign 
to the author’s (non-Jewish) Alexandrian neighbors. Paideia as divine discipline, which could 
include physical, mental, and emotional violence and even death, does not have a parallel in 
Greco-Roman thought. The author was able to incorporate this type of pedagogy into his overall 
project based on his reading of the Septuagint prophetic literature, where paideia came to take on 
the expanded semantic range.  
 Despite the seemingly contrarian ideas related to paideia, the Wisdom of Solomon does 
exhibit an overall, all-encompassing view of paideia, which accounts for this plurality in 
meaning and the unique confluence of both educational content and pedagogy. Taken as a whole, 
paideia comes to represent an ideal, global educational system, whose goal is the immortality of 
the soul. It includes the content of education—the author’s own words of paideia in the text and 
Wisdom’s gift of complete knowledge—, and it incorporates the means of distilling that 
education—musar, divine testing, even corporeal death. This paideia does not refer solely to a 
particular law code or ancestral tradition; it is not meant to express exclusively the curriculum of 
Hellenistic education. It may include both of these, but it is more. It includes the process by 
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which God and Wisdom educate humanity, the divine test that is this sense-perceptible world 
and the somatic death that is a natural part of it. And it is the text of the Wisdom of Solomon 
itself, the author’s textbook or pedagogical manual, which, he argues, came not from apocalyptic 
revelation but from the experience of this world and God’s gift of divine instruction. Ethnic 
partiality has no place in this text, where everything is reworked into a universal drama between 
the righteous and the impious, where the first step on the path to gaining Wisdom is total 
adherence to paideia. The righteous are the beneficiaries of paideia and the ones who learn from 
it; the impious are those who do not, ultimately bringing on the death of their own souls. This big 
view of paideia in the Wisdom of Solomon is not the result of either ancestral traditions or 
contemporary Greco-Roman ideas alone. Using the Septuagint translations as a lens through 
which to read, interpret, and modify both ancient Jewish traditions and contemporary 
philosophy, the author was able to craft a completely new and unique paideia. In the Wisdom of 
Solomon we find the creation of an innovative paideia in process. 
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Chapter 6. Paul’s Letter to the Galatians 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Philo of Alexandria envisioned a number of unique forms of paideia as necessary in the total 
education of the individual. These included the Greek encyclical curricula, the study of 
philosophy, and the laws of Moses, both as practiced on a daily basis and as understood through 
deeper allegorical exegesis. In common to all forms of paideia was their preliminary nature. 
Paideia, for Philo, was always the means not the end. Paideia was the means to the loftier goals 
of virtue, wisdom, and the immortal soul. The preliminary nature of paideia, however, did not 
necessarily indicate its temporary nature. The study of both philosophy and the Mosaic law was a 
lifelong pursuit, never to be abandoned despite the achievement of greater strides upward. 
Encyclical paideia, however, was necessarily impermanent, to be abandoned due to the 
dangerous pull towards the body and the sense-perceptible. Philo’s allegorical reading of the 
Hagar, Sarah, and Abraham narrative was focused on exactly this issue, the value and necessity 
of the encyclia as a means to wisdom, but the dangers of their continued study and the need to 
abandon them. 
 Although Paul’s allegorical reading of the Genesis narrative seems, superficially, to be 
quite different from Philo’s, there is good reason for attempting to read Paul’s exegesis in light 
of Philo’s and strong evidence from within the letter itself that Paul had this type of reading in 
mind when crafting his argument. This is not to suggest that Paul was actually reading Philo—
though I do not roundly dismiss the possibility—, but simply that he may have been aware of 
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this, perhaps popular, way of reading the Genesis account in the Diaspora, as Paul and Philo 
were both part of the same universe of discourse.233 Given his activities in major Hellenistic 
cities, it is plausible that Paul would have been conscious of two likely popular topics of 
conversation among the cities’ Jewish populations, the Mosaic law, as paideia, as a means to 
attaining wisdom, and Greek paideia as a more cautious means to attaining wisdom. Paul’s 
allegorical reading in Galatians, then, becomes part of these same conversations, though not 
without some fairly drastic innovation.  
 In his allegorical reading, Paul conflates the two paths to wisdom: Mosaic law and Greek 
propaideumata, the law itself becoming Philo’s encyclical paideia or Hagar, having, at one time, 
an educational purpose but no longer needed or desired once the end goal of wisdom has been 
attained. This is a concept that most of Paul’s fellow Jews would not have agreed with,234 but it 
is a move that Paul makes due to his conviction of wisdom being freely given to those who 
believe. Just as Philo sternly warned his readers of the dangers of turning back to preliminary 
paideia once having attained true wisdom, Paul warns the Galatians of the dangers of turning 
back to the law once having attained true wisdom via Christ. The allegory, instead of being cut 
off from the rest of Paul’s argument—as many scholarly interpretations would have it—is a 
continuation and expansion of Paul’s argument of the law as pedagogue, a tool that served a 
vital, pedagogic, though temporary, purpose. This concept of the Jewish law as pedagogue or 
preliminary paideia is not confined to these few verses (Gal. 3:24-25; 4:21-5:1), but forms the 
core of Paul’s main argument in his letter, which begins at 3:1. This reading of the allegory 
                                                 
233 On the use of Philo for understanding the texts of the New Testament generally, see Gregory E. Sterling’s article, 
“‘Philo Has Not Been Used Half Enough’: The Significance of Philo of Alexandria for the Study of the New 
Testament,” Perspectives in Religious Studies 30.3 (Fall 2003): 251-269. 
234 See Philo’s arguments against the “extreme allegorizers,” who thought that they could dismiss the literal precepts 
of the Law because they had learned the true, allegorical interpretations of the Law (Migr. 89-94). That Philo is 
arguing against these Jews testifies to the fact that Paul was neither the first nor the only Jew to make this move. 
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shows a consistency in Paul’s argumentation through this central section of the letter, which has 
often been overlooked or misjudged due to other interpretations of the allegory. 
 
2. PAUL’S ALLEGORICAL READING OF THE HAGAR, SARAH, AND ABRAHAM NARRATIVE 
Gal. 4:21-5:1 
4:21  Λέγετέ μοι, οἱ ὑπὸ νόμον θέλοντες εἶναι, τὸν νόμον οὐκ ἀκούετε; 22  γέγραπται γὰρ 
ὅτι Ἀβραὰμ δύο υἱοὺς ἔσχεν, ἕνα ἐκ τῆς παιδίσκης καὶ ἕνα ἐκ τῆς ἐλευθέρας. 23  ἀλλ᾽ ὁ 
μὲν ἐκ τῆς παιδίσκης κατὰ σάρκα γεγέννηται, ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐλευθέρας δι᾽ ἐπαγγελίας. 24  
ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα· αὗται γάρ εἰσιν δύο διαθῆκαι, μία μὲν ἀπὸ ὄρους Σινᾶ εἰς 
δουλείαν γεννῶσα, ἥτις ἐστὶν Ἁγάρ. 25  τὸ δὲ Ἁγὰρ Σινᾶ ὄρος ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ Ἀραβίᾳ· 
συστοιχεῖ δὲ τῇ νῦν Ἰερουσαλήμ, δουλεύει γὰρ μετὰ τῶν τέκνων αὐτῆς. 26  ἡ δὲ ἄνω 
Ἰερουσαλὴμ ἐλευθέρα ἐστίν, ἥτις ἐστὶν μήτηρ ἡμῶν· 27  γέγραπται γάρ·  
εὐφράνθητι, στεῖρα ἡ οὐ τίκτουσα,  
ῥῆξον καὶ βόησον, ἡ οὐκ ὠδίνουσα·  
ὅτι πολλὰ τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐρήμου  
μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἐχούσης τὸν ἄνδρα. 
28  ὑμεῖς δέ, ἀδελφοί, κατὰ Ἰσαὰκ ἐπαγγελίας τέκνα ἐστέ. 29  ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ τότε ὁ κατὰ 
σάρκα γεννηθεὶς ἐδίωκεν τὸν κατὰ πνεῦμα, οὕτως καὶ νῦν. 30  ἀλλὰ τί λέγει ἡ γραφή; 
ἔκβαλε τὴν παιδίσκην καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς· οὐ γὰρ μὴ κληρονομήσει ὁ υἱὸς τῆς παιδίσκης 
μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τῆς ἐλευθέρας. 31  διό, ἀδελφοί, οὐκ ἐσμὲν παιδίσκης τέκνα ἀλλὰ τῆς 
ἐλευθέρας. 5:1  Τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς ἠλευθέρωσεν· στήκετε οὖν καὶ μὴ πάλιν ζυγῷ 
δουλείας ἐνέχεσθε. 
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21 Tell me, you who wish to be under the law, will you not listen to the law? 22 For it is 
written that Abraham had two sons, one by the maidservant, the other by the free woman. 
23 One, the son of the maidservant, was born according to the flesh; the other, the son of 
the free woman, was born through a promise. 24 Now these things should be understood 
in an allegorical manner: these women are two covenants. One woman, bearing children 
for slavery, is Hagar. 25 Now Hagar is Mount Sinai in Arabia, and she corresponds to the 
present Jerusalem, for she is in slavery together with her children. 26 But the other, the 
free woman, corresponds to the Jerusalem above, and she is our mother. 27 For it is 
written,  
Rejoice, barren woman, you who has borne no child;  
cry aloud, you who have not endured birth pangs;  
for the children of the desolate woman are more numerous  
than the children of the one who has a husband. 
28 Now you, brothers, are children of the promise, like Isaac. 29 But just as at that time the 
child who was born according to the flesh persecuted the child who was born according 
to the spirit, so it is now also. 30 But what does the scripture say? “Throw out the 
maidservant and her son; for the son of the maidservant will not share in the inheritance 
with the son of the free woman.” 31 So then, brothers, we are children, not of the 
maidservant but of the free woman. 5:1  For freedom Christ has set us free. Stand firm, 
therefore, and do not be bound again to a yoke of slavery. 
 
Paul’s allegorical reading of the Genesis narrative in Galatians has been extensively discussed, 
as it speaks to such themes continuously at the forefront of Pauline studies as Paul’s relationship 
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with and understanding of the Jewish law and his overall conception of the nature of the 
Christian community. Recent studies, beginning from Barrett’s 1976 article,235 have largely 
moved away from the traditional understanding of the allegory as simple anti-Jewish rhetoric and 
have, instead, given more complex, compelling readings, often in light of recent depictions of 
Paul associated with the New Perspective236 or Radical New Perspective237 on Paul. However, 
                                                 
235 Charles Kingsley Barrett, “The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar in the Argument of Galatians,” in 
Rechtfertigung: Festschrift für Ernst Käsemann zum 70. Geburtstag (ed. J. Friedrich, W. Pöhlmann, and P. 
Stuhlmacher; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1976), 1-16. Barrett notes the two main problems with which commentators 
have struggled in dealing with the allegory: the interpretation of its details and the reason Paul included it in his 
letter. With a few exceptions, Barrett dismisses most previous scholarship on the topic due to the fact that most 
scholars had either ignored the allegory altogether, or they simply dismissed its importance and place within the 
letter, relegating it to minor (and not very convincing) support to Paul’s larger argument. Barrett attempts to rectify 
this situation and, in so doing, begins a new history of interpretation followed by many modern Pauline scholars. He 
argues that Paul’s use of scripture in Galatians 3 and 4 is directly due to the fact that his opponents in Galatia used 
those same passages to their own ends, and Paul, then, tries to turn the tables on them. In the case of the allegory, 
Paul’s opponents used the Sarah/Hagar story, interpreting the Genesis passages literally, in support of their own 
argument: they are the true descendants of Abraham through the covenant made with God through circumcision; the 
Gentiles are descendants of Hagar; if they want to be a part of Abraham’s seed, they must be circumcised; if not, 
they must be cast out like Hagar and Ishmael. This move by his opponents gives Paul the impetus to take up these 
passages from Genesis, passages which he would not have used otherwise (due to this literal interpretation). While 
his opponents interpret literally, Paul asserts that the matters are to be spoken of or interpreted allegorically. When 
they are, the opponents’ position is reversed: the physical descendants of Sarah become the spiritual descendants of 
Hagar, whereas the physical descendants of Hagar (i.e. Gentiles) become the spiritual descendants of Sarah, the 
inheritors of the promise. 
236 Unlike more traditional interpretations of Paul’s allegory as representing “two diametrically opposed covenants,” 
i.e., an old covenant and a new covenant (see, e.g., H. D. Betz, Galatians, [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1979], 243), James Dunn, Galatians [Black’s New Testament Commentaries; London: A & C Black, 1993], 256-
257) does not see in the allegory a contrast between the Jews and the Christians, but instead between those of the 
spirit versus those who rely on circumcision as a marker of covenant: “The child of Hagar is the child ‘born 
according to the flesh’; but that corresponds, not to the descendants of Ishmael, but to the Jews, or at least those of 
them who relied on their physical (‘according to the flesh’) descent from Abraham.” So, for example, in Galatians 
4:28, “But you, brothers, are children of the promise like Isaac,” Dunn emphasizes that Paul is saying, “not ‘you’ 
Gentiles over against or excluding Jews in whole or part, but ‘you’ Gentile believers in particular, ‘you too.’” Dunn 
does not see Paul conceiving of two separate covenants here, only one, with Hagar and her offspring representing 
the covenant wrongly perceived. Elsewhere, Dunn makes clear that Paul’s purpose is not to distinguish between two 
separate covenants: “Only one covenant is at issue here—the promise to Abraham of seed. Hagar represents the 
covenant misconceived” (The Theology of Paul the Apostle [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998], 146 note 94. 
237 Mark Nanos, “What Does ‘Present Jerusalem’ (Gal 4:25) in Paul’s Allegory Have to Do with the Jerusalem of 
Paul’s Time, or the Concerns of the Galatians?” presented at Central States SBL, St. Louis, March 28-29, 2004; 
available online, as of 2/23/2015, at: http://www.marknanos.com/Allegory-Web-Temp-5-2-04.pdf. Nanos does not 
see a dichotomy between Jew and Christian or between Gentile Christian and Jewish Christian in Paul’s allegory. 
Paul instead uses the allegory in support of his argument against proselyte conversion for Gentiles. The Sarah 
covenant represents the birth of free sons, “Israelites and those from the nations who join them through faith in 
Christ,” while Hagar represents the birth of slave sons, or Jewish proselytes (4). Gentiles have no need to become 
full proselytes; in fact, they must not, as it directly opposes Paul’s view of monotheism. Jews must remain Jews, and 
Gentiles must remain Gentiles. See also his The Irony of Galatians: Paul's Letter in First-Century Context 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002), 65-69, 156-158. 
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Pauline scholars continue to dismiss the possible connections between Paul’s allegory and 
Philo’s and the light that Philo’s reading may shed on Paul’s.238 Paul uses the allegorical reading 
at the concluding point of his main argument in the letter, which is focused, as we shall see, on 
the once necessary, though no longer needed, educational value of the Mosaic law in the lives of 
the Jews, a context parallel to that which compelled Philo to utilize the allegory. Though the 
Pauline allegory looks, on the surface, unlike the extensive Philonic version, the similarities 
between the two are striking once we recognize the unique elements in Paul’s version. 
 
The Allegory within the Argumentative Structure of the Letter 
The prominent use of rhetorical analysis in determining the structure of Paul’s letters, 
particularly Galatians, can be traced, in large part, to an article of Hans Dieter Betz from 1975, 
based on a paper read at the previous year’s SNTS meeting in Sweden.239 Though many would 
come to disagree with him in the details, especially his assertion that the letter was designed 
according to judicial oration and rhetoric, Betz’s impact on the structural understanding of the 
letter is without question, and most scholars of the letter today begin their structural analyses 
from the Greco-Roman handbooks on rhetoric and epistolography because of the foundational 
                                                 
238 Peder Borgen (“Some Hebrew and Pagan Features in Philo’s and Paul’s Interpretation of Hagar and Ishmael,” in 
The New Testament and Hellenistic Judaism [ed. P. Borgen and S. Giversen; Oxford: Aarhus University Press, 
1995], 151-164.) is the only recent scholar who has attempted to read the allegory of Paul in light of Philo of 
Alexandria in order to see what light may be thrown upon Paul’s interpretation of the Genesis passage. Although he 
discusses Philo’s allegorical interpretation briefly, it is chiefly in his more literal exegesis of the Genesis narrative 
where Borgen finds possible background to Paul’s allegory. In Abr. 247-251, Philo portrays Hagar as a sort of 
“borderline” figure. She is “an Egyptian by birth, but a Hebrew by choice” (Abr. 251), so, for Borgen, a Jewish 
proselyte. It is against this type of exegetical background that Paul, then, makes his chief argument in the allegory: 
Hagar and Ishmael represent the model for Jewish proselytes and those Judaizers in Galatia who want to make 
slaves out of the Christian gentiles. 
239 Han Dieter Betz, “The Literary Composition and Function of Paul’s Letter to the Galatians,” NTS 21 (1975): 353-
379. See also Betz, Galatians, 16-24. All today acknowledge Betz’s impetus in this matter. See, e.g., Philip H. Kern, 
Rhetoric and Galatians: Assessing an Approach to Paul’s Epistle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
90; and Mark D. Nanos, “Galatians,” in The Blackwell Companion to the New Testament (ed. David E. Aune; 
Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 453-474 (465). 
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work set by Betz in the 1970s.240 While a number of recent commentators have expressed their 
reservations about the benefit and applicability of ancient rhetorical criticism to assess Paul’s 
letters,241 the majority of Pauline scholars today acknowledge that there is something to be 
gained from a comparison with ancient rhetorical methods. 
Given the widespread disagreement as to the type(s) of rhetorical situations and models 
Paul may have been addressing and utilizing and because of the inconsistencies in the Greco-
Roman source materials themselves, we would expect a great deal of dissent in modern structural 
analyses. However, despite some minor terminological contention and variation, Betz’s structure 
has held up quite well, particularly in his outline of the primary argumentative section of the 
letter:242 
 
1:1-5  epistolary prescript 
1:6-11  exordium (also known as the prooemium or principium) 
                                                 
240 See, e.g., James D. Hester, “The Rhetorical Structure of Galatians 1:11-14,” JBL 103 (1984): 223-233; Robert G. 
Hall, “The Rhetorical Outline for Galatians: A Reconsideration,” JBL 106.2 (Jun., 1987): 277-287; G. Walter 
Hansen, Abraham in Galatians: Epistolary and Rhetorical Contexts (JSNTSS 29; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1989); Walter B. Russell, “Rhetorical Analysis of the Book of Galatians, Part 1,” Bibliotheca Sacra 150 
(July-September, 1993): 341-358; and Russell, “Rhetorical Analysis of the Book of Galatians, Part 2,” Bibliotheca 
Sacra 150 (October-December, 1993): 416-439. 
241 See C. Joachim Classen, “Paulus und die antike Rhetorik,” ZNTW 82 (1991): 1-33; Stanley E. Porter, “The 
Argument of Romans 5: Can a Rhetorical Question Make a Difference?” JBL 110 (1991): 655-77; Porter, “The 
Theoretical Justification for Application of Rhetorical Categories to Pauline Epistolary Literature,” in Rhetoric and 
the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference (ed. S. E. Porter and T. H. Olbricht; JSNTS 90; 
Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 100-122; Jeffrey T. Reed, “Using Ancient Rhetorical Categories to Interpret Paul's 
Letters: A Question of Genre,” in Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference 
(ed. S. E. Porter and T. H. Olbricht; JSNTS 90; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 292-324; Duane Litfin, St. Paul's 
Theology of Proclamation: 1 Corinthians 1-4 and Greco-Roman Rhetoric (SNTSMS 79; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994); R. Dean Anderson Jr., Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul (Contributions to Biblical 
Exegesis & Theology 18; Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1996); and Kern, Rhetoric and Galatians: Assessing an approach 
to Paul’s epistle. 
242 See Kern, Rhetoric and Galatians, 91-92, who compares the structures of Betz, Brinsmead, Kennedy, Standaert, 
Hall, Smit, Longenecker, Hester, and Russell. Brinsmead, Standaert, and Hester all see 3:1-4:31 as the central 
section within Paul’s argument. Kennedy sees 3:1-5:1 as one of the principal sections of the wider “proofs” section, 
which runs from 1:11-5:1. Hall places 3:1-6:10, “further headings,” within his proof section, 1:10-6:10. Russell 
argues that 3:1-4:31 is the “experiential argument,” within the larger probatio, 1:11-6:10. Kern also points out that 
Betz’s structure is largely followed by Barrett, Baasland, Harnisch, Beker, Hübner, and Becker (91 note 7). 
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1:12-2:14 narratio  
2:15-21 propositio (also known as the partitio or divisio)  
3:1-4:31 probatio (also known as the confirmatio or refutatio) 
5:1-6:10 exhortatio 
6:11-18 peroratio (epistolary postscript) 
 
For Betz, as for many commentators, the most decisive section of Paul’s argument in the letter is 
3:1-4:31, what Betz and others have labeled the probatio, or the “proof.”243 This is the letter’s 
central element, whose purpose is to demonstrate to the audience the reasons why they should 
accept the author’s proposition, which Betz sees in 2:15-21, namely that justification or 
righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) comes not through the law but through faith in Christ.244 
 Even if one is hesitant concerning the value and applicability of ancient rhetoric and 
epistolography to Paul’s unique circumstances and purposes, non-rhetorically-oriented structural 
analyses often place 3:1-4:31 as the central piece in Paul’s argument as well. For example, 
Lightfoot identified three main sections of the letter: 
 
 1:1-2:21 personal or narrative portion 
 3:1-4:31 argumentative or doctrinal portion 
                                                 
243 Betz is drawing on Quintilian 5; Cicero, De inv. 1.24.34; and Rhet. ad Her. 1.10.18. See “The Literary 
Composition and Function of Paul’s Letter to the Galatians,” 368-375. Some argue that Betz’s insistence that Paul is 
here following the model of a judicial speech has led to a rhetorical structure too complex. Both Russell and Hall 
argue, instead, that 3:1-4:31 is a central element in the larger probatio, which runs from 1:10 or 1:11 to 6:10. See 
Russell, “Rhetorical Analysis of the Book of Galatians, Part 2,” 421; and Hall, “The Rhetorical Outline for 
Galatians,” 284-286. 
244 See also Richard N. Longenecker, Galatians (Word Biblical Commentary 41; Dallas: Word Books, 1990), 80-81. 
Not everyone agrees that this is Paul’s proposition in the letter. Hall, for example, places it at 1:6-9, namely that the 
Galatians should stick to Paul’s gospel alone and reject all others. See “The Rhetorical Outline for Galatians,” 283-
284. 
223 
 
 5:1-6:18 hortatory or practical portion245 
 
Most important to our concern here is that Paul’s allegorical reading of the Hagar, Sarah, and 
Abraham narrative is included within Paul’s central argument.246 Betz, seemingly anticipating 
the objection that allegory was often considered a fairly weak argument in ancient rhetoric, and, 
therefore, that its place at the decisive conclusion of the probatio would make little sense, draws 
on Pseudo-Demetrius, who believed that simple, direct arguments were not the most effective:247 
 
In the light of the foregoing rhetorical considerations the place and function of the 
allegory iv. 21-31 becomes explainable. Paul had concluded the previous section in iv. 20 
with a confession of perplexity (... ὅτι ἀποροῦμαι ἐν ὑμῖν). Such a confession was a 
rhetorical device, seemingly admitting that all previous arguments have failed to 
convince. Then, in iv. 2l he starts again by asking the Galatians to tell the answer 
themselves: Λέγετέ μοι ... τὸν νόμον οὐκ ἀκούετε;. In other words, the allegory allows 
Paul to return to the interrogatio method used in iii. l-5 by another route. There this 
method was employed to force the Galatians to admit as eye-witnesses that the evidence 
                                                 
245 J. B. Lightfoot, St. Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians: A Revised Text with Introduction, Notes, and Dissertations 
(2nd rev. ed.; London and Cambridge: Macmillan and Co., 1866), 65-67. See also Ernest de Witt Burton, A Critical 
and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), 72-74; and 
Kern, Rhetoric and Galatians, 118-119. 
246 There is disagreement here. Some, like Hansen and Longenecker, prefer to situate the allegory more closely with 
what follows than with what precedes, in what both refer to as the “request section.” See Longenecker, Galatians, 
197-200; and Hansen, Abraham in Galatians, 141-154. Much of the disagreement over the placement of the allegory 
is due to the digressive nature of 4:12-20, where Paul interrupts his argument with a personal, direct plea to the 
community. Betz has explained the difficult section, as usual, in light of ancient rhetorical exempla: “The section 
becomes understandable when interpreted in the light of epistolography: iv. 12-20 contains a string of topoi 
belonging to the theme of friendship, a theme which was famous in ancient literature. More importantly, it was 
customary to use material from the topos περὶ φιλίας in the probatio section of speeches as well as in letters. 
Quintilian includes the material among the various types of exempla,” citing Quintilian 5.11.41 (“The Literary 
Composition and Function of Paul’s Letter to the Galatians,” 372). 
247 Ps.-Demetrius, De eloc. 2.99-101, 151, 222, 243. Betz, “The Literary Composition and Function of Paul’s Letter 
to the Galatians,” 373. 
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speaks for Paul, an admission that leaves them in the situation of ‘simpletons’ (ἀνόητοι). 
However, people who are to be persuaded should not be left in a situation of such low 
regard. By his confession of perplexity in iv. 20 Paul removes himself from the haughty 
position of one who has the total command of the arguments. Through the allegory he lets 
the Galatians find the ‘truth’ for themselves, thus convincing themselves, and at the same 
time clearing themselves from the blame of being ἀνόητοι Γαλάται. The conclusion (iv. 
3l), now stated in the first person plural, includes the readers among those who render 
judgement. Moreover, the conclusion of iv. 31 is not only the resume of the meaning of 
the allegory iv. 21-31, but of the entire probatio section, thus anticipating that the whole 
argument has convinced the audience.248 
 
Betz’s argument on the place of the allegory within the proof section and within the letter itself is 
admirable and works very well with Barrett’s hypothesis of Paul using an allegorical reading of 
the narrative in order to combat his opponents’ use of the literal reading,249 as it becomes the 
culminating scriptural proof for his overall argument in the letter, as outlined in the propositio 
(2:15-21), that the arrival and salvific death of the messiah has fundamentally nullified the 
present usefulness of the law. 
 If the allegory in 4:21-5:1250 is the fundamental and concluding element of Paul’s central 
argument in the letter that begins at 3:1, it must be interpreted in light of that argument. 
Interpretations of the allegory which do not cohere with this central section and with the message 
of the letter as whole must be dismissed. Unfortunately, Betz’s own interpretation of the 
                                                 
248 Betz, “The Literary Composition and Function of Paul’s Letter to the Galatians,” 374-375. 
249 “The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar in the Argument of Galatians.” 
250 As I will demonstrate, I take Gal. 5:1 as a part of the allegory’s conclusion in 4:31-5:1. 
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allegory, which he explains more fully in his 1979 commentary, does not, itself, accord with the 
meticulously crafted argument he has envisioned Paul having developed. By putting the 
emphasis in the allegory on “two diametrically opposed systems: an ‘old covenant’ . . . and a 
‘new covenant,’”251 Betz essentially ignores Paul’s focus in the rest of the probatio and in the 
preceding propositio, both of which, as we shall soon see, are almost entirely focused on the 
changing role of the Jewish law in light of Jesus Christ.252 And, by missing or ignoring the fact 
that the allegory continues and concludes Paul’s previous arguments concerning the essential, 
though temporary, nature of the law, Betz et al. have failed to make use of a clear, contemporary 
parallel usage of the Genesis narrative, Philo’s allegorical reading. 
 We can further distinguish the following sections within the argumentative center, or 
probatio, of the letter: 
 
 3:1-12  What the law cannot and was not intended to accomplish 
 3:13-18 I.e. those things faith in Jesus Christ was intended to provide 
 3:19-24 The divinely intended purpose of the law 
 3:25-29 The situation post-Christ 
 4:1-10  Dangers of turning back to the law, post-Christ 
 4:11-20 Rhetorical digression, personal plea 
                                                 
251 Galatians, 243. 
252 Others, too, have understood the central place of the allegory, yet have downplayed this connect to the law. Troy 
Martin, “Apostasy to Paganism: The Rhetorical Stasis of the Galatian Controversy,” JBL 114.3 (Autumn, 1995): 
437-461, understands the allegory’s primary emphasis being on those who are in versus those who are out: “Paul 
designs this allegory to prove that those who desire to be under law and practice the distinctions of circumcision are 
not the elected offspring of Abraham even though they are circumcised” (457). Clearly, the fate of the two types of 
individuals is an integrated, important part of Paul’s argument with the allegory. Yet, by solely focusing on this 
aspect, Martin and others have overlooked the true purpose of Paul’s bringing this allegory into the equation, namely 
as final scriptural proof of the analogical argument he had been making through the rest of the proof section, that the 
law once had a necessary function that is now no longer needed due to the arrival and death of the messiah. 
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 4:21-5:1 Allegory of Hagar and Sarah 
 
3. DIVERGENCE FROM PHILO’S ALLEGORICAL READING OF HAGAR, SARAH, AND ABRAHAM  
In the arguments leading up to the allegory, we find Paul setting up a comparison much akin to 
Philo’s between the encyclical or preliminary studies and loftier wisdom, though with two 
significant differences: one, the Mosaic nomos fills the role of Philo’s encyclical paideia as the 
necessary preliminary education, and two, the loftier goal of wisdom has been freely given to the 
community of believers. Once we understand these two dramatic shifts, the comparison to 
Philo’s allegorical reading becomes clear. 
 
The Jewish Law as Pedagogue or Preliminary Paideia 
The first discrepancy from the Philonic allegory, Jewish law as the preliminary paideia, was a 
hugely consequential and highly controversial move, as putting the law of Moses in the place of 
Philo’s encyclia meant that the law had a necessary, yet temporary role in the lives of the Jewish 
people. Paul was not the only second temple Jew to argue this point, but many or even most of 
his contemporaries would have viewed this assertion as deeply problematic.253 
 At the very start of the probatio, Paul follows up on the letter’s proposition he laid out in 
2:15-21. Gal. 3:3 vividly expresses Paul’s primary problem with the community and serves as 
the jumping-off point for his arguments regarding the actual purpose of the law: “Are you so 
foolish that, having begun in the spirit you will now finish in the flesh?” In 3:1-12, he explains to 
the Galatians what the law cannot and, importantly, was never intended to accomplish. These 
                                                 
253 See note 3 on Philo’s extreme allegorizers in Migr. 89-94. 
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were likely points of contention with Paul’s adversaries and those in Galatia who had been 
convinced by them. According to Paul, the law was not designed to provide the spirit (3:2, 5), to 
permit the doing and witnessing of miracles (3:5), to provide the blessing of Abraham (3:7-9), to 
provide justification (3:11, 21), or to make alive (3:21). These things were, instead, provided by 
faith and belief in God. Thus was the purpose of Christ, to fulfill the promise to Abraham. 
Therefore, Jesus Christ replaced the law (3:13), so that all could receive those things that the law 
could not provide: the spirit, justification, and Abraham’s blessing (3:14).  
Dunn and others from the New Perspective have argued that Paul’s references here and 
elsewhere to not being justified “by the works of the law (ἐξ ἔργων νόμου)” (3:2, 5, 10), though 
referring generally to all that the law requires, should, in this particular case, refer instead to 
those specific aspects of the law that serve to mark Jew from Gentile, laws pertaining to 
circumcision, Sabbath observance, and dietary regulations.254 The assertion, however, that ἒργοι 
νόμου was, in essence, a terminus technicus is tenuous, as there are no known examples of this 
type of usage prior to Paul, despite attempts to see something similar in 4QMMT. The notion 
that the various congregations in Galatia would have immediately understood the phrase as a 
metonym for only those aspects of the Jewish law that functioned to keep the Jews separated 
from the Gentiles is difficult to believe. As we shall see in the discussion of the stoicheia below, 
if Paul intended the phrase to have more than its superficial meaning, it was likely within the 
realm of a particular attitude towards the following the law, a slavish devotion. Furthermore, as 
Paul continues his arguments, he stops speaking of the “works of the law” in favor of simply “the 
law.” 
                                                 
254 See Dunn, The Theology of Paul, 354-366. 
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If justification of sins was not the purpose of the law, “why then the law?” (3:19). Paul 
tells us exactly why in Gal. 3:19-24. The law “was given for the sake of transgressions, until the 
seed to whom it was promised should come” (3:19). Despite what some commentators suggest, 
this verse does not have any negative connotation in regards the law.255 If we follow Paul’s logic, 
what he suggests is that the promise was given to Abraham because of his faith, but yet 
transgressions continued to increase. Therefore, the law was given in order to help, to educate the 
Jews and to inform them of their sins. As opposed to those not under the law, who might 
transgress without knowing it, the Jews have been given a great gift and a great help. The 
educational role of the law was a common theme with Paul, and in this he was not alone.256 We 
have seen in previous chapters numerous examples of Jews, Greeks, and Romans who 
understood the law as having a fundamental role in the education of the individual.257 Paul’s 
more controversial move, at least within the realm of Second Temple Judaism, was the necessary 
impermanence of this educational tool. 
 Gal. 3:23 is another verse that many scholars use to affirm Paul’s negative portrait of the 
law: “Before the faith came, we were protected under the law, contained until the faith would be 
revealed (Πρὸ τοῦ δὲ ἐλθεῖν τὴν πίστιν ὑπὸ νόμον ἐφρουρούμεθα συγκλειόμενοι εἰς τὴν 
μέλλουσαν πίστιν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι).” The primary point of contention here is the understanding 
of the phrase ἐφρουρούμεθα συγκλειόμενοι, which most modern English translations take as 
                                                 
255 Traditional interpretation of 3:19a has long seen this (and cf. Rom 5:20) as Paul arguing that the law was given to 
actually produce sin and increase wickedness, with 3:19b referring to the inferiority of the law due to angelic or 
even demonic mediation. See the discussion and bibliography in Dunn, The Theology of Paul, 139-140, as well as 
Dunn’s refutation of this line of interpretation. For a more recent understanding of 3:19 along traditional lines, see 
Chris VanLandingham, Judgment & Justification in Early Judaism and the Apostle Paul (Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson, 2006), 207. 
256 See Rom. 2:17-21; 3:20-21; 7:7; and 15:4. 
257 See, e.g., Plato, Rep. 429c; Prot. 326d; Heraclitus DK B114; Plutarch, Comparatio Lycurgi et Numae; Cato 
maior 20; Plautus, Mostellaria 37-47; Cicero, De Leg. I, 23. See discussions in Jaeger, Paideia, I:108-114, 2:219, 
3:216-217; and Stanley F. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 10-13, 88-89. 
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assigning the role of jailor to the law as opposed to guard or protector, as my translation attempts 
to make clear. See, e.g., the NRSV translation: “Now before faith came, we were imprisoned and 
guarded under the law until faith would be revealed.”258 The Greek terms themselves are 
ambiguous and context-dependent, and, therefore, the verse must be read in light of the Paul’s 
other arguments regarding the law at this point in the letter. As with 3:19, I argue that Paul is 
suggesting the law’s preparatory, custodial purpose, an idea continued in his depiction of the law 
as the child’s pedagogue in the following verses. 
 
Gal. 3:24-25 
24  ὥστε ὁ νόμος παιδαγωγὸς ἡμῶν γέγονεν εἰς Χριστόν, ἵνα ἐκ πίστεως δικαιωθῶμεν· 25  
ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς πίστεως οὐκέτι ὑπὸ παιδαγωγόν ἐσμεν. 
 
24 So then the law was our pedagogue until Christ, in order that we might be justified by 
faith. 25 But now that the faith has come, we are no longer under a pedagogue. 
 
Paul’s analogy here between the Jewish law and the (Greco-Roman) pedagogue is indeed 
unique, as, outside of his comment in 1 Cor. 4:15, which does not provide much help here, the 
Greek παιδαγωγὸς occurs nowhere else in the New Testament or the Septuagint. Most scholars 
have explained Paul’s use of the concept in the comparison as coming from two motivations. 
First, and most clearly, Paul wants to highlight the temporary nature of the Jewish law. The 
Greco-Roman sources, while depicting the pedagogue in varying terms, from loving family 
member and mentor to evil, sadistic terror, all agree that the pedagogue’s role in the life of the 
                                                 
258 For the various scholarly views, see David J. Lull, “‘The Law as Our Pedagogue’: A Study in Galatians 3:19-25,” 
JBL 105.3 (Sep., 1986): 481-498 (486-487). 
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child was temporary.259 This first point, then, is conclusive. The second, however, is more 
problematic. 
Often through superficial or carefully selective readings of the Greco-Roman sources, 
many have chosen to highlight the more negative portrayals of the pedagogue and, from that, the 
law.260 Some, following the lead of Dunn and others that Paul’s main problem with the law in 
Galatians is in its particularistic aspects, focus on the pedagogue’s protective role as the 
guardian of a child. In this way, Paul argues that the law was meant to keep the Jewish people 
separated from Gentiles, but only for a time.261 The view of the law here is not so much negative 
as neutral.262 Others, instead, have sought a more nuanced understanding of Paul’s motivations 
through both a thorough examination of the sources and a reading better contextualized within 
                                                 
259 There have been several nice reviews of the relevant literature. See Lull, “‘The Law as Our Pedagogue’: A Study 
in Galatians 3:19-25”; Norman H. Young, “Paidagogos: The Social Setting of a Pauline Metaphor,” NT 29.2 (1987): 
150-176; and Young, “The Figure of the Paidagōgos in Art and Literature,” The Biblical Archaeologist 53.2 (Jun., 
1990): 80-86. 
260 Older, more traditional scholarship has, not surprisingly, only seen a negative association here. Yet, even more 
recent studies have focused on the negative. See for example, Richard N. Longenecker, “The Pedagogical Nature of 
the Law in Galatians 3:19-4:7,” JETS 25/1 (March 1982): 53-61. Longenecker, based on his examination of the 
pedagogue in Greek and Hebrew sources, asserts that “It is not possible to interpret Gal 3:24-25 as assigning a 
positive preliminary or preparatory role to the Law. The point of the analogy for Paul is not that the Law was a 
preparation for Christ. Rather, the focus is on the inferior status of one who is under a pedagogue and the temporary 
nature of such a situation” (55-56). According to E. P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1983), 66-67, “The law as pedagogue, then, is more an enslaver than a protector. Thus it is 
understandable that many scholars view the phrase ‘on account of transgressions’ in 3:19 as meaning ‘for the sake of 
producing transgressions.’ This reading . . . can be derived from the enslaving character of the pedagogue (as 
interpreted by Gal. 4:2) and from the phrase ‘imprisoned under sin’ in 3:22.” D. F. Tolmie, “Ὁ ΝΟΜΟΣ 
ΠΑΙΔΑΓΩΓΟΣ ἩΜΩΝ ΓΕΓΟΝΕΝ ΕΙΣ ΞΡΙΣΤΟΝ [sic]: The Persuasive Force of a Pauline Metaphor (GL 3:23-
26),” Neotestamentica 26.2 (1992): 407-416, argues that the inferiority of the law with respect to faith means that 
there cannot be a positive interpretation of the pedagogue. Instead, the point of the metaphor is to point out the 
temporary nature of the law and notion of confinement and slavery to it (412-413). 
261 See Young, “Paidagogos: The Social Setting of a Pauline Metaphor,” esp. 170-176. According to Young, “Thus 
the law is ‘our pedagogue’ in the sense that the restrictive regulations which separated Jew and Gentile, which Sinai 
epitomized, were only temporary. Just as a pedagogue's guardian role finished when the child arrived at maturity, so 
the legal separation of Jew and Gentile ended with the coming of the new age in Christ” (176). Cf. T. David Gordon, 
“A Note on ΠΑΙΔΑΓΩΓΟΣ in Galatians 3.24-25,” NTS 35 (1989): 150-154; and Michael J. Smith, “The Role of the 
Pedagogue in Galatians,” Bibliotheca Sacra 163 (April-June 2006): 197-214. 
262 As Esler remarks, “Paul is not suggesting that there is anything particularly negative about the law in the use of 
this analogy, only that it is by definition, and of necessity, restrictive in its operation and limited as to its time of 
application. . . . The law has passed its use-by date.” See Philip F. Esler, Galatians (New Testament Readings; 
London: Routledge, 1998), 202. 
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the letter. Most notably, David Lull, refuting the principally negative view of the law in the 
metaphor found in earlier scholarship, argues for a more complex set of associations imposed 
upon the law through the analogy with the pedagogue, which include the temporal limitations, 
the function of the law to prevent transgressions and bridle the passions, and the experience of 
those under the law as one of slavery, though with the enslavement meant to protect and govern 
action rather than induce to sin.263 
There is much to agree with in Lull’s reasoned arguments. However, he and most other 
commentators on the passage, have too easily dismissed the educational, preparatory intent 
inherent in Paul’s analogy.264 The view of the pedagogue in the ancient sources is highly varied 
and ambiguous. Yes, the pedagogue could be described as a very strict disciplinarian whose most 
conspicuous accessory was the stick, good both for walking and for beating misbehaving 
children. But, he also served a necessary purpose in a child’s upbringing. The pedagogue was 
responsible for protecting the children under his care on their way to and from school, both from 
                                                 
263 Lull, “‘The Law as Our Pedagogue’: A Study in Galatians 3:19-25.” 
264 For example, Gordon argues, “Although it is adequately established, for instance, that the παιδαγωγός fulfilled a 
tutorial or academic function in some households, that understanding does not make sense in this pauline context” 
(“A Note on ΠΑΙΔΑΓΩΓΟΣ in Galatians 3.24-25,” 152). It is unclear to me why an educational function should not 
fit the context. According to Young, “The presence of φρουρέω and συγκλείω in close conjunction makes it clear 
that Paul's main point—if not his only point—in the metaphor is not a matter of discipline, education, instruction or 
punishment, but of restriction. That is, that under the law Israel experienced a curtailment of freedom akin to the 
limitations imposed on a child by a pedagogue” (“Paidagogos: The Social Setting of a Pauline Metaphor,” 171). 
Young, whose article has much to offer, places a too restrictive view here, picking and choosing which associations 
with which to limit the Greek term. There are a number of problems here. First, if a term was commonly understood 
as x, y, and z together, the modern scholar cannot choose to simply dismiss those aspects which do not suit one’s 
argument. Second, the combination of φρουρέω and συγκλείω in the previous verse is not decisive; the connection 
to guardianship and confinement would well include matters of discipline, education, instruction, and punishment. 
And lastly, the idea that Paul’s explanation of the past relevance of the law in Gal. 3:1-5:1 should be restricted to 
only one, narrow contention is naïve and overly simplistic. Paul uses five unique metaphors in order to make his 
point: law as guard (3:23); law as pedagogue (3:24-25); law as steward and manager (4:1-2); law as stoicheia (4:3, 
8-9); and law as Hagar (4:21-5:1). There are commonalities among them all, but there are also unique elements in 
each. Paul is not just simply repeating the same argument over and again. Finally, see Karl Olav Sandnes, Challenge 
of Homer: School, Pagan Poets and Early Christianity (LNTS 400; London: T&T Clark, 2009), chapter 17, “The 
New Testament and Encyclical Studies,” 248-277 (esp. 259-262), who argues that, in general, there is no 
propaedeutic view of the law in Galatians. Sandnes’ argument, however, is primarily against some common 
traditional scholarship/theology which claimed that Paul’s view of the law here was as preparation for the Jews for 
Jesus and the Christian faith, which I, of course, am not arguing. 
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outside dangers and the inner impulses of the passions. Depending on the slave’s own literate 
education, he would also tutor the children in their lessons and sometimes even give primary 
instruction himself.265 However, even if the pedagogue did not actively take part in his ward’s 
literate education, he was typically the one in charge of the moral education of the child—
“paideia which leads one towards virtue (ἡ εἰς ἀρετὴν παιδεία)”—and the child’s character 
development.266 It is no surprise, then, that those same slaves described as vicious tyrants were 
also remembered fondly, with deep affection, and were often manumitted.267 
This type of ambiguity in description can often be found within the oeuvre of a single 
author, including Philo of Alexandria. Philo, likely drawing on his favorite philosophers, both 
past and contemporary, and his own personal experience, had mixed feelings about the 
pedagogue. In the same treatise, Philo can at once argue that nurses and pedagogues (τιτθαὶ καὶ 
παιδαγωγοὶ) help to foster “foolishness, intemperance, injustice, fear, cowardice, and the other 
ruinous things which are inborn (ἀφροσύνην ἀκολασίαν ἀδικίαν φόβον δειλίαν, τὰς ἄλλας 
συγγενεῖς κῆρας)” (Sacr. 15; cf. Her. 295), and later compare those who love the passions and 
hate right reason (ὀρθὸν λόγον) to foolish children who hate their “pedagogues and teachers, and 
every reproving and chastising word (τοὺς διδασκάλους καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς καὶ πάντα νουθετητὴν 
καὶ σωφρονιστὴν λόγον)” (Sacr. 51). Elsewhere, Philo claimed that anyone who lives their life 
without a pedagogue and teaching (ἀπαιδαγώγητον καὶ ἀδίδακτον) will be a slave forever to self-
conceit, appetites, pleasures, injustice, foolishness, and erroneous conceptions (Cher. 71).  Philo 
                                                 
265 See Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 34-46. 
266 In Plutarch’s discussion of whether virtue can be taught, he says of pedagogues: “For these are the first to receive 
the child once it has been weaned, and, just as nurses form its body with their hands, so the pedagogues, by the 
habits they instill, lead the child’s character towards the first step on the path to virtue (πρῶτοι γὰρ οὗτοι 
παραλαμβάνοντες ἐκ γάλακτος, ὥσπερ αἱ τίτθαι ταῖς χερσὶ τὸ σῶμα πλάττουσιν, οὕτω τὸ ἦθος ῥυθμίζουσι τοῖς 
ἔθεσιν, εἰς ἴχνος τι πρῶτον ἀρετῆς καθιστάντες)” (An virtus doceri possit 439f). See H. I. Marrou, A History of 
Education in Antiquity (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1956), 144; Lull, “‘The Law as Our Pedagogue’: A Study in 
Galatians 3:19-25,” 491.  
267 Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 41. 
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understood the necessity of pedagogues (παιδαγωγῶν), teachers (διδασκάλων), parents 
(γεννήσαντες), or guardians (ἐπιτρόπους), who would reprove and correct the errors of children, 
and that children who had pedagogues were better off than those who did not (ἀπαιδαγωγήτων) 
(Det. 145). Here we see that, in addition to teachers, nurses, and parents, Philo, like Paul, saw a 
connection between the pedagogue and the “guardian/steward” or ἐπίτροπος (Gal. 4:1-2; cf. 
Legat. 26). And, like Paul, Philo saw a connection between the pedagogue and the law: 
 
Philo, Migr. 116 
σωφρονιστῶν ὡς ἔοικε τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἔθος, παιδαγωγῶν, διδασκάλων, γονέων, 
πρεσβυτέρων, ἀρχόντων, νόμων· ὀνειδίζοντες γάρ, ἔστι δ᾽ ὅπου καὶ κολάζοντες ἕκαστοι 
τούτων ἀμείνους τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπεργάζονται τῶν παιδευομένων. 
 
This, as it would seem, is the custom of superintendents, and of pedagogues, and of 
teachers, and of parents, and of elders, and of rulers, and of laws; for they, at times, do 
each of them reprove and punish and render the souls of those being educated better. 
 
Philo, Legat. 115 
μόνους γὰρ Ἰουδαίους ὑπεβλέπετο, ὡς δὴ μόνους τἀναντία προῃρημένους καὶ 
δεδιδαγμένους ἐξ αὐτῶν τρόπον τινὰ σπαργάνων ὑπὸ γονέων καὶ παιδαγωγῶν καὶ 
ὑφηγητῶν καὶ πολὺ πρότερον τῶν ἱερῶν νόμων καὶ ἔτι τῶν ἀγράφων ἐθῶν ἕνα νομίζειν 
τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ κόσμου θεόν. 
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For he was suspicious of the Jews, as they alone cherished wishes opposed to his and had 
been taught from their very swaddling-clothes by their parents, and pedagogues, and 
instructors, and even before that by their holy laws, and also by their unwritten customs, 
to believe that there was but one God, the father and the creator of the world. 
 
Although Philo did not make a direct analogy between the law and the pedagogue, as Paul did, 
these examples do show that Paul was not alone in associating the Jewish law with the 
pedagogue, in a positive, educational context. In both of these passages, the pedagogue is 
connected to the law by the very fact that they both serve to educate children in virtue. 
 The evidence, from both Greco-Roman and Jewish sources, no matter how ambiguous 
they may be in their attitudes towards the pedagogue, is clear in the integral connection between 
the pedagogue and education. To dismiss this fundamental aspect of the pedagogue’s function in 
favor of solely highlighting other possible attributes, such as the slave’s oppression or protection 
of his charge, is to miss entirely Paul’s motivations for the analogy. In reality, we should try to 
understand the term, and from that the metaphor, as his original audience, many of whom no 
doubt having first-hand, daily interactions with pedagogues of various sorts, would have. 
Therefore, we must say that the pedagogue was a slave entrusted with a child’s protection and 
education; he could often seem quite oppressive, especially through the eyes of a child, though, 
in the end, he was often remembered with great fondness; and, he was a necessary, yet 
temporary, component of a child’s moral development into adulthood. This, all of this, is what 
Paul wanted his audience to understand about the role of the law for the Jewish people, and why 
he chose the pedagogue specifically in the metaphor as opposed to a didaskalos. In making the 
comparison, Paul asserts that the law had a necessary pedagogical and protective purpose at one 
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time for the Jews. Being under the law could be oppressive, but it was necessary for their 
security and development on the path towards wisdom and virtue. In this way it was an amazing 
gift that God gave to the Jewish people and no one else, but it had a shelf-life; it was never 
designed to be permanent. 
 Paul’s message has been consistent throughout the probatio section of the letter thus far: 
the law did have a positive, intended purpose for the Jewish people, but its purpose was not to 
provide justification of sins or Abraham’s inheritance. Like Philo’s encyclical paideia, Paul’s 
law had a necessary, educational role in the lives of the Jewish people. And, also like Philo’s 
encyclia, Paul’s law was necessarily temporary, thus the analogy to childhood, expressed 
poignantly by Philo who claimed that as an infant relates to an adult, so the preliminary studies 
relate to knowledge in virtue (τὰ ἐγκύκλια τῶν μαθημάτων πρὸς τὰς ἐν ἀρεταῖς ἐπιστήμας) 
(Sobr. 9), and by Paul’s argument of the law as pedagogue that leads to Christ and thus virtue (ὁ 
νόμος παιδαγωγὸς ἡμῶν γέγονεν εἰς Χριστόν). The glaring difference between Philo’s 
preliminary studies and Paul’s is that Philo gives the clear subordinate position to Greek paideia, 
which must, at some point, be abandoned; Paul gives the same place to Jewish paideia. 
 
Jesus Christ as Wisdom 
Paul’s first divergence from the Philonic interpretation of the Hagar/Sarah allegory concerned 
the Hagar side of the allegory—Jewish law as preliminary paideia as Hagar—, the second relates 
to Sarah. In Philo, Sarah represented loftier virtue and wisdom, the goal that the student 
Abraham sought and that necessitated the abandonment of the preliminary studies, Hagar, once 
attained. For Paul, this loftier virtue or wisdom has been found with the arrival and crucifixion of 
Jesus Christ. Christ has provided the goal for which the Mosaic law served as preparation for the 
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Jews. The law did have an essential purpose at one time, but that time has since passed. Those of 
faith are no longer infants but full-grown adults, and to go backwards is not an option. This move 
that Paul makes is seen repeatedly throughout his letters (e.g. Rom. 7:4; 10:4), and it is explicitly 
made in the argument leading up to the allegory. A key passage is 3:13-14: “Christ redeemed us 
from the curse of the law, becoming a curse for us . . . in order that the blessing of Abraham 
might come to the Gentiles, in order that we might receive the promise of the spirit through our 
faith.” Christ has released humanity from the need of preliminary education via the nomos. The 
goal to which the law was preparatory has now been freely given: “But when the fullness of time 
had come, God sent forth his son, born from woman, born under the law, in order that he might 
redeem those under the law, in order that we might receive adoption as sons. And because you 
are sons, God sent forth the spirit of his son into your hearts, crying out, ‘Abba! Father!’ So that 
you are no longer a slave but a son, and an heir through God” (4:4-7). Note that Paul is not 
arguing that Christ himself was the goal of the law, but that Christ has provided that to which the 
law was always meant to be preparatory, wisdom. This goal has now been freely given to those 
who have faith, both Jews and Gentiles; therefore, the law is no longer needed and, as we shall 
see, actually dangerous. 
 An association between wisdom and Jesus Christ from Paul is not surprising. Scholarly 
discussion on the topic has always centered on Paul’s christology and whether or not he had a 
“Wisdom christology.” However, these studies have often suffered from two major problems, the 
first methodological, the second conceptual. First, the assessment of Paul’s possible Wisdom 
christology has been based on insufficient and/or overly reductive views of the figure of Wisdom 
in Jewish sources, the development and diversity of which is extremely complex.268 The larger 
                                                 
268 For example, Dunn, like many others, tries to simplify this complex situation into a unified Jewish view on the 
figure of Wisdom: “In short, the Wisdom of God is not something other than God, but God’s wisdom, God in his 
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problem, however, lies with the question itself, which is anachronistic and assumes that Paul was 
a sort of systematic theologian. Modern scholars and theologians can argue about whether Paul 
had a Wisdom christology, or a Son of God christology, or an Adam christology, or a Kyrios 
christology. Paul would likely not have not understood the question. It would be most accurate to 
say that Paul did not have a christology at all, at least in our understanding of the concept. He 
had certain ideas about Jesus Christ as the messiah, ideas that varied and were not always 
consistent in terms of modern theological standards. But this, of course, is irrelevant to Paul’s 
actual world of thought. To argue that Paul had this or that type of christology is to distill down a 
complex set of ideas, each of which worked in different ways and towards different ends for 
Paul, into a simple concept, which obscures Paul’s actual understanding of Jesus Christ and the 
purpose of his letters. 
 While I will not argue that Paul had—or did not have—a Wisdom christology, it is clear 
that he often associated Jesus with Wisdom and described Jesus in ways that other Jews in the 
past had described Wisdom. The best evidence for this is found in his letters to the Corinthians. 
In 2 Cor. 4:4, 6, Paul describes Christ as being the “image of God (εἰκὼν τοῦ θεου)” and his face 
as shining with the “light of the knowledge of the glory of God (φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς 
δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ),” both of which recall the beautiful poem praising Wisdom in Wisd. 7, 
especially 7:25-26:  
                                                 
wisdom. . . . Wisdom was universally understood within early Judaism as God’s wisdom, as the immanent God in 
his wise engagement with his creation and his people” (Theology of Paul, 271-272) See also his Christology in the 
Making (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989), 163ff. While Dunn does believe that Paul had a wisdom 
christology, Gordon Fee disagrees. His disagreement is based, in part, on a problematic and limited understanding of 
the figure of Wisdom in the ancient Jewish literature, which, for Fee, does not include Philo of Alexandria! See 
Gordon D. Fee, “Wisdom Christology in Paul: A Dissenting View,” in The Way of Wisdom: Essays in Honor of 
Bruce K. Waltke (ed. J. I. Packer and Sven K. Soderlund; Grand Rapids; MI: Zondervan, 2000), 251-279. See also 
A. Van Roon, “The Relation between Christ and the Wisdom of  God According to Paul,” NT 16.3 (Jul., 1974): 207-
239. For a brief history of research, see Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest 
Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 118-126. 
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Wisd. 7:25-26 
ἀτμὶς γάρ ἐστιν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως 
καὶ ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινής·  
διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν μεμιαμμένον εἰς αὐτὴν παρεμπίπτει. 
ἀπαύγασμα γάρ ἐστιν φωτὸς ἀϊδίου  
καὶ ἔσοπτρον ἀκηλίδωτον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας  
καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ. 
 
For she is a breath of the power of God  
and a pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty;  
therefore, nothing defiled gains entrance into her.  
For she is a reflection of eternal light,  
a spotless mirror of the working of God,  
and an image of his goodness.269 
 
In 1 Cor. 10:4, Paul refers to the story of Moses striking the rock at Horeb, providing miraculous 
water for the people to drink (Ex. 17:6; Deut. 8:15), though in Paul’s version, the rock was 
Christ: “and everyone drank the same spiritual drink. For they drank from the spiritual rock that 
followed them, and the rock was Christ (καὶ πάντες τὸ αὐτὸ πνευματικὸν ἔπιον πόμα· ἔπινον γὰρ 
ἐκ πνευματικῆς ἀκολουθούσης πέτρας, ἡ πέτρα δὲ ἦν ὁ Χριστός.).” The connection here to 
Wisdom is obscured until we see that Philo, in his allegorical reading of the account, claims that 
                                                 
269 Cf. Philo, Leg. 1:43. 
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the rock was divine Wisdom herself: “for the abrupt rock is the Wisdom of God (ἡ γὰρ 
ἀκρότομος πέτρα ἡ σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστιν), which being both sublime and the first of things he 
quarried out of his own powers, and from which he gives drink to the souls that love God” (Leg. 
2:86). 1 Cor. 8:6 is one of the primary places where scholars have claimed Paul exhibits a 
preexistent Wisdom christology: “yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all 
things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and 
through whom we exist (ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῖν εἷς θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν, καὶ εἷς 
κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς δι᾽ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι᾽ αὐτου).” The verse recalls the role Wisdom 
had in creating the world found in Proverbs, Ben Sira, the Wisdom of Solomon, and throughout 
Philo’s corpus.270 
Elsewhere, Paul is even more explicit. In the first part of 1 Corinthians, he distinguishes 
worldly wisdom—which God actually made foolish (ἐμώρανεν)—with the wisdom of God: “My 
speech and my proclamation were not in persuasive words of wisdom, but in a demonstration of 
the spirit and of power, in order that your faith might not rest on human wisdom but on the 
power of God (δυνάμει θεοῦ)” (1 Cor. 2:4-5). This dunamis is God’s wisdom which is Christ, as 
Paul had just made clear: 
 
1 Cor. 1:24 
αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς κλητοῖς, Ἰουδαίοις τε καὶ Ἕλλησιν, Χριστὸν θεοῦ δύναμιν καὶ θεοῦ  
σοφίαν· 
 
                                                 
270 See even the similar language in Philo, Det. 54: πατέρα μὲν τὸν γεννήσαντα τὸν κόσμον, μητέρα δὲ τὴν σοφίαν, 
δι᾽ ἧς ἀπετελέσθη τὸ πᾶν. 
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But to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ is the power of God and the 
wisdom of God. 
 
1 Cor. 1:30 
 ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ ὑμεῖς ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ὃς ἐγενήθη σοφία ἡμῖν ἀπὸ θεοῦ, δικαιοσύνη τε  
καὶ ἁγιασμὸς καὶ ἀπολύτρωσις, 
 
But from him you exist in Christ Jesus, who became for us wisdom from God, and 
righteousness and holiness and redemption. 
 
Paul was clearly not averse to associating Christ with the figure of Wisdom when the 
comparison suited his needs. In 1 Corinthians, Paul sought to differentiate the wisdom of this 
world—which is not wisdom at all—with God’s wisdom, represented by Christ. In Galatians, we 
find a similar strategy: the Jewish law belongs to the wisdom of this world—along with the 
pedagogue, guardians/administrators, and the stoicheia—, but with Christ comes the wisdom of 
God. These mundane things are, thus, represented by Hagar in the allegory; the divine, by Sarah, 
just as Philo’s mundane encyclical paideia found representation in Hagar and loftier wisdom in 
Sarah. This does not mean that Paul was disparaging the law or Philo the preliminary studies. It 
simply shows that the law and the encyclia were subordinate to that goal of all philosophically 
oriented Jews, Greeks, and Romans: wisdom. 
 
4. THE DANGERS OF THE LAW 
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Philo repeatedly emphasized the inherent dangers of the encyclical studies, the pull they had on 
the student, and, therefore, the desperate need to abandon them once having risen to the higher 
level of wisdom. To remain in or return to the encyclia was to be mired in the sense-perceptible, 
the somatic, and the mundane. In Galatians, Paul similarly argues that an attachment to the 
Jewish law was critically dangerous once the goal of wisdom via Christ has been reached. 
 
Situation Post-Christ (Galatians 3:25-29) 
To this point, Paul has spent much of the probatio arguing against, what was to him, a mistaken 
understanding of the Jewish law and its purpose. In 3:1-12, he describes those things that the law 
cannot and, more importantly, was never intended to do, such as provide justification and the 
inheritance of Abraham. These gifts, so Paul tells us (3:13-18), were to be provided by the arrival 
and crucifixion of Jesus Christ. Instead, Paul explains that the true, divinely intended purpose of 
the law was for the protection and education of the Jewish people (3:19-24). In this line of 
argumentation, 3:25-29 then serves as a major transition:  
 
Gal. 3:25-29 
25  ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς πίστεως οὐκέτι ὑπὸ παιδαγωγόν ἐσμεν. 26  Πάντες γὰρ υἱοὶ θεοῦ ἐστε 
διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ· 27  ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, Χριστὸν 
ἐνεδύσασθε· 28  οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην, οὐκ ἔνι δοῦλος οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος, οὐκ ἔνι 
ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ· πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἷς ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. 29  εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς Χριστοῦ, ἄρα 
τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ σπέρμα ἐστέ, κατ᾽ ἐπαγγελίαν κληρονόμοι. 
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25 But now that the faith has come, we are no longer under a pedagogue; 26 for you are all 
sons of God through the faith in Christ Jesus. 27 For, as many of you as were baptized into 
Christ have put on Christ. 28 There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor 
free, there is not male and female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus. 29 And if you are 
Christ’s, then you are the offspring of Abraham, heirs according to a promise. 
 
Prior to this, when Paul discussed the intended educational purpose of the law, he referred to the 
situation of the Jews prior to Jesus Christ (the first-person plurals in 3:23-24). With the arrival of 
Christ (3:25), Paul’s language shifts in order to reflect his overtly stated belief that the situation 
of the world has shifted. He no longer refers solely to the condition of the Jews; his concern now 
is for the baptized community as a whole, Jews and Gentiles together, and his personal 
addresses—both first- and second-person plurals—throughout the remainder of the letter should 
be taken as such, beginning from 3:25 itself: “But now that the faith has come, our entire 
baptized community is no longer under a pedagogue.”  
 Paul, continuing his metaphor, claims that baptism in Christ and the entering of the 
community is akin to the transition of a child into adulthood.271 The adults—i.e. those of the 
community—have no need of the law and no need of distinctions. They are all now heirs of 
Abraham. 
 
Τὰ Στοιχεῖα τοῦ Κόσμου and the Danger of the Law Post-Christ (Galatians 4:1-10) 
                                                 
271 See J. Albert Harrill, “Coming of Age and Putting on Christ: The Toga Virilis Ceremony, Its Paraenesis, and 
Paul’s Interpretation of Baptism in Galatians,” NT 44.3 (Jul., 2002): 252-277. Harrill convincingly explains the 
curious idea in Gal. 3:27 that those have you have been baptized have “put on Christ” or “clothed themselves in 
Christ” in light of the Roman toga virilis ceremony, which marked the child’s transition into manhood and freedom 
from the pedagogue (see especially Plutarch, Mor. 37c-e and Suetonius, Divus Claudius 2.2).  
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Gal. 4:1-2 appears, at first glance, to be an aside, a simple parenthetical throwaway designed to 
explain his comment about the community being the heirs of Abraham in 3:29. However, Paul 
utilizes this small section of text to string together earlier elements of his argument with the 
important points to come:  
 
Gal. 4:1-2 
1  Λέγω δέ, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον χρόνον ὁ κληρονόμος νήπιός ἐστιν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει δούλου κύριος 
πάντων ὤν, 2  ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἐπιτρόπους ἐστὶν καὶ οἰκονόμους ἄχρι τῆς προθεσμίας τοῦ 
πατρός. 
 
1  Now what I’m saying is this: as long as an heir is a child, he is no different from a 
slave, though he may be lord of everything, 2  but he is under guardians and 
administrators until the time set by his father. 
 
The allusions to his argument concerning the law as the Jews’ pedagogue in 3:24 are clear. Like 
the pedagogue, the guardians and administrators serve a necessary, preparative function for the 
child heir, but they too are temporary and are no longer needed once the child reaches maturity. 
The hupo clause in 4:2 (ὑπὸ ἐπιτρόπους . . . καὶ οἰκονόμους) recalls the hupo clauses in 3:23 
(ὑπὸ νόμον) and 3:25 (ὑπὸ παιδαγωγόν). It is not surprising, then, that many scholars argue that, 
as with 3:23-24, the child heir must represent the Jews and the guardians/administrators the 
Jewish law.272 But, this is only partially correct. 
                                                 
272 As with the pedagogue analogy, scholars have often argued that with Gal. 4:1-2, Paul is arguing that the Jewish 
people were enslaved to the law. See, e.g., Betz, Galatians, 244; Esler, Galatians, 180; and Sanders, Paul, the Law, 
66. For a more positive view, see Dunn, The Theology of Paul, 142; and Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and 
the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 149. 
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 We saw that, in 3:25-29, Paul transitions from his discussion concerning the intended 
educational purpose of the law for the Jews prior to Christ to the situation post-Christ. His focus 
shifts from the Jews alone to all those part of the baptized community, Jews and Gentiles 
together. He does not return now to the discussion of the Jews alone but continues his concern 
for the community in toto. Yes, these lines should remind us of the Jews and the law prior to 
Christ, but they also foreshadow Paul’s wider concern for the community post-Christ. The first 
clue is the reference to the “heir” or κληρονόμος in 4:1, a term Paul had just used to describe the 
baptized community in 3:29. Second, the idea of the child heir as slave is telling, as Paul has not 
yet raised the issue of slavery, an issue that becomes crucial in verses to come. Despite attempts 
to prove otherwise, Paul’s pedagogue metaphor was in no way meant to depict the Jews as slaves 
to the law. Unlike the pedagogue metaphor, the child heir refers to the community as a whole. It 
was not the Jewish people alone who were to be the heirs of Abraham but all his offspring, all of 
humanity. The guardians/administrators would have intentionally conjured up different notions 
to the different members of the community; to the Jews surely they were understood as the 
Mosaic law. To what exactly they referred for the Gentile members is more difficult to say, but 
the next portion of text, which follows this same pattern, should help. 
 
Gal. 4:3-10 
3  οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὅτε ἦμεν νήπιοι, ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου ἤμεθα δεδουλωμένοι· 4  
ὅτε δὲ ἦλθεν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, γενόμενον ἐκ 
γυναικός, γενόμενον ὑπὸ νόμον, 5  ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον ἐξαγοράσῃ, ἵνα τὴν υἱοθεσίαν 
ἀπολάβωμεν. 6  Ὅτι δέ ἐστε υἱοί, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰς 
καρδίας ἡμῶν κρᾶζον· αββα ὁ πατήρ. 7  ὥστε οὐκέτι εἶ δοῦλος ἀλλὰ υἱός· εἰ δὲ υἱός, καὶ 
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κληρονόμος διὰ θεοῦ. 8  Ἀλλὰ τότε μὲν οὐκ εἰδότες θεὸν ἐδουλεύσατε τοῖς φύσει μὴ 
οὖσιν θεοῖς· 9  νῦν δὲ γνόντες θεόν, μᾶλλον δὲ γνωσθέντες ὑπὸ θεοῦ, πῶς ἐπιστρέφετε 
πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα οἷς πάλιν ἄνωθεν δουλεύειν θέλετε; 10  ἡμέρας 
παρατηρεῖσθε καὶ μῆνας καὶ καιροὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτούς. 
 
3 So too with us; while we were children, we were enslaved under the stoicheia of the 
world. 4 But when the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son, born of a woman, 
born under the law, 5 in order to redeem those under the law, so that we might receive 
adoption as children. 6 And because you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of his son into 
our hearts, crying, “Abba! Father!” 7 So that you are no longer a slave but a son, and if a 
son then also an heir through God. 8 Formerly, when you did not know God, you were 
enslaved to things which by nature are not gods. 9 Now, however, that you have come to 
know God, or rather to be known by God, how can you turn back again to the weak and 
beggarly stoicheia? How can you want to be enslaved to them again? 10 You are 
observing special days, and months, and seasons, and years! 
 
 This passage and to what specifically these stoicheia tou kosmou should refer has long 
been the topic of extensive scholarly discussion.273 The Greek term stoicheion has the basic 
meaning of a part of a larger whole or series and, in classical Greek literature, commonly refers 
to an element of language or music—e.g. a syllable, the initial sound of a word, a letter, a part of 
                                                 
273 For reviews of the pertinent secondary literature, see Gerhard Delling, “στοιχεῖον,” TDNT 7:670-687; David R. 
Bundrick, “Ta Stoicheia Tou Kosmou (Gal 4:3),” JETS 34/3 (September 1991): 353-364; and Martinus C. de Boer, 
“The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians,” NTS 53 (2007): 204-224. Bundrick sees three 
typical interpretations of the stoicheia in the scholarly literature: principial (i.e. rudimentary principles), 
cosmological (i.e. components of the cosmos), and personalized-cosmological (i.e. personalized powers or spiritual 
beings). 
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speech, a note, etc.—, an elementary or foundational principle, or one of the four basic elements 
that make up the universe and everything in it—earth, water, air, and fire. Wink argues that the 
Greek stoicheia was used in essentially the same way that we use the English “elements,” as 
referring to irreducible components, of what exactly being deduced from the specific context.274 
In order to understand Paul’s meaning here, four primary questions must be addressed: (1) To 
whom does ἡμεῖς refer in 4:3? (2) To what exactly should the stoicheia refer? (3) What is the 
significance that these stoicheia are tou kosmou? (4) Are the referents in 4:3—both the stoicheia 
and those enslaved to them—the same as those in 4:8-9? 
 Clearly, how one answers the first question directly affects the answer to the second. 
Most scholars now take the ἡμεῖς in 4:3 as referring solely to the Gentile members of the 
community, who, prior to their entry into the community, were enslaved to their pagan “gods,” 
the stoicheia taken to mean the four basic elements of the universe—i.e. tou kosmou—which had 
been elevated to divine status.275 Those who argue that 4:3 refers to the Gentiles, then argue the 
same for 4:8-9. Some have argued instead that the “we” of 4:3 should refer solely to the Jewish 
members of the community. Linda Belleville, for example, contends that the stoicheia in both 
4:3 and 4:9 must refer to “elementary or rudimentary principles” or “the regulatory principles of 
the world,” as they more certainly do in Col. 2:8, 20, where, importantly, they are also tou 
kosmou. However, she sees the first reference pertaining to pre-Christian Jewish life under the 
                                                 
274 Walter Wink, “The ‘Elements of the Universe’ in Biblical and Scientific Perspective,” Zygon: Journal of 
Religion and Science 13 (Sept. 1978): 225-248 (227). 
275 See Dunn, The Theology of Paul, 108, who notes, “The long debate about the reference of stoicheia should 
almost certainly be regarded as settled in favour of the elemental substances of which the cosmos was usually 
thought to be composed (earth, water, air, and fire). The point here is that these substances were also commonly 
divinized (mythologized or personified) as divine spirits or deities.” Cf. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 
554; and Betz, Galatians, 205. Note that though we do not have clear evidence of this meaning of stoicheia in 
classical Greek literature, we do find that both Philo (Vit. Cont. 3-5) and the author of the Wisdom of Solomon 
(7:17-19; 13:1-3) assumed worship or deification of the cosmic elements. This has been a favored understanding of 
the phrase in Galatians 4 since the early patristic period. 
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Mosaic law and the second to Gentile life under some other, unspecified set of regulatory 
rules.276 
 Burton too had argued for a principial reading of the stoicheia, but that, in both 4:3 and 
4:8-9, they should be applicable to both Jewish and Gentile Christians, the ἡμεῖς being inclusive 
of both. More specifically, following Tertullian’s interpretation, he claimed that these stoicheia 
are “the rudimentary religious teachings possessed by the race.”277 They are tou kosmou in order 
to signify that they belong to the world of humanity278 or, as Bundrick has it, “the stoicheia 
possessed by the peoples of the world.”279 
Recently, Martinus de Boer has sought a solution to the quandary that allows for both the 
inclusiveness found in Burton or Bundrick but with an understanding of the Greek terminology 
more consistent with contemporary usage. Following the work of Blinzler, Schweizer, and 
Rusam, de Boer confidently begins from the assumption that “the phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου 
                                                 
276 Linda L. Belleville, “‘Under Law’: Structural Analysis and the Pauline Concept of Law in Galatians 3.21-4.11,” 
JSNT 26 (1986): 53-78 (esp. 68-69). Cf. Sigurd Grindheim, “Not Salvation History, but Salvation Territory: The 
Main Subject Matter of Galatians,” NTS 59 (2013): 91-108. Gindheim, though differentiating the referents in 4:3 and 
4:8-9, sees a sort of conflation between the two: “Paul’s use of this phrase is the clearest example of his tendency to 
conflate the history of Israel and the history of the Galatians. In 4.3, he and his fellow Jews are enslaved under the 
elements, and in 4.9 he associates these same elements with the Galatians’ former life in idolatry. If the Galatians 
were to embrace circumcision, it would constitute a return to the very same elements to which they had been 
enslaved when they were pagans.” (99) As will be discussed next, this is an idea more fully developed by De Boer 
and Woyke. 
277 E. D. Burton, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians (New York: Scribner's, 
1928), 510-518 (518). Burton, however, qualified the comment with the following note: “If the fact that στοιχεῖα is 
rather infrequently used in the sense of elementary teachings while, the physical sense is very common, seems to 
necessitate understanding τὰ στ. τ. κ. as in some sense physical or related to the physical sense, the interpretation 
most consonant with the evidence would be to understand στ. in that loose and inclusive sense in which it is 
employed in Orac. Sib. as including both the physical constituents of the world, and the sky and stars. To the 
στοιχεῖα in this sense, the Jews might be said to be enslaved in the ordinances pertaining to physical matters, such as 
food and circumcision, and also as the context suggests in the observance of days fixed by the motions of the 
heavenly bodies, while the bondage of the Gentiles to them would be in their worship of material images and 
heavenly bodies. See also D. A. Black, “Weakness Language in Galatians,” GTJ 4 (Spring 1983): 15-36, who 
similarly claimed that the stoicheia are “the rudimentary teaching regarding rules, regulations, laws, and religious 
ordinances by means of which both Jews and Gentiles, each in their own way, tried to earn their salvation” (19). 
They are followed by Bundrick, “Ta Stoicheia Tou Kosmou,” 362. 
278 Burton, Galatians, 518. 
279 Bundrick, “Ta Stoicheia Tou Kosmou,” 362. 
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is a technical expression referring in the first instance to the four elements of the physical 
universe: earth, water, air, fire,” and that the Galatians would have understood the phrase 
immediately in this sense.280 These stoicheia were, additionally, the weak, impotent things, 
which are not gods by nature (4:8-9) but which the Galatians had at one point apparently 
worshiped as such. Using texts from Philo and the Wisdom of Solomon as support for the idea 
that at least some Jews conceived of Gentiles worshiping the elements of the universe, de Boer 
takes Paul’s use of the phrase ta stoicheia tou kosmou as a metonym for a wider complex of 
Galatian religious beliefs and practices centered on the four constituent elements.281 
Despite what is, to his mind, a clear referent, de Boer is not convinced that this meaning 
is adequate to Paul’s argument at this point in the text and that the phrase must have had some 
additional intended meaning. Pointing out that the phrase hupo nomon in 4:4-5 serves as an 
“apparent synonym” for the phrase hupo ta stoicheia tou kosmou and is meant to echo 3:25, 
where Paul argues that, with the arrival of Christ, the people are no longer hupo paidagōgon, de 
Boer understands Paul establishing a parallel between existence hupo stoicheia to that hupo 
nomon where a return to observance of the Jewish law is equivalent to a return to the worship of 
the stoicheia.282 This is the reason Paul decided to bring the stoicheia tou kosmou into the 
discussion at this point in his argument: “in Paul’s mind the observance of the Law and the 
veneration of the στοιχεῖα were in some sense functionally and thus also conceptually 
equivalent.”283 Paul, then, reinforces this equivalence in his deprecation of calendrical 
observances, using terminology that would apply to both Jewish and pagan festivals (4:10). In 
the end, according to de Boer, Paul argues that, with the coming of Christ and the gift of 
                                                 
280 “The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians,” 207-208. 
281 “The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians,” 220. 
282 “The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians,” 213-216. 
283 “The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians,” 215. 
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redemption through faith, enslavement to the stoicheia tou kosmou is no different from 
enslavement to the Jewish law, and that to turn to the Jewish law now would, in effect, return the 
Galatians to a time when they still worshipped the stoicheia.284 
Following the argument on the transitional nature of Gal. 3:25-29, where distinctions are 
now abolished, both within the baptized community and with regard to Paul’s personal addresses 
in the remainder of the letter, I agree with those who support an inclusive reading 4:3, with the 
ἡμεῖς referring to the community as a whole, Jews and Gentiles alike. Paul’s use of third-person 
in 4:5, “in order to redeem those under the law,” when he had previously used the first-person 
plural when describing the Jews relationship to the law (3:13, 23-24), substantiates this 
interpretation. The hupo preposition, as with 4:2, should recall the hupo clauses of 3:23 and 3:25, 
but it is not directly parallel. The people “under the stoicheia” need not be the Jewish people 
alone, and the stoicheia need not refer to the Jewish law alone. Paul’s rhetoric is more complex 
and nuanced; he not only permits the ambiguity of the Greek terminology to stand on its own, 
not providing any definitive qualifiers, but he actually uses the ambiguity to his advantage, 
                                                 
284 Johannes Woyke, “Nochmals zu den ‘schwachen und unfähigen Elementen’ (Gal 4.9): Paulus, Philo und die 
στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου,” NTS 54 (2008): 221-234, in this article from a year later, Woyke takes up de Boer’s work, 
attempting to better understand how Paul could conceptually equate observance of the Jewish law with pagan 
worship of the stoicheia. In this, Woyke sees the depiction of the stoicheia in Gal. 4:9 as “weak and impotent” 
particularly enlightening and comes to understand this impotence as the inability of the stoicheia to overcome the 
passions and desires of the flesh. Woyke finds help in Philo’s allegorical reading of Gen. 15, found primarily in his 
treatise Quis rerum divinarum heres sit (Her.), where Philo asks whether an individual who is dependent on the 
body and the sense-perceptible is capable of inheriting incorporeal and divine things (Her. 63). In order to become 
heir of the spiritual, Abraham had to abandon his ties to the earthly and to the flesh, symbolized by his former 
Chaldean home and his former gods, and instead focus on the noetic and incorporeal. While in Her. 274, Philo 
makes clear that the mind, which must reside in the body, requires encyclical education in order to return back to its 
original, desired state as pure soul or mind, Woyke here assumes that this “Tugenbildung” is exemplified in the 
Mosaic law (229), setting up a clear distinction between, on the one hand, Philo’s dichotomy between the stoicheia 
of Abraham’s Chaldean past and the nomos which allows Abraham to become the true heir and, on the other, Paul’s 
equivalence between the Jewish nomos and the pagan stoicheia. Paul, for Woyke, understands both the nomos and 
the stoicheia as relegated to the earthly and fleshly and imbued, therefore, in sin. Philo’s reading of Gen. 15:15 in 
Her. 277-279, Woyke finds so analogous in Paul’s argument of returning to the stoicheia, that he posits the 
possibility that Paul was facing opponents in Galatia with knowledge of this Jewish-Hellenistic interpretation (233). 
250 
 
intending a dual referent for his mixed audience of believers, a notion most closely hinted at in 
de Boer’s article. 
While de Boer makes the case that only with the calendrical observances does Paul’s 
reference to the veneration of the stoicheia serve fully as an actual equivalent to the observance 
of the law,285 I would argue that Paul’s reference to the stoicheia itself was intended to be 
simultaneously understood as both the elements that comprise the universe and the elements that 
comprise the Torah. Paul is purposefully drawing on the ambiguous understanding of the Greek 
term stoicheion, which, as we saw, could regularly refer to either an element of the cosmos or to 
an element of language, most telling in the case of Paul, to a letter or γράμμα. While technically 
the stoicheia were to be distinguished from the grammati, in many classical authors, they appear 
as virtual synonyms.286 It is this common usage of stoicheia as grammati that Paul expects his 
readers to understand as the second referent in Gal. 4:3 and 4:9, and, in this way, we are 
reminded of Paul’s typical antithesis between the letter of the law and the spirit, particularly after 
the death of Christ: “For, while we were in the flesh, the sinful desires, which come via the law, 
were at work in our limbs to bear fruit for death. But now we have been released from the law, 
having died to that which we were bound, so that we are slaves (δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς) in the newness 
of the spirit, not in the oldness of the letter (γράμματος)” (Rom. 7:5-6; cf. Rom. 2:27-29; 2 Cor. 
3:5-8). Just as the people were enslaved to the stoicheia tou kosmou prior to Christ, so too were 
they enslaved to the letter of the law. In Gal. 4:3, Paul chose the term stoicheia over the near 
equivalent grammati, so that he could make the passage relevant to the Gentiles as well as the 
Jews: as the Gentiles were enslaved to their elemental deities, the Jews were enslaved to the 
                                                 
285 “The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians,” 222-223. 
286 See, e.g., Plato, Theaetetus 202e-203a. Philo often uses the term to refer either to individual vowels or to letters 
in general (Opif. 126; Sacr. 74; Agr. 136; Her. 282; Cong. 150; Leg. 1.14; 3.121.). See the discussion in LSJ, 
στοιχεῖον, II.1. 
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precepts of the Torah. The conceptual equivalence, as argued by de Boer, between the pagan 
religiosity and Jewish Torah practice becomes even clearer if we read the stoicheia as referring 
to religious and/or cultural foundations fundamental to both Gentiles and Jews, especially after 
the arrival of Christ. His addition of tou kosmou serves to highlight the human, created, and 
temporary nature of the stoicheia in opposition to the divine and eternal nature of the spirit now 
possessed by the members of the community. 
Paul continues the imagery of slavery to the stoicheia in Gal. 4:8-9: “Formerly, when you 
did not know God, you were enslaved to things which by nature are not gods. Now, however, 
that you have come to know God, or rather to be known by God, how can you turn back again to 
the weak and beggarly stoicheia? How can you want to be enslaved to them again?” While this 
language may seem excessive to describe the Mosaic law, it comes to make sense in the context 
of the law originally intended as paideia preliminary to wisdom and unnecessary or even 
dangerous once that wisdom is achieved. Just as the Gentiles served the elements as if they were 
actually deities, the Jews served the elements of the law as if they were themselves gods, and 
now that Christ has come and, with him, the desired goal of wisdom, the elements of the law are 
just as weak and ineffectual for the believers as the cosmic elements were to the Gentiles. Just as 
Abraham had to abandon his beloved Hagar—and encyclical studies—so those who have been 
baptized into Christ must leave the law behind.  
Paul’s purpose in 4:1-10 and the complicated yet effective rhetorical structure he 
developed is directly tied to that crucial line from the start of his argument, “Are you so foolish, 
that, having begun in the spirit, you now would finish in the flesh?!” This same incredulity is 
found in 4:9-10, with Paul amazed at the illogicality of the Galatians, and it leads to his personal 
plea in 4:11-20, a digression before he completes his argument with the allegory of Hagar and 
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Sarah. The rhetorical nature of the digression is signaled immediately with the first-person verbs 
φοβοῦμαι and κεκοπίακα: “I fear for you, that I may have labored for you in vain” (4:11). These 
verbs are echoed at the conclusion of the digression: “My children, for whom I am again in the 
pain of childbirth (ὠδίνω) until Christ is formed in you, I wish I could be with you now and that I 
could change my tone, for I am perplexed by you / for I have a difficult question for you 
(ἀποροῦμαι)” (4:19-20). While both of these meanings are possible for the verb ἀπορέω, with the 
first translation the more common and the one universally used by commentators, the second fits 
well within the context of the passage and leads more naturally to the question Paul immediately 
raises.287 Regardless of the meaning intended, the language of the verses clearly signals that he is 
going to take up his argument anew, this time utilizing a different tactic. 
 
5. THE ALLEGORY AND ITS PURPOSE 
With the allegorical reading of the Hagar and Sarah narrative, Paul makes his final defense, 
concisely highlighting the major pieces of his argument to this point: the intended purpose of the 
law, the need to abandon the law post-Christ, and the dangers of not doing so. When we arrive at 
the allegory and the closing of the letter’s argumentative center, we sense Paul’s desperation in 
the face of what must have been a persuasive counter-argument. He immediately alerts his 
readers that he will take on the problem of adherence to the law within the community from a 
new angle, as if sensing that his previous metaphors and analogies had not quite landed. He tells 
his readers that if they are apparently so desirous of being under the law (ὑπὸ νόμον), they must 
understand what the law itself actually says (about being under it) (4:21). But, he is not going to 
                                                 
287 See LSJ, ἀπορ-έω, (B) 1., for the first meaning, and (B) 2., for the second, where it is used prominently in 
dialectic. 
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simply use the Mosaic law as a source of proof texts, as is his wont. Instead, he informs his 
readers that he will exegete the law in a non-literal manner, explicitly stating that the referenced 
passages from Genesis (Gal. 4:22-23) were originally spoken of or written allegorically (4:24),288 
something that he does nowhere else. Paul’s final argument for abandoning the law will come via 
the law itself, but he makes clear that it is through the properly understood meaning of the law, 
not the plain, literal meaning. The unequivocal reference to Moses’ intended allegorical meaning 
of the text alerts his audience to, one, the mistaken understanding of the text espoused by the 
trouble-makers who have attempted to distort the gospel of Christ (1:7), and, two, an allegorical 
understanding of the narrative of which they may have already been aware, namely, an 
exegetical tradition akin to Philo’s reading, the only other allegorical interpretation of Hagar and 
Sarah we know of to this point.289 
 One could imagine a scenario in which Paul’s opponents in Galatia used the story of 
Abraham, Hagar, Sarah, and their children in support of their own agenda.290 They hoped to 
                                                 
288 I prefer to understand Paul’s phrase ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα as meaning “these things are spoken of 
allegorically,” as opposed to “interpreted allegorically,” as many commentators have it. While the difference may 
seem slight—for if something is spoken of allegorically then it must, out of necessity, be interpreted that way—there 
is a crucial nuance missed if this participle is not properly understood. Paul is not simply saying that he plans on 
giving his own, allegorical, interpretation of the Genesis passages. He is affirming that when Moses wrote these 
passages, he specifically wrote them allegorically, with the intended meaning which Paul wants to explain. The 
difference lies in the authority given to the interpretation. One is your own; the other is Moses’ original meaning that 
you are bringing to light. 
289 Castelli points out the importance of a common base between author and reader when dealing with allegory: “It is 
crucial that the interpreter and the reader share some common understanding about the elements of the allegory. In 
other words, allegory presumes a kind of pre-existing, if not absolute, consensus between writer and reader.” E. A. 
Castelli, “Allegories of Hagar: Reading Galatians 4.21-31 with Postmodern Feminist Eyes,” in The New Literary 
Criticism and the New Testament (ed. E. Struthers Malbon and E. V. McKnight; JSNTS 109; Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1994), 228-250 (231). See also, C. H. Cosgrove, “The Law Has Given Sarah No Children (Gal. 
4:21-30)” NT 29.3 (Jul., 1987): 219-235, who asserts that the allegorical interpreter “would make points via 
allegorical exegesis with which his audience was already in sympathy” (220). On the other side of the coin, is Punt, 
who sees allegory as often have a “counter-conventional force, which Paul applied with great effect in Gal 4.” 
Jeremy Punt, “Revealing Rereading. Part 1: Pauline Allegory in Galatians 4:21-5:1,” Neotestamentica 40.1 (2006): 
87-100 (87), and “Revealing Rereading. Part 2: Paul and the Wives of the Father of Faith in Galatians 4:21-5:1,” 
Neotestamentica 40.1 (2006): 101-118. In this view of allegory, Punt is following David Dawson, Allegorical 
Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992). 
290 I am following Barrett’s lead here. See note 3. 
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convince the community that it was necessary to hold to the Mosaic law in its entirety. They 
used, therefore, a more literal exegesis of the narrative to support their argument: they are the 
ethnic heirs to the covenant made with Abraham by means of circumcision; if anyone hopes to 
be heirs as well, they must be circumcised and follow the precepts of the Torah. Given Paul’s 
vehement stance in the letter, this argument was obviously quite persuasive to some of the 
Galatians. Paul then responds to this move by telling his audience that the text is not meant to be 
taken literally but allegorically, as Moses intended. Hagar does not represent the uncircumcised, 
but preliminary paideia in the form of the Jewish law; Sarah does not represent followers of the 
law but wisdom and virtue through faith in Jesus Christ, which provided justification and the true 
inheritance of Abraham.  
Paul’s discrepancies from the allegorical tradition—Mosaic law as preliminary studies 
and wisdom via Christ freely given to those of faith—are reinforced with a contrast between the 
“slave woman” and the “free woman,” a point that Philo did not exploit in his exegesis. While, in 
Paul’s reading, Sarah represents the heavenly Jerusalem, the mother of the true heirs, the promise 
made to Abraham, the spirit, and freedom (4:26, 28-29, 31), Hagar symbolizes Mt. Sinai—a not 
opaque reference to the law—, the mundane Jerusalem, the flesh, and the mother of slaves who 
will not inherit (4:25, 29-31). Paul emphasizes Hagar’s connection to slavery in order to 
demonstrate to the Galatians the mistake of becoming again enslaved to the stoicheia of the 
Jewish paideia now that the goal of Sarah, freedom, has been attained. 
This dichotomy is extended to the contrast between Ishmael and Isaac. For Philo, 
Ishmael, as the offspring of the somatic connection between Abraham and Hagar, was the heir 
and representative of sophistry, while Isaac, the offspring of the noetic union between Abraham 
and Sarah, was heir to wisdom. Paul draws a similar contrast, using his typical language of flesh 
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and spirit compared to Philo’s normal opposition of body and soul/mind. Ishmael, “born 
according to flesh” (4:23), was born into slavery to the Mosaic paideia, being, in essence, a 
sophist, slavishly devoted to the letter—or stoicheion—of the law. Isaac was born “through a 
promise” (4:23), that is, through Sarah, and therefore born into freedom and wisdom and as 
Abraham’s true heir. As we saw, God did not give the inheritance through the law (i.e. Hagar), 
“but God freely gave it to Abraham through a promise” (3:18).  
Philo tells us that one reason Ishmael was banished with his mother was “because he, 
being illegitimate, was mocking the legitimate son, as though he were on terms of equality with 
him” (Sobr. 8). For Paul, Ishmael was banished because “the one born according to the flesh 
persecuted the one born according to the spirit” (4:29). Paul’s opponents in Galatia—the children 
of Hagar, the devotees of the law—are persecuting Paul and the Galatian communities—“the 
children of the promise like Isaac” (4:28). The connection between the baptized and Isaac is 
telling. Not only was Isaac Sarah’s son and Abraham’s heir and thus represented the pneumatic 
union between Abraham and Sarah, while Ishmael represented the dangers of the sarkic desires 
of preliminary paideia, but Paul may also be betraying knowledge of Philo’s view of Isaac as the 
representative of the “self-taught race (αὐτομαθὲς γένος),” those who have no need of 
preliminary instruction in order to attain wisdom: 
 
But these men were husbands of many wives and concubines, not only those who were 
citizens, as the sacred scriptures tell us. But Isaac had neither many wives nor any 
concubine at all, but only his first and wedded wife, who lived with him all his life. Why 
was this? Because the virtue which is acquired by teaching (ἡ διδακτικὴ ἀρετη), which 
Abraham pursues, requires many things, both contemplations legitimate according to 
256 
 
prudence and those which are illegitimate according to the encyclical, preliminary studies 
(τὰ ἐγκύκλια προπαιδεύματα). . . . But the self-taught race (αὐτομαθὲς γένος), of which 
Isaac was a partaker, the greatest joy of good things, has received as its share a nature 
simple, unmixed, and pure, standing in need of neither training nor instruction, in which 
there is need of the concubine sciences and not only of the citizen wives. For, when God 
had showered down from above the noble self-learned and self-taught, it would have 
been impossible to continue to live with the slavish and concubine arts, desiring 
illegitimate doctrines as if children. (Cong. 34-36) 
 
Here we find both Abraham as an example of one who needed paideia to attain loftier wisdom 
and Isaac as one who is freely given wisdom, with no need of external instruction or training. 
Paul is, in essence, telling the community that they are like Isaac because they no longer need 
preparatory instruction in order to attain the promise. They’ve already received it because of 
their faith. The ends to which the law was the divinely intended means have been achieved, 
making the law now unnecessary. 
 Paul ends his allegorical interpretation and the central argumentative section of the letter 
in the very same way he began the probatio, “For freedom Christ has set us free. Therefore, 
stand firm and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery” (5:1), echoing, once again, that key 
verse, 3:3, “Are you so foolish that, having begun in the spirit you will now finish in the flesh?” 
Philo would have made the same argument with respect to Greek paideia. For the self-taught 
Isaac, who begins with wisdom, to become enamored of the encyclical studies and move 
backwards to a time of childhood is an absurd and contrary notion. 
 
257 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
By viewing Paul’s chief argument in his letter as a whole, of which the allegory is an essential 
part, and not looking at 4:21-5:1 in isolation from what surrounds it, we see that Paul is 
consistent and coherent in his message, and he displays a level of rhetorical sophistication not 
typically associated with the apostle to the Gentiles. Philo made the connection between Hagar 
and Greek paideia in order to both encourage his audience to take up the encyclical studies and 
to warn them of their dangers. Paul makes the connection between Hagar and Jewish paideia in 
order to explain the role the law had played for the Jews and to warn his audience of the danger 
of taking it up post-Christ. Unlike Philo, Paul does not encourage those in the community to take 
up the Mosaic law as paideia, because a new means of attaining Abraham’s inheritance has been 
found in the messiah’s justifying death and the baptized believer’s faith.  
 The implications of Paul’s allegorical reading in Galatians are clearly widespread, 
especially in what it may add to the scholarly discussion of Paul and the Jewish law, the makeup 
of the communities he founded, and the place of Paul within the wider realm of Second Temple 
Judaism. While the more modern schools of Pauline studies are to be credited with having a 
better, though by no means full, understanding of Judaism at the time of Paul, despite those 
scholars who maintain, rightly, that Judaism was not some form of stringent legalism, almost 
every scholar, when attempting to understand Paul’s place within that Judaism, nevertheless 
relies solely on Paul’s view of the Jewish law. Depending on the particular author’s 
interpretation of Paul’s view of the law, Paul either was divorced from Judaism (i.e. no longer 
saw the law as necessary for Christ believers) or was fully part of Judaism (i.e. he was Torah 
observant). Given our modern understanding of Second Temple Judaism, with its almost endless 
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diversity, it’s regrettable that the discussion of Paul within Judaism takes place exclusively over 
how he related to the law. 
While Paul does make the rather drastic move of equating the Mosaic law with Philo’s 
preliminary paideia, something that should be discarded once the goal of wisdom is attained, this 
does not mean that Paul thought of the law in essentially negative terms. Paul never, here or 
elsewhere, tells us that the law itself is bad or opposed to human will. It’s one’s overzealous 
devotion to the letter of the law, mistaking the created for the creator, which becomes 
problematic, especially given Paul’s addition of Christ into the equation. For Paul, as for Philo, 
the Mosaic Torah was a means to an end. Paul’s divergence comes when he suggests that the 
means are no longer needed once the end is achieved. 
This reading, then, of the allegory and the Letter to the Galatians as a whole, understands 
a Paul who called for the abandonment of the Jewish law within the baptized community, for 
both Jews and Gentiles. Note that Paul’s focus here is within the community. He is not arguing, 
at least not here, for the abrogation of the law for all Jews, only for those who have been 
baptized into Christ. Now, whether or not he believed that all of humanity—Jews included—
were guilty of sin and therefore needed the justification that only faith in Christ could provide, is 
another question and one not raised here. Paul’s focus in Galatians is on the community of 
believers, who, seemingly inclusive of himself, must no longer strictly hold to the precepts of the 
Torah.
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Summary and Conclusions 
As Plato in his Republic or Aristotle in his Politics well knew, education is a key component in 
the complex, multi-faceted formation of identity, both of the self and of the collective. Isocrates’ 
assertion that it was paideia which actually made one Greek rather than a shared genetics or 
ethnicity (Panegyricus 50) would serve as the basis for the spread of Greek education in the 
Hellenistic and Roman periods.291 Plato’s understanding of paideia as conversion in this respect 
is telling. Education has the power to convert the soul, to direct one to see that which truly exists 
rather than mere shadows dancing on the walls of a cave (Republic 514-518). The reorientation 
of the soul reflects the reshaping of the self. 
 According to Erich Gruen, “The fashioning and refashioning of identity constitutes a 
staple item in Jewish history. The matter took on particular urgency in an age when Hellenic 
power and Greek culture held sway in the Near East.”292 The process of identity formation is 
complex and often amorphous, and it occurs on a multitude of levels, involving every aspect of 
ethics, culture, and overall worldview. Discussions of education can provide the ideal vantage 
points from which to observe this process in action, as ideal education reflects those values most 
highly prized and necessary for the individual and within a community. As with Plato or 
Aristotle or Isocrates, discussions of paideia provided Philo, the author of the Wisdom of 
                                                 
291 On the connection between education and civic identity formation in Isocrates, see Yun Lee Too, The Rhetoric of 
Identity in Isocrates: Text, Power, Pedagogy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
292 Erich S. Gruen, Heritage and Hellenism: The Reinvention of Jewish Tradition” (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998), 292. Gruen demonstrates how this identity fashioning could occur through creative 
retellings of such integral stories as the Exodus or the Joseph narratives. 
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Solomon, and Paul a means to contemplate the individual and the individual’s place within the 
collective, and these discussions allow the modern reader unique insight into the shaping of 
identity in process. 
 Our three authors all used and revered the Greek Septuagint texts as the holy, received 
traditions of Moses and the prophets. The Septuagint and its translation of paideia for the 
Hebrew musar fostered the development of their unique educational theories. The Septuagint 
came to serve as a lens through which later authors could reimagine and merge their ancestral 
traditions together with Greek philosophical influences and thereby construct images of paideia 
ideally suited to their own specific aims and audiences, images which reflect their individual 
shaping of the self and collective Jewish identity. The very inclusion of paideia in the Greek 
translations provided these Jewish thinkers with their own internal, historical discussions of the 
fundamental concept, allowing them to enter into wider Greek and Roman conversations 
concerning the ideal nature, role, and significance of paideia. And the expanded semantic range 
of the Greek terminology found in the Pentateuch and prophetic literature opened up new 
possibilities for integrating the Jewish God and questions of theodicy into the overall education 
of the individual. With the Septuagint, paideia became both Greek and Jewish. 
 We find the incorporation of paideia into the Jewish ancestral traditions nowhere more 
important and central than in the writings of Philo of Alexandria. Questions of paideia are found 
throughout his work, whether explicitly or lurking in the background, and Philo’s overall 
conception of paideia is foundational in determining the complexities of his worldview. Philo’s 
idealized educational program includes the curricula of Greek encyclical paideia, training in 
philosophy, and both the practice and study of the laws of Moses. The value of education is 
beyond compare. Education provides the means to combat the irrational passions, a life properly 
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balanced between the active and the contemplative, access to virtue and wisdom, and the 
preparation of the soul for its future immortal life. These benefits are available to all of humanity 
through education; Philo’s outlook here is decidedly global. Philo never sets up any sort of Greek 
education versus Jewish education antagonism. It is rare that he even designates encyclical 
paideia as specifically Greek, though it assuredly was. Instead of being at odds, Greek and 
Jewish forms of education appear to work together, and both were required for the vast majority 
of people. Philo’s example here of a true Jewish/Greek, religious/secular, native/foreign 
educational system would prove critical in the history of modern Western education, influencing 
heavily the early Christians, to whom credit is typically given for developing this synthesis and 
thereby carrying Greek education into modernity. It is true that Philo urged caution when it came 
to the preliminary studies and argued that they must be abandoned at a certain point, but in this 
he was no different from contemporary non-Jewish philosophers. And it is true that the Mosaic 
law held a unique and prominent place within Philo’s ideal education, but in the law’s true 
educational content and aims, there is a decidedly cosmic perspective. The Jews are unique in 
possessing an incomparable teacher in Moses and the best possible textbook in his law. The 
Mosaic law, in Philo’s hands, is not a particular, ethnocentric code of conduct, but rather the 
guide to becoming a true citizen of the world, living according to the universal cosmic law, of 
which the Jewish law is a reflection. Mosaic paideia aims at the same truths as Greek 
philosophy; it just does it better. Because followers of the innate natural law serve as exemplars 
of wisdom and virtue throughout history and throughout the world, those who follow the Mosaic 
law too must serve as models or, in Philo’s terms, priests for the rest of humankind. 
 We find a similar universalist view of paideia in the Wisdom of Solomon. This text, 
contemporary to Philo, is addressed to the kings of the earth, who are called upon to take up the 
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author’s paideia, gain wisdom, and attain immortality, and the author goes out of his way to 
erase the distinctions between Jews and Gentiles, even in the particular history of the Jewish 
people, which the author reshapes in order to illustrate the division not between Jews and 
Gentiles, but between the righteous and the impious, the educated and the ignorant. As in Philo, 
education is responsible for the greatest possible goods. However, the necessary pedagogy 
described in the Wisdom of Solomon is in stark contrast to Philo’s forms. While Philo would 
argue that the rod is better viewed as a symbol of paideia, which is able to beat back desire and 
irrational passion, rather than a cane used to beat children at their lessons, the author of the 
Wisdom of Solomon, utilizing the extended meaning of paideia found in the Greek prophetic 
literature, would make violent punishment an integral part of humanity’s education. All manner 
of suffering in this world is reimagined as divine discipline and testing, including even the death 
of the body. Corporeal existence is portrayed as nothing more than an agōn, a testing ground 
where God determines who is worthy of the only life that truly matters, the immortal life of the 
soul. This more pessimistic view of the world seems to reflect the author’s contemplations on 
theodicy and his solution to, perhaps very real, experiences of suffering. And all of this is played 
out in his discussion of ideal education. 
 Paul offers us a unique view in his Letter to the Galatians, as, unlike the other two 
authors, Paul espouses a messianic, apocalyptic worldview and a firm belief in the immediacy of 
the eschaton, and these core values are reflected in his view of the temporary educational value 
of the Jewish law. Paul’s view of the law prior to the arrival of Christ would have matched well 
Philo’s: the law of Moses was the preeminent educational resource of the Jews which allowed 
them to combat sin and desire and was preparatory to wisdom. But, with Christ came this 
wisdom, now freely given to those in the community, relegating the law to the past. The series of 
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metaphors Paul uses throughout the central argumentative portion of the letter, culminating in his 
allegorical reading of the Sarah/Hagar narrative, highlight the once necessary but ultimately 
temporary role of the law for the community of believers. Philo would argue that with Hagar and 
Sarah, Moses intended to teach about the difference between encyclical paideia and wisdom or 
virtue and the need to abandon the preliminary studies once moving on to wisdom. Paul, instead, 
places the Jewish law in the preliminary and temporary role. With the removal of the law comes 
the eradication of distinctions in the community, where issues of race or ethnicity have no 
bearing in the preparation of the soul for the coming end of the world. 
 This study on the conceptions of paideia from Philo, the Wisdom of Solomon, and Paul 
makes clear just how problematic the lack of critical study to date on education and educational 
theory in the Second Temple period has been, as a study of education and the ways in which 
authors discussed education provides insight into far more than details of curriculum or 
pedagogy. Through discussions of an idealized education—including such questions as the forms 
it should take, the value it offered, who had access, etc.—ancient thinkers were able to 
contemplate on those aspects most fundamental to the shaping of individual and collective 
identity.  
 While there are many facets of Second Temple education that remain to be explored, the 
example I have set forth here forms a solid basis on which to build not only a comprehensive 
portrayal of Jewish education during the period, but also one that is critically situated and driven 
by the extant sources rather than anachronistic or unnecessary models. One of the principal 
results of the epic strides made in Second Temple research of the last century is the 
acknowledgment of the vast diversity of thought and practice during the period and, with that, 
the scholarly acquiescence to foregoing the search for a type of “common” or “normative” 
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Judaism. We must now accept the idea that Jewish education too was incredibly diverse and the 
goal of finding a common form of Jewish education is ultimately fruitless. A clear, unbiased 
examination of the sources, as demonstrated here, reveals the multiplicity of unique conceptions 
and theories of ideal Jewish paideia, which reflect an equally diverse range of views on Jewish 
identity. 
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